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Introduction 
 
 
 
“The language – and therefore also to some large degree the practice – of 
morality today is in great disorder,”1 Alasdair MacIntyre writes, and as long 
as our moral world is diverse and pluralistic, the confusion will not be easily 
overcome. Indeed, the legal world is daily confronted with conflicts that result 
at least in part from the moral confusion that has become our modern fate. 
Legal institutions and practices are inevitably involved in all sorts of struggles 
because they have an important function in dealing with conflict as a basic 
fact of life. We may even say, with Stuart Hampshire, that justice is conflict 
and that the law mitigates and transforms conflicts such that they need not 
escalate into uncontrollable violence and can somehow be settled or otherwise 
discharged.2 Indeed, legal professionals daily live and work in a world of 
confusion and conflict; dealing with conflict is what they specialize in and 
thus we might think of them as “connoisseurs of order” in a society that 
constantly threatens to disintegrate into chaos and disorder. 
However, now that the institutional organization and functioning of the 
judiciary is the object of political and public debates, confusion and conflict 
seem to strike at the heart of the legal world itself. We witness a growing 
critical interest in the judiciary coupled with a demand for both 
“transparency” and “efficiency,” which has already resulted in several 
institutional reforms and which has produced many more plans and 
                                           
1 MacIntyre, A., After Virtue, University of Notre Dame Press Notre Dame Indiana second 
edition 1984, p. 256. 
2 Hampshire, S., Justice is Conflict, Princeton University Press Princeton NJ 2000. 
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discussions about further measures.3 Such debates necessarily touch upon the 
“essence” of adjudication and therefore both in and outside the legal world 
they are followed with a dubious eye. These discussions concern the 
professional identity not only of the judges, but also of the other legal 
professionals – notaries, advocates and public attorneys – who have important 
roles in the adjudication, mitigation and prevention of social conflict and 
strife. The reforms of the judiciary and the (political) goals and values behind 
these reforms also indirectly involve the place and role in the community of 
these other professionals.  
But they are also more directly involved. In the Netherlands notaries are 
confronted with institutional experimentation and reforms; advocates are 
challenged by differentiation and the onslaught of the commercialization of 
advocacy is a matter of concern for many in society at large – as is the 
politicization and bureaucratization experienced by public attorneys. It is 
highly probable that those involved experience these changes in an 
“existential” sense. That is, they touch upon their professional identity, upon 
what, at bottom, it means to be a judge, a notary, an advocate or a public 
attorney. 
Not only the legal professions face a changing world. Professional ethics 
in general has become “one of the topics of present time.”4 Some see the 
promise of professionalism as a last vestige of moral obligation and practical 
wisdom. Others are more critical of the “culture of professionalism” and 
regard professional solidarity as self-serving and elitist. Every profession is a 
conspiracy against the laity, Shaw famously wrote,5 and we are undoubtedly 
witnessing a growing critical attitude towards both doctors and lawyers. This 
criticism is partly fueled by the fact that traditional professionalism was often 
experienced as rather paternalistic and undemocratic and, indeed, one of the 
important factors in this is the “twilight of authority” in modern societies: 
                                           
3 Cp. Hol, A., & Loth, M., Reshaping Justice, Judicial Reform and Adjudication in the 
Netherlands, Shaker Publishing B.V. Maastricht 2004. 
4 Toulmin, S., Return to Reason, Harvard University Press Cambridge Mass. 2001, p. 115. 
5 “The effect of this state of things is to make the medical profession a conspiracy to hide 
its own shortcomings. No doubt the same may be said of all professions. They are all 
conspiracies against the laity.” Shaw, G.B., ‘Preface’ to ‘The Doctor’s Dilemma,’ 1911. 
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claims to authority are more readily challenged today than they used to be.6 
Another basic topic of the present time is the promise and problem of the 
“bureaucratization” in the professional world reinforcing the 
“depersonalization” of the professional practices. 
The debate with regard to the essence of legal public offices is an 
especially politically sensitive subject because these discussions touch upon 
the identity of the community. These questions are not merely of “existential” 
importance for jurists; in these questions our present legal community, our 
Rechtsstaat is at stake, and all the arguments that circulate are more or less 
sophisticated answers to the question of what our community should become. 
In a deeply divided modern society, both the urgency and the dangers of such 
disputes are evident. 
However, confusion is here to stay because for many in modern society 
“pluralism” has become a good in itself. In other words, in an open society 
diversity has become a part of our ideal world and even the tragic tension that 
we necessarily experience between our ideals, as the fulfillment of some 
ideals always excludes the fulfillment of others, has become valuable as it 
constantly reminds us of our human limitations and imperfection.7 This does 
not imply that any opinion is as good as any other. There is still much room 
for rational argument, which makes it possible to criticize some opinions as at 
least one-sided, or sometimes even completely wrong.8 It does imply, 
however, that in a morally divided world, legal professionals will have to 
become “connoisseurs of chaos” and realize that consistency will not always 
be a virtue. Moreover, they will realize that a virtue in one context is a vice in 
another; or even that actions can be structurally ambivalent in moral terms. 
This study will be concerned with the question: What is the promise of 
legal professionalism in a modern society? There are at least four consistent 
answers that are explored; answers that are “rational” or “reasonable,” 
although the implied conception of rationality does differ with each answer. 
These four answers will also be explored as being in (tragic) tension with 
                                           
6 Nisbet, R, Twilight of Authority, Liberty Fund Indianapolis IN 2000; Friedman, L.M., 
Total Justice, Russell Sage Foundation New York 1985, p. 89. 
7 Cp. Toulmin, S., Cosmopolis, The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, The University of 
Chicago Press Chicago 1990; cp. Toulmin, Return to Reason, 2001. 
8 Cp. Putnam, H., Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge University Press Cambridge UK 
1981, p. 148. 
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each other, and I am especially interested in what seems to keep them so 
fundamentally at odds. But to gain perspective on this we need to start with 
the “construction” of these answers as rational answers because it is exactly 
the rationality or reasonableness that makes them understandable and is, to 
some degree, part of their attractiveness.  
Thus rationality is a criterion, but I hasten to add that a rather broad 
conception of rationality is employed such that it includes the four different 
versions of it that I investigate in this book. Nevertheless, we must be able to 
recognize these positions as rational because otherwise they would become 
totally out of our interpretative reach. This is implied in the interpretative 
method, which of necessity begins by postulating a common humanity 
between the interpreter and the interpreted. If people are drawn to a certain 
view of things and we want to understand this perspective, we will have to 
begin by treating such views as views of “persons” not totally unlike 
ourselves and, according to Hilary Putnam this means  
 
“[…] attributing to them shared references and shared concepts, however different 
the conceptions that we also attribute. Not only do we share objects and concepts 
with others, to the extent that the interpretative exercise succeeds, but also 
conceptions of the reasonable, of the natural, and so on. For the whole justification 
of an interpretative scheme […] is that it renders the behavior of others at least 
minimally reasonable by our lights. However different our images of knowledge 
and conceptions of rationality, we share a huge fund of assumptions and beliefs 
about what is reasonable with even the most bizarre culture we can succeed in 
interpreting at all.”9 
 
When we postulate a common humanity we should add a second premise. 
Human knowledge and human reasoning do not take place in some 
otherworldly realm but are always “situated” in a social world and connected 
to human interests and values. These interests and values are diverse – we live 
in a pluralistic world – and sometimes highly personal or intimately related to 
                                           
9 “We are committed by our fundamental conceptions to treating not just our present time-
slices, but also our past selves, our ancestors, and members of other cultures past and 
present, as persons; and that means […] attributing to them shared references and shared 
concepts, however different the conceptions that we also attribute.” Putnam, Reason, Truth 
and History, p. 119. 
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our social (or class) position.  But they most certainly need not be and some 
interests are surely shared by many in many situations.10 Basic values and 
interests that have a strong foothold in modern societies, and are even 
institutionalized to a large degree, inform the four answers. Moreover, I will 
argue that we can situate and understand many rational arguments from these 
basic goods. 
 
This book is Weberian in spirit in that it reasons from the distinction between 
facts and values. This precludes the resolution of these fundamental tensions 
in modern law because they are constructed as conflicts of a political and 
moral nature. The choices that are required cannot be dictated by some kind 
of self-evident or self-legitimating scientific truth, logic or rationality.11 What 
I can do is hypothetically make the choice for some basic good (some 
particular professional promise) that should inform the legal professional’s 
practice and knowledge claims and see what this implies. Thus I construct the 
traditional professional as aspiring for hermeneutical competency and 
practical wisdom. This ideal-type subsequently functions as a stepping-stone 
to construct typically modern legal professional types, such as the “formalist”, 
the “pragmatist” and the “activist modernist” lawyer that can also be 
distinguished on the basis of different basic, typically modern, value-
orientations. Once the choice for a basic ultimate good is made, and when we 
have thus replaced real intentions for hypothetical or ideal intentions, the 
perspective and practice of such a professional becomes instrumentally 
rational or value- rational, and this gives us a chance for understanding this 
perspective and the practices that derive from it.12 
                                           
10 Some interests might even be shared by all human beings always and everywhere. “Yet 
these interests are not necessarily shared in all cultures and periods alike: many of them 
overlap, or change slowly enough to be understood across cultural or historical 
boundaries.” Toulmin, Return to Reason, p. 165. 
11 Eliaeson, S., Max Weber’s Methodologies, Interpretation and Critique; Polity Cambridge 
2002, pp. 27-28; cp. Collins, R., Max Weber, A Skeleton Key, Sage Publications Beverly 
Hills 1986, p. 36; Posner, R.A., The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, Harvard 
University Press Cambridge Mass. 1999, p. xiii. 
12 “In its various forms the trick consists in replacing real intentions of interpreters and 
interpreted with hypothetical or ideal intentions, whether they attributed to the common 
mental apparatus of mankind, to history, or simply to explanatory convenience.” Unger, 
R.M., Knowledge and Politics, The Free Press New York 1975, p. 115; Weber, M., 
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When I say “understanding,” I consciously choose a particular method of 
inquiry. On the one hand, there is no general aim to “explain” the phenomena 
that I describe in a causal way comparable to explanation in the natural 
sciences. That is to say, there is no sustained effort to find hidden causal 
social structures that explain certain events or facts. On the other hand, there 
is also no aim to reach my goal by means of the autonomous (philosophical) 
use of reason in the sense of logical reasoning or conceptual analysis. What I 
aim for, in short, is Verstehen. I want to understand and thus disentangle the 
complex and confused promise of modern legal professionalism. Compare 
Roberto Unger’s succinct but adequate description of such a method aiming 
for understanding:  
 
“The division of the world into an order of ideas and an order of events, with their 
corresponding methods of logical analysis and causal explanation, must not be 
accepted as the eternal faith of thought. Between the order of ideas and the order of 
events, there is a third realm, the order of consciousness, mind, culture or social life, 
for the understanding of which neither the logical nor the causal method is 
adequate. Instead, it calls for a method of appositeness or symbolic 
interpretation.”13 
 
The construction of such a perspective, rationally and consistently informed 
by a value- orientation, is ambitious in the sense that it aims at a holistic 
view.14 This perspective (loosely) joins together a range of social, moral and 
political phenomena that are understood with the help of a “deeper” 
underlying value-orientation that gives meaning to them. Thus the ideal-types 
are deliberately designed to show how certain kinds of actions and beliefs 
tend to go together with other kinds. The hope is that this presentation 
connects experiences, and renders them comprehensible, on a somewhat 
                                                                                                                               
‘Kritischen Studien auf dem Gebiet der Kulturwissenschaftlichen Logik,’ in: Gesammelte 
Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, J Winckelmann, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1988, p. 272; 
Eliaeson, S., Max Weber’s Methodologies, pp. 37, 41, 42; cp. Hindess, B., ‘Rationality, 
and the Characterization of Modern Society’, in: Whimster, S. & Lash, S., Max Weber, 
Rationality and Modernity, Allen & Unwin London 1987, pp. 138-140. 
13 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 107; cp. Hindess, B., ‘Rationality, and the 
Characterization of Modern Society’, pp. 138, 139. 
14 Cp. Zijderveld, A., The Abstract Society, A Cultural Analysis of our Time, Doubleday & 
Company Inc. New York 1970, pp. 61, 62. 
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higher level of abstraction such that particular practices and complexities can 
be understood. Thus, the collision between the traditional professional, the 
formalist, the pragmatist and the modernist activist helps us to reduce the 
complexity of our modern predicament. 
Chapter One, “Law Caught in a Crossroads,” will preliminarily sketch the 
tensions that in my view characterize modern law. The tensions of the modern 
“legal junction” are the tensions between the (reasonable) demand for 
authority, certainty, effectiveness and critical engagement. I will employ 
several Weberian notions to construct four “ideal-typical” legal professional 
“cultures” and in the following four chapters they are explored. Chapter Two, 
“The Art of Authority,” deals with the first type that is foremost concerned 
with the good of “authority” as it is in many ways connected with the ideal of 
forging some sort of a community out of the unruly material of modern 
society. Chapter Three, “Freedom’s Formalism,” is a response to a demand 
for “objectivity” and “transparency” in adjudication, and in legal practices 
generally, by emancipated modern citizens who demand respect for their 
rights and freedom. Chapter Four, “Power to the People,” explores a third 
demand, the demand for effectiveness and efficiency, which can be connected 
with the growth of a modern democratic and technological culture in which 
structural scarcity of resources necessitates maximizing efficiency. The fourth 
ideal type, presented in Chapter Five, “Critical Commitments,” keeps a 
critical distance with regard to the tendencies in modern culture and commits 
all critical and imaginative powers to the construction of alternative visions of 
community. Thus with these four chapters I stage a head-on collision in an 
effort to gain perspective on the structural dilemmas and disputes within the 
modern legal world.  
The reduction of complexity by means of abstraction is, of course, the aim 
of all science. There is always an effort towards the reduction of complexity 
by finding principles that apply at least a bit more generally than in one 
particular case. In other words, “science is a way of finding the common 
principles that transcend particular situations, of extrapolating from things we 
know to things we do not know, a way of seeing the novel as another 
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arrangement of the familiar.”15 But there are several caveats and provisos that 
I should mention and briefly discuss.  
To begin with, the ideal-types that I present here are simplified 
hermeneutical devices to trace and order historical phenomena and 
perspectives that in reality structurally exceed or “transgress” my 
presentation. They do not “describe” actual empirical facts or events in the 
sense of an exact “correspondence” between the description and the 
described. Nor are they the product of logical or conceptual (philosophical) 
analysis. The ideal-types serve as constructions that represent extreme cases 
or hypothetical possibilities that can, when confronted with each other, be 
useful in understanding our present modern social world.16 We should be 
warned though that the “logic” that is suggested here is a theoretical 
construction that destroys the logic of social practices as such.17 Moreover, 
although I concede an ambitious aspiration for a holistic perspective on 
modern legal professionalism, there is no claim to exclusivity. There may be 
other methods and concepts to trace, order, understand or even explain the 
phenomena that I am interested in. 
The method of Verstehen – the hermeneutical method – can be criticized 
as being rather conservative. To be sure, if we want to understand that which 
is typically human and social about our collective world, we should try to find 
out what social arrangements and human behavior means to human beings. To 
understand social practices and institutions we have to describe what the 
participants or the agents think about it and how they experience it, and unless 
we take the meaning of these practices and institutions seriously, we have 
missed what is peculiarly social about our subject matter. However, if we stay 
too close to the understandings of the agents and his fellows, we are deprived 
of a standard by means of which we can distinguish insight from illusion, or 
                                           
15 Collins, R., Conflict Sociology, Toward an Explanatory Science, Academic Press New 
York 1975, p. 2. 
16 Weber, M., Methodologische Schriften, S. Fischer Verlag Frankfurt am Main 1968, pp. 
65-69, 169-173; Weber, M., Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 
Tübingen 1976, p. 171; Unger, R.M., Law in modern society, Toward a criticism of social 
theory, The Free Press New York 1976, p. 22. 
17 Bourdieu, P., The Logic of Practice, Polity press Oxford UK 1990, pp. 11, 12. 
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“ideology” in a neutral or functional sense from the kind of “masking 
ideology” and “false consciousness” that we might want to critically expose.18  
The ideal-types that I present in this study provide critical standards only 
with regard to each other. They do not provide critical standards that can 
claim universal or objective value because I constructed them as relative to 
basic interests and values. That they cannot provide such objective standards 
follows from my initial choice to respect the Weberian distinction between 
facts and values; there is no objective standard, and no “view from nowhere,” 
by means of which these positions can be scrutinized.19 
Nevertheless, the kind of “sociology of knowledge” that I try to engage in 
does have a particular critical edge. By correlating professional knowledge 
claims and commitments with social determinants, we might have a chance of 
acquiring a certain freedom from those social factors. Compare Pierre 
Bourdieu: 
 
“[…] it is through the illusion of freedom from social determinants […] that social 
determinants win the freedom to exercise their full power. Those who walk into the 
debate with their eyes closed and a little nineteenth century philosophical baggage 
would do well to think about this if they don’t want to lay themselves open to the 
easiest forms of objectification in the future. And so, paradoxically, sociology frees 
us by freeing us from the illusion of freedom, or, more exactly, from the misplaced 
belief in illusionary freedoms. Freedom is not something given: it is something you 
conquer – collectively. […] I think enlightenment is with those who turn their 
spotlight on their blinkers.”20 
 
This not only goes for the legal professionals but for the professional 
investigator of legal professionalism as well. There is one particular blinker 
that both jurist and scholar should be aware of and constantly scrutinize. This 
is the tendency to “identify with reason” and to act as the “spokesman for the 
                                           
18 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 15, 108; cp. Gerth, H.H., & Wright Mills, C., (eds.) 
From Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. London 1974, p. 
58. 
19 Cp. Nagel, T., The View from Nowhere, Oxford University Press Oxford 1986. 
20 Bourdieu, P., In Other Words, Essays toward a Reflexive Sociology, Stanford University 
Press Stanford Ca 1990, pp. 15, 16; “In the social sciences as elsewhere, the problem of 
achieving objectivity is that of learning to counter our own biases.” Toulmin, Return to 
Reason, p. 96. 
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universal” with regard to the subject matter, in my case the legal professional. 
The lesson we can learn from both Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu is 
that truth is not the product of a combination of neutral observation and 
universal reason. Often the idea is that the social scientist somehow, in 
contrast to the people he studies, transcends the forces that to some degree 
determine social life and thus reaches some objective point of view. But 
according to Foucault, “truth isn’t the reward of free spirits, the child of 
protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded to liberate 
themselves.” In short, “truth is not outside power” but produced within a 
particular power structure itself and “it induces regular effects of power”.21 
Of course, the scholar has an interest in suppressing or “masking” this fact 
because it tampers with the neutrality, rationality and objectivity of his 
knowledge claims. Nevertheless, he should turn the spotlight on his own 
blinkers and critically scrutinize this drive to universality and the 
identification with reason. Bourdieu says, rather paradoxically, “to escape 
even a little from the relative, one absolutely has to abdicate from the claim to 
absolute knowledge, uncrown the philosopher king.” Science is a 
quintessentially human activity and therefore a social practice like any other. 
This means that the scholar should also try to gain some critical distance with 
regard to his own practice and his own knowledge claims, because by means 
of perpetual critical self-analysis he has a small chance of knowing the limits 
of his vision as determined by his particular biases and interests.22 
As science generally exhibits a tendency to proceed by arguing for general 
distinctions that will reduce the complexity of phenomena and resolve 
observed contradictions, the dichotomous classification that I present here 
seems therefore to be a typical product of my professional “habitus.” Surely, 
the “art of distinction” is recognizable for jurists as an important method for 
resolving hard cases and something similar is tempting for both philosophers 
and scholars as well.23 However, “attempts to divide anything into two ought 
                                           
21 Foucault, M., ‘Truth and Power’ in: Rabinow, P., The Foucault Reader, An introduction 
to Foucault’s thought, Penguin London 1984, pp. 67, 72, 73. 
22 Bourdieu, In Other Words, pp. 32, 33; cp. Bourdieu, P., Homo Academicus, Polity Press 
Oxford UK 1998. 
23 Cp. Rorty, R., Contingency, irony and solidarity, Cambridge University Press 
Cambridge UK 1989, p. 77; Hacking, I., Historical Ontology, Harvard University Press 
Cambridge Mass. 2002, pp. 35 – 39. 
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to be regarded with much suspicion”, C.P. Snow writes in his famous 
pamphlet, The Two Cultures.24 The danger is that we turn such dichotomies 
into a moral distinction of good and bad and much prejudice and dangerous 
dogmatism start with such dichotomies. There is a responsibility here for the 
social scientist because, as said before, the classifications of social science are 
interactive with the persons so classified.25Therefore, we should never forget 
that, as Stephen Jay Gould reminds us: 
 
“Much of the world comes to us as continua, or as other complex, and far more than 
two-valued, series of reasonably discrete states. We do construct useful 
simplifications when we force this complexity into a simple system of successive 
dichotomous branchings – for such sequential ordering does resonate with the 
mind’s capacity to grasp a structure within multifarious and hierarchical systems. 
But what truer or more insightful ways of classification do we miss when we invoke 
this almost automatic mental scheme without pressing ourselves to consider less 
congenial, but perhaps more rewarding, alternatives?”26 
 
Thus, the distinctions I propose here are merely devices to order a complex 
social and cultural world that could also, no doubt, be ordered by means of 
other distinctions and concepts. Moreover, the four professionals and The 
Four Cultures that they represent, are ideal-types constructed on the basis of 
ideal or idealized intentions that might or might not be present, but that might, 
at least, illuminate much of the theoretical disputes on the level of the ideals 
of the legal profession. In order to show that these are not freestanding 
disputes by “free spirits,” but socially embedded discussions as well, in the 
following I try to connect these normative discussions on both modern legal 
professionalism and knowledge with sociologically informed theories on 
modernity. 
The four ideal typical positions that I present the reader with may 
metaphorically be seen as a “crossroads,” a junction of four distinct 
                                           
24 Snow, C.P. The Two Cultures, Cambridge University Press Cambridge UK 1998, p. 9. 
25 Hacking, I., The Social Construction of What?, Harvard University Press Cambridge 
Mass. 1999, pp. 27-34; cp. Giddens, A., The Consequences of Modernity, Polity Press 
Cambridge UK 1990, p. 16. 
26 Gould, S.J., The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Magister’s Pox, Mending the Gap between 
Science and the Humanities, Harmony Books New York 2003, p. 122. 
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professional cultures, with the modern lawyer in the middle. The four 
directions are not always and in every situation equally attractive and viable, 
but I suggest that professionals often experience the tensions between these 
four value-orientations and the concomitant professional (idealized and 
typified) commitments. The promise of professionalism is, therefore, a rather 
complex promise, and the argument here is that we can only attempt to reduce 
the complexity. The resolution of the tensions in any particular case will 
require choices by legal professionals. In this book I argue that this element of 
choice cannot be overcome on some abstract general level. In the end, I hope 
we arrive at a better understanding of what is at stake in these choices. 
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1. 
Law Caught at a Crossroads 
 
 
 
In her book on Dutch upper class domestic life around the turn of the 
twentieth century, Ileen Monteyn tells us about the advice her father gave her 
when she was still a child. “If you ever get lost in an unknown village or 
town, ask for the house of the local notary,” her father impressed upon her. As 
for Ileen Monteyn and many of us today, this paternal advice evokes a lost 
world, “a secure world of certainties. A world in which in every town the 
local mayor, the notary and the vicar were waiting in their big houses for the 
housekeeper to bring in a small girl that got lost.”1 In that world legal 
professionals like the notary were “notables” in the community, and their role 
and commitments seemed to imply that they were deemed highly civilized, 
public spirited and trustworthy. This explains why Ileen’s father could not 
think of a better guardian for his little daughter than the local notary. 
Indeed, the word “professional” seems to hold a promise. The root 
“profess” comes from the Latin word “profiteor”, which means, “to 
acknowledge, confirm, promise, confess.” In the medieval times the word 
“profession” was generally used when someone swore an oath to a religious 
organization or to the university (nowadays we would use the word “vow” 
instead) and indeed in the oldest English usage, the term profession refers to a 
declaration, an avowal, or to the expression of intention or purpose. The 
promise it held was that one dedicated oneself to a particular good or purpose 
                                           
1 Monteyn, I., Leven op Stand 1890-1940, Thomas Rap Amsterdam 1998, p. 7 (my 
translation). 
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and surely this promise is still largely part of the concept.2 But what exactly is 
the promise of professionalism in today’s world? 
If one thinks of the sports world, the first distinction that comes to mind is 
that of the contrast between the professional and the amateur. Nowadays, we 
tend to explicitly distinguish the professional, who makes a living with some 
activity and reaches high standards of achievement, from the amateur, who, in 
spite of his enthusiasm, will always remain a bit of a dilettante. Thus, we tend 
to think of an amateur as someone who is either still learning or is not very 
proficient because the activity is a mere pass time, a hobby. But some might 
argue that we should, with regard to the legal professional, not make too 
much of this distinction. Of course, the “profession” to public service has to 
be sincere, and therefore an important part of the promise seems to be that 
those who profess to such service actually hold dear this public good or end 
that they profess to serve, and further that the professional even loves the 
work he or she does for the good that it brings to the community. Thus, the 
monk or the priest enters the religious institutional order for the love of God 
and the university “professor” dedicates his life to knowledge for 
knowledge’s sake. One might therefore say that there seems to be something 
“amateurish” about these people as they commit themselves out of love and 
admiration for the particular good they serve.  
This might sound rather odd, as the particular meaning of the word 
“amateur” that is invoked here does not readily come to mind anymore. 
However, the meaning of the amateur as “a lover” or “an admirer,” also 
comes from a Latin source, “amātor”, “lover, devoted friend, devotee, 
enthusiastic pursuer of an objective,” and from its Latin-derived French 
source, “amateur” with a similar range of meanings. This older literal sense of 
the word might be more readily associated with the professional than the 
“dilettante” because the promise the professional holds is that his loyalty is 
with what he loves or admires as a public or common good, and, importantly, 
                                           
2 “In that usage the word is evaluated positively, implying religious and moral motives to 
dedicate oneself to a good end.” Freidson, E., Professional Powers, A Study of the 
Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge, The University of Chicago Press Chicago and 
London 1986, p. 20. 
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he puts this purpose or good ahead of personal/private material incentives or 
motives.3 
Undoubtedly, for many both inside and outside the professional world, 
professionalism still has this “amateurish” aspect. The concept of 
professionalism still carries the ideal of following a “vocation,” which implies 
a dedication to some important public good; be it health for the doctors, 
knowledge for the scientists or law and justice for the lawyers; and, indeed, 
many also think of the law as a “calling.” The legal professional is not in it 
(solely) for the money and the prestige but at least to some extent out of 
engagement with the good of the community that the law represents. In the 
words of Kronman when describing his ideal professional lawyer: “The 
outstanding lawyer […] is, to begin with a devoted citizen. He cares for the 
public good and is prepared to sacrifice his own well-being for it, unlike those 
who use the law merely to advance their private ends.”4  
Thus, according to Kronman, the legal professional is both an amateur 
who loves or admires the good or purpose that he or she serves (and the 
knowledge that it requires to serve it well) and a professional in the sense of 
earning a living and being highly proficient in his line of work. But in the 
ideal that Kronman sketches the love for the good trumps the private need to 
material well-being and prestige. This love or commitment is what seems to 
serve as a guarantee that the professional actually lives up to the professional 
promise – that the promise will be kept.5 
This professional dedication to some ulterior or higher public good has 
traditionally been contrasted with the motives of men of trade or industry who 
are assumed to be “merely” motivated by their private and material ends. The 
promise of professionalism included a disinterested and independent 
                                           
3 Professions “are occupations with special power and prestige. Society grants these 
rewards because professions have special competence in exoteric knowledge bodies of 
knowledge linked to central needs and values of the social system, and because professions 
are devoted to the service of the public, above and beyond material incentives.” Larson, M. 
S., The Rise of Professionalism, A Sociological Analysis, University of California Press 
Berkeley 1977, p. x. 
4 Kronman, A.T., The Lost Lawyer, Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession, Harvard 
University Press Cambridge Mass. 1993, p. 14. 
5 Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, pp. 371- 375; cp. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and 
Legal Theory, p. 186. 
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dedication to a public good. According to Kronman, though, this devoted 
lawyer is a dying breed. Modern lawyers are becoming much more like the 
commercial traders and industrialists that early modern professionals 
explicitly tried to distinguish themselves from. The ethos of honorable and 
principled commitment to the public good is incongruent with the utilitarian 
instrumental rationality of the world of commerce and industry. If modern 
professionals fail to live up to their original promise this will, according to 
Kronman, cause a deep crisis in the legal world and this feeling is widely 
shared both inside and outside the legal institutions.   
However, the traditional professional promise has a serious downside. In 
their effort to distinguish themselves from traders and industrialists, the 
professionals strongly identified with the aristocracy.6 As they fell in line with 
the anti-utilitarian aristocratic ethos, their professional ideals became rather 
perfectionist, exclusive and elitist. Indeed, to cultivate a public spirit the 
professionals were thought to require a specific education, an education that 
was thought to be more than merely the acquisition of the required complex 
body of knowledge and related skills. The aim was broader as it included 
acquiring “good taste” and “good judgment” and training in the powers of 
reasoning. Thus from the eighteenth century until well into the twentieth 
century, legal professional training was a so-called “liberal” education, which 
was firmly based on the classics.7 The idea was that the study of Greek and 
Latin literature trained them in the sophisticated use of language and literary 
taste. Of course, as the legal profession and practices had firm roots in 
classical Roman law, the education of the lawyer also consisted in studying 
classic legal texts, and this is part of the curriculum in many Western legal 
faculties until this very day.  
In addition, Euclidean geometry was thought to be important to train the 
powers of reasoning. However, many argued that legal reasoning should not 
be identified with geometrical reasoning because the law has its own 
particular rationality and deciding cases required sophisticated powers of 
“judgment” and “practical wisdom.” Thus, a purely technical training would 
                                           
6 Brint, In an Age of Experts, The Changing Role of Professionals in Politics and Public 
Life, Princeton University Press Princeton NJ 1994, pp. 8, 26-30. 
7 Reader, W.J., Professional Men, The Rise of the Professional Classes in Nineteenth-
Century England, Weidenfeld and Nicholson London 1966, pp. 9, 10. 
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never suffice: “Technical training might be good enough for the narrow 
purposes of a craftsman or trader, but for a gentleman who might have to deal 
with wide issues of government and policy, it was much more important to 
grasp general principles of intellectual activity: his education should teach 
him how to learn.”8 
The result of such training would be a professional class of lawyers who 
aspired for a gentleman’s emphasis on trust, discretion, judgment and 
character. In fact, leading professional men took on much of the cultural 
ambiance of the old aristocracy. Cultivation and transmission of this 
ambiance depended greatly on the liberal education in universities and by the 
rigid preservation of the profession’s gentlemanly standards as distinct from 
the utilitarian and commercial ethos of the merchant and industrial classes. 
Indeed, the American sociologist Steven Brint also argues that traditional 
professionals aspired to the character and values of a gentleman: 
“trustworthiness, discretion, and judgment in relations with clients and 
associates, but also an attitude of noblesse oblige, a sense of responsibility for 
the great affairs of government and society, and a high level of cultivation 
through the liberal arts.”9 
These ideals survived the formalization of the profession by means of state 
regulations of professional institutions and education. This formalization or 
“legalization” consisted of the demand for credentials in the form of a 
university education and the institutionalization of licensing systems. 
Entrance to the professional class and the dispensing of professional 
competences and powers are now strictly regulated. Today, the requirement of 
special qualifications, credentials and licenses surely reinforce the idea that 
the professions are a distinct occupational class and, indeed, formal university 
training and licenses create a formal boundary, distinguishing professionals 
from “dilettantes.”10 The stricter distinction between insiders and outsiders 
that developed in the nineteenth century also reinforced the idea that laymen 
could not judge the skill and knowledge of the professional. Thus the 
professional groups were granted the powers to control entrance into the 
professions (a large degree of autonomy in the sense of individual and 
                                           
8 Ibidem. 
9 Brint, In an Age of Experts, pp. 30, 8, 9. 
10 Freidson, Professional Powers, p. 26.  
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collective self-government) and the privilege of internally dealing with 
accusations of malpractice. Not only were outsiders technically incompetent 
to judge them, such outsiders were not trusted to judge them, since they 
typically reasoned from private or political interests and not the good that the 
professionals served.11 
If one takes a critical view of this, one might say that such professional 
groups took on the characteristics of a rather exclusive and elitist medieval 
“guild.”12 But it was exactly the moral aspect of professionalism (the promise 
of devotion to the public good) that justifies the lawyer’s privileges and 
protection. The good that professionals served was thought to be so vital to 
society that they should be granted the independence and autonomy needed to 
be actually able to take responsibility for the good of the community. 
 
This moral aspect of the idea of legal professionalism is the subject of the 
present study.  Specifically, what exactly is this common good or purpose that 
the legal professional should serve? In general we can answer this question by 
saying that legal professionals serve the law and commit themselves to justice 
as important goods. Although “the law” and “justice” are notoriously 
ambiguous and heavily contested concepts, an answer to the question seems 
to be especially urgent now since the legal world, in many Western countries, 
has seen significant changes in the past decades. Brint documents these 
institutional and cultural changes in many professional fields, including the 
legal one. Of particular note is Brint’s description of a trend in which 
professional commitment has lost its “moral bearings.” More and more the 
professions have become disconnected from the idea of service and 
commitment to some public good and, instead, more exclusively connected to 
the idea of “expert knowledge.” Modern professionals are more and more 
                                           
11 Brint, In an Age of Experts, p. 7. 
12 “The interpretation of these laws by specializes institutions, manned by a relatively 
independent professional group, steeped in its own craft and techniques of argument, 
guarantees that the persons whose power the law is designed to restrain will not be the ones 
to determine, in the final instance, its meaning.” Unger, Law in modern society, pp. 70, 52-
54; Brint, In an Age of Experts, pp. 33, 35; Posner, R.A., Overcoming Law, Harvard 
University Press Cambridge Mass. 1995 pp. 37-60. 
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thought of as “experts,” agents of formal knowledge that need “no additional 
moral vaulting.”13 
Critics of this trend towards such “amoral” professionalism in the legal 
world rather dramatically speak of a “crisis of morale.” I have already 
referred to Anthony Kronman who, with regard to American legal culture, 
explicitly speaks of such a crisis in that profession – a crisis, which is to some 
degree the result of several important factors, (though there are no doubt 
others): the bureaucratization of adjudication; the commercialization of 
advocacy; the politicization of the public attorney’s office and the 
formalization of legal education. Another example of a critical evaluation of 
the changing professional world is found in Mary Ann Glendon’s book A 
Nation under Lawyers. The subtitle – ‘How the Crisis in the Legal Profession 
Is Transforming American Society’ – certainly sounds alarming enough.14 
However, if one has different priorities – if one has a different ideal of 
legal professionalism – the changes can be seen in a more favorable light. 
There are lawyers who applaud at least some of these changes, like Richard 
Posner. Posner’s commitment to a thorough “professionalization” in the sense 
of becoming more functional, efficient and effective implies that we should be 
happy if the “aristocratic” type of lawyer leaves the stage. Indeed, in his view, 
the legal world is still much more traditional and old-fashioned than it should 
be. The pretension of having some privileged access to the definition of the 
public good in moral, political or legal terms is a typical example of 
“professional mystique.” As it is always attractive to justify privileges, wealth 
or power by means of a claim to greater nobility, honor, politeness, taste and 
technical skills, we might understand how professional groups will display a 
tendency to idealize themselves. Indeed, sociological analysis can bolster this 
scepticism about the professions. What is “professed” is often thought of as 
an “ideology” in a bad sense; that is, as a strategy to justify a privileged 
position while masking an underlying pursuit of self-interest.15 
 
                                           
13 Brint, In an Age of Experts, pp. 9-11, 40-43. 
14 Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, p. 2; Glendon, M.A., A nation under lawyers, How the 
Crisis in the Legal Profession Is Transforming American Society, Harvard University Press 
Cambridge Mass. 1994, p. 12. 
15 Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, p. xiii; cp. Brint, In an Age of 
Experts, pp. 9, 40. 
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The idea I want to investigate in this study is that the legal professions have 
gradually become more and more entangled in social trends and processes 
that can be associated with “modernity.” For lawyers of the older generations, 
these trends and processes have changed the legal world beyond recognition. 
The dispute between a rather pessimistic and nostalgic Anthony Kronman, on 
the one hand, and an enthusiastic, even impatient Richard Posner, on the 
other, testifies to the confusion that this has caused.16 But what is modernity? 
Modernity is a social-political world that is to a large degree the result of a 
modern scientific and technological outlook.17 The social and ideological 
processes and trends that are associated with modernity can be traced far back 
into Medieval Europe.  However, they became prominent in history 
somewhere between the Renaissance and the Reformation, when the 
recognizable modern world began.18 Since then, though, there has been a 
steady quickening in pace, and, especially since the Second World War, the 
legal professional world seems to be ever more deeply affected. 
Although they seem strongly related (and yet also heavily contested) 
concepts, I distinguish modernity from “Enlightenment.” The Enlightenment 
can be thought of as the explicit and conscious preaching of the gospel of both 
critical reason and modern technology as a road to socio-political progress. 
Although the Enlightenment is often thought of as a specific historic period in 
which this creed became more and more influential – the late seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries – many aspects of nineteenth- century “positivism” are 
still alive today.19 Richard Posner, for instance, when he argues for a more 
functional and efficient legal professionalism seems to proudly confess to this 
modern “scientistic” creed.  
                                           
16 Cp. Hol  & Loth, Reshaping Justice, pp. 99-106. 
17 Cp. Zijderveld, A.C., The Institutional Imperative, The Interface of Institutions and 
Networks, Amsterdam University Press Amsterdam 2000, pp. 88-92. 
18 Cp. Collins, R., Weberian Sociological Theory, Cambridge University Press Cambridge 
UK 1986, p. 45; Berman, H.J., Law and Revolution, The Formation of the Western Legal 
Tradition, Harvard University Press Cambridge Mass. 1983, p. 151; Watson, P., The 
Modern Mind, An Intellectual History of the 20th Century Harper Collins Publishers 2001, 
pp. 52,53; Toulmin, Cosmopolis, pp. 13-22, 80-87, 97, 98. 
19 Cp. Dale, P. A., In Pursuit of a Scientific Culture, Science, Art and Society in the 
Victorian Age, The University of Wisconsin Press Madison 1989; Dupré, L., The 
Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture, Yale University Press 
New Haven and London 2004. 
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However, this view of the Enlightenment as a self-conscious and actively 
critical commitment to the “modernization” of law, politics, and society 
seriously complicates an effort to define both “Enlightenment” and 
“modernity” as social and historical phenomena. The moment modern man 
becomes conscious of himself as particularly modern, this “reflectivity” 
causes “reflexivity:” what a person thinks of him- or herself becomes 
inextricably part of what that person actually is. In other words, because all 
human acts are always acts under some description, modern man and the idea 
of modern man start to interact. What acts are available to us depends on the 
available descriptions and subsequently these descriptions thus enter the 
universe of action. From the moment that modern man becomes conscious of 
modernity, we see a “dialectic” between the self-descriptions of modern man 
and how he acts. One can rephrase this by saying that there is a dynamic 
correlation between a social life form and the reflection by its members on 
social life, which implies that “the manner in which people understand a 
social arrangement is an inseparable aspect of the arrangement itself.”20 
Because these descriptions and understandings are constitutively involved in 
what modernity is, both modernity and Enlightenment (as a commitment and 
not merely as a historical period) cannot be completely and definitely 
defined.21 
However what we can say, though, is that modernity generally seems to 
lead to an experience of a loss of the “secure world of certainties” that Ileen 
Monteyn refers to and therefore leads to moral chaos and confusion. Max 
Weber famously analyzed how modernity and modernization tend to 
“disenchant” (Entzaubern) all overarching communal value systems, religious 
worldviews or transcendent goals. According to Weber it is the rather sad 
destiny of the moderns to witness an unending competition between value 
systems and worldviews: “Many old gods ascend from their graves; they are 
disenchanted and hence take the form of impersonal forces. They strive to 
                                           
20 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 108. 
21 Hacking, The Social Construction of What?, p. 34; Giddens, The Consequences of 
Modernity, p. 16; Unger, Law in modern society, pp. 37-43, 134-137, 265-266; “dynamic 
exchange, rather than the static rationalism with which it is often identified, characterizes 
the Enlightenment. It was essentially a dialectical movement.” Dupré, The Enlightenment 
and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture, pp. 4 etc.; Cassirer, E., The 
Philosophy of the Enlightenment, Princeton University Press Princeton 1951, pp. 4, 5. 
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gain power over our lives and again they resume their eternal struggle with 
one another.”22 
Thus Richard Posner argues that the growing moral heterogeneity and 
confusion in the legal world mirrors the growing heterogeneity in modern 
society. He argues that both the Grand Legal Tradition (and the particular 
values that it carries) and the traditional ideals of legal professionalism are 
beyond recovery; and, instead of wallowing in nostalgia, we should embrace 
the promise of a thoroughly modernized professional world. In his view, 
modern science and technology is the only road to some common ground in 
the modern legal professional world. There is a promise in terms of a more 
rational, effective, and efficient legal order.23 
While Posner considers this road one of great promise, Kronman 
disagrees.  Yet, importantly, their disagreement is not a disagreement on the 
facts of the present trends and changes in the legal world.  Rather, it is about 
how to appreciate them. Therefore, it is also a disagreement on the question of 
which direction these developments should take. Kronman thinks of the 
“scientism” in modern legal faculties and education as a major cause of the 
present malaise, while Posner thinks that both the professional ethos and legal 
education are by far not scientific enough.  In fact, Posner sees modern 
science as a cure instead of the disease. In the following paragraphs I want to 
set the stage for the following chapters by presenting the contrasts that are 
basic to my analysis. Such a presentation also gives me a chance to introduce 
some of the fundamental methodological and heuristic concepts that I employ. 
 
Traditional authority and substantive rationality 
Richard Posner is well aware of the limits of the modernization of the legal 
world that he propagates. He argues that law is still highly saturated with 
moral terms, fairly traditional and backward looking and, although he regrets 
                                           
22 Weber, M., ‘Science as a Vocation,’ in: Gerth, H.H., & Wright Mills, C., (eds.) From 
Max Weber, p. 149; cp. Eliaeson, S., Max Weber’s Methodologies, p. 11. 
23 Richard Posner explicitly refers to Jeremy Bentham, one of the philosophers of the 
Enlightenment and early modernizers of law: “Bentham sought to place law on a scientific 
footing – to make is a practical human instrument for the achievement of definite social 
goals. In this limited but important respect Bentham is the originator of the pragmatic 
concept of law advocated in this book.” Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, Harvard 
University Press Cambridge Mass. 1990, p. 14. 
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it, this will never be completely overcome.  Moreover, the “irremediably 
authoritarian character of law” especially limits the scope for a modern 
scientific ethos in the law.24 But why is the authoritarian character of law 
irremediable? And, in addition, why does this fact limit the modernization of 
legal practices, legal science and education? To investigate this question I 
propose to construct an ideal-typical “traditional professional” and confront it 
with the construction of an ideal-typical “modern professional” as 
promulgated by Posner. In an effort to understand the traditional legal 
perspective, I will particularly investigate the interconnection among the ideas 
of authority, community, and the legal tradition with regard to professional 
ethics and legal judgment.  
The construction of the ideal type of traditional professionalism that I 
present in the second chapter of this book serves a twofold purpose. In the 
first place, it can help us understand the new modern discourses that I explore 
in the subsequent chapters. The modern can be explored by contrasting it to 
what it tries to overcome. The second chapter thus serves as a stepping stone 
to the subsequent chapters. However, with Bruno Latour we can argue that 
“we have never been modern.”25 Many aspects of the ideals and the practice 
of the traditional outlook are, although receding, still viable and maybe even 
vital. When we confront this viewpoint with the perspective of the modern 
professional as an expert armed with the scientific method, we might come to 
understand why the law is still “saturated with morality,” fairly traditional and 
“irremediably authoritarian.” This confrontation might help us see that the 
value orientation that informs my construction of traditional authority is not a 
thing of the past, but rather it is indispensable. 
The construction of the ideal type should start with a conception of legal 
authority. We might start by noting that political communities tend to present 
and re-present themselves, not only with flags and banners, but also with 
authorities. To put it as simply as possible: such an authority represents a 
group and can therefore act and speak on behalf of this group.26 When we 
                                           
24 Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, p. 207; Posner, The Problems of 
Jurisprudence, p. 26. 
25 Latour, B., We Have Never Been Modern, Harvard University Press Cambridge Mass. 
1993. 
26 Cp. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, pp. 108, 298, 299; Bourdieu, P., Language and 
Symbolic Power, Polity Press Oxford UK 1991, pp. 75, 76. 
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think of the law as a storehouse of the basic norms and values of the 
community, we might consider legal officials, when they speak on behalf of 
the law, as representatives of the community that the law expresses. These 
basic norms and values can be thought of as “natural” in the sense of 
universal and timeless – as “natural law” – but this is not necessary. The legal 
tradition can also be thought of as the product of an historic evolution; when 
you think of community values as perpetually changing, the tradition is also 
continually evolving. 
In an ideal-typical traditional view, the subjects experience the submission 
to legal rules and rulings of the law as a submission to the community, the law 
being constituted of the norms and values that the subject qua member of the 
community identifies with. Conversely, the legal subjects identify with the 
law and submit to its authority because the law expresses the basic norms and 
values of their particular community. Ideally, the law provides a shared 
meaningful and normative order that is part of the basic “cement” of the 
community because, as such, it has an important binding quality. Legal 
authorities are both competent and authorized to speak or act as 
representatives of the law and thus they serve the common good: they protect 
the community as a meaningful normative force against the disruptive powers 
of violence and conflict. Within the community, they represent a basic 
common morality that has ‘hardened’ into law embedded in “a venerated and 
time-honoured tradition,” and embodied in the institutions of the law.27 
Indirectly, the law and its representatives therefore represent the larger 
community and thus the legal tradition itself becomes an important symbol of 
the community.  
The basic idea that I propose to investigate more extensively in the second 
chapter is that in guarding the authority of the law and its officials, the 
professionals will have to engage with the particular needs, values and the 
conceptions of well-being in the community.28 Such needs, values and 
conceptions surely have a cultural aspect; they are not universal but relative to 
local and particular social life forms. When we succinctly think of “culture” 
                                           
27 Zijderveld, The Institutional Imperative, pp. 125, 152-154; cp. Berman, Law and 
Revolution, pp. 1-10. 
28 Gray, J., Endgames, Questions in late modern political thought, Polity Press Cambridge 
1997, pp. 89, 90. 
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as “inherited ethical habit,” keeping in touch with these ethical habits and 
social customs will strengthen the authority of the law.29 In any particular 
community these norms, values and conceptions of well-being are not 
completely formal, procedural or “thin.” By contrast, they are substantial or 
“thick” as they prescribe particular ends and values as worthy as opposed to 
other ends and values. The legal tradition and its institutions aspire to be a 
repository of such “substantial rationality.”  
As the wording suggests, such substantial or “material” rationality is to be 
contrasted with “formal” rationality being “pure form” that can incorporate 
any content whatsoever.30 The traditional professional expressly aspires after 
substantive rationality as it provides him with a “horizon” that gives meaning 
to facts and actions that, from a legal standpoint, are in need of interpretation. 
“In every society […] law grows by ‘interpretation’ when applied to new 
problems and conditions, whence again the centrality of hermeneutics in 
following the career of Nomos.”31 This “nomos” is essentially built out of 
“narratives” and is the product of an edifying history of individual case 
histories that grew step-by-step into a symbolic legal order, an order made of 
language. This means that legal interpretation is thought to be essentially 
“hermeneutical” and good sound judgment is the result of practical wisdom or 
“prudence.” Both hermeneutics and practical reason are rather suspect from a 
scientific point of view because these methods cannot be formalized and the 
resulting “knowledge” cannot be objectively tested. But indeed, hermeneutics 
“has seldom pretended to scientific status: bound to language and to literary 
texts, hence to human convention and empirical scholarship (if not myth), it 
has been content to be regarded as an art (techne), at most a form of practical 
wisdom (phronesis, prudentia) and in this sense ‘local knowledge.’”32 
                                           
29 Fukuyama, F., Trust, The Social Virtues & the Creation of Prosperity, The Free Press 
New York 1995, pp. 34, 36. 
30 Gerth & Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, pp. 220, 298, 299; cp. Whimster, S. & 
Lash, S., Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity, Allen & Unwin London 1987, p. 30, 40, 
41, 45, 305; cp. Zijderveld, The Institutional Imperative, pp. 22, 36, 159, 160, 201. 
31 Kelley, D.R., The Human Measure, Social Thought in the Western Legal Tradition, 
Harvard University Press Cambridge Mass. 1990, p. 10; cp. Gadamer, H.G., Truth and 
Method, The Continuum Publishing Company New York 1990, pp. 269, 281, 282. 
32 Kelley, The Human Measure, p. 13; This knowledge is certainly “anti-algorithmic” and 
resists scientific systematization in order to make the methods and practices more 
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This implies that the lawyer has to be really free – that is to say, 
independent and autonomous with regard to outside forces that try to force the 
law their way – to speak and act on behalf of the law. From this implication 
some of the most conspicuous features of the legal institutional order can be 
understood. The chief characteristic of this order is “the formation of 
specialized, relatively autonomous legal institutions that claim a qualified 
supremacy within defined spheres of competence.”33 This autonomy has 
substantive, institutional, methodological, and occupational aspects.34 The 
substantive autonomy refers to the autonomy of the legal tradition as the set 
of particularly legal norms and values of the community, distinct from wider 
morality (prescribed by religion, for instance), and from both economic and 
political interests, beliefs and norms. The law is institutionally autonomous 
when the law is applied by specialized institutions whose main task is 
adjudication or dispute settlement, which in the modern liberal state is thought 
of as particularly distinct from the tasks of administration and legislation.  
Methodologically, the legal tradition provides a justification for the legal 
acts that differs from those in other practices or institutions. That is to say, 
“legal reasoning has a method or style to differentiate it from scientific 
explanation and from moral, political, and economic discourse.”35 In the 
traditional perspective, this means that the specific “art” of legal hermeneutics 
and good judgment is the product of intensive legal training and cultivation of 
taste by means of the liberal arts. Lastly, there is occupational autonomy, 
which refers to the fact that there is a special group of professionals that is 
entrusted with specific competences and privileges with regard to the 
application and further development of the law over time. This group of 
professionals mans the autonomous institutions of the law, devoting its energy 
and intellect to its well-being, and thereby this group serves the community.36 
In addition to Weber’s idea of substantive rationality, the Weberian ideal 
type of “traditional authority” is also very useful.  Weber distinguishes such 
                                                                                                                               
transparent. Cp. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, pp. 188, 189; 
Unger, R.M. What Should Legal Analysis Become?, Verso London 1996, p. 62. 
33 Nonet, P. & Selznick, P., Law and Society in Transition, Toward Responsive Law, 
Transaction Publishers New Brunswick and London 2001 (1978), p. 53. 
34 Unger, Law in modern society, pp. 53, 54. 
35 Ibidem. 
36 Ibidem. 
 31 
traditional authority from what he calls “charismatic authority” – the authority 
of the hero, the prophet, or the saviour: “Charismatic authority is in some 
ways the polar opposite of traditional authority: it is the authority of the 
unprecedented, the magical, the impact of some remarkable and unique 
personality.”37 Some judges or advocates are highly charismatic personalities 
and owe their authority in the community more to some mysterious personal 
appeal than to the fact that they represent the law. However, usually the 
traditional professional has authority because he or she can speak 
authoritatively in matters concerning the law. One might say that their 
authority is therefore a “derived” authority, and the authority of the law is 
fundamental as an ultimate good. The norms, values and institutions that are 
embodied in the legal tradition (i.e. the legal customs of the community) 
demand respect from the community members. The tradition thus has a 
certain “sacredness,” deriving from its basic customs it binds the individual 
members of the group into a community and prescribes obedience to the law’s 
officials.38 
The Weberian contrast between the ideal types of the “traditional 
community” and the “modern society” is also very useful. In traditional 
communities – where traditional authority is the rule – every single member 
of the community is born into a particular class with a particular social station 
and role. The norms and institutions, by means of which the whole 
community is pre-arranged, are not “formal” but specify a great deal of 
particular and fixed content or substance.39 The substantial ends and values 
that they prescribe can be thought of as part of the harmonious social whole 
articulated in the network of places, duties, and obligations. Importantly, the 
individual members derive their total personal identity from this station and 
role because through it they are connected to the larger whole of the 
community, there is “no separation between a person’s identity as a person 
                                           
37 Friedman, L. M., The Republic of Choice, Law, Authority, and Culture, Harvard 
University Press Cambridge Mass. 1990, p. 212; Gerth & Wright Mills (eds.), From Max 
Weber, pp. 295, 296. 
38 Gerth & Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, pp. 296-301. 
39 Gerth & Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, pp. 220, 298, 299; cp. Whimster & Lash 
(eds.), Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity, pp. 30, 40, 41, 45, 305; cp. Zijderveld, The 
Institutional Imperative, pp. 22, 36, 159, 160, 201. 
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and his or her definite social role.” 40 The particular stations, and the values 
and goals that are associated with it, are both fixed and complete, and they 
predetermine how to be a respected member of the community. 
To some extent, this still seems to be an inspiring idea in the contemporary 
legal world. In the traditional view of the legal professional, the station and 
role of the lawyer is (to a large degree) defining for the identity and self-
image of the professional. The legal tradition – and the customs, values and 
institutions that it embodies – forms the aspirant to such an extent that 
eventually he talks, thinks and acts like a lawyer. The aspirant lawyer should 
aspire to be a lawyer completely – it should become his “second nature” – and 
he achieves this by strongly identifying with exemplary authoritative 
members of the legal community and by internalizing the values and customs 
of the group. When an individual chooses to follow this vocation he, in the 
words of David Kolb, “internalizes the identity offered by the group. This 
helps to order his desires and impulses from within.”41 
The particular training and education that the aspiring legal professional 
goes through to become a lawyer is meant not only to make sure the aspirant 
acquires good taste and judgment but also builds “character” so that the 
desires and impulses are ordered from within.42 That is, this professional can 
then be safely trusted with his particular competences and with the large 
discretion and autonomy in how to employ them. Indeed, trust will often 
come up as a basic concept in the presentation of traditional legal authority 
and substantive rationality. Of course, there is no guarantee that the lawyer, 
out of love for the public good, will, unlike those who use the law merely to 
advance their private ends, actually be “prepared to sacrifice his own well-
being for it.”43 However, although we can never be totally sure that the 
individual interests or preferences of the lawyer have been completely 
                                           
40 Kolb, D., The Critique of Pure Modernity, Hegel, Heidegger, and After, The University 
of Chicago Press Chicago 1986, p. 29; cp. MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 123. 
41 Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, pp. 104, 109; cp. Berger P.L., & Luckmann, T., 
The Social Construction of Reality, A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, Anchor 
Books New York 1967, pp. 138-163. 
42 Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, pp. 15, 16, 367; Brint, In an Age of Experts, p. 8. 
43 Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, p. 14; “The problem is to show that the so-called deeper 
element really is common and not just another particular interest masquerading as 
universal.” Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 114. 
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superseded by the common good, the traditional lawyer is dedicated to the 
task of showing himself worthy of our trust as the guardian of the law. This is 
the promise that the traditional legal professional tries to fulfil. 
 
The disenchantment of authority and instrumental rationality 
Richard Posner finds such a traditional view of the law and legal 
professionalism very unattractive and argues for an alternative, specifically 
modern ideal of professionalism. This ideal is inspired by the success of 
modern (social/economic) science and tries to place the law and its practices 
on a more scientific base. From this perspective the great new promise of a 
truly scientific ethos will be objectivity and functionality.44 Legal judgment 
will be easier to test, and its institutions and practices will be more effective 
and efficient. Although Kronman associates the modernization of law with a 
thorough “demoralization” it can very well be argued that it is morally 
motivated as well. Moreover, this particular new “moral aspect” seems to be 
becoming more and more attractive. By confronting the ideal-typical 
“pragmatist” lawyer, as Posner calls him, with the traditional legal 
professional we might gain some perspective on the ensuing moral confusion. 
When we do so we will find that the modern scientific and traditional ethos 
are in many aspects diametrically opposed. 
As I indicated above, Steven Brint describes a trend in which professional 
commitment has lost its “moral bearings” and describes modern professionals 
as mere “experts,” agents of formal knowledge that need no additional moral 
vaulting. Brint tends to see the traditional type of professional as idealistic 
and committed, while the modern expert professional is amoral and rather 
“nihilistic.” However, although there is no explicit or implicit pledge of 
allegiance to the good of some Legal Tradition and the basic substantial legal 
values and norms that bind the community, in my view the modern legal 
pragmatist type is driven by a commitment to something else, something that 
is also regarded as an important good in modern society. Compared to the 
traditional lawyer, the modern professional is motivated by a completely 
different value orientation. Moreover, this good can be achieved without any 
                                           
44 Cp. Brint, In an Age of Experts, p. 35. 
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use of the concept of authority,45 and here lies an important “selling point” of 
this ethos. 
“Human knowledge and human power come to the same thing, because 
ignorance of cause frustrates effect. For nature is conquered only by 
obedience,” Francis Bacon famously wrote in the sixteenth century.46 And 
indeed, the modern scientific method promises a conquest of nature since 
when science has discerned the laws that govern it, man can use this 
knowledge to his own good purpose. Hobbes famously defined the power of 
man as “his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good.”47 One of 
the promises of the Enlightenment is just this: science can give man concrete 
influence over our (social) environment and this power can be used to good 
purposes. What we look for is technological progress leading to new ways of 
socio-political governance and coordination, without the paraphernalia and 
ideology of authority. Authority is a claim to “legitimate rule” or, to the 
enforceable right to command others. By contrast, modern science promises 
“influence” over the social environment, which is much more subtle. 
Influence is the ability to manipulate the social environment by the use of 
socio-political technology, “thereby increasing the pressures on others to act 
in accordance with one’s own wishes.”48 
Moreover, the epistemology and ontology of the Enlightenment does not 
leave much room for the rather mysterious and vague metaphysics that claims 
to authority often imply. Authority can be consistently thought of as being 
part of a “nomos,” a meaningful and normative world that is fundamentally 
relative to time and space. This local and historical nomos, the legal 
                                           
45 Cp. Kennedy, D., A Critique of Adjudication, Fin de Siècle, Harvard University Press 
Cambridge Mass. 1997, p. 111. 
46 Bacon, F., The New Organon, Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2000, p. 33 
(Book I. Aphorism 3). 
47 “The Passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit, are principally, the more or 
less Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowledge, and of Honour. All of which may be 
reduced to the first, that is Desire for Power. For Riches, Knowledge, and Honour are but 
several sorts of Power.” Hobbes, T., Leviathan, Cambridge University Press Cambridge 
1991, pp. 53, 62; cp. Parsons, T., The Social System, The Free Press New York 1951, p. 
121. 
48 Lenski, G. E., Power and Privilege, A Theory of Social Stratification, The University of 
North Carolina Press Chapel Hill and London, 1984 (1966), pp. 55; cp. Foucault, M., 
‘Discipline and Punish’, in: Rabinow, P. (ed.), The Foucault Reader, pp. 206-213. 
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traditional narratives that reflect it and the image of the authoritative jurists 
who represent it, is grist for the mill of modern science. The new 
“empiricism” rigidly founds scientific knowledge on observation and the truth 
of a hypothesis is only accepted when it is experimentally tested against the 
facts of the world. In the quest for objectivity, the modern scientific ontology 
is, in the expression used by William James, “tough-minded” – that is, 
intangibles such as “narratives,” “meanings” and “values” are considered to 
be “soft” and “subjective” and are eschewed “in favor of the hard world of 
concrete, particular, physical objects.”49 
What could this mean for the law? In the first place all reference to vague, 
abstract and metaphysical entities should be rigorously avoided: “Law is 
dissolved into physical force, also an abstract entity but one that has a more 
solid ring and, more important can be interpreted in behavioral terms.”50 The 
selling point here is that human behavior can be brute facts of experience and 
such facts can be known without much interpretation; they can simply be 
observed.51 The project is to re-conceptualize legal institutions and practices 
in “naturalistic” terms: terms with sufficient scientific respectability. This is 
what the so-called “naturalization of the law” is about; it implies a focus on 
the actual, on particulars and on the facts. The law is conceptualized as the 
exercise of power, or better, as a powerful instrument in the service of human 
needs and goals. In short, it is conceptualized as a “technology” and the law is 
thought about as wholly instrumental or functional.52 In Weberian terms, the 
substantial rationality that the traditional lawyer aspired for is superseded by 
                                           
49 “You get, in short, a materialistic universe, in which only the tough-minded find 
themselves congenially at home.” James, W., Pragmatism, Harvard University Press 
Cambridge Mass. 1978, p. 15; Hamlyn, D.W., Metaphysics, Cambridge University Press 
Cambridge UK 1984, p. 34. 
50 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, p. 223; “Perhaps Faust was right, and nothing 
and nothing is at work in the law but the deed – unrationalizable official acts, will and 
force.” Luban, D., Lawyers and Justice, An Ethical Study, Princeton University Press 
Princeton NJ 1988, p. 30. 
51 “[…] theorists from the nineteenth century on sought to anchor authority in something 
objective, something scientific, something ‘there’.” Luban, D., Legal Modernism, The 
University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor 1994, pp. 30-32; cp. Hollis, M., The Philosophy 
of social science, an introduction, Cambridge University Press 1994, p. 44. 
52 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, pp. 18, 19, 26, 28, 29, 223; cp. Posner, 
Overcoming Law. 
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the ethos of “functional” or “instrumental rationality” that places emphasis on 
“means, methods, and procedures developed for the effective and efficient 
realization of certain goals.”53 
From this perspective, the reference to both “meaning” and to “value” (or 
the “common good”) becomes suspect in the materialist or naturalist ontology 
and consequently much of the characteristic rhetoric of traditional legal 
professionalism is thought of as “ideology” in a bad sense of the word. This 
obviously has implications for the characteristics of the traditional legal 
world. The claim to autonomy in all its aspects – substantive, institutional, 
methodological, and occupational – is justified in terms that come under 
serious attack.  
Recall the claim that the values and norms embodied in the legal tradition 
and institutions are specifically legal and therefore distinct from non-legal 
beliefs or norms – the claim to substantive autonomy. Indeed, the legal order 
was thought of as substantially distinct from economics, politics or morality 
in general, and this distinction also legitimizes the institutional autonomy of 
adjudication from legislation and administration. Posner’s ideal professional, 
however, generally rejects this vague and useless distinction between legal 
norms and values applied by specialized institutions and non-legal norms and 
values. The law is merely what the community chooses to enforce and, as a 
result, the autonomy claimed for a specifically legal method concerned with 
specifically legal materials and values will be looked upon with suspicion. 
Moreover, this legal method and discourse is likely to be thought of as highly 
“obscure” and “esoteric.” Especially since there is no way an outsider can 
test, or in any objective way verify (or falsify) these claims, such claims to 
rightness in legal discourse become a major problem. And why should the 
members of the political community trust the members of this rather exclusive 
“guild” with the significant power they have? 54 
In accordance with this, occupational autonomy (and its related demanding 
qualifications, system of cooptation, peer-review, licensing, and life-time 
employment security – in short all the aspects that make professional groups 
look like modern versions of the medieval “guilds”) becomes problematic 
from this perspective. The moral aspect invoked is now thought of as 
                                           
53 Zijderveld, The Institutional Imperative, pp. 95-97, 201. 
54 Cp. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, pp. 293-309. 
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“professional mystique,” merely masking the interests of the professional in 
being beyond reproach and control. The use of terms like “vocation” or 
“calling” to serve the law as a good can be seen as self-idealization, as 
ideology masking the material interests of the professionals: “What is 
professed may mask the pursuit of self-interest.”55 
Particularly in the discipline of economics, a modern social science with 
firm roots in the empiricist and naturalist (or positivist) scientific method, “the 
pursuit of self-interest” is thought of as a much more realistic and empirically 
founded basis for human action than “altruism” or (legal) “morality.” In the 
context of law, it is much more realistic to presume that the legal professional 
cares for his own well-being rather than that he would structurally sacrifice it 
for something as vague and abstract as the well-being of the community.  
This discipline can help to make legal science more scientific. A first 
premise then is that human individuals are “rational actors” – free to choose, 
unfettered by substantive contextual values and ways of life, from a range of 
possible actions. Another premise is that means are always scarce and that the 
actors will choose the action with maximum satisfaction at the minimum of 
costs; in other words, that the choice will be “rational.” “Scarcity is thus, in 
the economist’s view, a basic fact of life, and rationality – the elimination of 
waste – is the equally basic human response to it.”56 Motivated by this desire 
to be both effective and efficient, (and who will deny that human beings are 
generally purposeful beings who have to be economic with scarce resources 
and means?) human action is roughly rational or can be thoroughly 
“rationalized.”57 
                                           
55 Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, p. xiii; cp. Brint, In an Age of 
Experts, pp. 9, 40; Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 114. 
56 Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, p. 227; “The economic theory of Rational Choice treats us 
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Surely, if we think of the law as merely an instrument to order society 
according to the wishes of the political community, there are strong incentives 
to make it as effective and efficient as possible. Effectiveness and efficiency 
will then become an important norm that functions as a central criterion by 
means of which we can decide whether the law and its institutions and 
practices are rational or not. Such a criterion can be an empirical concept if 
we focus on the maximization of some good that is both concrete and 
measurable. If this good or purpose is universally deemed important, we do 
not need to wait for the political community to state the purpose of some law 
but we have a yardstick to see whether the law, or some part of it, lives up to 
our expectations. The good that utilitarians seek to promote (“happiness,” 
“welfare” or “well-being”) seems concrete and measurable enough, and it 
does not in any way depend on some dubious metaphysical entity.58 This 
good is something we actually desire, “something we all pursue in our own 
lives, and in the lives of those we love.”59  
Being concrete and measurable implies that we can also actually check 
(and therefore know and predict) whether some rules or policies have actually 
done some identifiable good. “Utilitarianism’s two attractions, then, are that it 
conforms to our intuition that human well-being matters, and to our intuition 
that moral rules must be tested for their consequences on human well-
being.”60 Indeed, Richard Posner argues from a utilitarian perspective when 
he makes recommendations about legal policy: “I am guided mainly by the 
kind of vague utilitarianism, or ‘soft core’ classical liberalism, that one 
associates with John Stuart Mill.” He hastens to add that this moral and 
political commitment is not metaphysically grounded but merely something 
that “sketches a form of life that when properly understood is attractive to 
many people in the United States and similarly wealthy modern societies, and 
                                           
58 Cp. Hampsher-Monk I., A History of Modern Political Thought, Major Political 
Thinkers from Hobbes to Marx, Blackwell Oxford UK 1992, p. 312. 
59 Kymlicka, W., Contemporary Political Philosophy, An Introduction, Clarendon Press 
Oxford 1990, p. 10. 
60 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, pp. 10, 11, 21; cp. Dale, In Pursuit of a 
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not just me. That is ground enough for me to indicate how I would resolve 
particular issues.”61 
If we have knowledge of the concrete factual consequences of the rules, 
measures and policies, we have knowledge that we can use to maximize the 
results according to our purposes. Thus law as social science can give us 
concrete influence over our socio-political environment. The power to make 
our lives better is an important good to modern man. By contrast, when we 
actually have the knowledge of social/economic systems to achieve this good, 
not using it will be frowned upon and in need of justification in modern 
societies.  
Modern citizens will find it hard to accept wasting scarce resources, and in 
such a society, growth in welfare or well-being is a good in itself, trumping 
many other goods. This modern outlook has certainly affected legal 
institutions and practices. In a rapidly changing, highly rationalized modern 
society characterized by a strongly technological culture, there is a strong call 
for “regulation that is actively intrusive, firmly consequentialist, and forward-
looking in character.”62 To this end, the “law can use a big dose of 
disenchantment that accompanies real professionalization under the 
conditions of modernity,” Richard Posner argues.63 This professionalization 
should consist of acquiring a much more scientific ethos, which he calls “in 
essence, an attitude of respect for fact,” and which requires a focus on 
“measurable consequences” and the formulation of  “objectively testable” and 
“falsifiable” hypotheses tested by means of “controlled experiments.”64  
There is no need for the mystique and paraphernalia of authority and 
allusions to high-minded moral commitments. What Posner defends here is 
the ideal of the lawyer as an “expert professional” who intervenes in political 
struggles in the name of, or informed by scientific truth.65 However, from the 
perspective of the traditional professional ideal type this professional comes 
dangerously close to the utilitarian and materialistic ethos of the men of trade 
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and industry. Moreover, Anthony Kronman explains the growing malaise in 
the legal professions to be as a result of the fact that many of the traditional 
virtues of legal professionalism now appear as vices and vice versa.66 
 
Rational-legal authority and law as formal rationality 
The “positivist” or “scientistic” attitude is both a promise of freedom and a 
threat to it. On the one hand, the disenchantment of traditional authority and 
the shedding of the substantive limitations imposed by the traditional values 
and ways of life open up a wide new field of possibilities and in this respect 
Enlightenment is liberating. Indeed, Enlightenment is “the emergence of man 
from a state of self-incurred immaturity,” as Immanuel Kant famously put it.67 
Individual human beings are intelligent and rational enough to think for 
themselves, to decide for themselves what they think is good and worthwhile 
to pursue in their lives, and therefore they should emancipate themselves from 
the arbitrary substantive prescriptions of the community and its authorities.  
Freed from “arbitrary” substantive constraints, modern man has much 
more room for choice and the idea of man as unfettered or having free 
individual “will” now more prominently enters the historical stage. Moreover, 
during modernity the self-image of modern man has tended to become more 
and more one of a “distanced self, formally defined in terms of its power to 
choose.” Thus modern man is “correlated to an “empty” self, defined by its 
formal role of maximizing chosen satisfactions or attaining its goals with 
greatest efficiency.”68 And this can most certainly be associated with an idea 
of freedom.  
                                           
66 Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, p. 231. 
67 Kant, I., ‘An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in: Kant, I., Political 
Writings, Cambridge University Press Cambridge UK 1991, p. 54; cp. Foucault, M., ‘What 
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But we should not cry victory to soon. The modern attitude, with its 
utilitarian and instrumentalist focus on future consequences seems, on the 
other hand, to be a serious threat to the individual freedom of choice. There 
are two basic problems that I want to briefly discuss to set the stage for a 
different ideal of modern legal professionalism – the legal formalist – 
investigated more thoroughly in the third chapter. The first problem is that 
there is a structural disregard for backward-looking entitlements. The second 
problem is that the instrumentalist attitude is sometimes fundamentally at 
odds with basic moral intuitions regarding individual freedom. A brief 
presentation of Immanuel Kant’s conception of freedom will serve to 
introduce these problems. 
Kant famously founded individual freedom and morality on the conception 
of “autonomy” or “self-rule.”69 A basic point in the moral and political 
philosophy of Kant is that the “will” – which is thought of as an unfettered 
“empty self” – in order to become capable of moral action has to be 
disciplined by reason. That is to say, actions motivated by the “unfettered 
will” can never be moral actions; there is a criterion provided by reason by 
means of which the action has to be tested. Importantly, as mature adults are 
all endowed with the faculty of reason, the fettering of arbitrary will does not 
come from the outside (from the values and norms of the wider community 
and its authorities) but from the “inside.” Thus, the moral man does not give 
free rein to his arbitrary and capricious will but remains free nevertheless. 
This particular conception of freedom as autonomy is structurally different 
from that of most utilitarian conceptions of freedom. 
Let us now consider the first problem with forward-looking 
consequentialism to illustrate a basic tension in modern law. It is part of our 
everyday morality that when you have loaned me some money I should return 
it. You have an unqualified entitlement to the money, and I have a 
corresponding obligation to return it as agreed. We can refer here to an age-
old moral and legal adage: promises should be kept. This justification for 
returning the money is seen as sufficient; generally no further justification is 
                                           
69 “Autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duties 
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 42  
asked. 70 However, this justification is exactly of the vague (and metaphysical) 
kind that a modern scientific attitude eschews. Surely, the Bible can be 
quoted, or an endless list of both legal and philosophical authorities all the 
way back to classical Athens and Rome; but why should we accept their 
authority? 
Still the justification for the obligation to return the money refers to some 
fact in the past – the agreement to money-lending – and in principle we feel 
that this obligation stands as it is, regardless of future consequences of 
returning the money. We generally feel that we should not make any 
calculations on whether returning the money as agreed is maximizing our 
personal or collective welfare. We should not even make these calculations in 
those rare circumstances that not returning the money might be more 
advantageous for the other party involved in terms of future consequences. 
We think that deciding on this issue is unfair to the other because we are 
thinking and deciding for him. This is at odds with basic moral intuitions 
regarding individual freedom and autonomy; in principle the promise should 
be kept regardless of consequences.71  
There is a second problem: instrumentalism clashes with our basic moral 
intuitions. In the consequentialist perspective there is no criterion by means of 
which we can judge the choices people make. The preferences and tastes are 
taken as given; the scientist can only subsequently help to rationalize human 
action by showing what would be the most effective and efficient way to 
realize human desires. But we generally do feel that we should distinguish 
between legitimate and illegitimate (or “unfair”) preferences, because they are 
unreasonable or discriminating. 72 
For instance, a taste for racial or sexist prejudice should not be on equal 
moral footing with, let’s say, a taste for beautiful paintings. The problem is 
that such prejudice hurts those individuals that are discriminated against on 
the basis of such a preference or taste; human beings can be hurt this way like 
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71 Cp. Weinrib, E., The idea of Private Law, Harvard University Press Cambridge Mass. 
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ugly paintings cannot. We feel that such discrimination is especially immoral 
if those branded by prejudices did not choose to be what they are. “A taste for 
prejudice is not the same as other tastes because it restricts and injures 
individuals – it prevents them from exercising their own options. It stunts and 
ghettoizes them for being black, a woman, gay, or in a wheelchair – aspects of 
the person which have no basis in individual choice.”73 The intuition is that it 
is wrong in principle to discriminate on the basis of such characteristics 
regardless of whether or not we desire the particular consequences of 
behaviour based on such tastes or preferences. Such preferences are unfair 
and therefore illegitimate; the question of evaluating the consequences does 
not enter our considerations at all. 
From the consequentialist perspective, it is hard to explain both the 
intuition that backward-looking entitlements should be respected and that 
some preferences are illegitimate regardless of consequences. Therefore 
consequentialists generally dismiss such a principled attitude as dogmatic and 
irrational. However, the Kantian conception of autonomy does give an 
appealing explanation for these phenomena. We disregard the freedom of the 
other party by deciding for him in terms of future consequences what is best 
for him. Not returning the money on the basis of some calculation, or some 
weighing of the desirable consequences will not pass the formal test of reason 
because it fails to take the moneylender seriously as a free autonomous human 
being. The same goes for the preference for prejudice. We fail to take human 
beings seriously as free human beings if we restrict and injure them on the 
basis of our preferences. If we discriminate on the basis of such 
characteristics as skin colour or sexual preferences, we treat human beings as 
mere means, mere instruments in our goal attainment, and thereby we fail to 
treat them as autonomous. In the Kantian view it is not consistently rational 
(and therefore not moral) that we treat others as means in the achievement of 
our goals while we wish ourselves to be treated as an end in itself. This 
explains the duty to return the money and to abstain from discrimination on 
the basis of arbitrary prejudices: they are demands of (practical) reason. “Here 
we return to the Enlightenment view that it is the development of reason 
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which makes this will effective, it is no longer instrumental rationality which 
transforms us, however, but rather the demands of universality.”74 
Such moral intuitions, made coherent with the help of the ideas of human 
freedom and reason, can provide the first axioms of a modern system and 
practice of law. The demand will now be that modern law and its 
representatives respect human dignity and freedom by aspiring to neutrality, 
objectivity and fairness. I will argue that this morality entails a principled 
respect for individual rights – entails “Taking Rights Seriously” – and an 
emphasis on universally valid, objective legal rules, legal principles and fair 
procedures.75 The legal professional is not to examine issues of policy or the 
effects of the legal decisions but to narrow the differences between the parties 
by reasoning from shared premises provided by the law and its procedures. 
The courts claim a special expertise as guardians of due process, and the 
integrity of procedure becomes the legal value par excellence. In this 
expertise, and in this value, the courts find their basic source of legitimacy.76  
We owe it to the members of the community – whom we should treat as 
(legal) subjects and not as “objects” – to make legal reasoning as fair and 
predictable as possible. Therefore, we should aspire to a level of predictability 
that political or moral reasoning do not possess, and this requires, if not a 
complete codification, at least a thorough rationalization of the law. We need 
to make the law into a coherent, consistent system of rules and procedures, 
because we cannot derive unequivocal and objective solutions to legal 
conflicts from inconsistent law. Theorizing from the basic formal building 
blocks of the law and strengthening its coherence and transparency is 
generally thought to be the task of modern legal science. 
When the law is thus rationalized and systematized with the help of 
dogmatic theory, legal practice becomes more transparent and legal 
professionals receive a new justification and role in modern society. Formalist 
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professionals are experts in formal law (or agents of formal legal knowledge 
in Steven Brint’s sense), nothing more and nothing less. These professionals 
do not need any further moral vaulting, and the legal knowledge they 
represent does not need to be esoteric and intractable for outsiders. The 
argumentation does not need to be a “narrative” (and the product of 
hermeneutics plus practical wisdom) but can be strictly rational and analytical 
instead.77 Application of the law becomes merely a matter of the analysis of 
the meaning of the legal rules at hand, and of deducing conclusions for the 
present case. Such reasoning can be thought of as independent of value 
judgments and therefore objective.78 But here the ideal of legal reasoning 
borders on the kind of formalistic “geometrical reasoning” that, as we saw, 
the traditional lawyer explicitly rejects. 
In addition, as this legal expert merely stays on the analytical level there is 
no need to deeply identify with the norms and values of some legal tradition. 
Moreover, there is no need to build character or to be formed and moulded 
according to some perfectionist ethical ideal of what it means to be a lawyer. 
The private or personal and the public role can be strictly distinguished, and 
in a complex modern world where people play many different, often 
incongruent roles in their lives, and where “authenticity” as an ethical ideal 
has become dominant, this distinction plays an important role. When we stay 
on the level of objective rules and procedures, the personal and private can 
stay out of the picture, and this makes it possible to keep the personal at some 
distance from the public role. Being a legal professional is a job like any other 
that just requires a corpus of rather abstract and complex technical 
knowledge. But this is all there is to it; there is no further claim to superior 
powers of reasoning or judgment.79 
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In chapter three I argue that the objectivity that is aspired to in the law and 
legal practices is the result of a “drive to the universal.” The project will be to 
find basic universal legal categories that “ground” the legal system and 
through which the jurist can understand legal conflicts and find their solution. 
For the ideal-typical formalist lawyer, this universality is the only kind of 
objectivity that is available. The quest for universality makes an autonomous 
scientific legal discipline and practice possible, enabling lawyers to make 
impartial and objective juridical judgments.80  
For instance, Ernest Weinrib writes that in terms of its form law has an 
immanent rationality that makes legal reasoning and analysis structurally 
different from political or economical reasoning; and he explicitly argues that 
it is the Kantian idea of individual rights and the idea of justice as fairness 
(more specifically “corrective justice”) that describes this specific form. The 
law can have all different sorts of “content” or “substance.” What type of 
content should be settled by an argument outside rather than inside the law, 
but as form it makes sense on its own terms as long as it is coherent and fair. 
One might say that this provides the law with its specific grammar (or syntax) 
as opposed to the actual content and meaning (or semantics) of legal 
discourse: “Corrective justice and Kantian right are as immanent in the legal 
discourse as principles of syntax and logic in discourse generally.”81 
Weinrib emphasises that “nothing about formalism precludes 
indeterminacy,” but the “forms of justice are both determinate and 
indeterminate.” They “are indeterminate in that they do not predetermine 
exhaustively the particular results they govern.”82 And indeed, this formalism 
is explicitly not about results or consequences: it is thoroughly anti-
consequentialist. A focus on consequences would even structurally threaten 
legal objectivity because it would imply, as Posner puts it, “a messy encounter 
with empirical reality.”83 Instead, the objectivity is sought in the forms of 
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legal reasoning. These forms “are determinate in that they establish the 
bounds of coherence for the particulars that fall under them, thus making 
these particulars intelligible as the sorts of things that they are”. In essence, 
Weinrib concludes, in its governance of juridical relationships, “formalism is 
universality with a variable content.”84 
What arises from this aspiration is a different vision, not only on legal 
knowledge and reasoning, but also on legal authority. I propose to analyse this 
formalist vision of the modern legal order in terms of what Max Weber called 
“formal rationality” and the authority that the formalist professional 
represents is of a, so-called, “rational-legal” type.85 Such legal-rational 
authority is an impersonal form of authority that can be contrasted with both 
traditional and charismatic authority because it is based on legitimacy as the 
result of a system of consciously made rational rules. Such legitimacy derives 
from claims to rationality and universality and is rather formal, bureaucratic 
and legalistic; it is committed to rules and processes. “Fundamentally it rests 
on universal norms, rather than on the grace and favor of particular holders of 
power. It outlaws the arbitrary, the ad hoc.”86 It does so because arbitrary and 
ad hoc rulings are not reasonable, and therefore fail to do justice to legal 
subjects as both free and rational human beings. 
 
Modernism and substantive rationality 
Both formalism and instrumentalism are often attacked as rather one-sided. 
But there is more to the Enlightenment than formalism and naturalist 
instrumentalism. According to Louis Dupré the Enlightenment “was first and 
foremost a breakthrough in critical consciousness. Those who criticize its 
one-sidedness are unquestionably right, but they ought to remember that they 
attack the movement with the very weapon forged by the object of their 
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attack: that of critical reflectiveness.”87 Like Louis Dupré, I propose to 
interpret so-called “modernist” tendencies in modern culture in terms of the 
critical consciousness that turns on the Enlightenment project itself, especially 
since the metaphysics and (political and moral) ideology that the 
Enlightenment gave rise to are the object of much modern critical thought. In 
my fifth chapter I will explore this criticism of modern culture. “Legal 
modernism” will be presented as the aspiration to broaden the 
Enlightenment’s both highly formalist and instrumentalist concept of reason, 
intent, according to Dupré, “on saving the traditional content of reason.”88 
This critical project has been largely dominated by the political progressive 
left, especially in the United States:  
 
“Some of those who criticize the individualism and rationalism of the ruling theory 
represent what is often called, in political discussions, the ‘left.’ They believe that 
the formalism of legal positivism forces courts to substitute a thin sense of 
procedural justice, which serves conservative social policies, for a richer substantive 
justice that would undermine these policies.”89 
  
An important strand in the criticism of modern formalist-instrumentalist 
thought derives from Friedrich Nietzsche. As opposed to neo-Kantians, who 
think of universal conceptual categories as an essential ordering of reality, 
Nietzsche thinks of abstract conceptual thought as a “Verstellung,” that is as a 
structural displacing or disarranging of reality. Therefore, conceptual thought 
is a always a falsification of the world; reality in all its multiplicity and 
richness, always both exceeds and escapes those conceptual categories that 
are brought in to order and master it.90 
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One of those falsifications is the idea of human beings as “empty” and 
“autonomous selves,” selves that can be formally defined merely by their 
power to choose, a fiction that is part of the very core of the formalist-
instrumentalist view of modern law.91 William Lucy gives an impression of 
how we can criticize this anthropology as a typically “masking ideology” that 
critical thinkers want to expose:  
 
“First, because it is not us and, second, because it is complicit in legitimising 
existing power structures. Those structures are portrayed as a product of this self 
when in fact they produce it; moreover, this produced self is a seductive myth 
unrelated to how we really are. The effect of the myth is to legitimate power 
structures – their legitimacy derives from the fact that they are supposedly subject to 
the rationality and authority of the relatively autonomous self. […] This, then, is the 
point at which the argument about the disappearance of the self invokes the 
ideology critique.”92 
 
Thus the self as an empty and autonomous subject can be thought of as a 
“myth” that serves to legitimize the existing (unequal or otherwise unjust) 
distribution of power in modern liberal democracies. However, there is no 
alternative to myths or narratives as such. Nietzsche argued that we need 
other narratives or “myths” that provide a road toward a richer and fuller 
understanding of human reality. Similarly, Louis Althusser argued that all 
human beings actually need ideology in the sense of a number of unproven 
ideas, myths, or representations that preserve their identity as a social being.93 
Indeed, much modernist discourse is self-consciously developing conceptions 
of identity and self-hood by means of narratives and methods derived from 
literary analysis and criticism; methods that try to stay clear of any kind of 
“naturalism” and “scientism.” Here we may seem to be back at the traditional 
position that I began with, but I will later sketch a picture of a lawyer at a 
four-way crossing that addresses this issue. The modernist explicitly 
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distinguishes himself from traditionalism, as he cannot experience the 
authority (and legitimacy) of the tradition that the lawyer is thought to 
represent. 
In a quest for meaning and justice, the modernist does not “flee 
backwards” into the embrace of timeworn substantial traditions handed down 
by previous generations. Rather he or she feels that those traditions fail to do 
justice to the complex world we presently find ourselves in. The “canonical 
narratives” of the tradition might be experienced as just as impotent to give 
sense and meaning to our present lives and struggles, as might be the 
formalist-instrumentalist perspective of the Enlightenment. The general basic 
experience might thus be one of “estrangement” or of “homelessness.” Thus, 
one may feel that, in the words of David Luban in his book Legal Modernism, 
“neither tradition nor universal law provides a meaning-giving context for 
what we do and suffer.”94 
Instead, the modernist radicalizes critical consciousness and points his 
critical arrows at both the Enlightenment project and traditionalism. The 
criticism of the Grand Legal Tradition might start with a criticism of its 
tendency to “historicism.” The traditionalist strongly identifies with the Legal 
Tradition and derives a sense of dignity and worth from it as a professional. 
He may therefore find it hard to resist the idea of the historical development 
of the Grand Legal Tradition as both necessary and objective, as the 
realization of a “higher” and “necessary” order – in short, as a capitalized 
“Grand Narrative.”95 But the lure of historicism should be resisted because it 
cannot survive critical scrutiny.  
For the modernist the most important problem with traditionalism is that 
there seems to be an inherent conservatism in this attitude. By contrast, the 
“estranged” do not feel that there is much worth conserving in the tradition; 
they do not experience the claim to authority and legitimacy. If you do not 
experience this claim by history the perspective becomes radically different. 
Lenski nicely summarizes this: “Conservatives insist that might is employed 
only as the handmaiden of right, to restrain and rebuke those who put self-
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interest above the common good, while radicals maintain that the state 
employs might to suppress right, in defence of selfish interests.” 96 
The modernist (or Lenski’s radical) therefore chooses not to flee 
backwards from the modern world and its dominant ideological narratives, 
but forward into the future. A wholesale attack on the traditional and modern 
ideologies might make room for new forms of substantive rationality and for 
new ways of realizing justice. A fundamental critique of modern society and 
the modern law that constitutes and supports it should make room for creative 
and innovative social and political theory. For example, Roberto Mangabeira 
Unger is self-consciously and proudly modernist in this sense. The critique 
Unger develops aims at exposing all the “false necessities” – those of 
historicism as well as those of the present formalist-instrumentalist paradigm 
– that inhibit present social and political thought. In his work he offers exactly 
such a fundamental critique and also inventive ideas on how to realize goods 
like participation, substantial equality, autonomy and solidarity in modern 
societies. This is appealing especially when one feels that modern societies 
are wanting in those respects.97 
Duncan Kennedy is another self-declared modernist. Kennedy fights the 
false appearance of determinacy and necessity in the modern social world, 
which, in his words, “hides a true determination by human agency.” The 
appearance of determinacy and necessity is thus false and this means that 
people “alienate their powers” without really knowing it.98 Kennedy suggests 
that in some sense it is better not to alienate our powers and to determine our 
fates ourselves. This may not be an easy task. Max Weber was rather 
pessimistic about human freedom because there are strong forces to be 
reckoned with in modern societies. Weber thought of modernity as becoming 
a gloomy bureaucratic state where administered uniformity (and all the 
determinacy and necessities that this invokes) severely limited human 
freedom. Moreover, Weber thought that if there was an escape from this “iron 
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cage” of bureaucracy and formal rationality, it lay in the will and not in 
reason: “Freedom and democracy are only possible where the resolute will of 
a nation not to allow itself to be ruled like sheep is permanently alive.”99 
The famous “iron cage” that imprisons modern man is the product of a 
modern rational or analytical consciousness. This consciousness severely 
inhibits creativity and innovation and, moreover, one might even feel that 
certain values and goods are structurally repressed in modern liberal 
democratic states. Institutional languages, like that of the law and its 
practices, are typically languages that impose a conceptual framework that 
easily (and sometimes radically) excludes other, alternative languages and 
voices.100 Much modernist work can be thought of as trying to “disrupt the 
rational grid” in order to make room for these alternative voices; the 
disruption may thus make room for narratives that express meanings and 
values that are now structurally repressed. Once the traditional and modern 
depictions of law (and the concomitant methods and strategies of legal 
interpretation) are thought of as “ideology” masking the self-interest of the 
rulers and as instruments to justify existing power structures, one might feel 
an urgent need for a critical perspective and method in the law. One might 
feel a need to “disrupt the rational grid” of legal formalist-instrumentalist 
reasoning.101 
With Alan Megill, we can interpret the work of influential critical thinkers 
like Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida as engaging in a rebellion 
against the iron cage of modern rationality and bureaucracy. As I argued, this 
is a rebellion both with and against Kant. The ideal of constructing a social 
science modelled on natural science, in both its instrumentalist and formalist 
versions, came under attack by these thinkers with the help of the intellectual 
resources that Kant gave them.102 Indeed, we see that much modernist thought 
in the legal world aims at breaking open and disrupting the “iron cage” of 
legal practices and is inspired by the ideas and methods these revolutionary 
thinkers provided. In its most radical and revolutionary form, what is 
                                           
99 Gerth & Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, p. 71; Kolb, The Critique of Pure 
Modernity, pp. 10, 11; Whimster & Lash, Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity, p. 12. 
100 Gaakeer, Hope Springs Eternal, p. 28. 
101 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, pp. 7, 8, 346; Gaakeer, Hope Springs Eternal, pp. 
28, 29, 30. 
102 Megill, Prophets of Extremity, p. 4. 
 53 
generally aimed at is a “crisis” within the system; a crisis that makes a 
profound transformation of the styles of thought and life possible. The 
ultimate goal of such revolutionary thought is “a radical transformation of the 
whole symbolic dimension of everyday existence.”103 
Here lies a link with modernism in art. After many schools of art (and art 
criticism) that were devoted to purely formal goals, modernist art has 
achieved a conscious and critical reflectivity with the process of its own 
creation; a consciousness which manifests itself in a constant revolution and 
the invention of new forms. What we see is the emergence of the modernist 
artist as a typical modern self in the sense of a self “who chooses his styles 
and defines himself over and against the fixity of some tradition, in this case 
the tradition of modernism itself.”104 
But how are legal modernists to rebel against the “tradition of modernism 
itself” within the legal world? Duncan Kennedy argues for “eclecticism.” All 
methods that make it possible to criticize and transcend the “necessities” of 
modern legal doctrine and practice are welcomed. “We don’t believe only 
statistics, and we don’t believe only prose that sings totality. Why not use 
both?” 105 But if one looks at his A Critique of Adjudication, one can say that 
he focuses to a large degree on the “soft methods” developed in the human 
sciences, in philosophy, and in literary and art criticism. Thus he generally 
displays a loss of faith in modern naturalist science that is characteristic of the 
Romantic “reaction” to the Enlightenment (which Dupré rather sees as a 
“deepening” or a “broadening” of the critical consciousness characteristic of 
the Enlightenment). Importantly, the route to “transcendence among 
romantics is characteristically by way of aesthetic creation”106 and indeed in 
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Kennedy we see a return to narratives as he invests much hope in the 
disrupting potential of cultural “artefacts.”107 
This modernist quest for “transcendence,” and the substantive rationality 
that it makes possible, may even be regarded as an ultimate good. If one feels 
that there is a constant tendency towards closing the famous “iron cage”, like 
Max Weber argued, the disrupting of the rational grid can be experienced as a 
good in itself, requiring no further justification. However, if one does feel the 
need to legitimize the project, one might express the hope that it brings us a 
step closer to some better world, a world that is at least partly foreseen in an 
alternative theoretical blueprint or system. Roberto Unger provides us with 
glimpses of such a better future in his work; he tries to offer a vision that 
justifies this rather destructive critical attitude as a means to an important 
good: a better future.108  
Duncan Kennedy, however, does not offer such a vision. Kennedy aims at 
a perpetual liberation from experiences of constraint by reason, “in the name, 
not of justice and a new system, but of a dialectic of system and anti-
system.”109 This kind of modernism refuses to be settled within any set of 
rules or forms, and it even refuses “what in many other areas of life is a 
typically modern desire for unity and system, for the pure form.”110 The 
necessities that are informed by the desire for rationality, unity and system 
Kennedy associates with “death,” which makes him long for “liveliness” and 
creativity.111 Here the dialectic of system and anti-system becomes a goal in 
itself and we seem to have reached the outer extreme of modernism, the point 
where it borders on a post-modernist ethos. 
 
Each of next four chapters serves to give more flesh to the four ideal-typical 
professionals that I introduced here. Together these chapters also serve to 
investigate tensions in modern law by taking these tensions seriously – even if 
this means exaggerating them occasionally. Importantly, this is motivated by 
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the effort not to come to some synthesis or to somehow “overcome” these 
tensions because taking these tensions seriously, at bottom, means genuinely 
allowing for difference. 
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2. 
The Art of Authority 
 
 
 
Already in the early nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville pointed to the 
risks of the dismantling of customary or “traditional” authorities who had an 
important function in maintaining the cultural contexts and the traditions of 
the community. De Tocqueville predicted that in modern liberal democracies 
political power would invade more and more spheres of the lives of citizens, 
and foresaw an ever greater risk of political opportunism and of a tyranny of 
public opinion and dominating majorities. At the same time, however, in his 
book Democracy in America, de Tocqueville also argues that it is particularly 
the legal profession that shows signs of maintaining traditional authority. He 
deems this important because the autonomy and the high status of both the 
lawyers and the legal tradition in the United States counterbalances the 
dangers of democracy. A flourishing class of lawyers is indispensable to keep 
political passions in check.1 
Indeed, one can argue that legal professionals occupy a special place in 
modern society. Because legality is thought of as an important good, specific 
professionals – judges, advocates, notaries and state attorneys – are granted 
special competencies, immunities and privileges in order to be able to serve 
this good. As legal professionals they are thus bestowed with authority with 
regard to the settlement of legal conflicts in the community, and they do so by 
means of the application and the administration of the authority of the law. 
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The other side of the coin is that they are expected to live up to specific 
expectations of those subject to the law.  
The legal authority of the legal professionals can be justified by a general 
commitment to a specific social order, or the “community” that the law makes 
possible. In the present chapter, I explore this link between authority and 
community and its implications for the promise of legal professionalism. The 
fundamental idea is that the authority of the law and its administrators are 
means to serve the political order as a particular community, which implies 
that the professionals will have to take seriously the needs, values and 
conceptions of well-being of the community. More specifically, the law 
serves as a means to an important political goal, which is safeguarding society 
from the escalation of social strife and conflict into potentially highly 
disrupting violence. At the same time, guarding the law also means creating 
and defending a “nomos,” a shared world, both meaningful and normative, 
which implies guarding part of the common cultural understandings that can 
be thought of as the “backbone” of the community.2 Those common 
“meanings” also have a normative aspect because they make a group of 
individuals into a community. 
This professional commitment leads to a particular professional ethos that 
emphasizes “independence” and personal “disinterestedness.” What is also 
required is “character” to resist all temptation to abuse the professional 
powers for personal gain at the expense of the community. The professional’s 
independent posture and character helps to strengthen the confidence of the 
members of the community that the legal professionals can be trusted with 
power. In addition, cultivated judgment is required, which means that the 
lawyer knows where the good of the community in a particular case lies and 
how he should act to realize it. Character, independence and good judgment 
are the qualities that are prized in the traditional professional culture.3 
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Community and authority 
“Politics is always the pursuit of order,” Anthony Kronman states in his book 
on legal ethics, The Lost Lawyer, Failing ideals of the Legal Profession.4 No 
society can afford to neglect the pacification of society by means of 
authoritative judgments, and therefore every community has political and 
legal institutions to serve this goal. The Lost Lawyer gives us an interesting 
and inspiring picture of what this means for professional ethics and the 
specific ideals and commitments that are expected of the professional. By 
explicitly linking the law to the pursuit of order, Kronman has expressed the 
central political concern of the ideal lawyer that serves as an inspiration in his 
book. This “lawyer-statesman” is largely concerned with order and the good 
(or virtue) that makes it possible, i.e. “political fraternity.” This, according to 
Kronman, should be the countervailing power against “the forces of disorder 
that threaten all our human works”5 and thus make community possible. 
But what is a community? We should start with the premise that humans 
are social beings and that they feel most safe and complete in a group of 
kindred spirits. In the words of the sociologist Gerhard Lenski, “Man is a 
social being obliged by nature to live with others as a member of society. On 
this proposition at least, radicals and conservatives agree.”6 Seen from an 
external point of view any group of people is nothing but a flock of discrete 
individuals. But striking facial resemblances between members of a small 
group might already justify the assumption of a special bond and loyalty 
among them; they are most likely members of the same family. And indeed, 
both historically and symbolically the family is the archetype of the 
community.7 But the loyalty of individuals generally expands beyond the 
family, and the bigger the group the less “natural” and the more “cultural” the 
common features and the shared identity become. What makes such bigger 
groups into specific “communities,” what makes them “belong together,” is 
hard to discern from the outside unless one can “read the signs.”  
To find out whether we are dealing with a certain community or just an 
arbitrary set of discrete individuals, we need to “enter” into the minds of the 
                                           
4 Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, p. 108. 
5 Ibidem. 
6 Lenski, Power and Privilege, p. 25; cp. Berger & Luckmann, The Social Construction of 
Reality, p. 128; Unger, Knowledge & Politics, pp. 223-226. 
7 Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition, p. 48. 
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group members and see how they experience special loyalties and 
commitments to certain others and how they express these special loyalties 
and commitments. From the inside, the group as distinct from individual 
members is often experienced concretely in certain feelings of respect for, and 
belonging to, a community as expressed by particular persons, symbols, 
narratives, rituals, traditions and institutions. From this internal perspective 
the group can be experienced as highly stable and concrete.8 Moreover, in 
shared respect for symbols, rituals and institutions the individual members of 
the group recognize each other as members of the same group. They might, 
for instance, even come to recognize each other as having a kind of special 
relationship that is akin to the special loyalty one feels to family members. 
One might even express this by referring to them as “brothers” and “sisters” 
and in tightly knit (religious) communities this is exactly what one can expect 
to find. The political ideal of “political fraternity” refers to the special 
meaning these familiar bonds have for us.9 This means that a community is 
constituted by shared understandings. Compare Roberto Unger:  
 
“[…] the presence of commonly held moral and cognitive orientations is always 
what makes organized life possible. Shared beliefs allow people to understand one 
another and to know what to expect from each other. The basic scheme of human 
conduct is therefore the internalization of shared understandings and values.”10  
 
The community consists of individuals sharing meaning in their symbols, 
customs, rituals and institutions. Importantly, they are experienced as having 
a normative aspect because these shared understandings are constitutive of the 
community. Only if the individuals experience these meanings as valuable 
and worthy of respect can there be a community of meanings that 
“transcends” the individuals. Hegel stated that such a community must 
constitute a common life in which all individuals find their place and identity. 
What makes a “heap” of people into a community is thus a shared morality in 
                                           
8 Cp. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, p. 108. 
9 Cp. Bourdieu, P., Practical Reason, On the Theory of Action, Polity Press Oxford UK 
1998, pp. 64-73; Durkheim, E., Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, Routledge London 
and New York 2001, pp. 25, 26. 
10 Unger, Law in modern society, p. 30. 
 61 
the sense of shared values and meanings.  In other words, it is Sittlichkeit or 
the “ethical life” that has its basis in custom.11  
The internalization and realization of these shared understandings makes 
the (by nature possibly egoistic and selfish) individual into a social being. By 
paying respect to the community’s “ideology,” the individual can prove him- 
or herself to be a virtuous and loyal member of the group. Obviously, 
“ideology” has a negative connotation that we generally owe to Marx. For 
Marx it refers to the (super-structural) ideas that legitimize the rule of the 
powerful but in fact only serve the interests of the dominant class. However, 
Louis Althusser argued that ideology – the unproven ideas, myths, or 
representations of a group – forms an indispensable part of every social 
structure, not necessarily one that supports only the interests of one class. He 
argues that all groups need to hold on to a number of unproven assumptions to 
preserve their identity.12 Seen in this light, ideology is a collection of shared 
understandings that individuals experience as an essential part of their identity 
as social beings.  
For Hegel, the moment of truth is when the group goes to war, and the 
community calls on its members to maintain its substantial unity “at the risk 
and sacrifice of property and life.”13 Only someone who is truly committed to 
the community will actually risk life and property; and we generally can call 
this motivating sentiment “patriotism.” In other words, human beings as 
social beings need to have something in common with their fellow human 
beings that they value both in them and in themselves. This commonality has 
to be taken seriously by the members of the community, and they should be 
prepared to submit to this as a common good. The individuals should be 
prepared to “open” or “give” themselves to this good, conform to it, be 
formed by it, and inform their actions by it: “The task of forging a common 
                                           
11 Taylor, C., Hegel, Cambridge University Press Cambridge UK 1975, pp. 439, 444, 458; 
Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 36; cp. Unger, What Should Legal Analysis 
Become?, p. 108. 
12 Althusser, For Marx, pp. 231-241; cp. Dupré, The Enlightenment and the Intellectual 
Foundations of Modern Culture, p. 10. 
13 Hegel, G.W.F., Philosophy of Right, Oxford University Press Oxford 1967, § 324; cp. 
Hampsher-Monk, A History of Modern Political Thought, p. 474; cp. Collins, Weberian 
Sociological Theory, pp. 155-157. 
 62  
citizenship among a vast and disparate people invites more strenuous forms of 
soulcraft.”14 In one word, they should accept its “authority.” 
In his Spheres of Justice Michael Walzer is also especially concerned with 
the common meanings and values that make a group of discrete individuals 
into a community, and Walzer points specifically to the common language, 
history and culture as producing some kind of “collective consciousness.” 
Walzer warns us not to “reify” this collective consciousness but he argues that 
“[…] the sharing of sensibilities and intuitions among the members of a 
historical community is a fact of life.” Moreover, since “in matters of 
morality, argument simply is the appeal to common meanings,” morality in 
his view is closely tied to such common understandings.15 The “moral 
community” is, then, constituted as a “nomos,” a collective consciousness of 
meanings and norms, inspiring the individual members with the feeling of 
communality and a specific identity and place. These shared understandings 
become concrete and (relatively) stable not just in ritual and symbols of the 
group, they also become concrete in the phenomenon of “authority” as the 
community presents and represents itself in authoritative texts, figures, 
institutions, and practices. James Boyd White aptly describes the link between 
community and authority: 
 
“A claim for – or against – the authority of an institution or a set of practices is 
always, among other things, an invitation to create a community, both with one’s 
interlocutor and with those others one speaks about, a community for which 
authority is claimed.”16 
 
When we explore the idea of “authority” we can start with the classic 
Weberian contrast between “authority” and “power” (or “naked power”). 
Power in social relations is simply the ability to make others do what you 
want them to do. An authority can make others obey his or her will by making 
them feel that submission to the authority’s power is obligatory rather than 
                                           
14 Sandel, M., Democracy’s Discontent, America in Search of a Public Philosophy, The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press Cambridge Mass. 1996, p. 319. 
15 Walzer, M., Spheres of Justice, A defense of Pluralism & Equality, Blackwell Oxford 
1983, pp. 28, 29. 
16 White, J.B., Acts of Hope, Creating Authority in Literature, Law, and Politics, Chicago 
University Press Chicago 1994, p. xii. 
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coercive. Those who are subject to the authority, and who are thus forced into 
order, feel that the authority has the right to do so; authority is the legitimate 
exercise of power.17 “The power of the Catholic Church over Catholics is 
traditional, but its power over heretics who are persecuted is naked. The 
power of the State over loyal citizens is traditional, but its power over rebels 
is naked,” Bertrand Russell writes.18 We might say that when there is 
authority there is not only outward conformity, in the sense of doing as 
demanded, but also an “inner” conformity: the demand is experienced as 
legitimate. Legitimacy is therefore the crucial ingredient. Moreover, 
legitimacy can be thought of as the “invisible glue that holds society 
together.”19 We see then how authority and community are closely linked 
concepts and phenomena. 
Max Weber described three ultimate principles, or three types, of 
legitimacy. Two types of authority (“traditional” and “charismatic”) are of a 
“personal” nature and the third, “rational-legal authority,” is, by contrast, 
“impersonal.” Legitimacy is here grounded in a system of consciously made, 
rational and universal rules.20 The rationalization and formalization processes 
that lead to this rational-legal type will be explored in the next chapter. But, 
although the legal professional might be immediately attracted to this idea, in 
the present chapter I am most interested in the concept of traditional authority, 
the authority that is closely woven into the fabric of tradition, community and 
customary morality. I will do this for two reasons. In the first place this 
exploration can serve as a foil for the next chapters. Secondly, I will argue 
that aspects of this type of authority and the idea of community that is linked 
with it are still with us today and may even prove to be indispensable for the 
understanding of the promise of legal professionalism. 
Traditional authority should be contrasted with charismatic authority, 
which refers to rule over others that is experienced as legitimate because of 
some extraordinary personal qualities of the ruler, qualities that give the ruler 
an almost magical appeal. Surely this is a “personal” type of authority and 
many lawyers may have this special quality. The ideal type of “traditional 
                                           
17 Gerth & Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, pp. 180, 294-301. 
18 Russell, B., Power, A new Social Analysis, Routledge London 2004 (1938), p. 63. 
19 Friedman, Total Justice, p. 30; cp. Unger, Law in modern society, pp. 29-30. 
20 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, Law, pp. 112, 113, 211, 212; Unger, Law in modern 
society, pp. 29-30. 
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authority” is also personal in the sense that particular persons represent an 
ancient tradition that is expressive of the collective identity, one that 
individual members of the community can identify with, and preferably on a 
“deep” emotional level. The authority is experienced as the privileged 
spokesperson of a tradition that has an inherent worth and which carries, in 
the words of Robert Nisbet, an “inherent and unassailable wisdom 
transcending any one man’s reason.”21 Moreover, because such authorities 
represent such a tradition, they have a special status within the community 
and such authority is cultivated and transmitted through special institutions, 
practices and processes of education.22 
If we take seriously that community, morality and authority are strongly 
linked, we can think of traditional authority as “functional,” at least to a 
certain degree. That is to say, authority can be thought of as having an 
important, indispensable function in the constitution and maintenance of 
morality and thereby of the community. Nisbet argues that authority which is 
rooted in moral values, not only buttresses moral life, but that it is moral life:  
 
“Only when traditions, codes, and roles have the effect of coercing, directing, or 
restraining man’s impulses can it be said that society is genuinely in existence. […] 
Man cannot become attached to higher aims and submit to a rule if he sees nothing 
above him to which he belongs. To free him from all social pressure is to abandon 
him to himself and demoralize him.”23   
 
Moreover, it is exactly because authority is not totally irrational that we can 
understand the practice and institutions of authority.24 The first basic function 
of authority figures is to represent a group of people such that their separate 
individual wills are bound into one. This representation makes it possible for 
the authority to both speak and act on behalf of the group.25 Although, as we 
                                           
21 Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition, p. 142. 
22 Gerth & Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, p. 296. 
23 Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition, pp. 151, 154, 158; Durkheim E., Moral Education, A 
Study in the Application of the Sociology of Education, The Free Press of Glencoe Ill. 
1961, pp. 31-64. 
24 Brint, In an Age of Experts, pp. 6, 7; Gerth & Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, p. 
296. 
25 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, pp. 108, 298, 299. 
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will see later on, the materialist philosopher Thomas Hobbes is not the most 
likely candidate to start with when one is interested in the link between 
authority and some substantial community, his definition of authority is 
canonical: 
 
“A multitude of men, are made one person, when they are by one man, or one 
person represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of the multitude 
in particular. For it is the unity of the representers, not the unity of the represented, 
that makes the person one.”26  
 
Such an authority figure is functional in the community because the symbols 
and rituals of the group, although they do generate a sense of communality 
and bonding, cannot act on behalf of the group. By contrast, an authority can 
represent the group and be authorized to act in its name and thus through the 
authority the group can act collectively. Such actions can be directed at 
individual outsiders or other collectivities, but such an authority can now also 
act collectively toward individuals within the group who threaten to disrupt 
the unity with selfish and aggressive behavior. This is what Hobbes saw as the 
primary function of the authority in the political community. 
Traditionally, the relation between the authority and the subjects is thought 
of as top-down, with God as the ultimate authority from which all earthly 
authority derives its legitimacy.27 Extrapolating from the family experience 
wherein the father is the central authority figure, we might come to refer to 
such authorities as “fathers” who can speak on behalf of a group as a kind of 
family. We call those communities “patriarchal” where the power of the 
highest authorities is seen as “but little different from that exercised by fathers 
over sons, priests over communicants, and masters over apprentices.”28 By 
contrast, in modern political philosophy, commonly thought to start with 
Hobbes’s Leviathan, there is a “bottom-up” relationship between the authority 
and the subjects based on the “consent” of the subjects; to the modern mind 
the authority speaks on behalf of the group which is the ultimate “author.” 
Hobbes thought of authority in contractual terms to emphasize the idea that 
                                           
26 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 114; cp. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, § 279. 
27 Cp. Hampsher-Monk , A History of Modern Political Thought, pp. 36- 45, 97-103. 
28 Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition, p. 108; Gerth & Wright Mills (eds.), From Max 
Weber, p. 294. 
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the whole political order is ultimately grounded in consent, and thus a whole 
new tradition of modern liberal philosophy thinks of the legitimacy of power 
as deriving from the consent of the people. While the subsequent exercise of 
power is certainly top-down, it acquires legitimacy from the initial rational 
consent of the subjects.29 
Hobbes thus conceives of the authority figure – the sovereign – as the 
person who unifies the group because he is himself one and indivisible. When 
the individual group members feel that such a figure can speak on behalf of 
them all and unite their separate wills into one, they experience such a figure 
as authorized, and the power that he exercises as legitimate rule. This idea is 
contrasted with the idea that God authorizes authority top-down but the 
objective, if not the result, is the same. In both perspectives “authority refers 
to a kind of bonding, a link of legitimacy between someone or other that 
commands and the subjects who follow or obey.”30 There is thus a bonding 
link between the authority and those who obey the commands, but there is 
also a bonding link amongst the “subjects” of such an authority: the authority 
binds the community. Robert Nisbet thus argues: 
 
“The function of authority is integrative, the indispensable cement of association, 
the constituent tie of human loyalties. Loyalties and obligations to the group would 
waver, would be constantly threatened with atrophy, were it not for the hard, 
unyielding structure of authority that serves not only the mission of the group and 
its values but also the vital tie between individual and group.”31 
 
As said before, this authority could flow from the individual charismatic 
qualities of some leader, but generally it derives from some supra-individual 
                                           
29 “True sovereignty, it had been argued from Hobbes to Rousseau, has its origin in, not 
tradition, not the historic social authorities, but in the nature of man and in contractual 
consent, either actual or implicit, and it gains its rationality from its independence of all 
other types of authority.” Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition, p. 116. 
30 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 112; “the theory of legitimacy or consensus […] 
starts with society or group and its shared values and understandings.” Unger, Law in 
modern society, pp. 29-30. 
31 Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition, p. 163; cp. Parsons, T., ‘A Sociologist Looks at the 
Legal Profession’, in: Essays in Sociological Theory, The Free Press New York 1954, pp. 
378, 379; Aubert, V., The Hidden Society, The Westminster Press Inc. Totowa NJ 1965, p. 
65. 
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power – God, the state, the community, a tradition – that “clothes a person 
with a reputation, a dignity, a power of ultimate decision, which could never 
flow from his individuality.”32 Of course, such an authority should show 
genuine commitment to their role because otherwise they will lose credibility 
and the respect of the subjects. “Nothing is demanded more absolutely by the 
political game than this fundamental adherence to the game itself, illusio, 
involvement, commitment,”33 writes Pierre Bourdieu. Indeed, authority and 
overt cynicism about its role in the community do not readily combine.34 But 
when the authority shows commitment, he is bestowed with a dignity that 
deserves the respect of the group members. In this respect for the authority, 
the members of the group express their respect for, and submission to, the 
community as a whole. The group is now bound by the “symbolic 
significance” that such an authority can attain in the group and to make this 
symbolic significance more concrete, authorities are often decorated with 
distinctive “marks” and “insignias” – qualifications and symbols like stripes, 
uniforms and all sorts of other attributes.35 
Respect seems to be a basic ingredient for the effectiveness of authority. 
The marks of respect that are given to the authority figure are a constant 
confirmation of the symbolic reality of authority. Bourdieu considers such 
marks of respect as “valid as oaths of allegiance” and “proofs of recognition” 
that relate to both the authority figure and the institution that instituted him. 
Interestingly, Bourdieu argues that the symbolic investment in authority by 
some group, and the distinctive marks that symbolize this, actually tends to 
change the person bestowed with authority. Once invested with authority, a 
person will generally (at least to some degree) live up to the expectations and 
the perceptions of the public. The moment he is in his role, he really is what 
                                           
32 Wolff, K.H., (ed.), The Sociology of Georg Simmel, The Free Press of Glencoe Ill. 1950, 
p. 183. 
33 Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, pp. 152, 179, 180. 
34 As Richard Posner says about judges: “It is easy (even for a judge) to be a cynical 
observer of judges, but it is difficult to be a cynical judge.” Posner, The Problematics of 
Moral and Legal Theory, p. 206. 
35 Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, pp. 123, 126; “The trappings of judicial 
authority – the robe, the elaborate deference, the solemn rhetoric, and so forth – are clues 
to the political nature of that authority.” Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, p. 82. 
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everyone believes him to be and thus he lives up in reality to his appearance.36 
When this authority is actually based on collective belief and not merely on 
personal pretensions, the authority truly represents the group and thus can 
perform the integrative function. 
The question that I would now like to address more fully is: What kind of 
arguments could support the idea of the fundamental rightness of an 
authority’s rule? This is an important question because, according to 
Lawrence Friedman, “the permanence and survival of any society – or, at any 
rate, its governing structures – depend on some mix of force and authority. 
Authority is basic.”37 Indeed, it is next to impossible for political power to be 
effective without at least some legitimacy within the community. Moreover, 
legitimacy as “invisible glue” of society is indispensable in modern societies 
where authority ultimately derives from the consent of the subjects. This 
question is crucial “because a culture cannot survive without authority; it 
cannot survive without legitimate rule; it cannot survive without shared 
norms, which are the heart and mind of the social body. When authority 
degenerates, society will tend to disintegrate too.”38  
 
Authority from the inside 
Asking for the fundamental rightness of this rule, however, is asking for a 
normative theory that can establish the legitimacy of the power of those who 
rule from a more internal point of view. As Emile Durkheim argues, “We 
cannot account for an institution simply by demonstrating its social function. 
Beyond this, it must not encounter insuperable resistance in people.”39 What, 
seen from within the shared understandings of a particular community, can 
legitimate the right to act in the name of the community? Or, to put it as 
simply as possible: what, in their own eyes, justifies the power the authority 
has over community members? To understand the normative force of 
authority I propose to use Thomas Hobbes’s political philosophy as a first 
introduction. By identifying the rather “thin” rational basis that Hobbes offers 
for the constitution of a genuine community, we can understand why from the 
                                           
36 Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 126. 
37 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 211. 
38 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 12; cp. Friedman, Total Justice, p. 30; Unger, Law 
in modern society, pp. 29-30. 
39 Durkheim, Moral Education, p. 38. 
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normative point of view we might come to argue for a “ thicker,” more 
substantial legitimation. 
Hobbes famously defends the idea of the modern state as a “Leviathan,” 
which is the artificial person that is created by all the individual members of 
the group as its “personification.”40 On the title page illustration of the first 
editions, we see this extremely potent figure as literally composed of all the 
heads of the citizens that comprises the modern state. The basic point of 
Hobbes’s argument is that it is rational (or at least reasonable) for the citizens 
of the modern state to subject themselves to the authority of one central and 
sovereign power because such an institution is highly functional in keeping 
society from going to pieces. Only a sovereign power, one and undivided, can 
pacify society such that the state of war of all against all (in which life 
famously is “nasty brutish and short”) can be overcome. 
Order is a precondition for a thriving civil society and prosperous 
economy, and therefore Hobbes argued that the peace that can be established 
by a Leviathan state that “keeps everyone in awe” is a prerequisite for 
something that we should all want. People only experience the security they 
need for genuine freedom of choice when there is high regard for constituted 
authority. Therefore, political order is a prerequisite not only for prosperity 
but also for individual freedom.41 Thus it is rational to submit to the sovereign 
authority of the modern state; and as people subject themselves they become 
the Leviathan’s “subjects.” However well advised this choice for the 
functional authority of the state might be, Hobbes’s theory of political 
authority must have been shockingly revolutionary for many of his 
contemporaries, and not only to his contemporaries. Even today Hobbes is 
considered controversial as a political philosopher. 
For one thing, his theory posits the absolute authority of the state without 
deriving it from the superior and ultimate authority of God and without any 
                                           
40 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 114; cp. Hampsher-Monk, A History of Modern Political Thought, 
pp. 36- 45; “Group made man, he personifies a fictitious person, which he lifts out of the 
state of a simple aggregate of separate individuals, enabling them to act and speak, through 
him, ‘like a single person.’ Conversely, he receives the right to speak and act in the name 
of the group, to ‘take himself for’ the group he incarnates, to identify with the function to 
which ‘he gives his body and soul,’ thus giving a biological body to a constituted body.” 
Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 106. 
41 Cp. Nonet & Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, p. 5. 
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reference to the authority of the traditional “fathers” in the community: the 
heads of the families, the religious authorities, the aristocracy, or the regional 
community leaders. Moreover, Hobbes seemed to work from the 
revolutionary liberal idea that all individual citizens or subjects are equal 
within a political community and bound together by the sovereign state power 
that essentially acts as a referee and peacekeeper. Whoever is the role-
occupant of the sovereign power (a King or a parliament) is contingent and 
irrelevant. The only basis for the legitimacy of this power is that the sovereign 
can effectively keep the peace and maintain order.42 If that was not shocking 
enough to his contemporaries, even more shocking might have been the fact 
that in Hobbes’s theory of political authority the sovereign power does not 
establish or maintain anything more than a community held together by 
“awe,” or fear.43  
Looking at its underlying logic, the reason that Hobbes gives for the 
respect that is due from the subjects for this authority figure is the subject’s 
rational self-interest. The effective pacification of society by a sovereign 
power is a prerequisite for pursuing their interests or accomplishing any of 
their personal goals. The basic method available to the sovereign to achieve 
this goal is to keep all citizens in awe such that they do not dare to break the 
law. There is no further legitimation of the authority by means of reference to 
the kind of moral community that such authority should establish, embody or 
maintain; and there is also no further reference to the kind of moral example 
that such a figure or institution should set to the individual members of the 
community. Although Hobbes does not seem to present it as such, the 
ultimate consequence of his logic is that there is no further need for a specific 
substantial or perfectionist ethics that the sovereign should realize in his 
actions which would make his rule just and legitimate. There is also no need 
for particular virtues that the sovereign should make his own to merit the 
respect and loyalty of the people. The sovereign need not aspire for anything 
less profane than the maintenance of political order by means of fear, 
although the sovereign might need the rhetoric and appearance of virtue if it 
                                           
42 Cp. Finer, S.E., The History of Government, Oxford University Press Oxford UK 1997, 
p. 97. 
43 “Of all passions, that which inclines men least to break the laws is fear. Nay, (excepting 
some generous natures) it is the only thing, (when there is appearance of profit, or pleasure 
by breaking the laws,) that makes men keep them.” Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 206. 
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suits his purposes.44 Such a profane view is generally referred to as a 
“realistic” as opposed to an “idealistic” view.45  
 
From the inside this “thin” liberal theory of legitimacy often seems to be too 
cynical and prosaic, and I will argue that in political practice it is next to 
impossible to remain consistent and not refer to the existence of a community 
as a justification. Politicians – and I will argue that this also goes for legal 
professionals generally but judges more particularly – will often express a 
more idealistic view. For instance, a view deriving from Hegel that justifies 
authority by referring to the particular moral community it represents.46 
Referring to rational self-interest and fear is not a very attractive justification 
for obedience. There is generally a preference to obey an authority because by 
doing so one thereby obeys the larger community. Moreover, by identifying 
with an authority, one identifies with the community that one feels one 
belongs to. Only then will submission be experienced as having a genuine 
moral aspect. 
Emile Durkheim argues that there is a need to “put ourselves in harmony 
with the social world of which we are members,” and he connects this to 
morality. Above and beyond human individuals there are groups of many 
kinds: the family, society, the nation, and even humanity as a whole. Moral 
action implies pursuing impersonal objectives, or better objectives that are 
“supra-personal” and submitting to a communal good or interest, if necessary 
at the expense of one’s personal interest. In other words, “to act morally is to 
act in terms of the collective interest.” Durkheim states: 
 
                                           
44 This seems to be the ultimate logic of Hobbes’s reasoning. Hobbes, however, did refer to 
particular virtues that the sovereign should take seriously. Cp. Skinner, Q., Reason and 
Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK 1996. 
45 Hobbes’s ill reputation still today matches that of Machiavelli’s just for this reason. 
Compare footnote 186. 
46 “The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea.” Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §§ 256, 257; 
Taylor, Hegel, p. 444; cp. Hampsher-Monk, A History of Modern Political Thought, pp. 
464, 473; “The state is the fuller community within which civil society has its concrete 
existence and is given rational limits […] In the state the unity is differentiated and 
contains particular content built into the way individuals recognize one another in the 
social whole.” Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, pp. 37, 103. 
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“This proposition, in effect, prescribes that man acts morally only when he works 
toward goals superior to, or beyond, individual goals, only when he makes himself 
the servant of a being superior to himself and to all other individuals. Now, once we 
rule out recourse to theological notions, there remains beyond the individual only a 
single, empirically observable moral being, that which individuals form by their 
association – that is, society.” 47 
 
Authorities are expected to subjugate their individual personal interests to the 
public good because otherwise the feeling grows that they cannot be trusted 
with their power in the community. Authority is made in the eyes of the 
public and as such it is merely a matter of perception, or of shared 
understandings. As such authority is rather ephemeral and vulnerable, and we 
realize this most clearly when some authority figure fails to live up our 
expectations. When the people feel that some authority figure has abused their 
trust and used his power to hurt or damage the community and its collective 
meanings and values, from one moment to another such an authority can be 
seen as fake, as a mere pretender. The authority is suddenly exposed or 
“unmasked,” and because he has betrayed the trust of the group, he has placed 
himself outside the community and falls from grace. Those who are bestowed 
with authority in the community are especially vulnerable for de-legitimation 
when they do not show respect for the shared understandings and goals of the 
community they represent.48 
This particular phenomenon can be better understood from the idealistic 
rather than the realistic theory of the legitimation of the authority’s power. In 
Hobbes’s realistic perspective, the individual subjects share a rational interest 
in obeying an authority as long as he effectively keeps the peace. There are no 
moral or ethical demands made on this authority that make him deserve or 
justify his power and status within the community. However, generally people 
do set certain moral standards for the behavior and actions of authorities. 
                                           
47 Durkheim, Moral Education, pp. 60-61; “Cp. Bourdieu, Practical Reason, p. 142; 
Dworkin, R., Law’s Empire, Belknap Press Cambridge Mass. 1986, pp. 187, 188. 
48 This connects to the fact that authorities are not free to dispose of the meanings and 
values of the group exactly because they are of communal origin: “There is no private 
ownership of values. That would contradict their communal origin.” Aubert, The Hidden 
Society, p. 90; Therefore, such communal values are also less vulnerable on factual 
grounds. Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 71. 
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Especially in their public role, but even in their private lives, they are always 
followed by the public eye. Machiavelli knew very well that an authority 
should appear as a person of compassion, good faith, and integrity. He added, 
however, that appearance of integrity is enough and that he should not 
hesitate to violate that what is regarded as virtuous or moral when he has to 
maintain his state.49 
By contrast, in the idealistic view, the authority figure is supposed to be 
sincere in his commitment to the political community and its specific culture, 
values, needs and goals. To put it in rather “heroic” terms, authority figures 
are the “champions” of the group as long as they are seen as serving the 
common good and the public interest.50 To be effective, the authority figure 
will have to be seen as sincerely committed to this common good and, as we 
have already seen, the person bestowed with authority will generally live up 
to this demand. But, the moment the authority is exposed as a self-serving 
opportunist who hurts the community and thus abuses the trust that was 
invested in him, things change radically. As Schmitt famously argued, the 
defining distinction of politics is that between “friends” and “enemies” and 
there is nothing much in between.51  If disloyal, one easily turns from friend 
into enemy and loyalties are totally reversed. What might explain this “all-or-
nothing” logic?  
 
The fragility of authority 
Let us start by looking upon authority as a specifically cultural phenomenon. 
Above I hinted at the fact that in the cultural realm it is hard to distinguish 
between normative and factual aspects of phenomena.52 The community is 
                                           
49 Machiavelli, N., The Prince, Penguin Books London 1981, pp. 100, 101; This is why 
Machiavelli’s ill reputation matches that of Hobbes’s. The Prince is a classical work of 
“Realpolitik” and the introducer states that already in the seventeenth century “ it became 
as acceptable to call the Devil Machiavellian as it was to call Machiavelli diabolical.” p. 9; 
cp. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, pp. 101-108. 
50 This might explain why individuals in the group will feel offended when some outsider 
offends someone with authority in their community; this attests to the strong identification 
of the members with the community as it is represented by such an authority figure. 
51 “The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced 
is that between friend and enemy.” Schmitt, C., The Concept of the Political, Rutgers 
University Press New Brunswick1976, p. 26. 
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constituted through shared understandings that have an irreducible normative 
aspect because they make the group into a specific community. But I propose 
to take a step back from the cultural realm and take a more external view. The 
Kantian distinction between the normative and factual realms makes it 
possible to explore their different logics. The normative is the realm of 
“validity” as opposed to “facticity,”53 and I will argue that this realm of 
validity has an all-or-nothing logic compared to the factual. Natural science 
allows for degrees of truth as it allows for probabilistic reasoning. By 
contrast, in the normative realm there does not seem to be any use for 
probabilistic reasoning, and thus it is harder to think of truths in ethical 
matters in terms of statistical percentages or degrees. 
Modern natural science is very successful in explaining natural phenomena 
because it works from the distinction between facts and norms. That is to say, 
with regard to the factual realm, modern science postulates a contingent world 
that has no “intrinsic” worth or purpose; a natural world that can be known by 
means of empirical experimentation and probabilistic reasoning. Scientists 
seek “statistical” or “probable” truths, and there is a wide consensus that the 
mathematical formulas that describe natural laws are only approximately true. 
Moreover, they are also relative truths, relative to certain (circumstantial) 
factors and the standpoint of the researcher. Modern science deals in 
probabilities that are statistically sound and that have survived extensive 
empirical testing. Thus modern science does not deal in “Absolutes.” 
Speculation on the “deeper” structure, the deeper meaning or worth of the 
natural order, is relegated to the domain of metaphysics.54 
                                                                                                                               
52 “The perception of fact and the choice of values are joined together on the deepest levels 
of consciousness. ” Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 109. 
53 “From the theoretical perspective of the scientist, there arises a strict distinction between 
the spheres of being and of validity and, correspondingly, between descriptive and 
evaluative statements.” Habermas, J., The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1 
Reason and the Rationalization of Society, Beacon Press Boston 1984, p. 186. 
54 “Laplace’s point was that we can never know with absolute certainty; we can only know 
with greater or lesser degrees of probability. […] The right answer is, in a sense, a function 
of the mistakes. By uncoupling the idea of precision from the idea of a single absolute 
value, statistics and probability theory allowed scientists to achieve far greater degrees of 
precision than they had ever imagined possible. Statistics conquered uncertainty by 
embracing it.” Menand, L., The Metaphysical Club, A Story of Ideas in America, Farrar 
Straus and Giroux New York 2001, p. 182. 
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Thus the factual realm, the domain of “being,” seems to allow for relative, 
probable and approximate truths. In this realm some scientific statements can 
be incompletely or partially true and all depends on how probable it is, how 
the chances are, statistically. Moreover, facts are thought to be both 
contingent and not normative, and scientists generally think it is of great 
importance to keep the factual and the normative apart, however difficult this 
may be. In Kantian terms, sein is the domain of being (and this is what 
scientific knowledge aims to describe) and sollen is the domain of the 
desirable, or better, the domain of the will.55 However, if we return to an 
internal perspective, in the cultural sphere authority is both a meaningful and 
normative phenomenon. Authority is something that is irreducibly in the 
minds of those who accept such authority, and it is irreducibly experienced as 
aimed at something good, something that binds, presents and represents the 
community. From this point of view, meaning and value are fundamentally 
entangled, and therefore we seem unable to reduce the phenomenon of 
authority to something factual without seriously distorting the experience of 
“the believers.”56  
Indeed, in the cultural realm we do not speak about such cultural 
phenomena in probabilistic and statistical terms but in terms of validity. 
Because there is a normative aspect to it, a claim to authority is valid or 
invalid within a certain group. Surely, there is nothing “out there” in the 
factual world that approximately or partially corresponds (in whatever 
meaning of this word) to such a claim to validity. To repeat, we therefore 
cannot think about validity in terms of probability or statistics, and this 
explains why we experience such claims to be of an all-or-nothing nature: 
validity or non-validity, there seems to be nothing in between. As we can only 
investigate such a phenomenon from the inside, and not scientifically, we 
seem to be constantly driven to the “absolute.” Compare Habermas: “The 
‘oughtness’ of binding norms has the absolute sense of an unconditioned and 
universal obligation; what “one ought to do” claims to be equally good for 
all.”57 
                                           
55 Kant, I., The Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge University Press Cambridge UK 1991, 
p. 42. 
56 Cp. Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 126. 
57 Habermas, J., Between Facts and Norms, Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
and Democracy, The MIT Press Cambridge Mass. 1998, p. 255. 
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We might speculate that the experience of deception can be understood 
from a fundamental human longing (or psychic need) for “integrity.” “To live 
is to put ourselves in harmony with the physical world surrounding us and 
with the social world of which we are members,” writes Emile Durkheim in 
his book on moral education.58 Human beings long for the feeling that their 
beliefs are consistent and true and, furthermore, in perfect harmony with the 
world; this seems to be exactly the kind of “well-being” or “perfection” that 
human beings should strive for in classical philosophy. The moment one of 
their beliefs proves to be untrue, man experiences chaos in his belief system, 
and a critical break with the world around him. This is experienced as 
disagreeable or even painful and in Greek philosophy the broken integrity or 
“wholeness” of the human soul is even seen as a loss of the soul’s “being” 
because it fails the test of well-being. Moreover, it thereby fails to be a 
harmonious part of the cosmic order.59 However, this longing for falling in 
line with the cosmic order might be remote for many moderns because they 
might find it hard to think of the cosmos as a normative order, at all. 
But we need not become metaphysical to understand this longing for 
integrity. Qua social beings humans long to be part of a community, and they 
identify with its meaningful and normative shared understandings, or its 
“collective spirit.” The communal order is seen and experienced as 
harmonious, and the individual member needs to fit in or “harmonize” with 
it.60 Furthermore, within this community the individual member wants to be 
seen and experienced by fellows as in harmony with this collective order, 
desires to be seen as virtuous, loyal and trustworthy – in short, a moral 
member of the community. The moment one of his beliefs is questioned and 
proven to be false, man experiences a break with his community, and the 
resulting experience of disharmony and chaos is rather frightening. The more 
tightly connected the questioned beliefs are with the communal identity, the 
more obstinately the beliefs will be defended by the members of the 
community.  
                                           
58 Durkheim, Moral Education, p. 48. 
59 Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, pp. 80, 84; Rorty, Contingency, irony and solidarity, p. xiii. 
60 “Political fraternity is to communities what integrity is to individuals. It is what gives 
them their unity and preserves them from disintegration.” Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, p. 
92; cp. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, pp. 176-224. 
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The phenomenon of authority here serves as an example. Previously I 
argued that authority is made in the eyes of the public, that it is a matter of 
perception. I also argued that this makes the phenomenon of authority highly 
fragile and vulnerable. The moment the public feels that some authority figure 
has abused the trust invested in him, one generally sees two rather radical 
reactions. On the one hand, the fact that an authority figure has abused its 
power over us and hurt the community can be ardently and passionately 
denied. Not only will people deny the evil – the immorality – of certain 
actions, sometimes people even go as far to ignore or deny certain scientific, 
or even the most obvious, facts about those actions. Indeed, the farther they 
go in their loyalty and rationalizations, the harder it might become to 
convince them of the contrary, because they have invested so much in these 
beliefs. Thus authority and a scientific respect for facts are sometimes uneasy 
bedfellows. Compare Richard Posner: 
 
“Systems of thought that emphasize hierarchy, tradition, authority, and precedent 
disvalue the kind of critical inquiry that tests beliefs and advances knowledge, and 
as a result the truths that such systems accept are not robust. This is notoriously true 
of religion, an activity in which the perceived costs of free inquiry are often very 
high. It is also true of law, and is one reason that the scientific attitude is not at 
home in the legal enterprise. […] The hierarchical structure of a legal system and 
the desire for stability […] impede the search for truth. We come to see law as an 
uneasy compromise between science, where inquiry is sovereign, and theology, 
where authority is sovereign.” 61 
 
But authority can also, from one moment to the other, be seen as fake, and 
someone or some institution can easily and quickly fall from grace.62 In the 
language of “heroic” morality, the authority who posed as a hero of the 
community demanding respect and loyalty is now exposed, or unmasked as a 
“traitor” who should be excommunicated; the pretender proved to be totally 
unworthy of our trust and loyalty. Former authority figures who are thus 
                                           
61 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, p. 82. 
62 “The group only fully accepts those who publicly show that they recognize the group. 
The sanctions of political scandal will inevitably befall the spokesperson who is disloyal, 
who does not really give the group what the group’s recognition is worth to him.” 
Bourdieu, Practical Reason, p. 142. 
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publicly exposed and humiliated will, from that moment on, not have many 
friends left.  
 
“It is expensive to obtain a reputation, for it only attaches to distinguished qualities, 
which are as rare as mediocrities are common. […] It is easy to get a bad reputation 
because it is easy to believe evil but hard to eradicate. The wise therefore avoid 
such incidents, guarding against vulgar scandal with constant vigilance. It is far 
easier to prevent than to rectify.” 63 
 
When a reputation is ruined by some scandal the exercise of power will no 
longer be seen as legitimate. Authority dissolves into naked power that will 
most likely be resisted. 
This is a constant risk for countries with a political culture depending 
strongly on centralized bureaucratic authority structures. France would be a 
case in point. Because it has a long-standing history of centralism and 
absolutism, the system can easily lose legitimacy and fall into anarchism. As 
Francis Fukuyama states, “When pressures for change build to a breaking 
point, participants in the system lurch to the opposite extreme, revolting and 
questioning all authority.” Fukuyama suggests that this accounts for the 
revolutionary past of the French and its relatively conflict-ridden labor 
relations.64 
The same logic seems to be at work in the communitarian concern with 
community. To repeat, a community only seems possible if individuals are 
prepared to submit to the collective meaningful and normative order, to the 
“collective consciousness” of the group. They also have to be prepared to 
conform their behavior to it and to be formed by it, even to be “disciplined” 
by it in their upbringing and education.65 This cultural communal order 
becomes part of their individual identity and both this order and the 
complementary identity are experienced as specific goods, goods that deserve 
protection, respect and loyalty. Indeed, emphasizing the importance of the 
specific cultural contexts, or “forms of life,” is a specifically “communitarian” 
                                           
63 Gracián, B., The Art of Worldly Wisdom, Shambhala Boston & London 2001, pp. 36, 39. 
64 Fukuyama, Trust, p. 121. 
65Durkheim, Moral Education, pp. 31-63. 
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concern.66 And here again there is a tendency to the absolute because making 
these contexts relative to something else threatens to thoroughly devaluate 
them.67 People should experience actions in conformity with the demands of 
the communal contexts as morally superior to actions motivated by petty 
individual interests and concerns. The common good should be seen as an 
ultimate good and by making this relative, it will lose its power to inspire the 
citizens to conform their actions to it.  
This might explain why cultural traditions and institutions that claim 
authority over us are rather “greedy” in the sense that they demand from 
people “complete loyalty and undivided commitment.” Compare Anton 
Zijderveld:  
 
“One serves the greedy institution and is, as it were, completely consumed by it. 
[…] Most traditional institutions bear greedy features as they impose on the 
individual strict and demanding norms and values which are binding. Traditional 
institutions require loyalty and a commitment which in modernity are rather rare 
and very hard to come by.”68 
 
If the good is experienced as an ultimate good, as a “Good in itself,” it will be 
most effective in inspiring people in their actions and inspire complete loyalty 
and undivided commitment. From the inside it is precisely the experience of 
“absoluteness” of this Good that seems to make it possible to see such a Good 
as an objective Good.69 In the cultural realm one easily slides from fact to 
                                           
66 “In a communitarian society […] the common good is conceived of as a substantive 
conception of the good life which defines the community’s ‘way of life.’ This common 
good, rather than adjusting itself to the pattern of people’s preferences, provides a standard 
by which those preferences are evaluated. The community’s way of life forms the basis for 
a public ranking of conceptions of conceptions of the good, and the weight given to an 
individual’s preferences depends on how much she conforms or contributes to this 
common good.” Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, p. 206. 
67 For instance Alasdair MacIntyre thus presents us with a rather absolute choice: either we 
accept the authority of some cultural contexts have over us, or we are left at the mercy of 
the uncontrolled Nietzschean will to power. MacIntyre, After Virtue, pp. 109-120, 256-263. 
68 Zijderveld, The Institutional Imperative, p. 124; cp. Coser, L., Greedy Institutions, 
Patterns of Undivided Commitment, The Free Press New York 1974. 
69 “We explore from within the human life form. We find that within this form, humans are 
irresistibly given to accord certain things significance. Certain matters are the invariable 
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value and back, and therefore it is only a relatively small step to completely 
“reify” the Good and see it as a “thing.” Thus the Good might come to be 
experienced as objective like all other objects in the factual world. Political 
philosophers who grounded the authority of the law in the Divine authority of 
God serve as an example.70 Such metaphysical theories generally amount to a 
“reification” of a common morality in the sense that it is seen as something 
that has an existence comparable to the existence of natural phenomena. Such 
a morality can take on a “thing-like” appearance, or becomes “objective.” 
With regard to the morality of the community, it can now be seen as in 
accordance with “natural law.”71 
 
The critical reader will note that my method of inquiry cannot do justice to the 
experience of the objectivity of the good because it makes the experience of 
objectivity relative to a collective experience within a moral community, a 
shared universe of meanings and values.72 Surely, this shatters the experience 
of objectivity in this universe.  As Weber wrote,  “Many old gods ascend from 
their graves.” One might even say that it is exactly this kind of relativist 
analysis that has destroyed the allure of objectivity of the meaningful and 
normative contexts of community. In turn, this may explain why the kind of 
loyalty and commitment that traditional institutions require is hard to come by 
in modern society; a theme that I will explore in the later chapters of this 
book. However, the conclusion that authority is both indispensable for 
communities and highly fragile and ephemeral makes sense of much of the 
ideas that I want to explore in the coming pages. 
 
Authority and the settlement of conflict 
In pre-modern political philosophy, authorities in the community were 
thought to rule not by fiat of the sovereign people but by the highest authority 
of the Lord in Heaven. The political community that was made possible by 
this intricate hierarchy of authorities deriving from God downwards was 
                                                                                                                               
objects of moral sentiments, which are by their nature marked off from others by their 
unique significance” Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 346; cp. Putnam, Reason, Truth and 
History, pp. 137-149. 
70 Cp. Friedman, Total Justice, p. 129. 
71 Unger, Law and Modern Society, pp. 76-83. 
72 Cp. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, pp. 186, 187. 
 81 
ultimately founded on common Christian morality. Such a political theory 
seems to take the concept of authority to its logical extreme. The legitimacy 
of the ultimate Rule of God was founded on the fact that God is absolute 
Truth, Good and Beauty (Verum Bonum Pulchrum) and any earthly authority 
only deserves loyalty and respect from its subjects in so far as this authority 
proves his complete loyalty and undivided commitment to the Lord.73 The 
equation of the truth (fact) and value is, since Hume and Kant, considered to 
be a category mistake and any metaphysical grounding, whether in Divine 
Will or in Nature, of the law is now generally regarded as both scientifically 
and philosophically suspect.74 
In his book Moral Education, Emile Durkheim also argues that morality 
implies that the individual member submits to some higher “superior being” 
and that this superior authority has an important, indispensable function for 
the moral order. However, he argues that we do not need to take a religious 
view to make sense of morality and authority. All we need to acknowledge is 
that humans are social beings and that they live in a “society” that Durkheim 
describes as a “moral being” to which individual members submit. Moreover, 
we saw how Durkheim thinks of the essence of moral action as the 
subordination of the individual’s own interests and goals to those of this 
“superior moral being” that is society.75 Ideally, an authority represents this 
superior “moral being,” and this makes the authority figure especially suitable 
to settle conflicts in a legitimate, definite and, therefore, authoritative way. In 
submitting to the judgment of the authority, the conflicting parties submit to 
                                           
73 In On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche explores the natural law idea deriving from 
Plato’s doctrine of ideal being – the transcendent unity of “the good,” “the true,” and “the 
beautiful.” He is especially interested in how it influenced medieval and Renaissance 
Christian thought. Nietzsche is highly critical of this “fictional translation of morality into 
the very machinery of nature” which, with disdain, he calls “moral metaphysics.” Allison, 
D.B., Reading the New Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, The Gay Science, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, and On the Genealogy of Morals, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc. 
Oxford 2001, p. 186. 
74 “The reason is that the empire of liberal doctrine, and of the modern conception of 
science, has undermined the premises that would make the symbolic method intelligible. 
The opposition of the order of ideas and the order of events results in the impossibility of 
seeing the link between reflection and existence in its true light.” Unger, Knowledge and 
Politics, pp. 113, 114. 
75 Durkheim, Moral Education, pp. 60, 61. 
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the moral community of which they aspire to be a part. By means of 
submitting to this authoritative judgment they show their loyalty to this larger 
whole and profess their loyalty to the important good of order that this 
submission makes possible.  
By comparison, the Hobbesian submission to authority seems 
uncomfortably “nihilistic” and “instrumental.” We can now see that what is 
thoroughly missing from this realist theory is the moral dimension of the 
submission to the authority verdict. It seems to be far more attractive to accept 
the ultimate authoritative judgment, not because it makes order possible (and 
thereby freedom and prosperity), but because the authority represents a 
substantial morality that binds the group. In other words, the submission to 
authoritative judgment is not seen as the result of individual self-interested 
reasons motivated ultimately by fear, but instead a profession of loyalty to the 
supra-individual moral community that humans as social beings aspire to be a 
part of. Submission to authoritative judgment is not motivated by rational 
self-interest but is an explicitly moral act: the citizen accepts the authoritative 
solution to some conflict because this acceptance is an expression of his or 
her submission to the moral community. This might explain the popularity in 
modern political theory of such notions as the “General Will,” “Public Good” 
and “General Interest” as legitimating certain solutions to conflicts.76 
 
From the aspiration to a political community founded on the common good, a 
more idealistic picture of conflict settlement by authorities can be derived. 
Now, the simultaneous submission by the conflicting parties to this common 
good of order and community makes it possible for the authority to establish 
more than a mere pacification. We can now establish a genuine 
“reconciliation” between the parties. By confirming and validating the good 
of peace and harmony and, importantly, the common meanings and values of 
                                           
76 These ideas all seem to be conceptually related to the idea of the Volonté Générale (the 
General Will) of Jean Jacques Rousseau who thus provided us with a secular morality that 
citizens of modern political communities can submit to; such that our submission is not 
inspired by prosaic self-interest but is experienced as a moral deed. Rousseau, J.J., The 
Social Contract, Penguin Books Harmondsworth UK 1968; cp. Barber, B., Strong 
Democracy, Participatory Politics for a New Age, University of California Press Berkeley 
Ca 1984, p. 200; Taylor, Hegel, p. 402; cp. Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, 
p. 55. 
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the community, the interested parties may feel that they were brought back 
from the margins of the moral community to its heart. By reestablishing or 
reaffirming their communality, the authority can reestablish the community 
that threatened to fall apart. After the reconciliation by the authority, the 
parties and others involved have a renewed sense of what ultimately binds 
them (their common identity as members of a community) instead of what 
temporarily divided them (their individual interests or goals). They are, 
furthermore, reconciled on a “deeper” emotional level than they would have 
been by using mere cold rationality. The moral or political community makes 
it possible to act collectively and thus develop and perfect the human being 
qua social being.77 
Only after the group has been pacified can individuals experience a sense 
of belonging and security in the rituals, symbols and institutions of the 
community. “Law and order” precedes individual freedom and prosperity and 
also the experience of community. Authority is the means to such symbolic 
and moral orders. But not only notions like the “Public Good” or “General 
Interest” can be explained by the longing for a deeper community. The nation 
building that many modern states during the past two centuries have engaged 
in aimed at establishing just that. The state was to be experienced as a 
“nation,” a moral community that deserved the loyalty of its members not 
because it satisfies their enlightened self-interest in peace and prosperity but 
because it satisfies their need to belong to a larger moral community. In such 
a nation the submission to the judgments of the central authority can be 
experienced as a submission to this larger moral whole that makes it possible 
to realize the full social nature of the members of this community. To this 
effect the nation has to be “materialized” in narratives, symbols, rituals and 
institutions.78 
Notoriously, the myth of “national character,” as a quality shared by all 
within the nation, was devised to bind the people under the authority of the 
modern nation-state. Some kind of racial or blood kinship was then invoked 
                                           
77 “Like everything else, man is a limited being: he is part of a whole. Physically he is part 
of the universe, morally, he is part of society. […] man’s nature cannot be itself except as it 
is disciplined.” Durkheim, Moral Education, p. 51; cp. Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition, 
pp. 150-161. 
78 Cp. Anderson, B., Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, Verso London revised edition 1991; cp. Nisbet, R., Twilight of Authority. 
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to “naturalize” the solidarity within the group, thereby creating a “fatal 
community.” Such myths are generally discredited in twentieth-century 
political philosophy, but again we do not need metaphysics to acknowledge 
the fact that members of modern societies share a world of collective 
meanings. “The sharing of sensibilities and intuitions among the members of 
a historical community is a fact of life,” according to Michael Walzer.79 
Language, history and culture still provide important common references and, 
although people always seems to focus on the margins of these common 
understandings, and on the pluralism in society, they often fail to see how 
much citizens do have in common and how these common meanings shape 
their individual and collective actions.  
Importantly, experienced from the inside of such a community, such a 
sharing of meanings is not merely a fact. Such meanings are experienced as 
having a normative aspect because they are the tissue that binds the individual 
members to each other. Thus, if we take culture in a broad sense to include 
both a common language and history we might even concisely say that “[…] 
culture is inherited ethical habit.”80 We should actually strive to find and 
strengthen these shared understandings and, according to Walzer, the political 
community is the appropriate setting for this enterprise.  This is because “the 
political community is probably the closest we can come to a world of 
common meanings,” and it is “to these understandings that we must appeal 
when we make our arguments,” for in matters of morality, “argument simply 
is the appeal to common meanings.”81  Thus, in matters of morality, argument 
is a matter of common meanings. Conversely, from a communitarian 
perspective one can also argue that common meanings are also a matter of 
morality. Now why is all this relevant for the legal professional? 
 
Legal authority and the modern state 
In the modern world the central authority – the sovereign power of the state – 
has become highly abstract and differentiated. However, the modern state is 
still an important focus point of authority and the fountainhead of many 
modern authority structures in civil society. This also goes for the authority of 
                                           
79 Walzer, Spheres of Justice, p. 28. 
80 Fukuyama, Trust, p. 34. 
81 Walzer, Spheres of Justice, pp. 28, 29. 
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the law and the legal institutions in liberal democracies. One can argue, 
though, that the law and the legal institutional structure do have a special 
place within this larger whole. The legal institutions are granted certain 
autonomy and independence with regard to the political and administrative 
powers, and this can be understood when one realizes how precarious the 
authority of the modern state is.82 The exercise of power by the state can 
easily be experienced as arbitrary and unjustified. Moreover, in any modern 
society the question arises of how political power can be trusted with the 
enormous power that is concentrated in the modern state. The development of 
an autonomous “legal order” within the larger political whole made it possible 
for modern states to ascertain the legitimacy of its rule.83  
The potentially (or even intrinsically) repressive nature of such an central 
authority, which is invested with enormous power, might have some kind of 
legitimacy in the abstract, but its factual employment in concrete instances is 
always in danger of being tainted by subservience. But no modern regime can 
endure without some foundation in consent. According to Nonet and Selznick 
in their book Law & Society in Transition, what can be expected to happen is 
that the subjects, when society is adequately pacified, refocus their attention 
from a blanket certification of the source of power – the modern state – to a 
justification of the use of this power within society.84 
The rule of might is both costly and inefficient, and legitimacy (which 
transforms power into authority) is an indispensable ingredient or “lubricant” 
in effective and efficient rule. Moreover, ruling elites do not generally find 
rule by force alone very honorable, and the law and its institutions can play an 
important role in legitimating the government’s particular acts and policies. 
Max Weber argued that modern subjects will generally obey by virtue of 
“legality,” or by virtue of legal statute and functional “competence” based on 
legal rules.85 This means that those who control and employ the powers of the 
state, the representatives of state authority, should rule by means of legal 
statutes and within the bounds of the law of the community. Such statutes 
                                           
82 Cp. Friedman, Total Justice, pp. 27- 29. 
83 “Rulers have only limited credibility as certifiers of their own legitimacy.” Nonet & 
Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, p. 56; Lenski, Power and Privilege, pp. 51, 52; cp. 
Unger, Law and Modern Society, pp. 66-76. 
84 Nonet & Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, p. 56. 
85 Held, D., Models of Democracy, Polity Press Cambridge UK 1996, pp. 164, 165. 
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have a number of important features that can strengthen the legitimacy of the 
rulers. For one thing, if they are stated in general and impersonal terms, 
rulings and policies apply to everyone in society equally and as such they are 
more easily seen as fair. Another important feature is that these rules and 
statutes both precede and regulate administrative acts. Both these features 
give law its appearance of neutrality.86 
Nonet and Selznick explain the rise of a relatively independent and 
autonomous legal institutional order in modern states as the result of a 
“historic bargain” between legal institutions and political power. Legal 
institutions recognize the state as the sovereign power in society and thus 
submit to its legislative powers. The state, however, delegates to the legal 
professionals part of its authority, which can be exercised free from political 
interference. This means that “[…] the legal institutions purchase procedural 
autonomy at the price of substantive subordination.” The price they pay for 
this immunity is that they effectively “remove themselves from the formation 
of policy.”87 Those are the terms on which the judiciary wins its independence 
from political intrusion and a specific part of the political order can now 
become a legal order or a Rechtsstaat. 
We can always expect tensions between the political realm and the legal 
order, and especially in times of crisis, the state will claim the primacy of the 
raison d’état, and the legal order will then be curtailed. However, in most 
modern states this step is also meticulously regulated by means of legal 
statutes and rules. Such statutes point to the ultimate authority in the state as 
the power that can proclaim a “state of emergency” by means of which it can 
temporarily suspend functioning of the legal order.88 However, under normal 
circumstances the division of powers that is established between the judiciary 
and the legislative and executive powers is considered to be a basic feature of 
the modern liberal democratic state. Although the authority of the legal 
professionals is derived from, and relative to, the authority of the state, they 
are granted autonomy in the form of certain carefully circumscribed 
                                           
86 Lenski, Power and Privilege, pp. 52, 53. 
87 Nonet & Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, p. 58. 
88 Schmitt, C., The Concept of the Political, University Of Chicago Press Chicago Ill. 
1996, pp. 8, 38. 
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competences in the administration of the law in the realm of a basic socio-
political function: conflict resolution. 
We see how the legal professionals are now thought of as having a 
specific role and invested with a particular authority in modern liberal 
democracies. The legal professionals as a group are the officially authorized 
guardians of something that is now a great public good to the political 
community: legality. In other words, these professionals are the guardians of 
the law (its institutions, procedures and practices) and thereby the keepers and 
guardians of the good of legality. As such they can grant “legal” status to 
certain policies and actions by both individual citizens and state actors and 
thereby legitimate them. In legal procedures, actions (or refusals to act, for 
that matter) are tested against the legal norms and principles that are in force 
in the legal community. When actions are deemed legal this validates the 
deployment of state power to bring the factual situation into accordance with 
the legal state of affairs. 
In the present perspective, legal practices are a special kind of politics. 
With Talcott Parsons one may think of them as a “secondary line of defense” 
against conflict in society and therefore mediating between society and the 
state. As such the legal institutions have an indispensable “integrating task” in 
modern societies.89 The legal institutional structure might even be described 
as a “detached post” of the state in the pacification of society. The fact that 
these legal institutions are placed at the “front line” in the fight against 
conflict and violence in society could explain why they are organized along 
the lines of an army, in the sense that there is a strong emphasis on authority, 
hierarchy and ritual. But all this is still very well compatible with a realist 
view of law and politics. In the following I will argue that such a view is too 
“thin” and cerebral; we need a “thicker” or more “idealistic” view to see how 
legal authority could be experienced from the inside and how we make it 
effective. 
 
Legal authority and the moral community 
The settlement or resolution of conflicts has to be done in an authoritative 
way. That is to say, the settlement has to be experienced as both legitimate 
                                           
89 Parsons, T., ‘A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession’, in: Essays in Sociological 
Theory, pp. 378, 379; cp. Aubert, The Hidden Society, p. 65. 
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and definite by those both directly and indirectly involved. The professional is 
supposed to end the argument or conflict, and he should leave no space for 
further escalation. In the realistic perspective, the power of the law derives 
from the state and one might see the legitimacy of the rulings by and 
judgments of legal professionals as the product of fear for the state power. A 
no-nonsense realistic view on legal practices might take the Hobbesian stance 
that the law is essentially a matter of “force” and that if all parties involved 
are equally afraid of this power they can be expected to comply with these 
rulings and judgments.90  Fear might make the actual use of this power 
necessary only in relatively exceptional cases. The legitimacy of the power of 
legal authorities is here based on the interest the public has in peace and 
order.  
But surely one might ask whether this rather thin and prosaic justification 
is satisfactory; one might even ask whether it will be at all effective. 
Moreover, it is exactly because the justification of the authority of the modern 
state is rather fragile and thin, that the law is necessary to strengthen its 
legitimacy. A thin legitimation of the law might, however, prove not to be 
much help. From a more idealistic view, the powers of legal officials can be 
justified by a genuine commitment of both the officials and the legal subjects 
to the – specifically legal – values and norms of the community represented 
by the law.91 From this perspective, these legal values and norms can be 
experienced as an important source of community and social harmony. But 
how should we see this link between the law and its institutions and practices, 
and the community? 
We might think of the legal order as the ever-evolving product of a “legal 
tradition” that is an important part of the common cultural identity of the 
                                           
90 “Law, an abstract entity is dissolved into physical force.” Posner, The Problems of 
Jurisprudence, p. 223; cp. Lenski, Power and Privilege, p. 50. 
91 “Set against this background, rules become manifestations of the shared values of the 
group. They perform subsidiary though indispensable tasks: to clarify the implications and 
the boundaries of […] collective ends and to reassert them against would-be violators. But 
the broader the extension, the concreteness, the intensity, and the coherence of the 
consensus, the less necessary do rules become. It is their nature to survive in the crevices 
of consensus. Hence, the main reason for which laws are obeyed is that the members of the 
group accept in belief and embody in conduct the values the laws express.” Unger, Law in 
modern society, pp. 30, 31. 
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group. From this perspective one might think of legal professionals as 
representing a common morality ‘hardened’ into law, embedded in “a 
venerated and time-honoured tradition”, and embodied in the institutions of 
the law.92 The law is the product of generations of legal professionals 
transforming the basic meaningful and normative order into a legal order. 
Thus the legal order is the product of the “hardening” or “elaboration” into 
law of the most basic or fundamental shared understandings, that is, of a 
particular “nomos.” In other words, the law, its institutions and traditions are 
as the cultural “expressions” of most precious and basic common morality 
and thereby a expressions of the communal identity. Indirectly, the law and its 
representatives therefore represent the larger community and thus the legal 
tradition itself becomes an important symbol of the community. 
The scheme of legal rules, rights and principles might be seen as a “pre-
political” scheme that is accepted by the people because they justify certain 
political actions and are the expression of the fact that we are acting and 
dealing within a moral or political community. We might even think of these 
basic legal norms and values as both “natural” and timeless – as “natural 
law.”93 However, we saw how such a naturalization of the law can easily be 
discredited, and today not many defend this idea. Generally the legal tradition 
is conceived as the product of the historic evolution of the moral community 
worked into a concomitantly evolving legal community. 
As a source for law, such a legal tradition originates in well established 
“customs” – “ways of life in a community” and “structures for mutual 
recognition.”94 Lawyers work these customs and structures into more specific 
sets of rights and duties that can be used for conflict settlement or resolution. 
                                           
92 Zijderveld, The Institutional Imperative, pp. 153, 154; cp. Berman, Law and Revolution, 
pp. 1-10. 
93 “Customary law takes shape around a series of interlocking continuities: of law with the 
actual expectations and claims that people make upon one another according to the social 
roles they occupy; of normative standards with routinized behavior and belief; and of the 
acts by which people define what the law is with the acts by which they apply it in 
particular cases. The cumulative effect of these continuities is to naturalize society.” Cp. 
Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, p. 108. 
94 “The customs we to give content to our lives resemble Aristotle’s taken-for-granted 
social background and its virtues that describe what kind of persons we should be.” Kolb, 
The Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 37, 100; Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, 
p. 108. 
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Subsequently the legal tradition is developed in close concert with the 
community as it evolves over time in a collective effort of generations of 
professionals, preferably closely involved with the legal practices and the 
community at large. This evolution proceeds by means of “stories” in the 
sense of “cases,” narratives that join in a larger historical chain of legal 
experience and reasoning. To put it differently, “the understanding of cases is 
inseparable from our views about narratives: particularly, the kinds of 
narratives we call case histories.”95 We proceed from case to case, from story 
to story, and thus the collective experience with social conflict is recorded in a 
legal tradition that can be thought of as a “storehouse” of a common legal 
culture, a collective memory of narratives. Importantly, the tradition 
maintains in the present a “bond between past and future;” the law binds the 
present members of the community but is also a bond between past, present 
and future generations. 96 
It is through this tradition, and the institutions and roles that are embedded 
within it, that members participate in history – not just the history of the 
particular legal institutions but the history of the community as a whole. 
Identity is thus firmly linked to the past through the reiterated performance of 
the role occupants.97 The legal tradition can thus be a source for “historical 
consciousness;” that is, it can be a means to better understanding of our 
collective past and thereby gives us a perspective on the present as well. Such 
a tradition and its institutions can also be thought of as “thick” as it embodies 
what Weber would call a specific “substantial rationality.” The legal tradition 
is thought of as embodying a specific substantive content: the substantial 
values that bind the community. By contrast, formal rationality is pure form 
                                           
95 Toulmin, Return to Reason, p. 124. 
96 Zijderveld, The Institutional Imperative, pp. 125, 152-154; cp. Posner, R.A., ‘Pragmatic 
Adjudication’ in: Dickstein, M., The Revival of Pragmatism, Duke University Press 
Durham and London 1998, p. 238. 
97 “It is through the performance of institutional roles that the individual participates in 
history, not only the history of the particular institution, but that of his society as a whole.” 
Berger, P., Berger, B., & Kellner, H., The Homeless Mind, Vintage Books New York 1974, 
p. 91. 
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that can incorporate any content whatsoever.98 The contrast between 
substantive rationality – or “practical wisdom” – and formal rationality will 
be a central topic in the next chapter.  
But in the present context, legal professionals expressly strive for 
substantive rationality and see the legal tradition as the “horizon” that gives 
meaning to the facts and actions of the legal subjects that, from a legal 
standpoint, are in need of interpretation.99 This connects to the fact that the 
legal tradition is essentially a “narrative,” that the law is a man-made 
symbolic order, made of language. Although they are universally valid, the 
rules and norms that are expressed in such narratives are not abstract and 
empty but specify a great deal of particular content. They express the 
particular substantial values and goals of the community.100 It is exactly 
because the information that narrative carries can be thought of as “thick” and 
“substantially rational” that narrative imbued with substantial values is 
especially apposite for the development of historical consciousness. 
As Kelley writes in The Human Measure, “The substance or dress of 
Nomos […] is verbal discourse.”101 In other words, the law is built out of 
“stories,” and no observer can fail to notice that indeed “legal interpretation is 
steeped in stories.” Legal rules, norms and values are embedded in 
authoritative narratives, and through stories the law creates a meaningful 
normative world; a symbolic order that makes sense of our individual and 
collective experiences and that subjects as members of the community can 
and should identify with.102 By means of the authoritative narratives of the 
                                           
98 Gerth & Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, pp. 220, 298, 299; cp. Whimster & 
Lash, Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity, p. 30, 40, 41, 45, 305; cp. Zijderveld, The 
Institutional Imperative, pp. 22, 36, 159, 160, 201. 
99 “In every society […] law grows by “interpretation” when applied to new problems and 
conditions, whence again the centrality of hermeneutics in following the career of Nomos. 
“Kelley, The Human Measure, p. 10; cp. Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 269, 281, 282. 
100 Zijderveld, The Institutional Imperative, pp. 152-154; Kolb, The Critique of Pure 
Modernity, pp. 15, 29. 
101 Kelley, The Human Measure, pp. x-xiii, 1-13; “The law is not merely ongoing; it has a 
history. It tells a story.” Berman, Law and Revolution, p. 9. 
102 “If they function well, institutions constitute what the ancient Greeks called a nomos 
that is, a meaningful infrastructure which provides people with a proper place in the world. 
If that order, for whatever reason, collapses, we face the terror of anomie. Anomie is not 
lawlessness or normlessness but the reign of senseless, illegitimate, and inhuman laws and 
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legal tradition, the lawyer makes sense of the legal claims and facts that he or 
she is presented with; they provide both a meaningful and normative horizon 
by means of which one finds meaning in events and actions. This horizon 
makes legal interpretation and sound judgment possible. 103 
It can be argued that the past can best be understood in terms of traditions. 
It is important to understand the present in concert with the past precisely 
because common cultural identity is essentially the product of a shared 
history, of, to put it rather dramatically, a common historical “fate” or 
“destiny.” Because this tradition is the historical carrier of the collective 
meanings and norms of the community, it has a specific authority in the 
group, and as such, deserves the loyalty and respect of its members. One 
might even, think of traditions in the community as being “sacred.” 
 
In his book Law’s Empire, Ronald Dworkin also takes a similarly idealistic 
stance. He might feel uneasy with the previous description of legal officials as 
carriers of substantial rationality and endowed with traditional authority. 
However, Dworkin does argue that we need the (counterfactual) idea of a 
political community expressed in the law to explain the fact that officials or 
authorities are experienced as having special responsibilities towards the 
individual members of the community.104 Let me explore this by again using 
Hobbes as a stepping stone. The realistic view can never explain our feeling 
that such officials or authorities should not only keep the subjects in collective 
awe but should also aspire to serve our common meaningful and normative 
world. The basic (political) morality of the community, as it is expressed and 
historically developed in law, is often thought of as a criterion by means of 
which the authorities can be judged and criticized. 
Dworkin argues that we generally feel that authorities have special 
responsibilities toward members of the community and that the idea that these 
officials represent a moral community seems to explain and justify this 
feeling. As we saw before, one of the problems with this is that there is 
                                                                                                                               
norms. It is above all, a state of general meaninglessness which deprives people of the 
possibility to orient and position themselves in the world, in society and in history, in a 
way that provides their lives with stability and direction.” Zijderveld, The Institutional 
Imperative, pp. 83, 96. 
103 Luban, Legal Modernism, pp. 14-16, 34; Gaakeer, Hope Springs Eternal, pp. 39, 40. 
104 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, pp. 173-175. 
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always the danger of seeing such a community in religious or metaphysical 
terms. But how else can we then explain the special responsibility of the 
officials to the community? As Dworkin says, “The community should be 
seen as a distinct moral agent because the social and intellectual practices that 
treat community in this way should be protected.”105 Thus seeing the 
community as a “distinct moral agent” does not, according to Dworkin, 
amount to a metaphysical vision; it might be better thought of as an ideal that 
legal professionals should aspire to. Legal professionals should act as the 
guardians of this ideal community and should aspire to let the law, as the 
expression of this moral agent, “speak through them.” By thus protecting the 
independent authority and autonomy of the law, they protect the specific 
community that the law makes possible. This aspiration makes the legal 
institutional order and its practices highly valuable, and as such, they are 
worthy of respect. If we give up this aspiration we seem to be left with fear 
alone. 
Since dynamic and fleeting modern societies106can give rise to a large 
degree of pluralism and concomitant moral and ethical controversy, legality, 
and the community that it makes possible, can become an ever more 
important means for coordinating behavior and for settling social and political 
conflicts. As long as the law remains a set of uncontroversial and authoritative 
norms and principles, society can for the most part be normatively divided 
and variable. Thus the authority of law plays an important mediating and 
integrating role in dynamic and pluralist modern societies. However, as the 
role of law can be expected to become more important in modern societies, 
the authority (and autonomy) of the law needs to be ever more carefully 
guarded. The loss of legal authority could amount to the loss of an important 
last source of shared communal meanings and norms in otherwise already 
relatively unstable modern societies. 
 
                                           
105 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, pp. 187, 188; “The result is that in the administration of justice 
civil society is explicitly posited as a whole within the life and action of its members.” 
Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 107; cp. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, § 229; 
Taylor, Hegel, p. 439. 
106 Cp. Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 200; Berman, M., All that is Solid melts into 
Air, The Experience of Modernity, Penguin Books London 1988; Giddens, The 
Consequences of Modernity. 
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Anthony Kronman realizes that in modern pluralistic societies there is less 
and less communality for the law to work with. Nevertheless he presents us 
with an exemplary lawyer that commits to the good of the community: the 
“lawyer-statesman.” The promise of this professional is that he aspires to 
excel in what Kronman calls “political deliberation,” which is always guided 
by the “preservation or improvement of some collective enterprise.”107 In 
whatever setting it occurs, “political deliberation always aims at the good of a 
community.” Moreover, political deliberation and negotiation center on the 
question of, not what the parties’ interests and values are, but what those 
interests and values ought to be, considering the fact that political decisions 
are aimed at the good of the community.108 The ideal of political fraternity 
aims at establishing emotional bonds among the members of the community 
and helps to counteract the destructive forces that “threaten our fragile human 
works.” The wise political judgment is the one that can inspire conflicting 
parties to this good of political fraternity. This is an important good because it 
makes possible respect and concern for all sorts of different interests and also 
a willingness to reconsider one’s own values and interests. Thus, “the law is a 
public calling which entails a duty to serve the good of the community, and 
not just one’s own good or that of one’s client.”109 
Both one’s own values and interests and those of others are seen in the 
light of the important value of the preservation or improvement of the 
collective enterprise of the political community. The enterprise can only be 
served by the ideal of political fraternity for this keeps our minds and hearts 
open to common meanings and values that can bind us in our modern pluralist 
societies, if only occasionally and temporarily. The idealist, contrary to the 
realist, refuses to give up on the hope of shaping the political order into a 
political community.110 
                                           
107 “For when a community is divided by a contest among incommensurable values 
important enough to place its identity in doubt, it is in the preservation of political 
fraternity that the public good largely consists.” Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, p. 99. 
108 Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, pp. 88, 91. 
109 Kronman, A.T., ‘The Law as Profession’, in: Rhode, D.L. (ed.), Ethics in Practice, 
Lawyer’s roles, responsibilities and regulation, Oxford University Press Oxford UK 2000, 
p. 31; cp. Parsons, ‘A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession’, in: Essays in 
Sociological Theory, p. 384. 
110 Cp. White, Acts of Hope; Gaakeer, Hope Springs Eternal. 
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Hermeneutics and judgment 
Authoritative settlement of conflict requires that both the directly involved 
and more remotely interested parties experience the legal verdict of the law as 
both legitimate and definite. The legal professional is supposed to end, or help 
to end an argument or conflict, and he should leave no space for further 
escalation. If the professional can persuade the conflicting parties to recognize 
the common good by means of his judgment and decision, this is the best 
chance he or she has for a successful solution. To find this common good in 
particular cases, the good that can bind the conflicting parties, the 
professional will require cultivated judgment and “practical wisdom.” The 
mechanical application of formal legal knowledge to individual cases will 
never do because finding the common good requires the capacity to construct 
the common meanings and values that the law – and the moral community 
that it makes possible – consists of in the particular case. It requires coming 
up with solutions that promote order and community. 
Generally, members of a community are brought up with basic shared 
understandings that bind their community.111 This also applies to the officials 
who are made responsible for the settlement of conflicts in society: the legal 
professionals. Normally these shared values can remain unconscious as 
individuals orient their behavior and actions towards them in a “natural” way. 
They just know how to behave and act within this community, and they most 
certainly also know how to judge the behavior and actions of others based on 
these shared understandings. 112  
A naturalist or “physicalist” scientific approach seems not to be very 
fruitful if we try to construct a theory about the meaningful normative order 
that constitutes the community. But “the brute problem of incorporating 
meaning into a physicalist’s universe lies heavily across the landscape,” as 
                                           
111 Cp. Berger & Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, pp. 129-163. 
112 Members in the community generally cannot make this knowledge completely explicit 
in the sense of knowing that; this is the difference between practical and scientific 
knowledge. Cp. Geertz, C., Local Knowledge, Basic Books New York second edition 
1985; cp. Fish, S., Doing What Comes Naturally, Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of 
Theory in Literary and Legal Studies, Duke University Press Reprint edition 1990. 
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Simon Blackburn writes.113 Both meaning and values are thought of as too 
subjective to be suitable objects of objective knowledge. From the perspective 
of modern science, the meaningful normative order that we need to recognize 
is both subjective and thoroughly relative to a community or tradition of 
shared beliefs. This means that only within such a community can we 
experience the shared understandings and values that belong to it. From the 
“outsider” perspective of modern science, the qualities of objectivity and 
universality are unattainable for these meanings and values.114 The scientific 
approach will tend to try to explain the cultural realm by “reducing” or 
“translating” it into something else, something that is a suitable object of 
scientific research.115 In the process, both the semantic and the normative 
aspects will be destroyed. 
However, legal professionals have to keep a close eye on the 
developments in the shared understandings of the community in order to 
guard the authority of the law. If the subjects are to recognize themselves in 
the law, the legal officials need to show sensitivity for meaningful social 
order, for the shared meanings and values in the community. What we seem 
to need, then, is a non-naturalist scientific method that does justice to the 
specific semantic and normative nature of cultural phenomena. That is why 
Ronald Dworkin does not refer to lawyers as scientists but as “philosophers.” 
According to Dworkin, “Lawyers are always philosophers” since they are 
working within a realm that does not allow for scientific knowledge but only 
for the analysis and exegesis of authoritative meanings and norms. This 
practice always involves theorizing about the legitimacy of the law and about 
how the law as a whole fits the most basic arrangements of the political 
community.116 
From the present perspective, the methods of “analytic philosophy” do not 
seem to be very helpful for the legal professional because they take a rather 
                                           
113 Blackburn, S., Spreading the Word, Groundings in the Philosophy of Language, Oxford 
University Press Oxford UK 1984, p. 281. 
114 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, pp. 112-114. 
115 “So we very often find these social changes explained in terms of the desire for greater 
wealth, or power, or the means to survival or control over others. Though these things can 
be woven into moral ideals, they need not be, and so explanation in terms of them is 
considered sufficiently “hard” and “scientific.”” Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, p. 20. 
116 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, p. 380. 
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“detached” or “disengaged” stance toward meaningful normative order. 
Analytic philosophy generally tends toward a Kantian attitude and searches 
for a rather high level of abstraction. Thus, there is a danger of abstracting 
away from the rich and complex (both concrete and particular) shared 
understandings that we are interested in here.117 Moreover, the analytical 
method also consistently works from the distinction between facts and norms, 
and this also leads to a fundamental distortion of the phenomena the legal 
professional is interested in. Compare Alfred Ayer in his famous Language, 
Truth and Logic: “The function of the relevant ethical word is purely 
‘emotive.’ It is used to express feelings about certain objects, but not to make 
any assertion about them.”118 Meanings are analyzed as “concepts” and the 
normative is, just as in the scientific approach, a subjective matter.  
The basic point here is that the analytical philosopher keeps a relatively 
disengaged view; he tries to keep a critical distance and not take a completely 
internal view.119  The analyzing mind does not completely “open up” to the 
normative force of the meanings that he investigates. He does not let himself 
be “formed” by it, because he remains at a critical – one might say Kantian – 
distance. But the authority cannot always afford such a distanced view. He 
needs to bridge the gap between the critical detached philosopher and the 
meaningful normative order. And because he needs a method that does justice 
to the rich semantic and normative aspects of social reality, he needs to make 
the distinction between facts and values relative.. Such a method starts from 
our experience or perception of the world as both a rich, meaningful and 
                                           
117 Cp. Cohen, The Dialogue of Reason, An Analysis of Analytical Philosophy, Clarendon 
Press Oxford 1986, p. 11; Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, p. 110. 
118 Ayer, A., Language, Truth and Logic, Penguin books London 1990, p. 110; “If the 
question of fact and value is a forced choice question for reflective people, one particular 
answer to that question, the answer that fact and value are totally disjoint realms, that the 
dichotomy ‘statement of fact or value judgment’ is an absolute one, has assumed the status 
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not things are good or bad or better or worse, etc., has, in a sense, become 
institutionalized.” Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, pp. 127, 128. 
119 For instance, H.L.A. Hart as a legal philosopher (and according to his preface 
“descriptive sociologist”) can be said to take, in his Concept of Law, a “moderately 
internal” view. Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press Oxford UK 
1960, pp. v, 86-89, 99; Martin, M., The Legal Philosophy of H.L.A. Hart, A Critical 
Appraisal, Temple University Press Philadelphia 1987, pp. 20-25. 
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indiscriminately evaluative world, and that allows us to view moral reactions 
as more than subjective or “emotive” gut reactions.120 Exploring from such a 
committed internal or “hermeneutical” perspective, we find that humans are 
irresistibly given to accord certain things moral significance. According to 
Charles Taylor, this means we are irresistibly given to experience such 
meanings and norms as “objective.”121  
It seems that we cannot but fundamentally distort our experience of our 
social world when we make a distinction between facts that we can 
objectively describe and values that are merely subjective and emotive. A 
complete understanding of this shared meaningful normative reality is only 
possible if one really “opens” oneself to it and does not abstract away or 
“disengage” from it in analytical or scientific reasoning. By contrast, we have 
to engage, to be prepared to let ourselves be formed by it such that it enriches 
our horizon, our perspective on things. And we must be prepared to 
investigate critically the prejudices that make it impossible for the meanings 
and values to enrich us; prejudices that close us off from these meanings and 
values.122 
To take seriously the idea that legal authorities have special 
responsibilities with regard to the community that the law makes possible 
seems to demand a sincere commitment or engagement with the law as a 
“nomos.” This requires a committed and engaged approach to our collective 
social reality and to the sources of the law and to legal history and tradition. 
Social reality, and its legal sources, history and tradition, only yield its rich 
content when one submits to its authority over us.123 This is not submission to 
authority in the sense of a blind obedience to commands. The authority is 
ultimately based on “an act of acknowledgement.” It is based on the 
acknowledgment that there might be superior knowledge available in some 
source (persons or texts) and on the fact that one trusts the better insight of 
others. But, like Goethe said, such authority must be earned.124 The 
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knowledge that such authorities make available can always be discovered to 
be true (or false), and it is therefore always ultimately the content and not the 
source that legitimizes the authority.125 
 
As argued before, the legal tradition can be seen as the product of a long-
standing collective effort of legal professionals to find (or construct) the 
moral community that binds individual members. The law as a living tradition 
or history can be seen as “an argument extended through time in which 
certain fundamental agreements are defined and redefined.”126 The law can 
thus be seen as the legally developed “core” of our common meaningful and 
normative world, diligently researched and elaborated upon by generations of 
committed lawyers and legal scientists. By the collective effort of the legal 
community, law has been made into an important source for shared 
understandings of the community and as such it deserves to be an 
authoritative text for both individual members and legal professionals. The 
law can be seen as the product of the continual confrontation of a specifically 
legal “depository” of rules, principles, concepts, procedures and institutions 
with the particulars of a wide range of conflicts in society. The collective 
experience of this confrontation of the universal with the particular through 
time, in which the tradition is constantly adapted to new problems in an 
orderly and piecemeal way, is deposited into a tradition and thus handed 
down to us. 
“We are always situated within traditions,” Hans Georg Gadamer argues 
in his Truth and Method. Ronald Dworkin echoes these words when he says, 
“Interpreters think within a tradition from which they cannot wholly 
escape.”127 Gadamer argues that every judgment we make derives from the 
“prejudices” or the “foreknowledge” that we receive in our socialization 
within a community, through our education and experiences. The legal 
professional thus works from the prejudices instilled in the study of and 
experience with the law, and as well, the shared understandings embodied in 
the law’s traditions. The legal tradition and its sources are authorities that 
                                           
125 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 280. 
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have been handed down to us, and such authority must have power over us.128 
Compare Anthony Kronman: 
 
“Every activity has a past. Every activity therefore has a history, which can be 
studied and written down in books. I am sure that even pinmaking has been studied 
by historians. But the law has a special relation to the past. The law’s past is not 
merely something that can be observed from the outside; it also possesses value and 
prestige within the law itself. […] To enter the legal profession is therefore to come 
into an activity with self-conscious historical depth, to feel that one is entering an 
activity that has been long under way, and whose fulfillment requires collaboration 
among many generations. It is to know that one belongs to a tradition.”129 
 
According to Gadamer the justification of such a tradition, although it in large 
measure determines our institutions and attitudes, is beyond rational 
grounding.130 Nor can we, in the modern world, find any other metaphysical 
foundation for it. It used to be thought that we needed such a metaphysical 
grounding to account for the special significance that the tradition has for us. 
For example, there have been impressive efforts to ground the development of 
the legal tradition in some metaphysics of history, like Vico, Hegel and Marx.  
But now philosophy or science is generally thought to be incapable of 
providing us with such a warrant.131 
The absence of such a warrant should not seduce us into ignoring what 
traditions can teach us. If we refuse traditional authority, and take a too 
distanced and disengaged view, we close our consciousness to tradition’s 
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meaningful and valuable contents. In the words of Kronman, you need to care 
for the law and its meanings/values to become a good lawyer. You need to be 
an amateur in the literal sense of the word, and aspire to become a 
“connoisseur.”132 We can rely on an amateur to always be critical of 
something he really cares for: he would never allow insufficiencies and 
shortcomings to damage it. Moreover, such an “amateur” cares for the law as 
a source of meanings and values that are goods in of themselves, “ultimate 
goods,” and most certainly not as a means to some outside goal (or worse, 
personal material gain). This might explain why we generally fear that 
amateurs will lose their love for the activity when they start to earn a living 
from their expertise, which thus becomes “professionalized.” The long-
standing discussions on professionalized sports and the traditional Olympic 
dream serve as a good illustration. 
True amateurs, though, will never take a cynical or even completely 
distanced and reserved view of the law because that would mean they stop 
caring for it. Only when one cares for a certain activity, and if one opens 
oneself up to the meanings and values that constitute it, can that activity 
reveal its wealth to the fullest extent. The same goes for the practices of the 
law. One needs to become an “amateur of the law,” and study it diligently and 
with commitment – accepting the authoritative standards of evaluation 
internal to this practice and submitting to the established guidelines – to really 
understand it.133  
In settling conflicts, professionals therefore consciously focus on the 
question of how, in a particular case, the law can structure the interactions in 
such a way that community can be realized. In a conflict, this means bridging 
the gap between the universal and the particular, between the law and 
individual parties with their own private goals and interests. In other words, it 
means giving substance to abstract or formal rules and principles. Bridging 
this gap requires what we might call “good judgment” or “prudence,” and we 
generally do this by searching for a good “fit.”134 Good judgment is what 
someone who has a cultivated and broad vision of things is capable of. Any 
                                           
132 Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, p. 108; cp. Frankfurt, H.G., The Reasons of Love, Princeton 
University Press Princeton NJ 2004. 
133 Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, p. 140. 
134 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, p. 230; Ricœur, P., The Just, Chicago University Press 
Chicago 1995, p. 113; cp. Unger, Knowledge and Politics, pp. 97, 148. 
 102  
wise person who can unite quarrelling members of the community in a bond 
of mutual respect and sympathy can be thought of as having a special gift of 
practical wisdom. This gift cannot be made into a science because it requires a 
form of practical wisdom that is not reducible to rules or methods. One is 
better to think of it as an “art.”135 
 As such, in the classical world, good judgment or practical “worldly” 
wisdom was thought to be the harmonious realization of human powers that 
required the “edification” of the whole person.136 Cultivated judgment could 
be expected of someone with character, refined taste, broad knowledge and 
experience and training in rational and logical reasoning and deliberation. A 
practically wise person deserves the loyalty and respect of community 
members for his judgment and is of great worth to the community. Others will 
look to such a person for leadership on account of his deliberative power, a 
power that is a matter of disposition and character rather than of mere 
calculation or simple skill. Such a person deserves to be seen as an authority 
for he or she can truly act and judge on behalf of the community and, to quote 
Kronman again, “guard it against the forces of disorder that threaten our 
fragile human works”137 – especially those shared understandings, elaborated 
into law, that makes a mere “heap” of people into a genuine community. 
 
The ethics of legal authority 
The law grants legal professionals – judges, notaries, advocates, and state 
attorneys – certain competences and immunities such that they are able to act 
as the guardians of legality and the community that it makes possible.138 It has 
been a central topic in this chapter that the community expects legal officials 
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to be committed and loyal to the legal community they represent. Because the 
nature of professional judgment is complex and context-dependent, and 
because solutions cannot be spelled out in advance, we entrust greater 
autonomy to legal professionals than people ordinarily have in their jobs. The 
professional serves as a prototype of a high-trust and relatively unregulated 
(non-bureaucratic) occupation.139 In return, like Dworkin argues, legal 
officials are generally thought to have special responsibilities towards the 
community. We might add that, in the political field, authority and overt 
cynicism about the binding meanings and values of the community do not 
readily combine. According to Bourdieu, “The group only fully accepts those 
who publicly show that they recognize the group. The sanctions of political 
scandal will inevitably befall the spokesperson who is disloyal, who does not 
really give the group what the group’s recognition is worth to him.”140 
Above I discussed the fragility of authority. Authority figures often 
represent a huge collective power and the authority is only trusted with this 
power when he is (seen as) employing this power to further the common 
good. Legal professionals should therefore prove themselves “worthy” of 
their special power, status and privilege, because only this makes them 
trustworthy or reliable in the eyes of those who subject themselves to their 
authority. Moreover, some of the specific competences and immunities (or 
privileges) are explicitly granted to make it possible for these professionals to 
really commit themselves to the law in a way that we do not normally expect 
from ordinary job-holders.  
We want legal professionals to be dignified, disinterested and independent 
in their judgments and actions. To begin with there should be no social or 
economic need for professionals to put their personal monetary interests 
ahead of their loyalty to the law. The independent institutional position of 
these professionals makes it possible to honorably and virtuously serve the 
law without being obliged to continually attend to personal and private 
interests.141 If with Bourdieu we think of “autonomy” as a liberation from all 
external constraints, it is in the first instance the economic, social and 
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institutional independence of the professional legal functionaries that makes 
“autonomous law” possible. This means at least that legal professionals 
should carefully cultivate an aura of disinterestedness. In the paradoxical 
words of Bourdieu, they have an “interest in disinterestedness.”142 
Anthony Kronman tries to guard the moral aspect by describing it as a 
“higher order interest” that makes the transcendence of private and particular 
interests possible.143 The ethos of disinterestedness makes it possible for the 
participants in the proceedings to see the professionals as fulfilling a higher 
vocation, as letting the common good be their guiding voice. We can now 
understand why these professionals generally distinguish themselves 
meticulously from the utilitarian ethos of the commercial classes in modern 
society. Legal professionals try not to be motivated in their actions by 
particular and private economic concerns, and they resist both the 
“commodification” of their output and the description of legal practices in the 
jargon of business administration.144 We can also understand why the ethos of 
legal professionals can never be but incompletely democratic: it is next to 
impossible for the lawyer to accept that the rightness of a legal judgment can 
be the object of subsequent democratic discussion and authorization by some 
arbitrary democratic majority.145 Compare Nonet and Selznick:  
 
“In interpreting and applying the law, jurists are to be objective spokesmen for 
historically established principles, passive dispensers of a received, impersonal 
                                           
142 Bourdieu, P., The Field of Cultural Production, Essays in Art and Literature, Polity 
Press Cambridge UK 1993, pp. 112, 113; cp. Bourdieu, Practical Reason, pp. 75, 143; 
Bourdieu, P. The State Nobility, Stanford University Press Stanford Ca 1996, p. 382; 
Bourdieu, P., ‘The Force of Law’: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, The Hastings 
Law Journal vol. 38 July 1987. 
143 Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, pp. 32, 54, 101, 374. 
144 “Lawyers […] lobbied for friendly regulation and the like, not because they believed in 
a corporatist state, but in defense (they claimed) of the public good; they spoke as little as 
possible of self-interest, and when they did, they defined it in individualistic terms. 
Excessive or unfair competition were evils because (among other things) they threatened 
the independence of the practitioner, reducing a profession to a mere business and a free 
worker to a serf.” Friedman, The Republic of Choice, pp. 76, 77; cp. Posner, Overcoming 
Law, p. 56. 
145 Brint, In an Age of Experts, pp. 8, 16, 124; Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, p. 155. 
 105 
justice. They have a claim to the last word because their judgments are thought to 
obey an external will and not their own.”146  
 
External will is the “will of the law,” not public opinion or the will of some 
contingent majority. This claim to fundamental “rightness” in legal matters 
means that there is a certain legal truth about the matter that can be found by 
means of hermeneutical exegesis of the relevant legal materials and by means 
of good judgment.147 Rightness in legal matters is not the product, nor the 
object, of subsequent democratic wheeling and dealing. Ideally, the law is 
“above” politics and its democratic procedures and decision-making, as well 
as “above” economic motives and calculation. One might even very well 
argue that it is the law that makes orderly and constructive democratic 
argument and decision-making possible in the first place. The law and its 
institutions are part of the “social and cultural walls” that keep the interaction 
in civil society within bounds. At the same time, the law also keeps in check 
those democratic majorities that can avail themselves (through legislative and 
executive means) of the huge power of the modern state.148 
Legal professionals should guard the law and the common good that they 
represent against all sorts of partial and particularistic interests, and this 
demands personal professional disinterestedness and independence. This 
disinterestedness and independence makes a credible and convincing loyalty 
and commitment to the law possible. Legal professionals should obey – or 
even be – the voice of the law.149 In the following I will argue that, ideally, 
the commitment of the lawyer concerns his whole personality and that the 
distinction between private and public is highly relative from this perspective. 
The public role and the ethos that it requires should become his “second 
nature.”150 The legal professional identifies strongly with his role, with the 
law and the public good, if necessary with the sacrifice of his own private 
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interests. In the traditional view this requires the building of character and a 
perfectionist virtue-ethics. 
We can start by contrasting Jane Jacobs’s idea of the “commercial ethos” 
of the merchant classes with the “guardian ethos.” The latter can be associated 
with the political realm and Jacobs characterizes it as respect for hierarchy 
and tradition, high regard for honour, obedience, loyalty, discipline and 
commitment.151 The legal professional is entrusted with special powers and 
competences that give him considerable security, income and status in 
society. But in return the legal professional “gives himself” to the law.152 
The ideal of self-sacrifice is intimately connected to the ideas of “noblesse 
oblige” and professional “honor.” Noblesse oblige means that it is part of the 
definition of the good lawyer to be disinterested and devoted to the common 
good. When the professional ethos has become his second nature he cannot be 
otherwise; it is “stronger than him.”153 Ideally, an authority figure should 
invest his professional “honor,” which can hardly be distinguished from his 
personal honor, in serving the community and subordinating his personal 
particular interests. The idea of honor has an important function here. In the 
words of Bourdieu, “The ethic of honor bears down on each agent with the 
weight of all the other agents.”154 The authority should regard the honor that 
will be granted by his peers, his “confrères,” as his greatest price, and his 
reward is therefore “spiritual,” or at least “immaterial.” The material fees or 
compensation that he does receive should be experienced as benefiting the 
community as a whole. The idea of honor and noblesse oblige also connect to 
the idea of professional pride, which also helps to arm the professional against 
powers in politics or civil society who try to bend the law their way. 
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“Pride is the crown of all virtues,” Aristotle argued, and according to 
Roberto Unger the core of the virtue of “pride” is the refusal to acknowledge 
your dependence upon other people’s opinion of you and the wilful assertion 
of the worth of your project against all constraint and adversity.155 When a 
person is thought to be virtuous in the sense of unfalteringly keeping his eye 
on the good, we grant him the (professional) pride of doing so. The 
sociologist Peter Berger provides another important aspect: the professional 
qualities and virtues enjoined by honour “provide the link between self and 
community.”156 The ideal lawyer, that is to say his “superior essence,” 
identifies strongly with the good of the community as a whole, and the good 
lawyer invests both his personal honour and professional pride in this 
commitment. Because he wants to live up to this essence, this lawyer would 
experience it as shameful if he is exposed as an opportunist and a “fraud.” 
Because authority is both fragile and fleeting in modern societies, he will try 
to live up to his essence and failing to do so would mean losing face in the 
community. Thus honour and pride are highly social dispositions and require 
a public.157 Like Berger states, these dispositions link the lawyers both to the 
community of lawyers and to the larger community that the law makes 
possible. 
Generally people feel that communal values are not for sale, and this 
might explain why the “selling out” of basic values by one of the community 
members is a threat to the group as a whole.158  As the law is supposed to be 
the expression of the shared understandings binding the community, loss of 
professional honor is loss of face within the larger community. This goes a 
fortiori within the legal community. Since it is professional honour and pride 
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that binds the community of professionals, loss of honour is loss of face in 
this community as well. Thus, the authority should take seriously the 
professional virtues that are highly regarded as means to a worthy and 
valuable professional life. The community will generally praise and reward 
any citizen who lives a virtuous life, but it will especially praise authority 
figures who make these virtues their “second nature.” In order to deserve the 
trust of those who submit to their authority, these figures will have to aspire to 
an exemplary and “perfectionist” ethos, that is to say, realizing the ideal of the 
“superior essence” – or the ideal standard of professional “excellence” – of 
being a lawyer. 
But legal professionals are constantly at risk of succumbing to pressures 
from outside forces. As I stated before, they are at the forefront in the 
pacification of society and as such constantly confronted with power-play and 
violence whether of a physical or of a more symbolic nature. Moreover, to do 
their work well, professionals often are required to have “guilty knowledge” – 
knowledge of illegalities, or the immorality of those they are confronted with 
in their practice. These requirements further encourage the emphasis in 
professional culture on trust, discretion, judgment and character.159 To 
function well under such circumstances requires what one might call a “mild 
state of mobilization”160 on the part of the professionals involved. This is 
perhaps most obvious in the case of the police, but it applies throughout the 
legal world. Accordingly, like armies these institutions are hierarchically 
organized and share other characteristics as well. For example, legal 
professionals are thought to be “officers of the court” who reside in “palaces 
of justice” wearing uniforms and interacting in a highly formal and ritualistic 
way. The hierarchy is functional to make it possible for the law to speak with 
one united voice, and generally to make it act (at least in they eyes of the 
public) authoritatively as a consistent and impersonal whole. To this effect, 
also, all sorts of symbolism, rituals and procedures are invoked. 
Legal professionals are not in the business of the exercise of naked power 
but of authority, which is, in the end, nothing more than a set of legitimating 
“ideas” added to power. These ideas are to be made concrete and manifest by 
means of symbols, uniforms, rituals, etc., and thus the powers that the parties 
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are confronted with become to be seen as “authorized.” The authority of the 
law (the value of legality) is the means to order, and as such, the roles, 
formalities and rituals that symbolize this authority command the respect and 
loyalty of all court officers and all parties involved in legal procedures, as 
well. Through this respect they show respect for the law. Importantly, all 
these “forms” that make it possible for the officials to interact in a highly 
formal and ritualistic way function as powerful constraints upon passions that 
can be evoked in the conflict at hand.161 The whole ritual is performed to set it 
apart from other practices and activities, and to make sure that everyone is 
well aware that only certain arguments and certain behavior will be 
acceptable and valid in this context. The relations between all the participants 
in the legal procedure need to be formalized to some degree to make the 
ongoing discussion fair and the final decision authoritative and definite.  
“Conventions are rules for behavior at a distance from the immediate 
desires of the self,” argues Richard Sennett in his book The Fall of Public 
Man.162 Through the conventions, forms and rituals a “new reality” is created, 
a reality in which the hierarchy and exercise of authority is made visible and 
in which the roles that the different participants play can “transform” the 
persons who are forced to behave formally and ritualistically or who are thus 
addressed.163 Considering the fact that the parties are involved in a (possibly) 
highly destructive conflict with one another, conventions and formalized 
rituals are necessary to make everyone behave and argue with a certain 
distance from their anger and frustration. In this possibly explosive 
confrontation the parties involved “can be sociable only when they have some 
protection from each other; without barriers, boundaries, without the mutual 
distance which is the essence of impersonality, people are destructive.”164 
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To conclude, what these forms make possible is “distance.” The officials 
distance themselves from the parties involved in a conflict such that they can 
judge them impersonally and objectively. There can be no doubt that the 
relationships within the legal proceedings are not relations between equals. 
The officials represent the law, and the law is “above” society with its 
individual members and collectivities. The law certainly is above the litigants 
and parties involved as it has an authority they should obey.165 Indeed, the law 
appears above the parties in both a figurative and a literal sense. Of course, 
from the perspective of the litigants the judge represents a huge collective 
power. In the person of the judge, “a superior power appears before the 
litigants, one which transcends the confrontation of private worldviews.”166 
To make this concrete the judge is also literally placed on a dais to represent 
the fact that he or she is above the particular concerns and interests in society 
and is the guardian of the law and the community. 
Because authority is fragile, the professional should distance him or 
herself from the particular perspectives of the parties involved and be 
prepared to let the law prevail. This also goes for the attorney at law. Talcott 
Parsons writes that the advocate represents the law rather than the client and 
this means that he should resist the powers that he is under to make sure that 
the client gets what he wants.167 Only if the law commands admiration and 
respect can it be expected to fulfill its function in modern societies. Those 
who do not conform should duly fear the law and its functionaries. State 
agents, such as the police, can be authorized by the law to (re-) create a lawful 
situation, if necessary by means of physical force. It is exactly because the 
law should arouse both respect and fear in the public that we can explain why 
an almost “military” dedication to the “higher cause” is demanded from legal 
professionals. After all, how are they supposed to be consistent and credible 
combatants for law and order if they do not admire and respect (and fear) the 
law themselves? 
                                           
165 This fact, in principle, invokes in the officials an “aristocratic sense of distance.” 
Kronman, Max Weber, Jurists: Profiles in Legal Theory, Edward Arnold London 1983, pp. 
44, 46. 
166 Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law, Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field,’ p. 831. 
167 Parsons, ‘A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession’, in: Essays in Sociological 
Theory, p. 384; Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, pp. 71, 72, 145. 
 111 
We might say, then, that what is patriotism for the citizen of the nation 
state is love of the law as represented by the legal professional. Of course, 
there is an “interest in the disinterested” dedication to the common good, but 
with Kronman we can say that this is an interest of a special sort. It is “a 
higher order interest we take in our ideals, the aspirational norms we think 
should guide our more immediate preferences even when they do not.”168 We 
can now truly say that the law is a “calling.”169 From this dedication to an 
external voice – the vocation or calling – in this case the voice of the law, the 
recommended professional virtues logically follow. What is needed in the 
first place is independence and personal disinterestedness. Secondly, what is 
needed is character to resist all temptation to abuse the professional powers 
for personal gain at the expense of the community. Both establish the feeling 
that legal professionals can be trusted with their power. Thirdly, and I 
explored this in a previous paragraph, what is needed is cultivated or good 
judgment, which means that the lawyer knows where the good in a particular 
case lies and how he should act to realize it. These qualities are exactly those 
that are prized in a traditional professional culture: “a public outlook 
influenced by noblesse oblige, an emphasis on character and trust, and an 
insistence on cultivated judgment.” What arises here is akin to an “aristocratic 
ethos.”170 Lawyers who find their inspiration in this ideal are the kind of 
professionals that de Tocqueville hoped would save modern societies from the 
powers that are unleashed in modern democratic politics. 
                                           
168 Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, p. 54. 
169 Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, pp. 54, 32, 101, 374. 
170 And, indeed, Steven Brint argues that there are deep roots of these traditional ideals of 
professionalism in the older aristocratic culture. Brint, In an Age of Experts, pp. 8, 27, 28, 
30; Gertrude Himmelfarb quotes Taine describing this ethos: “A real “gentleman” is a truly 
noble man, a man worthy to command, a disinterested man of integrity, capable of 
exposing, even sacrificing himself for those he leads; not only a man of honor, but a 
conscientious man, in whom generous instincts have been confirmed by right thinking and 
who, acting rightly by nature, acts even more rightly from good principles.” And she adds: 
“The gentleman was typically identified by his moral virtues: integrity, honesty, 
generosity, courage, graciousness, politeness, consideration for others.” Himmelfarb, G., 
The Demoralization of Society, From Victorian Virtues to Modern Values, Vintage Books 
New York 1994, pp. 45, 46. 
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3. 
Freedom’s Formalism 
 
 
 
Human beings not only value living in a community of kindred spirits, they 
also value their individual freedom. Indeed, we live in a modern culture where 
“rationality,” “freedom” and “human dignity” form an important part of our 
moral world, and legal institutions and practices have to take these values 
seriously in order to safeguard their legitimacy. People realize that there are 
reasonable limits to their individual freedom, but they demand that these 
limits are as clear and distinct as possible. The demand for respect for 
individual freedom translates into a demand for fairness, transparency and 
objectivity in their treatment by legal authorities. “The real consequence of 
the Enlightenment is […] the subjection of all authority to reason,”1 Gadamer 
writes and, indeed, it can be argued that one Enlightenment ideal is the 
thorough “rationalization” of the law. In Weber’s terms the authority of the 
law takes on a “rational-legal” character, and we witness a tendency towards 
abstraction and generalization.2 As a result not only the law, but also legal 
practices, become more impersonal, formal and abstract. In other words, we 
witness a tendency toward the “empty universal.”3 
                                           
1 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 278. 
2 “Government today is formal, bureaucratic, and legalistic; it is rational and instrumental, 
at least compared to most historical forms of government. It is committed to rules, to legal 
processes; it rejects the personalism of its predecessors. Fundamentally it rests on universal 
norms, rather than on the grace and favor of particular holders of power. It outlaws the 
arbitrary, the ad hoc.” Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 212; Nisbet, The Sociological 
Tradition, pp. 42, 43. 
3 “For Aristotle as well as for Plato, things owed their identity to a universal form that 
included all particular determinations. The Enlightenment concept of the universal, to the 
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Liberal culture 
Individual freedom requires emancipation from the “chains” of the 
community and from the grip of all sorts of authorities. In the introduction I 
argued that the “Enlightenment” could be thought as the self-conscious 
pursuit of this good by means of reason and modern science. Indeed, 
Immanuel Kant argues that Enlightenment is “the emergence of man from a 
state of self-incurred immaturity.” There is no need for man to let others do 
the thinking for him; human beings should dare to think for themselves and 
thus dare to be free. To quote Kant in full: 
 
“Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity 
is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another. 
This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of 
resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of 
enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have the courage to use your own 
understanding.”4 
 
Beside the fact that rational human beings can think for themselves, Kant also 
pointed to another important aspect of the fundamental freedom of human 
beings. The individual actually should be free because he or she can behave 
ethically or morally only if there is a choice to avoid evil and do the moral 
thing. Only someone with the freedom to act can be held responsible for his 
or her deeds. Moreover, Kant thought that we could safely trust the individual 
with this freedom because human beings are “rational,” or at least reasonable 
beings, and by means of their rationality they can know good from bad, and 
                                                                                                                               
contrary, was a rational a priori void of any particular content, a category of thought 
imposed upon the real, rather than expressive of it. Its formalist character shows a 
surprising similarity with the universal names that, in nominalist philosophy, the mind 
imposes upon reality in order to gain purchase on a chaotic multiplicity. […] Social factors 
also presented a powerful incentive for stressing the primacy of universal concepts and 
values over particular differences.” Dupré, The Enlightenment and the Intellectual 
Foundations of Modern Culture, p. 3. 
4 Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in: Political Writings, p. 
54; cp. Foucault, M., ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in: The Foucault Reader, pp. 32- 50. 
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act accordingly.5 For Kant the dignity of individual human beings lay in their 
freedom, and in their respect for other people's values and beliefs. Here the 
central notion is “human dignity.”6 The individual human being deserves to 
be free and equal, and his or her specific interests, desires and projects are 
therefore worthy of respect. Against the communitarian concern with 
community and the authority of its shared understandings, Kant embraces the 
“principle of individualism” and argues for the authority of (formal) reason. 
Immanuel Kant, along with other modern liberal political philosophers, thus 
provided us with the “normative” project of the Enlightenment. 
In his famous essay On Liberty, John Stuart Mill also embraced 
individualism: “Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is 
sovereign.” But he provided us with a different yet also very influential 
justification. Mill regarded the free development of individuality as essential 
to human flourishing, generally, and even as an element of all that is 
designated by the terms civilization and culture. He argued that human 
powers are exercised and developed only in making a choice in particular 
circumstances. Choice is vital; it makes it possible to develop oneself, to build 
a life suited uniquely to oneself, to realize the self in free action and 
exploration. Mill therefore regarded freedom of choice as essential to human 
development. Moreover, people are all different and “to give a fair play to the 
nature of each, it is essential that different people should be allowed to lead 
different lives.”7  
Mill sings the praises of “originality.” Individuals who dare to be different 
make it possible for others to identify with and learn from their example, and 
perhaps even distinguish themselves from each other, as well. He even 
                                           
5 Kant belongs to the tradition of thinkers who believed in a “reason-based morality.” 
Unger, Knowledge and Politics, pp. 49, 50; cp. Kronman, Max Weber, p. 21. 
6 “If rational control is a matter of mind dominating a disenchanted world of matter, then 
the sense of the superiority of the good life, and the inspiration to attain it, must come from 
the agent’s sense of his own dignity as a rational being. I believe that this modern theme of 
dignity of the human person, which has such a considerable place in modern ethical and 
political thought […] will become an explicitly central theme with Kant.” Taylor, Sources 
of the Self, p. 152; Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, p. 46. 
7 Mill, J.S., ‘On Liberty’ in: On Liberty and other writings, Cambridge University Press 
Cambridge UK 1989, p. 64; cp. Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 2; Dale, In Pursuit of 
a Scientific Culture, p. 44. 
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explicitly connects the achievements of European civilization and culture to 
the age-old “pluralism” in this corner of the world. In Europe, a great 
diversity of individuals and cultures have followed different paths, and many 
have led to something valuable. Thus, within a certain legally defined zone, 
the individual self is free to cultivate whatever talents or feelings he or she 
wishes. The other side of the coin is, however, that one is not free to impose 
one’s values and norms on others through the collective power of the 
community:  
 
“But neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to 
another human creature of ripe years that he shall not do with his life for his own 
benefit what he chooses to do with it. He is the person most interested in his own 
well-being: the interest which any other person, except in cases of strong personal 
attachment, can have in it, is trifling, compared to what he himself has; the interest 
which society has in him individually (except as to his conduct to others) is 
fractional, and altogether indirect: while, with respect to his own feelings and 
circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge 
immeasurably surpassing this that can be possessed by any one else.”8 
 
This means that, although the community is bound together by a collective 
respect for the sovereignty of the state and the authority of the law, the 
modern citizen now demands something in return. He demands respect from 
the state and from the law for his dignity as a free person and thereby for his 
personal beliefs, values and interests. Within a community, this demand 
amounts to a demand for “fairness” in the sense that the individual’s social 
status and his personal beliefs, values and interests are disregarded and that he 
receives equal and fair treatment by authorities. The citizen does not demand 
fair treatment only by the state and its laws,9 but it does start there. Only if the 
state and the law guarantee and protect certain fundamental rights and 
freedoms can the citizen truly realize his potential and pursue his idea of the 
                                           
8 Mill, J.S., ‘On Liberty’ in: On Liberty and other writings, p. 76. 
9 “The first, in brief, is the citizen’s expectation of fair treatment, everywhere and in every 
circumstance. Justice here is not merely a matter of courtroom procedures. Justice is, or 
ought to be, available in all settings: in hospitals and prisons, in schools, on the job, in 
apartment buildings, on the streets, within the family. It is a pervasive expectation of 
fairness.” Friedman, Total Justice, p. 43. 
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good life. Consequently, only if the state and the law treat citizens fairly are 
they prepared to subject themselves to the ultimate authority of the state and 
its laws. The relation between citizens and the state is thus seen in 
“contractual” terms. 
Thomas Hobbes was one of the first liberal philosophers who saw the 
modern state as a product of a contract between citizens and the sovereign. He 
argued that it was in their enlightened self-interest to relinquish their rights 
and submit to one central authority charged with keeping the peace and 
settling conflicts rather than take the law into their own hands. What Hobbes 
argued that everybody should do has, in fact, been largely realized in the 
modern sovereign state: “The kind of absoluteness in the state that Hobbes 
demanded as the sole alternative to the state of nature is, and has been since at 
least the French Revolution, a fact.”10 As well, since early modernity, Western 
societies have also become more open and free. We can relate this to the 
gradual development and spreading of the liberal and constitutional state, 
which guarantees its citizens certain fundamental rights and protection against 
the arbitrary employment of power by the state itself.11 
 
Freedom and modernity 
This changing moral landscape has consequences for the law and for legal 
professionalism. However, before going into this I want like to delve a bit 
further into the changes we associate with “modernity.” It seems naïve to 
explain these changes from a purely normative standpoint because it is not 
likely that institutional orders come into being simply because they are just. 
Only a better look at the developments in modern societies from a 
sociological point of view can provide us with a framework to understand 
what made the spread and growth of freedom in modern societies possible. 
Modern society is experienced by its members as very dynamic and 
relatively unstable.  According to Robert Nisbet, this mutability has, since the 
                                           
10 Nisbet, Twilight of Authority, p. 63. 
11 Liberalism starts from “the precedence of the individual over the state: hence it demands 
that what it regards as the basic political freedoms of the individual be protected from the 
state. What these are, is discerned by various routes – for example natural-rights theory, 
such as Locke’s ‘life, liberty, and property’ or the American Declaration of Independence’s 
‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’. These rights are held to be self-evident. They 
are also inalienable.” Finer, The History of Government, p. 1569. 
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end of the nineteenth century, been one of the major concerns to preoccupy 
the founding fathers of sociology. They have all sought explanations for the 
socio-economic turmoil in modern societies, its resulting fragmentation of 
traditional communities, and the destruction of the meaningful and normative 
“fabric” (or culture) of the community. For instance, Emile Durkheim argues 
that the modern industrial order, and the accompanying ever more intricate 
division of labor that it entails, is constantly changing. The tumultuous 
character of modern social life is explained by the impulse towards this 
complex division of labor. This division that meets modern economic needs 
by exploiting nature makes industrial production possible.12 But the modern 
industrial order has a highly destructive aspect: “What is characteristic of our 
development is that it has successfully destroyed all the established social 
contexts; one after another they have been banished either by the slow usury 
of time or by violent revolution, and in such fashion that nothing has been 
developed to replace them.”13 
Another founding father of modern sociology, Karl Marx, also pointed to a 
destructive power at work in modern societies: capitalism. Capitalism is also 
an engine that keeps society in constant motion. It does so by constantly 
generating new consumers goods, new methods of production or 
transportation, new markets, and new forms of industrial organization. Hence, 
modern capitalism is a process of continual “creative destruction.” As the 
technological frontier moves outward, markets expand and new forms of 
organization emerge. In the process older forms of solidarity are ruthlessly 
crushed underfoot.14 
Max Weber was a little less pessimistic about modern society. He paired 
the Marxist analysis of capitalism as a major engine of change and insecurity 
with the idea that this force seems to be qualified by a continual 
“rationalization”15 of social and institutional ordering. Weber thus points to 
                                           
12 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, pp. 11,12; cp. Nisbet, The Sociological 
Tradition, p. 21. 
13 Durkheim, E., Suicide, Étude de Sociologie, Félix Alcan Paris 1897, p. 446; quoted in: 
Barber, Strong Democracy, p. 97. 
14 Schumpeter, J., Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Georg Allen & Unwin London 
1976, pp. 83, 162; Fukuyama, Trust, pp. 312, 313. 
15 “For Weber, the transition to modernity takes place largely through increasing 
rationalization. Rationality denotes following a rule as opposed to acting on impulse or at 
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what he calls “rational” or “rationalized capitalism” as the major driving force 
for change. The end result will not be the destruction of capitalism itself, 
which was prophesied by Marx, but the gradual extension of (state) 
bureaucracies to cope with the complexities and incongruities of modern 
social life. These bureaucracies themselves will become an effective and 
autonomous force in society, and Weber is justly famous for his visionary 
analysis of the dynamics of the modern “bureaucratic state.”16  
According to Weber, rational capitalism will lead to a growing “pluralism” 
in modern society. While pre-modern communities were bound together by 
shared meanings and values, modern societies will see “many old gods ascend 
from their graves; they are disenchanted and hence take the form of 
impersonal forces. They strive to gain power over our lives and again they 
resume their eternal struggle with one another.”17 Weber argued that the 
forces of rational capitalism lead to a gradual but irreversible 
“disenchantment” of the socio-political order, which amounts to a destruction 
of our sense of the cosmos as a meaningful and normative order, a destruction 
of the collective horizon towards which people previously oriented their lives. 
In the modern experience, we do not share a meaningful common perspective 
on things anymore, nor do we share a substantial moral framework. All shared 
values in society are thus experienced as precarious and contingent; that is 
what we mean by “pluralism.”18 We already saw how Mill praised such 
pluralism as a source for culture and civilization. The other side of the coin is, 
of course, that this confrontation amongst value systems might leave them all 
relative and contingent. This results in uncertainty and insecurity. 
Moreover, we seem to have moved from an eternal static cosmic order (in 
which change was slow, incidental and largely deceptive as time was 
experienced as cyclic in which everything was the “eternal return of the 
same”) to an experience of time that is like a “runaway train” in which 
                                                                                                                               
random. Rationality means consistency in linking our thoughts or statements, creating the 
logical order of premise to conclusion. It also means consistency in linking our actions, 
creating the efficient order of means to end.” Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 10. 
16 Collins, Weberian Sociological Theory, pp. 19-44. 
17 Weber, ‘Science as a Vocation,’ in: Gerth & Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, p. 
149. 
18 Cp. Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 17; Unger, Law in modern society, pp. 66-76; Unger, 
Knowledge and Politics, p. 103. 
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everything is changing all the time and in fundamental ways, sometimes 
virtually overnight. The experience of modernity is therefore, for most people, 
as much a threat as it is a constant promise. “The beauty it offered held a 
terror within.”19 But, the promise of the Enlightenment was freedom, and 
there must be a connection between the forces at work in modern societies 
and the promise of freedom. Partly because the socio-economic forces 
destroyed collective horizons (and the accordingly preordained social stations 
with their concomitant meanings and norms), could individuals disengage 
from authority and individually pursue alternative life projects. Moreover, the 
increasing mobility in modern societies and the growing economic 
independence of ever larger parts of the populace made it much easier to 
“escape” suffocating socio-political orders. In short, it became easier to 
simply move away from family and local authorities.  
A common trait in the sociology of modernity is that the modern world is 
seen as fundamentally one of “movement,” both literally in geographical 
terms, and figuratively, in terms of social mobility.20 But as people become 
more mobile and as modern life has, to a large extent, become “urban” life, 
we can, with Alexis de Tocqueville in his Democracy in America, 
characterize modern society as a “society of strangers.” This is, of course, but 
a relative notion. But it seems an adequate metaphor to describe the contrast 
between the many generations that have lived in closely-knit rural 
communities before the coming of the modern age.21 In the more abstract (or 
figurative) sense of mobility, modern societies are characterized by the fact 
that its much easier for people to move up the social ladder (and down the 
ladder as well). In previous societies one might speak of the “rule of status” 
since the (power) relations at that time were predetermined by fixed and 
definite positions and roles, which also determined the personal honor of 
individuals. These relations and positions were in many instances even 
                                           
19 Watson, The Modern Mind, p. 72; cp. Gould, S. J., Time’s Cycle, Time’s Arrow, Myth 
and Metaphor in the Discovery of Geological Time, Harvard University Press Cambridge 
Mass. 1987. 
20 Dahrendorf, R., The Modern Social Conflict, An Essay in the Politics of Liberty, 
University of California Press Berkeley Ca 1988, p. 21; Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, 
p. 59; Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 48. 
21 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. II p.336; Friedman, Total Justice, p. 90; 
Friedman, The Republic of Choice, pp. 56, 70, 75; Aubert, The Hidden Society, pp. 66, 67. 
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thought to be of “divine” origin and deeply ingrained in the whole natural and 
cosmic order.22 How much more secure can social positions and roles 
become?  
In modern societies, however, social positions and roles become “fluid and 
negotiable,” as famously described by Henry Sumner Maine in the nineteenth 
century as a movement from “status to contract.”23 Of course, it is hard to 
resist seeing a connection between geographical and social mobility. A 
society of relatively mobile individuals, a society of strangers, will lead to 
more fleeting and indefinite social relationships. Mobility and city dwelling 
“involve much more impersonal and casual contact, in place of the more 
intense, face to face relations in earlier times.”24 Indeed, the social status of 
individuals is both less evident and less significant in a heady commercial 
world than in a rustic, but “rusty” rural environment. In a commercial world, 
others are potential business partners on a contractual and temporal basis, 
while the feudal rural world created life-long dependencies that seemed to 
command life-long commitments and loyalties. To assume such life-long 
loyalties and dependencies in a “society of strangers” seems much less 
obvious.  
 
Liberalism and the abstract self 
According to Friedrich von Hayek the essence of modern liberal political 
philosophy is “the denial of all privilege,” and surely it cannot be a 
coincidence that modern mobile societies give birth to such a new political 
ideology. In commercially thriving communities, the rising commercial 
classes are bound to question the justification for the privileges of the ruling 
                                           
22 Von Hayek, F.A., The Road to Serfdom, The University of Chicago Press Chicago Ill. 
1994, p. 87; Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, p. 46; Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 
42. 
23 Maine, H.S., Ancient Law, Smith Gloucester Ma, 1970; cp. Dahrendorf, The Modern 
Social Conflict, p. 21. 
24 Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, p. 59; “Urbanisation, which brings together groups 
with different traditions and weakens the reciprocal controls (and even before urbanization, 
the generalization of monetary exchanges and the introduction of wage labor), results in 
the collapse of collectively maintained and therefore entirely real fiction of the religion of 
honor. For example, trust was replaced by credit.” Cp. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, p. 
110. 
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classes and will eventually demand equal recognition from the state powers. 
Thus, if “privilege” is understood in its proper and original meaning of the 
state granting and protecting rights that are not available on equal terms to 
everyone, then “the essence of the liberal position is the denial of all 
privilege.”25 From this new ideology, all privilege derived from a 
predetermined station and status within the community now becomes the 
object of effective moral criticism. 
But if rights and privileges should not be granted to particular individuals 
with particular qualities, roles and positions in society, how should they be 
distributed? It is exactly the experience of living in a society of strangers that 
seems to suggest an answer to this question. It can be argued that the liberal 
answer involves a more abstract way of looking at people and their political 
community than communitarians generally favour. If we subtract all 
particularity from the particular individual, we are left with the abstract 
“person,” and on this level of abstraction all individuals are exactly the same. 
Granting privileges demands treating different individuals differently, while 
granting equal rights to all “persons” means treating everybody as equal. 
Interestingly, it is this kind of abstract “persons” that John Rawls posits when 
he designed the famous “original position” in which the basic structure for a 
just society is deliberated. These persons are abstract – or “unencumbered” – 
in the sense that they have no specific qualities and do not yet know what 
their particular talents and interests in society are going to be. The idea of the 
veil of ignorance is invoked, and “the purpose of these conditions is to 
represent equality between human beings as moral persons.”26 This is a basic 
premise of liberal political theory. 
One might say that as relationships become more impersonal in a society 
of strangers, the other is actually experienced as much more of an abstract 
person. And accordingly, it becomes thinkable to treat others more 
impersonally as “persons” in this abstract sense. Without the new “implicit 
emphasis upon the universal qualities of men and [the] theoretical exclusion 
of all personal or parochial attributes, a great deal of the history of modern 
freedom and democracy would not have been possible.”27 Although the idea 
                                           
25 Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. xxxvi. 
26 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 19. 
27 Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition, p. 146. 
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of such an abstract self as a bearer of rights was already well established in 
Roman law, in modern society this juridical concept becomes both a social 
reality and a pivotal notion in liberal political theory. 
We thus see the emergence of the idea of an abstract self that is thought of 
as “above” or “behind” particular roles and positions in society.28 Gradually 
this abstract self is thought of in opposition to the “masks” one wears in 
public life, masks that come with a role or a position but which are thought of 
as “masking” some real self behind it. Public life is more and more 
experienced as a “theater,” as an unreal world of “roles” and “poses” where 
one is forced to be someone or something one is not really.29 This leads to an 
upgrading of the private life and a downgrading of public life. Moreover, the 
distinction becomes ever more radical. 
After the idea of a real self behind such masks is established, it could 
subsequently gave rise to the idea of “originality” and “authenticity” that 
should find expression and realization in the private life of individuals. We 
already saw how essential to human flourishing Mill regarded the 
development of individuality free from the fetters of the community, and that 
is a totally new perspective. The public self becomes more and more abstract 
– the equal and free citizen – and the self goes on a private quest for 
authenticity, which amounts to a “road inward.”30 In the words of Charles 
Taylor: “This notion of an inner voice or impulse, the idea that we find the 
truth within us, and in particular in our feelings – these were the justifying 
concepts of the Romantic rebellion in its various forms.” Taylor points to the 
important moral implications of this highly influential new idea of a fuller 
individuation: 
 
“This is the idea which grows in the late eighteenth century that each individual is 
different and original, and that this originality determines how he or she ought to 
live. Just the notion of individual difference is, of course, not new. Nothing is more 
evident, or more banal. What is new is the idea that this really makes a difference to 
how we’re called to live. The differences are not just unimportant variations within 
                                           
28 Berger, ‘On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honor’ in: Hauerwas & MacIntyre, 
Revisions, p. 176; Berger, Berger, & Kellner, The Homeless Mind, pp. 83-96; cp. Unger, 
What Should Legal Analysis Become?, pp. 21, 128. 
29 Cp. Sennett, The Fall of Public Man. 
30 Zijderveld, The Abstract Society, p. 63. 
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the same basic human nature; or else moral differences between good and bad 
individuals. Rather they entail that each one of us has an original path which we 
ought to tread; they lay the obligation on each of us to live up to our originality.”31 
 
In modern liberal philosophy, it is the abstract self that is thought to deserve 
equal recognition in public life and that this self should be buttressed with 
political rights and freedoms. The connection between developing and 
realizing the original or authentic self in private life and protecting individual 
rights seems clear. Liberal political philosophy provides us with the 
arguments and justifications. 
 
The critique of practical reason 
Marx and Lenin in their Communist Manifesto stated that the fleeting modern 
world is a world in which “all that is solid melts into air.”32 In one sense this 
means that, as modern individuals see more of the world, they are likely to see 
the social and political arrangements of their own society as more relative and 
contingent. More generally and dramatically, however, this means that the 
stable and harmonious cosmic order of the pre-modern world starts to shake 
on its foundations. In the previous chapter I discussed how, as this cosmic 
order was of Divine origin, the whole of the natural and social order was also 
a normative order. The order was not only how it happened to be but also how 
it was ordained to be by God, and as such, the political and social order was 
worthy of respect and awe. Moreover, in the pre-modern cosmology, the 
whole order was also one of Divine Truth, Beauty and Goodness.  
We should also not underestimate the role that modern science played in 
shattering this cosmic order, and the success of modern science had huge 
consequences for the way man saw its place in both the cosmos and in 
modern society. Science gradually came to see the natural order as determined 
by blind and mechanical forces that allowed for a purely formal, mathematical 
description. The mechanical laws of nature that were discovered in modern 
science make God look much more like an ordinary “engineer” – or even, in 
the phrasing of Richard Dawkins, a “blind watchmaker”33 – rather than the 
                                           
31 Taylor, Sources of the Self, pp. 368, 369, 375. 
32 Marx, K., & Engels, F., The Communist Manifesto, Penguin Books New York 1998, p. 
54; cp. Berman, All that is Solid Melts into Air. 
33 Dawkins, R., The Blind Watchmaker, Penguin London 1988. 
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Grand Designer of a beautiful and normative order. In the process, modern 
science made the word “law” forever ambivalent between the old normative 
meaning and the new merely descriptive meaning.34  
The word “law” in the pre-modern sense inspired awe and respect exactly 
because of the fact that such a law was thought to be of divine origin. As such 
the Law inspired an experience of truth, beauty and goodness in people. In a 
modern world, however, not many will confess to such an experience. In its 
modern usage the word “law” refers to blind, meaningless forces in nature in 
one language game, and it refers to the prescriptions of the highest law-giving 
institution of the state in another. Scientific and legal language games have 
drifted fundamentally apart and in both senses the magic is gone. Thus the 
new scientific cosmology makes implausible the idea of the whole cosmos 
and society as an integral harmonious normative order. Natural laws and 
political or ethical laws were shown to be of a fundamentally different kind. 
Moreover, according to David Hume, although the natural world is a world 
determined by natural laws these laws will not tell us anything about what we 
should do.  
In other words, the is of the natural world was to be strictly severed from 
the ought of human action, or to put it differently again, the scientific 
knowledge of the facts (of nature for instance) will never teach us anything 
about our ethical and political duties.35 Why should the natural world 
determined by merely blind and mechanical laws teach us anything about how 
we should furnish our social and cultural world? In line with this questioning, 
it was Immanuel Kant who made a fundamental distinction that is still very 
much part of modern consciousness. Kant distinguished between scientific or 
“theoretical” knowledge and moral or “practical” knowledge, and we have 
generally come to think of this distinction as insurmountable, and it has 
become generally “institutionalized” in the modern world.36 Kant thought of 
                                           
34 Cp. Unger, Law in modern society, pp. 66-86. 
35 G.E. Moore coined the term “naturalistic fallacy” for this category mistake but the basic 
idea is generally attributed to David Hume. Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge UK 1993, p. 15; cp. Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 53. 
36 “Reason’s cognition can be referred to the object of that cognition in two ways: either in 
order merely to determine the object and its concept (which must be supplied from 
elsewhere), or in order to make it actual as well. The first is reason’s theoretical, the 
second its practical cognition. In both the pure part, i.e. the part in which reason determines 
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man as inhabiting two distinct “realms” – the realm of nature, which is 
completely deterministic, and the realm of human freedom in which man is 
himself lawgiver.37 
Kant recognized the revolutionary consequences of this thought. We can 
think of the distinction Kant made as congruent with the distinction between 
nature, on the one hand, and culture or society, on the other. Culture or 
society can now be experienced as a realm of human freedom. It is the world 
that modern man constructs or creates himself and, furthermore, that man is 
now himself responsible for. In the modern world, human societies cannot be 
justified by merely being there, by merely being fact. Societies are in need of 
an independent and external justification, which can only be the product of 
“practical reason.” Practical reason will discover or construct a rational 
normative vision of a just social world against which actual political 
arrangements can be critically evaluated. The Enlightenment project is thus 
the rationalization of society by means of the critical powers of human reason. 
Rationalization makes it possible for man to emancipate himself from a state 
of self-imposed tutelage. 
John Rawls’s project is a recent offshoot of the Kantian tree. The abstract 
“persons” in an original position devise a “theory of justice” that can serve as 
a critical point of reference for present societies and institutions. Some basic 
structure is devised that all rational human beings can accept as doing justice 
to both their “moral intuitions” and interests, albeit described in a rather 
                                                                                                                               
its object entirely a priori, must be set forth all by itself beforehand, no matter how much 
or little it may contain.” Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, Hackett Publishing Company, 
Inc., Indianapolis Cambridge 1996, p. B ix, x (16, 17); cp. Körner, S., Kant, Penguin 
Books Harmondsworth 1955, p. 129; “If the question of fact and value is a forced choice 
question for reflective people, one particular answer to that question, the answer that fact 
and value are totally disjoint realms, that the dichotomy ‘statement of fact or value 
judgment’ is an absolute one, has assumed the status of a cultural institution. […] The view 
that there is no fact to the matter as to whether or not things are good or bad or better or 
worse, etc., has, in a sense, become institutionalized.” Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, 
pp. 127, 128. 
37 However, notoriously, the relationship between these two realms remains rather 
mysterious. Cp. Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 43; Unger, Law in modern society, p. 
38. 
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abstract way. A society that conforms to this ideal can expect the willing 
cooperation of all citizens.38 
 
Freedom and the universal 
Obviously here lies a crucial break with the position that I described in the 
previous chapter. The “art of authority” seems to imply that the legal 
professional takes the institutional order as factual and normative. This order 
is both a meaningful and normative order because the shared understandings 
of which it is constituted make the group into a community bound by the 
authority that can personify and guard it. A basic and important premise that I 
discussed is that this order, its traditions and shared meanings and norms are 
seen as beyond rational grounding.39 From this perspective formal reason – 
and especially the emphasis on the reasoning individual – is often regarded 
with a suspicious eye because it is apt to disregard the cumulative wisdom 
embodied within tradition. And since there is a strong tendency to abstraction 
and universality, the concrete and particular remain unexamined.40 By 
contrast, Immanuel Kant, and many of his followers, invested much hope in 
human reason for a better, more just, future.  
Another important modern distinction amplifies the contrast with the 
paradigm that I sketched in the previous chapter. As stated, the modern 
society of strangers seems to have been the background for the emerging idea 
of an abstract person as a bearer of equal rights behind the particular roles and 
positions in society. This abstract person – the “unencumbered” or 
“disengaged” or “punctual” or “neutral” self – became the “subject,” in both 
senses, of modern (liberal) political philosophy.41 Schematizing heavily, one 
might say that there is a tendency to think of the unencumbered subject as 
comprised of “reason,” on the one hand, and “desire,” on the other. “Desire” 
seems to be the central motivating drive towards action, but in Kant’s vision it 
                                           
38 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 15. 
39 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 281. 
40 Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition, pp. 42, 43; Dupré, The Enlightenment and the 
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture, p. 3. 
41 Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent, p. 12, 13; Gutting, G., Pragmatic Liberalism and the 
Critique of Modernity, Cambridge University Press Cambridge UK 1999, p. 48; Taylor, 
Sources of the Self, p. 49; cp. Rorty, R., Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton 
University Press Princeton NJ 1979. 
 128  
can and should be “governed” by  (practical) reason. Kant was inspired here 
by Rousseau who famously stated that “to be governed by appetite alone is 
slavery, while obedience to a law one prescribes for oneself is freedom.”42 
Reason and the law and duties that reason identifies are thus primary. By 
subordinating desire to reason Kant has initiated a rich philosophical tradition, 
which might with Roberto Unger be characterized as a “morality of reason.” 
The alternative position, however, is to see reason, with David Hume, as 
merely the “slave of the passions,”43 and thus reverse the hierarchy between 
desire and reason. In this vision reason is purely “instrumental,” and the 
satisfaction of desire, or reaching the desired result, is primary. Thus Hume is 
one of the intellectual fathers of the modern “morality of desire” and these 
two traditions have gone fundamentally astray.  
According to Roberto Unger “the morality of desire” defines the good as 
the satisfaction of desire, the reaching of goals towards which our appetites 
and aversions incline us. In a morality of reason, on the other hand, reason 
establishes the standards of right conduct.44 In the next chapter I will identify 
the modern democratic culture as more fundamentally premised on a morality 
of desire. In this chapter, however, I will focus on this morality of reason and 
the formalist political and legal order that it seems to entail. But how did Kant 
think that reason can “govern” the desiring part of human beings? Or to 
rephrase it the question: how can human appetites and aversions be 
“disciplined” or “canalized” by reason?  
Recall the emergence of the abstract person – the free and equal citizen as 
the bearer of rights – as the abstraction from all particular and concrete 
aspects of the individual. In his investigations into practical reason Kant 
makes a comparable move. If we abstract from all particular desires we reach 
the idea of “pure will” and, although the particular desires and ends may 
differ extensively among different people, they are all equal in possessing 
such a will. Put differently, people can identify with each other because 
everyone possesses an abstract will independently of what they actually 
                                           
42 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 65; cp. Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Kant, p. 314. 
43 Hume, D., A Treatise Upon Human Nature, Oxford University Press Oxford UK 2000; 
cp. Solomon, R.C. Not Passion’s Slave, Emotions and Choice, Oxford University Press 
Oxford UK 2003, p. 92. 
44 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, pp. 49, 50. 
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desire. As such, they are all equal. Reason will recognize that it is irrational to 
give one such will priority over another. Respecting one’s own “will” implies 
respecting all other “wills,” and thus it is thought to be irrational to will 
something that is not compatible with anyone else’s will. From this a morality 
of duty is derived.45 
What is performed here is the standard philosophical strategy of 
distinguishing between “form” (will) and “substance” (particular desires and 
ends).46 At the same time it is also the disentanglement of the “universal” 
(will) and the “particular” (particular desires and ends). Respecting one’s own 
will means respect for all other wills, and one shows this respect by abstaining 
from actions that are incompatible with other wills.  But how can I know 
whether it will be incompatible? I can know this by “universalizing” the 
particular action I have planned and need to evaluate. Can I consistently will 
this particular action to be performed by all other individuals? Can I 
consistently universalize this particular action and think of it as prescribed by 
a universally valid law? If not, the desire to act this way should be resisted, 
and I should reconsider the desires and ends that informed it. 
                                           
45 Cp. Körner, Kant, pp. 130-136, 147-151. 
46 Since Plato western philosophy has tended to think of “form” as always and everywhere 
the same (universal) whereas “substance” is temporal and local (particular). In the classical 
metaphysics of Plato en Aristotle the concrete and particular still “participates” in the 
abstract and universal “form” – “idea” or “essence.” Moreover, Plato en Aristotle did not 
distinguish between a factual and a normative realm and thus the forms are both factual 
and normative in a perfectionist sense. However, in the Kantian scheme reason become 
thoroughly “empty” and the substance is thereby totally contingent, subjective and 
arbitrary. Charles Taylor: “We could say that rationality is no longer defined substantially, 
in terms of the order of being, but rather procedurally, in terms of the standards by which 
we construct orders in science and life. For Plato, to be rational we have to be right about 
the order of things. For Descartes rationality means thinking according to certain canons. 
The judgment now turns on properties of the activity of thinking rather than on the 
substantive beliefs which emerge from it.” Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 156; “What is 
distinctive about the modern situation is that the universal rules have become quite formal 
and do not specify any content to the particular case, but only some restrictions imposed by 
the formal process for entering into the general interaction. In such a society the universal 
rules specify no particular content and the individuals are told to seek their own good […]. 
The separation of universal from particular has become institutionalized.” Kolb, The 
Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 15; cp. Unger, Knowledge and Politics, pp. 44, 45, 137-144. 
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In other words, if we think of “rationality” as both “thinking in universal 
terms” and “thinking consistently,” we should make sure that the maxim 
underlying any proposed action be such that we can universalize it without 
contradiction. We cannot as rational wills consciously undertake this action if 
we cannot do this. A will operating on this principle would be free from any 
grounding of determination in nature and hence be truly free. A moral subject 
is thus autonomous in a radical sense. He obeys the dictates of his own will. 
Reason, as rational will, is now the only criterion.47 One might also say (in 
slightly less abstract terms) that it is just not “fair” to act on my impulses if 
my actions are incompatible with the freedom of others. Importantly, we can 
now see how reason and freedom are related. In the words of Roberto Unger, 
“The morality of reason could not be devoted to the promotion of any 
substantive end except the end of freedom.” This means that I should 
voluntarily curtail my own freedom in the name of freedom and that “there 
are certain rules I must accept in order to be able to move beyond the 
assertion of naked desire to the practice of judging right or wrong.”48 
Let us return to the project of John Rawls. In his Theory of Justice he 
argues that it is rational for individuals deliberating the basic structure of a 
just society behind a veil of ignorance (which makes them ignorant about 
their talents and their place in the future society) to accept a constitution 
protecting basic freedom rights and assuring them careers that are open to all. 
He even argued that they would agree on a “difference principle” that justifies 
a specific redistribution of goods as a requirement of distributive justice. To 
distinguish Rawls from Kant I should mention, however, that, leaving it a bit 
ambiguous in his Theory, Rawls later argued that, contrary to Kant, he did not 
think of such rationality as “metaphysical” but merely informing a “political” 
argument for insulating a basic structure of rights from daily political 
controversy and decision making.49 
What is important is that within this tradition from Kant to Rawls the 
individual – to be more precise, the individual endowed with the faculty of 
reason – is seen as “autonomous.” No one needs paternal or moral guidance 
                                           
47 Taylor, Hegel, p. 369. 
48 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 50. 
49 Cp. Rawls, A Theory of Justice; Rawls, J., ‘Justice as Fairness: Political Not 
Metaphysical’, in: Collected Papers, Harvard University Press Cambridge Mass. 1999, pp. 
388-414; Rawls, J., Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press New York 1993. 
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because every individual has the capacity for action in accordance with the 
conception of universal laws and thus the capacity to reason her way out of 
moral or ethical dilemmas and do the right thing. The modern individual can 
be left to her own devices and be trusted to be an ethical person, if only she is 
granted the freedom to prove her worthiness. Moreover, it is exactly the 
capacity for rational self-determination that gives the human being his 
particular “dignity,” (Würde). Everything else may have a “price,” but only 
human beings have “dignity”50 and, importantly, as all rational human beings 
have this capacity, they all have equal dignity.51  
To summarize, human society and the political order are human creations 
and as such not a divine or sacred order that defies rationalizing or 
modernizing. Furthermore, a just socio-political order should grant 
individuals the freedom to exercise their faculty of moral judgment, and this 
points to liberal political arrangements because “the liberal state respects 
persons as persons, and secures their equal right to live the lives they 
choose.”52 We can now fully see the revolutionary potential of Kant’s ideas: 
“Man’s emancipation from his self-imposed tutelage” requires the evaluation 
and rationalization (or “modernization”) of the political arrangements of the 
political community by means of the critical powers of human reason. Indeed, 
the publication of Rawls’s Theory gave rise to a new impulse to devise such 
rationalizing plans for our modern states, which were heavily debated 
throughout the past decades.53 
 
From honor to dignity 
The emancipating modern citizen demands freedom from the older 
hierarchical paternalistic or “patriarchal” political arrangements, and only the 
liberal constitutional state seems to be able to fully honor the dignity of 
individual citizens. And modern societies have in fact seen a collapse of 
social hierarchies, replacing the idea of “honor” associated with certain 
                                           
50 “In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a “dignity.” What has a price 
can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is raised above 
all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity.” Kant, I., Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge University Press Cambridge UK 1998, p. 42. 
51 Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, pp. 140, 141; Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 83. 
52 Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent, p. 13. 
53 Cp. Pogge, T., Realizing Rawls, Cornell University Press Ithaca NY 1989. 
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institutional roles and specific social positions in society with the idea of 
dignity granted equally to persons as persons, which is independent of 
institutional roles.54 The ideas of honor and dignity point to a completely 
different cultural world: 
 
“In a world of honor the individual is the social symbols emblazoned on his 
escutcheon. The true self of the knight is revealed as he rides out to do battle in the 
full regalia of his role; by comparison, the naked man in bed with a woman 
represents a lesser reality of the self. In a world of dignity, in the modern sense, the 
social symbolism governing the interaction is a disguise. The escutcheons hide the 
true self. It is precisely the naked man, and even more specifically the naked man 
expressing his sexuality, who represents himself more truthfully.”55 
 
In the world of honor man discovers his true identity only in his public role 
or, more exactly, the individual identifies strongly with some social ideal of 
his role such that he tries to realize it to perfection. In the world of honor, this 
is the only road to true “being,” to turn away from the role is to turn away 
from himself. Moreover, the loss of honor is a loss of being that leaves man 
naked and vulnerable. By contrast, in a world of dignity the perfection of the 
self does not lie in pre-established social roles without, but in the discovery 
and perfection of the unique authentic self within: “In a world of dignity, the 
individual can only discover his true identity by emancipating himself from 
his socially imposed roles – the latter only masks, entangling him in illusion, 
“alienation,” and “bad faith.”56  
“Honor demands preferences and distinctions,” Montesquieu wrote and 
indeed honor is something that one has relative to social status and to 
institutional and social roles and is as such always unequally distributed.57 In 
Bourdieu’s phrase, the rise of the distinguished class to Being has, as an 
inevitable counterpart, “the slide of the complementary class into Nothingness 
or the lowest Being.”58 Human dignity, however, is associated with mere 
                                           
54 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, pp. 65, 66. 
55 Berger, Berger & Kellner, The Homeless Mind, pp. 90-91. 
56 Ibidem. 
57 Montesquieu, C., The Spirit of the Laws, Cambridge University Press Cambridge UK 
1989, pp. 257, 258. 
58 Bourdieu, Language & Symbolic Power, p. 126.  
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personhood and is thus a thoroughly egalitarian notion.59 One might say that 
as opposed to the earlier demand to respect Nature as God’s creation and to 
concomitantly respect the superiors in society that ruled by Gods authority, 
the Enlightened individual demands equal respect for his or her reasons and 
interests. We already saw that this amounts to a demand for freedom. 
“Honor is a mere “escutcheon” behind it is the face of modern man alone,” 
Peter Berger writes.60 As a result of this “unmasking,” modern societies have 
witnessed the emergence of “a culture of personality” emphasizing the “real 
idiosyncratic” self. The ruling idea of this modern culture of personality is to 
be “the author of one’s own life.”61 We might also refer to this modern culture 
as “a culture of authenticity” in which the person is called upon to find his or 
her own way of being. The freedom that is demanded by the modern 
individual is used to emancipate him- or herself from socially contingent roles 
and positions, and from all sorts of external demands, to find one’s true 
authentic being and to find a particular voice to express and further develop 
this unique and authentic self. Importantly, this modern culture leans towards 
an ahistorical consciousness that also stands in stark contrast with the world 
of honor:  
 
“It follows that the two worlds have a different relation to history. It is through the 
performance of institutional roles that the individual participates in history, not only 
the history of the particular institution but that of his society as a whole. It is 
precisely for this reason that modern consciousness, in its conception of the self, 
tends toward a curious ahistoricity. In a world of honor, identity is firmly linked to 
                                           
59 Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, pp. 46, 49, 50; Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 66. 
60 Berger, ‘On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honor’ in: Hauerwas & MacIntyre, 
Revisions, p. 175; Berger, Berger & Kellner, The Homeless Mind, pp. 83-96; cp. Sennett, 
R., The Fall of Public Man. 
61 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, pp. 135, 44; “the nineteenth century had strikingly 
little respect for people who were “[…] individuals” […] the unattached, marginal person 
was the object of fear and disgust. […] In some ways, the modern individualist is the exact 
opposite of the nineteenth century individual. At the very least, the free spirit, the social 
deviant, suffers less social and legal ostracism today than his nineteenth century 
counterpart. The “individual” now might be someone who does not “conform”; someone 
who builds his own life, he own personality; who makes the most of his own uniqueness. 
[…] Today the emphasis is on maximizing one’s potential.” Friedman, Total Justice, p. 
103; cp. Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity. 
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the past through the reiterated performance of prototypical acts. In a world of 
dignity, history is the succession of mystifications from which the individual must 
free himself to attain authenticity.”62 
 
The political community should grant all individuals the freedom to explore 
their own unique being, to find their own values and define their own interests 
and, in general, to be the authors of their own lives. It seems inevitable that 
modern societies founded on this moral premise will become “pluralist” and I 
already mentioned Weber referring to this development as one in which 
“many old gods ascend from their graves.” The concomitant modern 
experience, however, is one of a fundamental precariousness and contingency 
of all shared values in society.63 How can any idea of a “community” of 
values or ends be grafted onto such a pluralist world?  
Karl Popper’s answer in his book The Open Society and its Enemies is 
rather blunt and pessimistic. Modern open society does not provide for a 
common life, and this is the price we have to pay for human freedom. 
Furthermore, Popper refers to modern societies as “abstract societies,” 
meaning a society in which men practically never meet face to face such that 
the group can hardly be thought of as a concrete and real group of men, or a 
system of such real groups. “Such a fictitious society might be called a 
‘completely abstract or depersonalized society.’”64 In such a society loyalty to 
some community becomes more than ever a matter of “choice,” and the 
sharing of values within such a community will therefore be just a precarious 
and possibly temporal “alliance of ends.”65 Since common or universal 
humanity (the “personhood”) of modern individuals is just an empty 
abstraction, and the particular ends and values are part and product of an 
individual quest for authenticity, it is unlikely that modern individuals will 
identify with communal ends and values, except occasionally and 
strategically. 
Moreover, the modern world has generally come to see particular ends and 
values as radically “subjective,” and values are understood as subjectivity 
                                           
62 Berger, Berger, & Kellner, The Homeless Mind, pp. 90-91. 
63 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 103; Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 19. 
64 Popper, K., The Open Society and its Enemies, Routledge London 1995, pp. 174, 175; 
cp. Friedman, The Republic of Choice, pp. 19, 20. 
65 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, pp. 102, 103. 
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projected onto a factual world, which is neutral.66 As stated before, the 
theoretical realm is the realm of the “objective.”  This is the realm that is 
determined by the universal laws of nature. Particular desire, values and ends 
are part of the realm of human freedom and thus thought to be “subjective” in 
the sense that they are only “determined by choice,” and in this picture of 
things it is only choice that confers worth.67 Obviously, authority will have to 
change its nature, and authorities will have a much harder time keeping the 
flock together. Under such circumstances it seems that the community is no 
longer bound by a substantial morality but only a formal morality, a common 
respect for citizen freedom, that keeps the political order together. Such a 
“formal community” can only be established by a common respect for 
rational law. 
 
Human dignity and formal law 
In the previous chapter, we investigated an important step on the way to a 
modern legal order, namely that the state powers grant the legal institutions 
autonomy in the settlement of legal conflict in society. Under normal 
circumstances the state powers even promise to consider themselves bound by 
law. This movement naturally seems to lead to the replacement of the “Rule 
of Status” idea by the idea of the “Rule of Law and not of Men.”68 But from a 
Kantian position, the factual historical developments are contingent. For Kant 
the crucial point is not a matter of socio-economic facts; the point is moral. 
Modern Enlightened citizens have seized the freedom that, as rational beings, 
they deserved from the start. The modern liberal state, and the modern legal 
order that makes it possible, is not merely a means to secure legitimacy for 
state rule, but an important moral achievement. 
                                           
66 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 53; cp. MacIntyre, After Virtue. 
67 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 76; Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, p. 37. 
68 Nonet & Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, pp. 53-54; Von Hayek, The Road to 
Serfdom, p. 87; “The rule of law exists when power-holders remain bound by general rules, 
even if these are rules established by the power-holders themselves. For them to be bound 
means, in part, that the rules must be interpreted, applied, and enforced in ways that can be 
publicly understood. The reasons for decision must not turn on case-by-case judgments of 
strategic interests bearing no general and reasonable relation to the rules. […] When the 
rule of law prevails people enjoy security of a regime of rights” Unger, What Should Legal 
Analysis Become?, p. 64. 
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Although human beings are social beings, modern individuals are 
particularly freedom loving beings as well. Some conclude that the liberal 
constitution of the liberal democratic state is the only one doing justice to 
“human nature.” In particular, Francis Fukuyama in his The End of History 
and the Last Man explains the inevitable success of the modern liberal 
democratic state by arguing from the demand for freedom and equal 
recognition.69 But without taking recourse to such a rather grand idea, the 
general (although relative) success of the liberal constitutional state even in 
non-Western countries deserves attention and the idea that within the modern 
world individual freedom has in fact grown seems to be very well defensible. 
In the past decades, the longing for freedom and equal respect is amplified 
by the desire for authenticity in the Western world. The Good Life is no 
longer something that is prescribed by some outside source or authority. 
Every individual has to find it for him- or herself, mainly by means of self-
exploration and the ensuing self-knowledge There is no ready-made format 
for how to live a worthy and meaningful life (like religions usually provide), 
rather everyone has to search and find her own authentic way of “being.” 
Every individual is thought to be unique in a rather radical sense, and 
nowadays the task of the modern individual is to find and realize his or her 
own unique destination in life.70 This search should not be impeded by 
moralism or paternalism, because these stifle the development of the unique 
authentic self. We should not be forced into conformism or confronted with 
pre-established identities and social roles. That would severely hurt our 
individuality and therefore it would be, in the contemporary jargon, 
“politically incorrect.” 
Of course, our individual freedom must, in a modern society, be 
compatible with the freedom of others and therefore we need “rules” and 
individual “rights” to clearly delineate our freedom.71 Kant stated that genuine 
freedom is only possible with the acceptance of “the law.” Only the 
acceptance of the validity and authority of the universal law makes it possible 
for us to act morally (and legally) and yet remain free. However, for Kant this 
                                           
69 Fukuyama, F., The End of History and the Last Man, Hamish Hamilton London 1992. 
70 Cp. Trilling, L., Sincerity and Authenticity, Harvard University Press Cambridge Mass. 
1972; Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity. 
71 Nonet & Selznick, Law and Society in Transition, pp. 61-63, 71. 
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law cannot be just any law that is imposed on us from the outside, like the law 
that is decreed by God or Nature. We cannot know God’s will, and the laws 
that rule in nature do not seem to have any normative power for human beings 
in their social and cultural world. We can now, with regard to “man-made 
laws” (or positive law), ask a rather embarrassing question: quo warranto? 
What legitimizes the authority of man-made law? Or, on what authority does 
the law count as valid and binding? In other words, if law is only man-made, 
and in that sense arbitrary, why should we subject ourselves to it?72  
The problem is that if neither God nor Nature can provide us with valid 
norms, it becomes hard to see who or what can authoritatively end or decide 
disputes on the question of the validity of the law that makes a claim of 
authority on us. What makes an orderly society possible under such 
circumstances? This is the fundamental question of modern political or legal 
philosophy and several elegant and influential answers have been given. 
Hobbes’s basic question was indeed: how can society persist given that 
each of its members pursues his or her own private goals?73 In the previous 
chapter we already mentioned Hobbes’s realistic and rather prosaic answer. 
The authority of the law is grounded in the authority of the state that is 
grounded in the rationality of subjecting to such an authority because the war 
of all against all would make life “nasty, brutish and short.” In his scheme, 
human beings have a natural right to “life,” and this legitimizes the voluntary 
and reasonable subjection of individual citizens, who cannot protect this right 
by themselves, to the state. In turn, this natural right legitimizes the state as 
the authority to proclaim the man-made laws that make an ordered and 
peaceful society possible.74 Hobbes offers a highly influential (both secular 
and liberal) theory of the modern state as the only and absolute authority that 
can protect its citizens against each other. 
A later influential liberal philosopher, John Locke, devised a much 
stronger position of the individual citizen against the authority of the state. 
Locke argued that property and liberty are not merely man-made 
                                           
72 Nonet & Selznick, Law and Society in Transition, p. 55. 
73 Cp. Parsons, The Social System, p. 71. 
74 According to Hobbes human beings have an equal natural right of  “self-preservation” 
which is both a dictate of reason and a law of nature. Therefore this right is inalienable. 
Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 91-93; cp. Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of 
Hobbes, pp. 320, 321. 
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constructions made possible and protected by the state authority but that there 
exists a natural right to “Life, Liberty and Estate” that should be deemed 
“sacred” by the political authority. This means that there are important 
“natural” limits to what the state can declare as law. Locke can be thought of 
as the first to devise not just “constitutional” or “pre-political” but natural 
limits to the power of the state authority.75 Both Hobbes and Locke, however, 
derived the fundamental authority of the law from “rights to life” or “rights to 
life, liberty and estate” from Nature thus committing the “naturalistic fallacy.” 
Kant proceeded more rigorously and, contrary to Hobbes and Locke, tried to 
consistently work from the distinction between facts and norms.76  
In his exploration of practical reason, Kant started within the normative 
realm – the realm of validity (instead of facticity) – and explored the 
“transcendental structure” of normative or practical judgments. Such 
judgments are the answers to the basic question: What should I do? In other 
words, he explored what ultimately made such judgments possible. Kant 
thought that he had found the law that “constitutes” or “founds” the moral or 
normative realm to which human beings should subject themselves. This law 
should function as a touchstone for moral action, and as such it works as a 
criterion that makes the distinction between valid and invalid moral 
judgments possible, and thereby, of course, between moral and immoral 
actions. In short, this law makes it possible to know whether we act morally or 
not, although this kind of knowledge is of a different nature than knowledge 
in the natural realm. It is practical not theoretical knowledge. 
Kant provided an incredibly influential idea by directing our attention to 
the “formal structure” of laws instead of their content or substance. In the 
“form” or “structure” of the law, we can discover the secret of the law’s 
authority. Regardless of its actual content, the law derives its authority from 
its form, and its form is “universal validity.” Laws are laws because they have 
the form of universal validity and applicability. The sentence “the law is 
                                           
75 Locke, J., Two Treatises on Government, Cambridge University Press Cambridge UK 
1998, pp. 350, 351, 363; Hampsher-Monk, A History of Modern Political Thought, pp. 81-
83, 93, 102. 
76 It can, however, be argued that also Kant founded his practical reason on “nature,” in 
this case on human rational nature and his transcendental subject can be thought of as 
metaphysics. Sartre, J.P., ‘Existentialism and Humanism’ in: Marino, G., Basic Writings of 
Existentialism, Modern Library New York 2004, pp. 344, 345. 
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universal” is true in both of the realms we explore here, the factual realm and 
the normative. It is an analytical truth, or a tautology; try to deny this and you 
will end up with all sorts of paradoxes and contradictions. Moreover, the 
statement “the law is universal” is an analytical truth that any rational being 
can acknowledge to be true. Such a being can also acknowledge the 
significance of this truth because it offers everyone the possibility to 
rationally discover whether some action is “lawful” or not by abstracting from 
the content and analyzing merely its form. All one needs to do is to see 
whether the action conforms to the law in the sense that it can claim universal 
validity. To do so, one needs to ask whether one acts in accordance with a 
maxim that one can consistently will to be a universal law.77 
Only rational beings are able to freely conform their action to the law, and 
therefore only rational beings are able to act morally. Human beings are 
therefore thought to be able to act freely in this normative realm, which does 
leave such elbowroom as opposed to acting in the causally determined natural 
world. Contrary to animals who are not gifted with the faculty of reason and 
who therefore cannot enter the normative realm, human beings are free to let 
reason guide their actions and, conversely, they can be held responsible for 
their actions if they did not act morally in spite of their freedom and ability to 
do so. Human beings can know the moral law that should be their moral 
guide. Moreover, they have a “duty” to act from a basic respect for this formal 
moral law.78 If they fail to conform and fail in their duty to respect the law, 
we can confront them with the law, and by authority of this law, by the 
authority of reason, we can judge them to be immoral. 
Now we come to an important Kantian notion. Only the human being who 
lets reason guide his actions is “autonomous” or truly free in the sense of self-
                                           
77 “The moral law itself, Kant holds, can only be the form of lawfulness itself, because 
nothing else is left once all content has been rejected. The moral law can therefore be 
stated as follows: A perfectly rational will acts only through maxims which it could also 
will to be a universal law. When this appears to us in the form of the categorical 
imperative, it says: Act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same 
time will that it should become a universal law.” Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion 
to Kant, p. 320; cp. Unger, Knowledge and Politics, pp. 51, 85. 
78 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 82 (106). 
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rule.79 As a rational being, he or she imposes the law on him- or herself 
because any rational being recognizes his duty to do so. But as long as he lets 
reason be his guide in moral matters, he does not need to subject himself to 
any law that is imposed on him from any outside power. He does not need any 
guidance from others or need others to be moralistic with him, nor does he 
accept any paternalism as long as he acts in conformity with the moral law. 
Thus the rational being can remain in the realm of freedom and (partially) 
disengage from the realm of necessity.  
After the notion of autonomy, we need to introduce one last notion to 
complete the Kantian picture. Because human beings are capable of 
autonomous moral action, rational human beings are worthy of their freedom. 
They truly deserve to be free, and it is part of human dignity to be granted this 
freedom to judge moral matters for themselves. This is what human dignity 
amounts to – being able to choose autonomously and to determine one’s own 
fate in life.80 People can be trusted with this freedom. So we need to make 
individual freedom possible by making sure that constitutional liberal state 
institutions protect individual rights to freedom. The legal order should 
protect the individual freedom that makes it possible for citizens to act truly 
morally and in accordance with their own conception of the good.  
According to Kant, the difference between the legal and the moral is that 
the first only demands outward or behavioral conformity with the law, while 
the second demands, from the internal point of view, actual acceptance and 
subjection to the moral law. Thus law in the legal sense, codifies the outer 
limits of individual freedom into a set of legal rights and obligations, 
preferably stated in clear and distinct, universally valid rules. In legal 
                                           
79 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 33 (48); cp. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, pp. 38, 
39. 
80 “It now follows on its own that in the order of purposes the human being (and with him 
every rational being) is a purpose in itself, i.e., he can never be used merely as a means by 
anyone (not even by God) without being in this at the same time a purpose himself, and 
that therefore the humanity in our person must be holy to ourselves. For he is the subject of 
the moral law and hence of that which is holy in itself [and] on account of which and in 
agreement with which alone anything can indeed be called holy at all. For, this moral law 
is based on the autonomy of his will, as a free will which, according to its universal laws, 
must necessarily be able at the same time to agree with that to which it is subject itself.” 
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 131, 132 (167); cp. Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 
152. 
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procedures the only thing that is tested is whether the behavior of the 
individual parties involved conformed to this law: “In the domain of the law it 
does not matter why I do what I do, so long as I abstain from violating the 
rights of others.” 81 Legal institutions should not mingle in the moral question 
of whether the intentions or motivations of the parties were actually moral. If 
we translate this to the attitude that legal officials should take with regard to 
the subjects involved in a lawsuit, officials should try to be nonjudgmental. 
Particularly in an effort to uphold a distinction between the legal and the 
moral realms, the legal professionals are not to judge the parties on their 
intentions. Outward conformity to the legal order is all that the law in the 
legal sense demands, and beyond this, the citizens are free. 
Obviously, honoring the law and desiring to follow the universally valid 
(legal) rules in the (legal) order are connected to “the desire to recognize the 
rights and liberties of others and to share fairly in the benefits and burdens of 
social cooperation.”82 However, this implies that we should follow the rules 
both impartially and consistently and also that we should treat similar cases 
similarly. These are aspects of what we can call formal justice, and they are 
closely linked to the ideal of the rule of law, which in turn is closely related to 
liberty. A legal order consists of a system of universal rules addressed to 
rational persons for the purpose of regulating their conduct and providing a 
framework for social cooperation. When these rules are universal and 
formally just, they establish a basis for legitimate expectations within the 
social order. The rules constitute grounds upon which persons can rely on 
each another and rightly object when their expectations are thwarted. 
                                           
81 “[Kant] there divides morality into two domains, one of law or right (Recht), and one of 
virtue. The domain of law, which extends to civil law, arises from maxims that are vetoed 
because they cannot even be thought coherently when universalized. The rejection of such 
maxims turns out to provide a counterpart to the recognition of the strict rights of others. 
We may not interfere with their legitimate projects, may not take their property, and so on. 
The domain of virtue involves maxims that can be thought but not willed as universal laws. 
Most of what morality requires as action rather than abstention is a requirement of virtue.” 
Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant, p. 323. 
82 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 60. 
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Crucially, “when these claims are unsure, so are the boundaries of men’s 
liberties.”83 
 
Political liberalism 
The whole exercise thus ends up in stating the priority of the right over the 
good.84 Reason can only provide us with a formal law, and we need an 
institutional legal structure that grants us our freedom rights, and 
subsequently protects them, such that we are able to act both genuinely 
morally and in accordance with one’s own conception of the good life. This 
means that reason cannot provide us with a “substantial morality” or a 
“perfectionist ethics.” Or, in other words, it cannot teach us anything about 
what constitutes a good life. What such a life consists of is something that 
each individual should find out for himself or herself, and it is exactly the 
demands of freedom and human dignity that prohibit any authority (the moral 
philosopher, the politician, or the lawyer for that matter) from saying anything 
on this point. That would inadvertently amount to paternalism or moralism 
and thereby subvert freedom.85 
For Kant all this was the outcome of a metaphysical inquiry, the product of 
the critical analysis of the transcendental structure of moral judgments. In 
other words, it is the product of the critical analysis of practical reason: eine 
Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft. We can safely write Practical Reason with 
capitals, as it is thought of as the universal and eternal structure of judgment 
in the normative realm. An important conclusion for Kant was that moral 
judgments could receive an objectively true answer. The answer can transcend 
the relativity of the here and now. That is to say, the moral law is universally 
                                           
83 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 235; “Thus there is a link between “individualism” and 
the cycle of expectations that lies behind the demand for total justice.” Friedman, Total 
Justice, p. 106. 
84 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 63 (84); Kant, ‘On the Common Saying: ‘This 
May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice’’ in: Kant, Political Writings, pp. 
80-87; cp. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 31. 
85 “The fact that many people fear that if they concede any sort of moral objectivity out 
loud then they will find some government shoving its notion of moral objectivity down 
their throats is without question one of the reasons why so many people subscribe to a 
moral subjectivism to which they give no real assent.” Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, 
p. 149. 
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and eternally true as it is a demand of Reason. The statement “This answer is 
rationally valid here and now” can be transcended and transformed into the 
statement “this is Rationally valid” because it can be thought of as universally 
and eternally valid. 
Another rephrasing can change the statement from a claim to universal and 
eternal (or absolute) validity in the normative realm to a statement referring to 
objectivity in the factual realm: “This is Rational.” Now we can refer to the 
Rationality and Morality of a certain action as objectively true. Why should I 
do this or that, or better still, why should I obey this law? Because it is 
Rational! Now consider the words of John Rawls when he argues for the 
principles of justice the first of which means to grant every person an equal 
right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a similar liberty for 
others:86 
 
“Thus acting autonomously is acting from principles that we would consent to as 
free and equal rational beings, and that we are to understand in this way. Also these 
principles are objective. They are the principles that we would want everyone 
(including ourselves) to follow were we to take up together the appropriate general 
point of view. The original position defines this perspective, and its conditions also 
embody those of objectivity: its stipulations express the restrictions on arguments 
that force us to consider the choice of principles unencumbered by the singularities 
of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. The veil of ignorance prevents us 
from shaping our moral view to accord with our own particular attachments and 
interests. We do not look at the social order from our situation but take up a point of 
view that everyone can adopt on equal footing.” 87 
 
Under the circumstances of the original position and behind a veil of 
ignorance, reason provides us with a “general point of view” (the “universal 
perspective” one might say) that “everyone can adopt on equal footing.” 
Under such circumstances, we would all agree on the priority of the right over 
the good and agree to grant everyone equal liberty rights. Now consider the 
following words of Immanuel Kant: 
 
                                           
86 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 60. 
87 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 516. 
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“Reason provides a concept which we express by the words political right. And this 
concept has binding force for human beings who coexist in a state of antagonism 
produced by their natural freedom, so that it has an objective, practical reality, 
irrespective of the good or ill it may produce (for these can only be known by 
experience). Thus it is based on a priori principles, for experience cannot provide 
knowledge of what is right, and there is a theory of political right to which practice 
must conform before it can be valid.”88 
 
Thus both Kant and Rawls see the basic political rights of the citizens in the 
liberal state as objective because they are founded on or derived from reason. 
Thus these rights acquire a metaphysical allure. As such they need no further 
legitimation as they are firmly grounded in something supra human – in 
Rationality. It is Rationality that claims to be the ultimate authority, and now 
Rationality provides us with the ultimate argument that puts an end to all 
discussion of moral and legal rights and obligations. This argument appeals to 
the rational nature of all rational beings and purports that if the answer is 
rational, a rational being should conform to its demands because otherwise he 
or she does not live up to his or her rational nature. If someone fails to live up 
to this nature, he or she falls back into the realm of necessity and squanders 
his or her freedom. Any such person can be forced back to recognition of the 
demands of rationality by means of moral criticism or even legal enforcement 
or punishment. 
However, Rawls does not need such a metaphysical idea of Rationality.89 
Much of the features of modern law, legal practices and institutions can be 
understood by reference to a thoroughly human and contingent drive to “the 
universal” or “the abstract,” and to the consistent reasoning of such universal 
and abstract terms. These are properties of rationality, to be sure, but they 
                                           
88 Kant, ‘On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in 
Practice’’ in: Kant, Political Writings, p. 86; cp. Ernest Weinberg: “Kant understood right 
as the juridical manifestation of self-determining agency. The fundamental feature of this 
agency is the agent’s capacity to abstract from – and thus not be determined by – the 
particular circumstances of his or her situation. Inasmuch as this capacity is a defining 
feature of self-determining agency, all self-determining agents are equal with respect to it.” 
Weinberg, The Idea of Private Law, pp. 81, 82. 
89 Cp. Rawls, J., ‘Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical’, in: Rawls, Collected 
Papers, pp. 388-414; Rawls, Political Liberalism; Rawls, J., Justice as Fairness, A 
Restatement, Harvard University Press Cambridge Mass. 2001. 
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need not be thought of as grounded in a metaphysical order, or transcending 
our phenomenal world. They can also be thought of as merely “a way of 
looking” at fellow human beings and our social world. In such an abstract 
modern society, this conceptual edifice could be the result of a simple truism. 
Modern citizens do not accept it when they are treated “unreasonably.” Such a 
citizen feels that he or she is not respected, or taken seriously, as a reasonable 
human being when he or she is confronted with unreasonable judgments and 
interference with his/her freedom by whatever authorities.  
To be sure, this has serious consequences for legal practices and 
institutions in modern societies. It means that the law should be “rationalized” 
such that it can provide us with clear and distinct answers to legal questions 
such that the involved parties can be dealt with in a way that respects their 
dignity as reasonable human beings. Only under a regime of “rational law” or 
“formal law” can we know what to expect from the law and the officials that 
administrate it.90 The important conclusion is that in such a project of 
rationalizing the law and legal judgment, formal reason is deemed to be the 
ultimate authority.91 This need not be the metaphysical Rationality that Kant 
thought he had discovered but at least rationality in the sense that the political 
contingencies and the moral disagreements of the here and now are 
transcended in a way that all rational citizens can identify with a certain 
rational decision under certain circumstances. 
 
Law as a glasshouse 
Let us explore what kind of legal order can be legitimized by such an exercise 
of taking rationality as the ultimate authority in the political community. First 
of all, it will take individual freedom and human dignity as basic notions and 
subsequently construct a “deontological” moral and political universe that can 
serve as a home to this free and dignified individual. The state and its laws 
                                           
90 Cp. Nonet, & Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, pp. 60-70. 
91 “Formal reason is the cognitive complement to instrumental rationality. It is the kind of 
thought that does not directly depend on the choice of ends, and therefore need not run into 
the embarrassment the need for such choice creates. It is the realm of pure knowledge in 
which theory means contemplation even though it may be put to practical use. Formal 
reason produces understanding through the perception of what is universal in a set of 
particulars rather than through the choice of means or the advancements of ends.” Unger, 
Knowledge and Politics, pp. 153, 154; cp. Cohen, The Dialogue of Reason. 
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only have a relative authority: they must stand the test of reason. Surely, this 
endangers the effectiveness of these institutions, and we can safely say that 
“rational-legal authority” will not give the power holders in the state nor the 
legal institutional role occupants much room for manoeuvring. Especially in 
times of crisis or instability, the logic of freedom that I just depicted in its 
rudimentary form seems to substantially (or one might think dangerously) 
limit the elbowroom for authority that I described in the previous chapter. But 
let me give a picture of a rational legal order that can satisfy the demand for 
rational legal reasoning and decision-making.  
Previously I introduced Kant’s notion of “pure will” as the universal 
abstract substrate of all particular desires. This will is furthermore supposed to 
submit to universal law to make genuine freedom possible. Now, to have such 
a will seems to imply that this will has an entitlement of respect for its 
objectives and projects. This in turn implies the acceptance of a system of 
rules to distribute and enforce such entitlements.92 To put it in less abstract 
terms, individual citizens in modern societies demand the right to equal 
respect and concern for their individual goals and projects. This amounts to 
the demand for concrete legal rights, “rights incised in stone,” as it were, and 
the very term “right” implies law. Moreover, it requires law with a strong 
formal element, in the sense of precision, objectivity and enforceability.93 
Only then do modern citizens have the feeling that they are ruled by law and 
not by men. In these three steps – from the will to rights to formal law – the 
massive and seemingly unbridled legalization, or the “law explosion,” of 
modern societies seems to be readily explainable.94 
                                           
92 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, pp. 51, 71; “To protect people from the harm that can 
come from modern society and its tools – on which they are totally dependent – some new, 
more powerful method of control is needed. This means intervention by some strong 
outside force, a force that can control harm at its source. In short, what is needed is the 
generalized third party, the state. Or to put it still another way, what is needed is law. If 
custom is the name given to norms that govern face-to-face relationships, then law is the 
name for formal, authoritative norms that come from the state and govern the relationships 
among strangers. It stands in contrast both to the informal norms of traditional society and 
the despotic or charismatic norms of absolutist states.” Friedman, Total Justice, p. 41. 
93 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 10; cp. Kant, ‘On the Common Saying: ‘This May 
be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice.’’ in: Kant, Political Writings, p. 77. 
94 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, pp. 10, 11; Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 87; 
cp. Friedman, Total Justice. 
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Not many will contest the thesis that to make an orderly society possible, 
individuals need to be constrained in the pursuit of their objectives to the 
extent that such pursuits inhibit or damage the pursuits of others. It is a 
demand of reason that individuals need to delimit and coordinate the freedom 
of action, and this requires a system of legal rules. The specific demand for 
universal “rights” can be explained by the fact that they have a peculiar 
phenomenal quality: rights seem to be mediators between the realm of pure 
value (which is subjective) and the factual (which is objective).95 This means 
that rights discourse seems to bridge the gap between the subjective and the 
objective –between norms and facts – and this, importantly, seems to make 
objective and calculable reasoning possible. The “factoid” character of rights 
allows the citizen to make his claims as claims to reason, rather than a matter 
of mere “desire” or preference. (Such a claim can become a legal claim when 
the written laws affirm such rights as legal rights.) 
Before I considered formal reasoning as thinking consistently in universal 
terms and this is exactly what rights make possible and values do not. 
Reasoning in terms of rights lifts reasoning to an objective and universal 
level, making it possible to disregard the particular and the subjective. 
Thinking in terms of rights almost automatically leads to the demand of 
making these rights as concrete and particular as possible in the law. The 
demand for rights will thus lead to a demand for law with a “strong formal 
element in the sense of precision, objectivity, and enforceability.”96 It requires 
that rights and duties be circumscribed in terms of the well-defined, visible, 
factual characteristics of people’s activities, and it is preferably the law that is 
a consistent system of universal “rules,” as rules are precise, objective and 
applicable to facts without much ado.97  
This is so because rules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion: “If the 
facts a rule stipulates are given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the 
answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes 
nothing to the decision.” Thus we can think of rules as norms with 
                                           
95 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, p. 305; cp. Kant, ‘On the Common Saying: ‘This 
May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice’’ in: Kant, Political Writings, p. 
86. 
96 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, pp. 10, 11. 
97 Aubert, The Hidden Society, p. 66, 67; Unger, Knowledge and Politics, pp. 50, 51. 
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determinate scope and application.98 This means that rules seem to demarcate 
clearly and distinctly my legal obligations at the same time that they just as 
clearly demarcate the realm of my freedom; accordingly, the scope and limit 
of official authority is also demarcated.99 Naturally, the citizens need to know 
exactly what the rules are that he or she must conform to. Only certain rules 
are thought to be so important that state power will be used against me if I do 
not voluntarily conform. Since only the violation of legal rules will provoke 
such a reaction, I will need some criterion to distinguish legal rules from other 
rules, (social rules, for instance, or rules of games and of etiquette). Hart’s 
“rule of recognition” is devised to do just this. The simplest form of remedy 
for the uncertainty is the introduction of such a rule of recognition.100 
In most modern liberal states the rule of recognition will take the form of a 
formal criterion. Again we are not asked to look at the particular substance of 
the rule under investigation, but only at a certain formal quality – the formal 
criterion being the fact that, generally, in modern liberal democracies, the rule 
was established by means of the right procedures by the right institutions. The 
source of the law will have to be the right authority, which is in most cases 
the established law-giving power or institution in the state. The legal rules 
that are proclaimed by such an authority should also be universal in scope. 
This is a requirement of the Kantian argument that was presented before: the 
law should limit everybody in his or her freedom to exactly the same extent. 
This again is a formal requirement necessitated by the fact that the law should 
not favor particular goals and ends at the expense of other values and ends, 
which would amount to favoring or privileging one group over others in 
society.  
                                           
98 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 24; Nonet & Selznick, Law & Society in 
Transition, p. 60. 
99 “The rule-centered character has a very practical basis: 1.) Rules are a potent sources for 
legitimating power. They fix with precision the scope and limit of official authority, thus 
offering seemingly clear tests of accountability. 2.) When judges are perceived as 
constrained by rules, the apparent range of their discretion is narrowed.  […] The outcome, 
however unintended, a rights-centered jurisprudence.” Nonet & Selznick, Law and Society 
in Transition, pp. 61-63, 71. 
100 Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 92; cp. Nonet & Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, p. 
12. 
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As stated before, in this perspective, any grounding of the law on some 
strong or substantial notion of the common good will lead to the imposition of 
values upon people, and this would mean denying all individuals equal 
concern and respect.101 If the law would distinguish between certain ends and 
goals there is, in modern society, a risk that this will endanger the legitimacy 
of the law because the law would be seen as taking certain subjects – those 
subjects whose objectives conform to those of the law – more seriously than 
others. This means that the law should be stated in general and impersonal 
terms and should be neutral with regard to all goals and objectives of 
individual citizens in society. Furthermore, when it also exists prior to the 
events to which it is applied, this suggests an objective impartiality, which 
makes modern law rationally acceptable.102 
Thus we may conclude that the matching vision of law in a culture of 
“plural equality” with a strong equal rights consciousness is highly 
“formalist.” It is formalist in the sense that it treats persons as abstract and 
equal “selves” with an equal right to respect and concern. It is also formalist 
in the sense that it radically separates law from morality and politics by 
focusing on rules with a particular origin, which are universal in scope. To 
repeat, to make any substantive moral, ethical or political vision the 
fundament of the law (like is done in the natural law tradition) would 
discriminate against those who choose a different moral, ethical or political 
vision to guide their lives. Furthermore, these formal rights are to be “clear 
and distinct,” to use the Cartesian phrase, because the modern citizen 
demands that he know exactly what his or her rights and obligations are. Only 
formal and sharply focused rules will satisfy this strong demand for legality:  
 
“The formal element, moreover, contributes to the legitimacy of rules and 
institutions. Form and procedure seem to be the key elements in legitimation of 
modern law. And legitimacy is presumed to be indispensable to the success of 
authority – a vital substance without which authority is dead, inert, a statue of 
stone.”103 
 
                                           
101 Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 85; Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, p. 51. 
102 Lenski, Power and Privilege, p. 50, 51. 
103 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, pp. 10, 11; Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law’, p. 817. 
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With this strongly formalist vision of legality we have given substance, or 
better, form, to the ideal of the “rule of law and not of man.” The rule of law 
means that government in all its actions is bound by legal rules fixed and 
announced beforehand – rules which make it possible to predict the behaviour 
of those with whom we must collaborate and to foresee with fair certainty 
how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to 
plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.104 Thus, reliance 
on rules reflects an effort to stem the tides of personal justice and to render 
power impersonal through law.105 
However, the rule of law does not only promise us legality in the sense of 
both neutrality and certainty, it also offers us the hope of “equality.” The 
vision of the law as treating everybody as an abstract legal subject – a bearer 
of rights – and depending on clear and distinct impersonal rules might have 
contributed significantly to the almost constant increase of freedom and 
equality in modern societies because the ideal of impersonal rules introduces 
into the social order a permanent source of subversion of all forms of 
hierarchical community.106 In fact, the ideal of impersonal rules seems to be 
an effective antidote to all forms of inequality and oppression by whatever 
“authorities” exist in society, and this also partly explains the success of 
thinking in terms of individual rights and impersonal universal rules. 
Moreover, rights and the legal rules embodying them have multiplied. 
Without exception modern societies have witnessed a thorough and almost 
uncontrollable “legalization,” the proliferation of legal rules and procedural 
formalities.107  
                                           
104 Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, pp. 80-89. 
105 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, pp. 48, 319; Unger, Knowledge and Politics, 
pp. 243, 268. 
106 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 170; “For it is the generality of law that establishes 
the formal equality of the citizens and thereby shields them from the arbitrary tutelage of 
government. Administration must be separated from legislation to ensure generality; 
adjudication must be distinguished from administration to safeguard uniformity. These two 
contrasts represent the core of the rule of law ideal.” Unger, Law in modern society, p. 54. 
107 Marshall, T.H., ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ in: Marshall, T.H., Citizenship and 
Social Class and Other Essays, Pluto Press London 1992, p. 45; Nonet & Selznick, Law & 
Society in Transition, p. 108. 
 151 
In a society characterized by the increasing importance of formal and 
large-scale organization – that is to say in modern industrial, capitalist and 
urban societies – there is a growing demand for defining situations and 
responses to situations in terms of highly visible and easily recognizable 
criteria. We already identified a demand for the law to be impersonal and 
formal and this implies that rights and duties for almost all thinkable social 
relationships have to be circumscribed in terms of well-defined rules. In 
modern societies the general trend has been toward assigning rights and duties 
on the basis of visible, measurable characteristics, a development which has 
taken the form of a general increase in legal or semi-legal regulations of 
social situations.108 Indeed, according to Lawrence Friedman, “The shrinking 
zone of authority is remarkably similar to the shrinking zone of immunity to 
law.” Almost no corner of modern society – including even the cradle of 
“fraternity,” the family – is left untouched by the authority of the law as it 
tries to protect all individuals from arbitrary interference by whatever other 
“authorities.”109  
The other side of the coin is that the law might become a “total 
presence,”110 and many think it stifles economic initiative and human 
sociability. It should be clear, though, that as long as we value individual 
dignity and formal equality like we do, as long as we loathe oppression of the 
individual by “arbitrary” external authorities, and as long as we demand 
objective positive law to help us orient our behavior and secure our freedom, 
all kinds of proposals for “de-legalization” will encounter severe difficulties. 
We seem to end up with the image of the law as, in the words of Ronald 
Dworkin, “a set of timeless rules stocked in some conceptual warehouse 
awaiting discovery by judges.”111 This set of rules is seen as a system that 
covers the whole of society like a huge “glasshouse,” ordering and regulating 
every aspect of it by means of a “clear and distinct” (glassy) system of sharp 
rules that clearly delimits our rights and legal obligations. Thus, the legal 
order is an abstract and formal Rechtsstaat that can assume any substantial 
content that the lawgiver wants it to have as long as it is “formalized” in 
                                           
108 Aubert, The Hidden Society, pp. 66, 67. 
109 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, pp. 10, 17; Friedman, Total Justice, p, 148. 
110 Friedman, Total Justice, p, 42. 
111 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 15. 
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general or universal and sharp rules that fit the overall system of rules and 
legal rights derived from it.112 In other words, the law is experienced as a 
large glasshouse of norms that “covers” or “domes” our civil society and 
political institutions to keep them within bounds and to guard and guarantee 
the individual’s freedom against arbitrary external interference. 
To complete the picture we need to briefly mention some other qualities of 
this glasshouse of the law. Adjudication in this doming legal order, the 
application of the rules to concrete cases, must be strictly distinguished from 
“administration” to safeguard uniformity of adjudication.113 Individual judges 
should not try to think as administrators and aim at particular (political or 
social) results with their reasoning. In the second place, the adjudication must 
also be strictly distinguished from “legislation” to safeguard the independence 
and autonomy of the judges, because the intrusion of particular political 
values and ends will destroy the formal qualities of the glasshouse. As we 
have seen, granting equal concern and respect requires the strict separation of 
the law from both politics and morality. In interpreting and applying the law, 
jurists are thought to be objective spokesmen for the law, “passive dispensers 
of a received, impersonal justice.”114 
In the previous chapter we learned to understand the law in terms of the 
respect that individuals owe to the shared understandings of the community 
and to its expression in the law. Here we tried to understand the law in terms 
of the individual’s demand for formal respect from the law in return for his 
loyalty to the community. The law is still thought to be “above” politics, but 
is such in a new sense. The glasshouse might be thought of as the formal 
normative structure that makes political strife and controversy possible in the 
first place. It is possible only in so far as the glasshouse itself stays clear of 
“politicization” or “moralization,” which would thoroughly obfuscate our 
doming glasshouse, and thus would compromise our freedom. 
 
                                           
112 Cp. Weinrib, ‘Legal Formalism: on the immanent rationality of law’, p. 1011; cp. Ward, 
Introduction to Critical Legal Theory, pp. 41, 42; Weinrib, The idea of Private Law, p. 25. 
113 Unger, Law in modern society, p. 54. 
114 Nonet & Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, p. 57. 
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Rationalizing the law 
In the present paradigm, both the modern state and a legal order are regarded 
as necessary because, first, the freedom of the individual has to be limited by 
the law to make the freedom of all possible and, second, the state has to be the 
power that enforces and executes the law if people fail to comply voluntarily. 
However, the individual citizens only trust the state authority with this power 
if certain basic rights are guaranteed and protected by an independent judicial 
power. Legal rights will have to be complemented by legal obligations, of 
course. These legal obligations limit the individual’s freedom, and therefore 
they should be codified as much as possible in clear and distinct legal rules. It 
should be possible to know exactly what the legal obligations in the political 
community are. The limit of these obligations is where the realm of freedom 
starts, and this limit should be as sharp as possible. To attain a maximum of 
legal certainty, and to guard and respect the individual autonomy of the 
citizens, the law needs to be constantly and thoroughly “rationalized.”  
Previously I described “rationality” or “formal reason” as thinking in 
universal terms and thinking consistently. Thus “universality” is the road to 
objectivity. In Unger’s words, “The simplest way to define the point of 
rationalizing legal analysis is to say that it represents a way to think clearly 
and connectedly about the law.” The road to such “clear and distinct” thinking 
is “to climb up the ladder of abstraction, generalization, and system.”115 
Importantly, in contrast to the hermeneutical attitude that was propagated in 
the previous chapter, formal rationality should again be thought of as 
“disengaged” reason. Analytical or formal reason adopts a critical distance 
towards its object of knowledge and scrutinizes it for inconsistencies and for 
arbitrary particulars and substance in order to find the “universal form.” In 
other words, one looks for the “deeper” formal structure, the inherent system 
of axioms that subsequently makes inferential reasoning possible.116  Thus 
legal reasoning should be thought of as thinking consistently in universal 
legal terms, and legal science will have an important role in making this 
                                           
115 Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, p. 59; Unger, R.M., The Critical Legal 
Studies Movement, Harvard University Press Cambridge Mass. 1983, pp. 13, 14. 
116 “The Cartesian option is to see rationality, or the power of thought, as a capacity we 
have to construct orders which meet the standards demanded by knowledge, or 
understanding, or certainty. […] Clarity and distinctness require that we step outside 
ourselves and take a disengaged view.” Taylor, Sources of the Self, pp. 143-158, 410, 411. 
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possible because “science is a way of finding the common principles that 
transcend particular situations, of extrapolating from things we know to things 
we do not know, a way of seeing the novel as another arrangement of the 
familiar.”117 This means that we should “discern in law an inchoate and 
developing rational scheme in order to recognize its legitimacy and to read its 
meaning.”118 
But what are the universal legal terms? In essence, we will see the same 
procedure in legal science as we have seen in the previous sections. The idea 
is to “empty out” the legal tradition and materials of all particularity and 
substance and ideally end up with a consistent system of universal rules that 
clearly demarcates the legal rights and obligations of the citizens. Such a 
system needs to be a consistent and coherent system because only such a 
system can offer unambiguous and clear answers as to what is legally due. It 
has to be a system of rules because rules stated in the “if/then” formula can 
unambiguously state the rights and obligations on the one hand and the legal 
consequences or sanctions on the other such that a maximum of certainty is 
reached. Thus rules can be norms with a determinate scope of application.119 
The systematic reasoning from rights formulated in rules that is made possible 
by rationalizing legal science is an antidote to arbitrariness in legal reasoning 
and, according to Unger,  
 
“[…] enables people to stay secure in their entitlements while restraining power 
under law. Within broad limits people can understand what the law means and how 
it will be enforced. Citizens can participate in the same process of justification that 
the judges themselves must use. More importantly, the character of the reasons for 
decision given in rationalizing legal argument enjoys a power of significant 
generalization and selection.”120 
 
                                           
117 Collins, Conflict Sociology, p. 2. 
118 Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, p. 55. 
119 We can even say that rules are the “cutting edge of social control” in contrast with 
values because “control is easier to institute when reliance is placed on specific rules than 
more general precepts.” Nonet & Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, pp. 60, 63; cp. 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 24. 
120 Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, p. 63. 
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But the project of rationalizing the law requires making some fundamental 
distinctions – distinctions we explicitly refused to make in the chapter on 
authority in the previous chapter.121 To start with, we should honor the 
famous Humean distinction between “relations between facts” and “relations 
between ideas.”122 The autonomy and objectivity of the law are secured by 
confining legal analysis to the “conceptual level,” staying at a respectable 
distance from facts and particulars. Legal doctrine or legal analysis is thus 
thought to be an exclusively conceptual practice that starts from institutionally 
defined materials and aims at rationalizing it into a coherent system.123  
But we need to add another important distinction. We might say that the 
construction of the law as a consistent rational system is an exercise in, what 
one might call (with Max Weber), “formal rationality,” which can be opposed 
to “substantive rationality” and, obviously, this distinction also capitalizes on 
the philosophical form/substance dichotomy that we encountered before.124 
From a legal point of view, the problem with substantive rationality is that it 
aims at particular just results but, again, reaching just results in particular 
cases would make the reasoning dependent on the facts about the world. 
Because these facts and circumstances are always variable, such purposive or 
substantive reasoning is inherently particularistic and unstable.125 Thus Von 
Hayek in The Road to Serfdom thinks of formal legal rules as instrumental 
only in the sense that they are expected to be useful in a very general sense to 
as yet unknown individuals, and for as yet unknown purposes. To his mind, 
formal rules do no aim at the wants and needs of particular people, rather they 
aim at helping people to predict the behaviour of those with whom they must 
                                           
121 Indeed, one might argue that the analytical mind typically proceeds by making 
distinctions, reducing complexity by analyzing back into elementary parts. Unger, 
Knowledge and Politics, pp. 46-49, 121. 
122 Hume, D., An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, Open Court Chicago Ill. 
1988, p. 71; This distinction was a last “dogma of empiricism.” Cp. Quine, W.V.O., ‘Two 
Dogma’s of Empiricism’ in: From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press 
Cambridge Mass. 1953; Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, p. 122. 
123 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, pp. 39, 40; Unger, The Critical Legal Studies 
Movement, p. 2. 
124 Cp. Brint, In an Age of Experts, p. 144; Unger, Knowledge and Politics, pp. 153, 154. 
125 Lash, S.M., Another Modernity, A Different Rationality, Blackwell Publishers Oxford 
UK 1999, p. 372; Unger, Law in modern society, p. 86; Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 
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interact and collaborate. Von Hayek advises the law to stay at the formal or 
conceptual level, the level of relations between ideas: 
 
“In fact, that we do not know their concrete effect, that we do not know what 
particular ends these rules will further, or which particular people they will assist, 
that they are merely given the form most likely to on the whole to benefit all the 
people affected by them, is the most important criterion of formal rules. […] This 
consideration is in fact the rationale of the great liberal principle of the Rule of 
Law.”126 
 
Yet, there is, however, a third important distinction that we should consider. 
We need to take seriously the distinction between facts and norms, the 
“is/ought distinction,” also initially made famous by David Hume. In the 
previous sections we saw how the breakdown of the cosmic order made this 
distinction necessary. One cannot say norms “exist” in the same way as facts 
do. Facts can be said to exist in reality, of norms we can only say that they are 
valid under certain circumstances. This “logical” or “analytical” difference 
justifies the strict separation between facts and norms in scientific discourse. 
Science generally focuses on the facts, but it seems clear that the law belongs 
to the normative realm. In the previous chapter we saw that from the 
perspective of authority there is a tendency to make relative the separation 
between norms and facts. Particular shared meanings are experienced as 
having a normative aspect in a particular community, and it is on behalf of 
this community that the legal professional speaks with authority. Conversely, 
norms are only expressible in factual meaningful utterances, and this also 
seems to make the distinction relative. In fact, in the present paradigm we also 
tend to focus on the meanings, but only after a last important distinction has 
been made. We need to separate the domain of the law strictly from the 
domains of morality, on the one hand, and the political realm on the other.127 
This is important because, in a legal community, we want the subjects to keep 
their legal obligations, but we do not want to further treat them in a moralistic 
or paternalistic way. 
                                           
126 Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, pp. 81, 83 (emphasis added.) Cp. Kennedy, A 
Critique of Adjudication, p. 359. 
127 Cp. Nonet & Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, pp. 57-60. 
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To summarize, legal issues should be distinguished from the factual realm, 
on the one hand, and from the other normative realms – politics and morality 
– on the other. 128 If we would focus on the facts, legal science would be 
reconfigured as legal sociology, and if we do not make a distinction between 
political and moral controversies, on the one hand, and particular legal issues 
on the other, we will never come to a distinct legal science that aims at 
finding the universal structure of the law. We might say that such a legal 
science searches for “universality through immunity to normative and 
empirical controversy.”129 
We delimit a specific autonomous legal domain that is rationalized into a 
system of clear and distinct rules. The “rationalizing project” aims at thinking 
consistently and in universal terms about the law. To achieve this we need to 
rationalize the law into a system of rules that “abstracts away” as much as 
possible from specific concrete and particular aspects of particular 
circumstances and persons such that this system can be unambiguously, and, 
most importantly, universally applied to legal conflicts. Surely, reason or 
rationality is “a machine for analysis and combination,”130 and this is exactly 
what both the lawyer and the legal scientist will have to do. The legal 
professional has to work with legal materials (statutes, precedents, treaties, 
and customs) that have authority in the community as reasons or justifications 
                                           
128 We can think of an alternative reaction and I will extensively explore the resulting 
position in the next chapter. We might also reduce the moral world to the natural (or 
factual) one instead of radically separating the two. This is one of the distinctive 
differences between the paradigm I am exploring here and the idea of law as technology, 
which will be the subject of the next chapter. Unger, Law in modern society, p. 38. 
129 An influential direction in legal theory is “the project of producing an analytic 
representation of law that can disengage itself from both normative controversies about 
what the content of law should be and causal-empirical controversies about the causes and 
consequences of different rules and doctrines. […] the central idea of an analytic 
description of law disentangled from ideology and sociology.” Unger, What Should Legal 
Analysis Become?, pp. 122, 123. 
130 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, pp. 74, 75; “With Kant the modern individual is 
explicitly discussed in purely formal terms. Our cognitive and volitional lives are analyzed 
into a process that works for unification, consistency, and universality. What content they 
receive is a contingent matter; the process itself can be known only in purely formal terms. 
[…] In Kant’s opinion it was exactly the formal purity of his system that made it scientific 
and necessary knowledge.” Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 17. 
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for legal actions. These materials can only successfully regulate modern 
societies if they are consistently and coherently applied in legal practices. 
Proceeding by means of “analysis” and “combination” analytical (and critical) 
inquiries aim at finding the underlying coherence and unity in the apparently 
chaotic mishmash of legal materials that the lawyer has to work with and 
apply to particular cases. “Thus analysis and combination” or “thinking 
consistently in universal terms” is the road to consistent and predictable legal 
practices.131 
We see how there is a strong dependence on reason as a means to 
coherence and consistency. This leads easily to both a “legal positivist” and 
“legal formalist” conception of law. The legal positivist works from and with 
the certainty that the law consists only of particular legislative or other official 
commands. In other words, legal rules are only those that are chosen by the 
sovereign to be legal rules, as opposed to social or moral rules.132 I already 
mentioned the rule of recognition that makes it possible to know exactly know 
what is and what is not a source of such legal rules. The legal formalist works 
from the premise that these commands can, in all cases, yield demonstrably 
correct results. In its simplest form, it reasons from the premise that by an 
automatic or mechanical process we can deduce correct answers to our legal 
questions from the given laws.133 The legal professional can stay on the 
conceptual or formal level and proceed by means of analysis of the meaning 
of the relevant legal texts and materials only.  
Legal formalism and legal positivism can go together very well. To put it 
succinctly, the exclusive forms of consistent and correct legal reasoning 
(formalism) are exclusively given in the authoritative sources of law 
(positivism). A specific division of labor in the legal professional world 
makes objectivity and certainty possible in legal practices: it is legal science 
that searches for a coherent interpretation of legal materials as a whole, such 
that professionals in legal practices can more easily find the correct answers 
in particular legal cases. But how does the rationalizing of the law work? 
                                           
131 The road to such practice is sometimes called “rational reconstruction.” Cp. Lucy, 
Understanding and Explaining Adjudication, pp. 3, 108, 110. 
132 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 70. 
133 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, pp. 40, 41; Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 
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Legal science advances through a constant “flattening out” of 
particularity.134 Starting from particular cases and problems and the particular 
rules and principles that offered a satisfying and authoritative settlement of 
particular conflicts, the legal scientist abstracts away from the particulars and 
tries to formulate more general rules that can cover more particular cases (and 
thus treat alike cases alike).135 Thus constant “rationalizing” of the legal 
materials refers to the constant reasoning away from the particular, the 
concrete, the timely and the local toward the universal and the abstract, and 
thus towards the “transcendence” of time and place, or in the words of the 
sociologist Ralph Dahrendorf, “individual problems are generalized, 
formalized, [and] turned into impersonal cases in a filing system”.136  
The reasoning away from the particular, the concrete, the temporal and the 
local amounts to “the emptying out of symbols of specific content” and the 
emptied-out symbols can in this way become the standard “forms” of legal 
reasoning. One might say that what is aimed at in this legal science is “the 
absorption of ever-increasing spheres of human activity and fancy into a 
predictable, calculable, organizing stream of categorizations and rational 
actions.”137 The law should thus be an organised and systematic whole of such 
“categorizations” and “actions” that on an abstract and impersonal level 
prescribe what the state demands from its citizens. 
To give an example of this method of formalism, let us take a look at the 
concept of the so-called “legal subject.” The “legal person” is constructed out 
of individual lives as an abstract and formal universal, and then treated as if it 
                                           
134 Cp. Parsons, ‘The Professions and Social Structure’, in: Essays in Sociological Theory, 
pp. 41, 42. 
135 Compare the “Langdellism” that Kronman describes: “[…] what Langdell actually 
sought to do was reorganize the common law in the spirit of geometry […] a science of 
this sort could be established by rearranging the common law from within.” Kronman, The 
Lost Lawyer, p. 181. 
136 Dahrendorf, The Modern Social Conflict, p. 132; According to Parsons we can think of 
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Professions and Social Structure’, in: Essays in Sociological Theory, pp. 41, 42. 
137 Lash, Another Modernity, A Different Rationality, p. 105; cp. Brint, In an Age of 
Experts, p. 144. 
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were a real and independent being. It is particularly (and ideally even 
exclusively) with this abstract legal person, who is the subject of legal rights 
and duties, that the jurist is concerned. The particular individual “behind” this 
abstraction, the man or woman who uses his or her legal entitlements to 
promote particular interests, should be completely left out of the picture. “The 
law,” according to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “considers all subjects collectively 
and all actions in the abstract,” 138 and we can now see what he means. 
The legal scientist should work with such abstracting generalizations of 
the self and abstain from getting involved in the evaluation of concrete values 
and interests. In the present paradigm the particular interests, experiences, or 
circumstances are viewed as a contingent substance of the forms, or as 
concrete examples of abstract propositions. They are, furthermore, to be left 
to the exclusive assessment of the particular individuals themselves. The 
abstract legal persons are granted rights and one of the advantages of thinking 
in terms of “rights” is exactly that one can define a right independent from 
particular interests that it might serve. In the previous paragraph I already 
discussed how the “factoid” character of rights allows for an objective legal 
discourse without the need to meddle in questions of a moral or political 
nature.139 What remains are the forms of the law – or pure law140 or the ideas 
or concepts of law – and these have to be applied in concrete conflicts. 
Rationalizing legal science makes objectivity in legal practices possible. A 
perfectly rational law even makes what one might call “mechanical 
jurisprudence” thinkable. If judges can easily find an apposite rule, they may 
seem not much more than legal analysts or legal technicians acting out 
preordained procedures and routines.141 No particular judgment is necessary; 
no practical wisdom or “prudentia” is required. The law can be found in, or is 
given in the legal sources, preferably in systematic and accessible statutes, 
and can simply be mechanically applied in particular cases. 
                                           
138 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 82. 
139 Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, pp. 80-96; Unger, Knowledge and Politics, pp. 74, 
35; Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, pp. 308, 309, 334. 
140 Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, pp. 59, 74; cp. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 
p. 400. 
141 Nonet & Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, pp. 60, 61; Kennedy, A Critique of 
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Previously we identified a constant pull toward legal formalism in modern 
societies. The rights that people demand should be firm and enforceable. This 
means that people want rights to have a “formal reality.”142 This is impossible 
if they depend on the discretion or goodwill of some official or functionary. 
Complete discretion is considered to be radically inconsistent with the 
concept of right. From the present perspective, rights are formally recognized 
in a codified law as a coherent system of rules, and no interpretation or 
judgment is required. Ideally, the facts are data fed into a system of categories 
that produce the answer, and at each step definitions do all the work. Thus the 
“deductive mode” moves from the abstract (or general and universal) to the 
concrete (or particular), and this excludes the judge’s personal interests and 
values. Any neutral observer endowed with reason and a good set of eyes will 
be able to determine whether the legal professionals have unpacked the 
meaning of the rule and applied it correctly or whether they have forced their 
moral or political preferences on the parties involved.143 
An important selling point of this method is that the forms of legal 
reasoning attain an “ahistorical” quality. Temporal abstraction leads to an 
experience of forms as things without a specific history. Importantly, in a 
sense, the forms of the law seem to resist being interpreted as contingent 
products of history. This is so because formalism is a “synchronic” and not a 
“diachronic” method. What is searched for in the scientific program of 
formalism is horizontal (local) rather than vertical (temporal) consistency of 
the system of rules.144Another important aspect of the universalizing attitude 
is that it makes the law seem totally independent from all sorts of (political or 
socio-economical) power relations in society or the political community. The 
very generality and impersonality of formally rational law presupposes a 
vision of law as transcending social, economical or political interests. Thus, 
the universalizing attitude makes it possible to guard the autonomy and 
                                           
142 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 10; “Modern rights  […] are pushy, expansive 
and bold. They are less liable to forfeiture which is another way of expressing the fact that 
they are more general and less liable to run afoul of old immunities and unreviewable 
discretions.” Friedman, Total Justice, p. 120. 
143 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, pp. 98, 102. 
144 Cp. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, p. 227; Berger, ‘On the Obsolescence of the Concept of 
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objectivity of legal practices. 145 We end up with a practice of “reasoned 
elaboration.” This practice concerns itself with universality of understanding 
and of application from a “need to leave the law, after a decision, in an 
organized state, “one allowing judges, other officials, lawyers, and ordinary 
people alike to understand and to obey the law, and every extended part of it, 
as a reasonable plan rather than as a formless collection of accidents and 
deals.”146 
 
However, it will be hard to rationalize the legal materials of any legal order 
into a coherent system of rules without crossing the dividing line into the 
political and moral sphere. Most likely, the legal scientist needs a 
philosophical apparatus of basic moral or political concepts to lift the whole 
system to a higher degree of order and cohesion, concepts and ideas that make 
it possible to see the law as a “reasonable plan” as they “formalize” the 
formless collection of particulars and accidents that we encounter in the legal 
materials. Generally, the basic idea is that formal law, in an effort to become 
pure form, needs to be systemized with the help of some conception of 
“formal morality.” Thus the law will be redesigned and reconstructed to reach 
towards a rational plan, and the traditionalist, with his distaste for abstraction, 
will lose ground. “Rationalizing legal analysis and its supporting theories 
represent extended areas of law and legal doctrine as moving toward the 
conceptual order of comprehensive prescriptive theories”147 
After all that has been said it will come as no surprise that mainstream 
liberal moral philosophy, and especially the towering figure of Immanuel 
Kant and those inspired by him, will probably be of great help here.148 Indeed, 
it is clear that it is not an arbitrary morality that is proposed as the starting 
point for rationalizing and systematizing the legal order. It is the liberal 
morality of formal and equal rights as the requirement of the basic morality of 
                                           
145 Lash, ‘Modernity or Modernism? Weber and Contemporary Social Theory’, in: Lash & 
Whimster (eds), Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity, p. 374; cp. Bourdieu, Language 
and Symbolic Power, pp. 141, 142; Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law’, p. 817. 
146 Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, p. 65. 
147 Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, pp. 67, 68, 72. 
148 “Corrective justice and Kantian right are as immanent in the legal discourse as 
principles of syntax and logic in discourse generally.” Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, p. 
146: Cp. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously. 
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individual human dignity that fits well with the modern liberal culture in the 
modern Western world I described in the opening paragraphs of this chapter – 
a morality that works from the idea of human dignity and political equality.149 
The sort of (political) morality that can be put under the heading of “fairness” 
has been especially highly influential.150 This explains why concepts like 
individual “rights,” “corrective justice,” “procedural justice,” or “justice as 
fairness” will be invoked to re-conceptualize many of the basic notions of the 
law. 
 
Modern expert professionalism 
The respect that is due to the citizen’s freedom implies that legal professionals 
should distance themselves from the values and interests of the parties in the 
conflict. That is to say, these values and interests should be taken as givens 
and should not in any way be evaluated or assessed. On the whole, the role of 
the professional attains an increasingly formal quality and becomes more 
limited and strict. In other words, the legal professional will behave in a more 
rational and impersonal way. He strictly limits his or her responsibilities to 
matters of formal law, which is the expertise that legitimizes the lawyer’s role 
and competencies. Such a formalist lawyer does not consider it to be the task 
of the lawyer to judge persons but merely to test their behavior against the 
formal demands of the law. 
This means, and we investigated this “universalizing” or “abstracting 
attitude” in the previous section, that legal concepts and rules must be made 
devoid of any particular and concrete meaning; they have to be, in other 
words, “emptied” of particular references and meaning. Thus, professionals 
are particularly interested in matters of meaning,151 but they do so in a 
disengaged and an analytical way. Professionals should become “experts 
committed to a method of reasoned elaboration,” and such professionals 
should forestall becoming personally “involved” or “engaged” in the 
                                           
149 Cp. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 198. 
150 “Notions of fairness have the property that evaluations relying on them are not based 
exclusively – and sometimes are not dependent at all – on how legal policies affect 
individual’s well-being.” Cp. Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, p. 39. 
151 Nonet & Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, p. 61. 
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particulars of the conflicts.152 In other words, we see here a “disengaged” (or 
“unencumbered,” “punctual” or “neutral”) professional at work, the type of 
relatively “estranged” subject that might be seen as a typical product of the 
modern world. Needless to say, we find a strong contrast here with the 
explicit engagement with order and community displayed by the ideal lawyer 
in the previous chapter.  
The formalist does not experience any particular loyalty to a larger whole, 
no concern for the community nor any intrinsic substantial good of the law. 
We see a serious contrast with the traditional commitment here, which 
requires placing oneself above society, and distinguishing oneself strongly 
from it in an effort to serve the binding meanings and values of the 
community. However, as described in the previous chapter, such a 
professional attitude and engagement easily leads to a rather aristocratic and 
paternalistic attitude. The formalist certainly is not prone to elitism and 
paternalism.153   
In modern society, where individuals demand equal respect for their 
interests and goals in return for their “subjection” to the law, the moral side of 
the traditional professional could seem “overly genteel, unnecessarily 
intrusive, and inclined to purism.”154 In modern egalitarian liberal culture, the 
in-egalitarian logic of authority will be challenged, and (as they do from all 
authorities) individuals will demand equal respect and concern from legal 
professionals.155 Moreover, according to Brint, “The idea of occupationally 
                                           
152 “If we can quarantine the political branches and leave the case-by-case development of 
law in the hands of experts committed to a method of reasoned elaboration, we can expect 
the law over time to “work itself pure.”” Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, p. 
74; Dworkin, Law’s Empire, p. 400. 
153 But we should also note that the present “disengaged professional” is generally not 
concerned with results of legal decisions and actions. He is particularly not concerned with 
effectiveness and “efficiency.” Lucy, Understanding and Explaining Adjudication, pp. 
108, 110. 
154 Brint, In an Age of Experts, p. 8. 
155 “Legally as well as politically, society is no longer pictured as the traditional pyramid 
with a moral and economic elite at the peak. Morally and socially, society is a plateau, a 
mesa; with standing room for all at the top.” Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 159; 
One might refer here to the idea of the ‘egalitarian plateau’: “On Dworkin’s view, every 
plausible political theory has the same ultimate value, which is equality […] the idea of 
treating people ‘as equals.’ […] A theory is egalitarian in this sense if it accepts that the 
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defined contributions to the public good seemed increasingly dubious to a 
skeptical generation,”156 and this can be explained by the fact that modern 
society can hardly be expected to generate common values and goals. The 
idea of legal professionals as self-evidently contributing to the public good of 
order and community will now constantly be critically considered and 
assessed.  
We saw how modern, rights-conscious individuals will demand 
transparency from professionals, as they want to be able to see whether they 
are unduly patronized or moralized at by those who exercise authority over 
them and thereby have power over them. This implies that such individuals 
demand a formal evaluation of their actions by means of the relevant legal 
rules and the abstention from judgment of his or her moral stature. This 
formal evaluation can remain impersonal, objective and transparent; the 
“personal” and the “subjective” can stay out of the picture and thereby remain 
safe from damaging involvement. Under such circumstances the idea of 
professional honor or professional pride, which was the basis of the 
distinction between legal professionals and “commoners” in civil society, is 
also bound to crumble. In the legal world, like in the rest of modern society, 
professional honor will be experienced as a mere “escutcheon,” a kind of 
“mask” hiding the “real face” of the professional.157 The real face, that is to 
say the person with his or her interests, values and taste, should, however, 
remain out of sight because these idiosyncrasies should not be seen as 
determining the outcome of the legal proceedings. 
This implies that the individual demands that the modern legal 
professional comes down from his “elevated position” and give him due 
respect by relating to him in a businesslike, professional and neutral manner. 
What is demanded is a “calculable impersonality of relations of authority”,158 
                                                                                                                               
interests of each member of the community matter, and matter equally. Put another way, 
egalitarian theories require that the government treat its citizens with equal consideration; 
each citizen is entitled to equal concern and respect. ” Kymlicka, Contemporary Political 
Philosophy, pp. 4, 5; Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 179- 183. 
156 Brint, In an Age of Experts, p. 9. 
157 Berger, ‘On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honor’ in: Hauerwas & MacIntyre, 
Revisions, p. 175; Berger, Berger, & Kellner, The Homeless Mind, pp. 83-96; cp. Sennett, 
The Fall of Public Man. 
158 Dahrendorf, The Modern Social Conflict, p. 131. 
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which means that the personal – being the moral and the political – should be 
evaded and the relationship should be neutral and premised on mutual respect. 
In the words of Steven Brint, such modern legal professionals are nothing 
more, and nothing less, than “agents of formal knowledge” forgoing 
judgment.159 They settle conflicts with the use of this formal knowledge and 
make no further claims to wisdom or to a pretentious legal professional ethics 
that emphasizes character, trust and judgment. Moreover, the commoners 
experience the professional pride of jurists, which works as a binding element 
within the legal community, as aloof and unassailable. 
Roberto Unger describes pride as the denial of vulnerability, as the denial 
of the dependence on other people for self-respect and success, which 
produces a “hardening of the self.” In the extreme, the proud self might even 
be described as a kind of “citadel” with all the constraints on experience that 
such a closure implies.160 In contrast to the traditional professional, the 
formalist professional does not identify completely with his or her 
professional – or public – role in society. The formalist attitude allows for a 
certain distance between the professional role and the personal commitments 
that are preserved for private life. Moreover, the professional and the personal 
– or the public and the private – are to be strictly severed; the latter should not 
influence the former. Self-esteem and personal pride are not wholly derived 
from the public professional role but rather derived from and relegated to the 
personal and private life. 
This does not mean that formalist professionals do not consider themselves 
as playing an important role in modern societies. By consistent formalistic 
practice with regard to the legal rights and duties of the citizens that are 
involved in conflicts with each other or with the state, these rights and duties 
become real. The protection of weak parties in society against the mighty 
state and powerful (repeating) players like large corporations and 
organizations requires a principled dedication by the professionals to such 
rights and duties. To repeat, freedom and the modern culture of authenticity 
require “rights incised in stone,” 161 and the formalist legal professional can 
offer just this. Rights and duties now become clear and distinct, and the legal 
                                           
159 Brint, In an Age of Experts, p. 37, 10. 
160 Unger, Passion, pp. 199-202. 
161 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 10. 
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professional can give them teeth in his impersonal and formalist dedication to 
the law as a system of rules. This formal professional is the guardian of the 
“formal community” that the modern liberal state, or Rechtsstaat, aspires to 
be.  
Another important point is that a consistent formalistic attitude also makes 
formal equality more than just an ideal. The famous blindfolded figure of 
justice can only really be blind if legal professionals treat everyone and all 
cases alike on purely formal grounds. The formalist treats everyone as an 
abstract legal subject with abstract rights and duties regardless of their 
personal qualities or status. Everyone also goes through exactly the same legal 
procedure, and everyone’s actions (or inactions) are tested against the same 
clear and distinct legal norms.162 We can think of such equality as a major 
achievement of the modern liberal state. In the words of Friedrich von Hayek 
in The Road to Serfdom,  “It is the Rule of Law, in the sense of the rule of 
formal law, the absence of legal privileges of particular people designated by 
authority, which safeguards that equality before the law which is the opposite 
of arbitrary government.”163 
Thus, in the ideal case, from the liberal formalist perspective that I 
investigated here, modern legal professionals should be “mechanical agents of 
formal knowledge” and as transparent, calculable and verifiable as possible. 
One might say that this requirement would make them a paradigm case of the 
“heartless and spiritless experts” that, according to Weber’s prediction, would 
more and more administrate the rational-legal institutional structures of 
modern life.164And indeed, striving for universality makes law on the whole 
                                           
162 Cp. Luhmann, N., Legitimation durch Verfahren, Luchterhand Neuwied am Rhein 
1969. 
163 Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 87. 
164 “[…] the iron cage [in which] specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart, [are] 
caught in the delusion that [they] have achieved a level of development never before 
attained by mankind.” Weber, M., The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 
Scribner’s and Sons New York 1948, p. 182; cp. Eliaeson, Max Weber’s Methodologies, p. 
11; Brint, In an Age of Experts, p. 144; “Rational-legal authority […] cannot help but place 
an emphasis on equality that is lacking in the traditional order. All are equal under the rules 
governing them specifically. The emphasis is on the rules rather than on persons or on 
mores. The organization is supreme and, by its nature, strives toward increasing 
rationalization of itself through reduction of the influence played by kinship, friendship, or 
the various other factors, including money, that so strongly influence the traditional 
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rather cold and bloodless, and it can be argued that it cannot completely 
replace traditional authority in the expressive, emotional sense that was 
explored in the previous chapter. Authority is a kind of bonding, and the law 
is now merely the product of reason, which inspired a tendency to universality 
but which has no appeal to the emotions and cannot provide us with a sense of 
belonging and community. This formal law is merely a form, a framework.165 
Such a law is a nightmare for Anthony Kronman who thinks that the 
growing disengaged formalism in the legal professions is a major cause of the 
crisis of morale in the modern legal community. But he also realizes that the 
product of the modern liberal egalitarian culture has found expression in the 
Kantian domination of our moral and political order. The conception of self-
rule or autonomy that Kant has made famous has, in our contemporary 
culture, become almost a dogma of belief, and this leaves the virtues of 
excellence, leadership, judgment, wisdom and character as rather suspect. 
Kronman in today’s egalitarian culture speaks of them as “embarrassed 
virtues.”166 
Interestingly, already in the eighteenth century, Montesquieu prophesied 
the coming of this “heartless, spiritless” legal professional. In his famous 
quotation on judges being only the “mouthpiece” of the law, he calls them 
“inanimate beings” who have no authority but to strictly apply the exact 
wording of the law and who can “moderate neither its force nor its rigor.”167 
Since the eighteenth century, it seems that the whole public sphere in modern 
societies is rationalized and impersonalized (one might even speak of a 
“demoralization of society”),168 and it was only a matter of time before legal 
professionals would follow suit. Like Kronman argues, it leads to 
“demoralized legal professionals.” Kronman mainly argues from a 
                                                                                                                               
system. Function, authority, hierarchy, and obedience all exist here, as they do in the 
traditional order, but they are conceived to flow strictly from the application of 
organizational reason.” Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition, p. 143. 
165 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, pp. 112, 113. 
166 “Kant’s conception of self-rule has become, in our contemporary culture, almost a 
dogma of belief.” Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, pp. 2, 46-50. 
167 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, p. 163. 
168 Cp. Himmelfarb, The Demoralization of Society. 
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philosophical point of view, but he does claim a sociological basis for his 
argument, as well.169 
The sociologist Steven Brint supports Kronman’s thesis. In the past 
decades, Brint noticed a movement from the traditional “social trustee 
professional” (which is characterized by an emphasis on character, trust and 
judgment) towards formalism. The modern professional is generally seen as 
merely an “expert professional” whose role and competencies are legitimated 
only by the formal knowledge that he or she brings to certain (social, medical, 
or legal) problems. According to Brint, for the modern expert professional, 
such knowledge requires no additional moral vaulting.170  
However, this trend does have an important moral dimension that has been 
the basic premise in the present chapter. The respect that the modern 
individual (who tries to emancipate himself from arbitrary interference by 
external authorities) demands from the law for his personal interests and 
values seems to demand the “demoralization” or even “dehumanization” of 
the law’s administrators. Under such demands, administrators then change 
into experts of formal reason who just do their jobs while reserving their 
passions and commitments for their private lives,171 and they treat all legal 
subjects as abstract public selves deserving of equal respect, which implies 
neutral, impersonal and transparent treatment by the law. 
                                           
169 Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, p. 6. 
170 Brint, In an Age of Experts, pp. 10, 204. 
171 “The distinction between strangers and insiders never wholly disappears under 
liberalism. It persists […] above all, as a contrast between the public world of work and the 
private life of family and friendship.” Unger, Law in modern society, p. 144. 
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4.   
Power to the People 
 
 
 
“Power to the people,” Jeremy Bentham is reported to have said, and indeed 
in modern liberal democracies the legitimacy of the legal order is ideally 
derived from the “will of the people.”1  However, Bentham’s slogan also 
seems to point to a specific democratic and technological culture that has 
developed in modern societies. In such a culture, we find a repeated and 
explicit reference to the will – or the actual needs and desires – of the people 
as a basis for legal legitimacy, coupled with an extensive use of socio-
economic knowledge to reach the desired results by means of the law.  
In the previous chapter, the Enlightenment was analyzed in normative 
terms and tied to the emancipation of the individual. I explored the idea that 
freedom-loving individuals should respect certain prescriptions of reason. 
Reason prescribes certain boundaries to the exercise of their free will. In 
general, what they should respect are certain precepts of “fairness.” The 
democratic and technological culture discussed in this chapter is 
fundamentally different, even fundamentally at odds with it, because it leads 
to a conception of the law as a powerful instrument of public policy. The 
fundamental difference is that the law is seen as an instrument at the disposal 
of the people’s will. The actual desires of the people become the focus of 
attention. 2 The Enlightenment is also a naturalistic scientific project, and 
                                           
1 Quoted in Kelley, The Human Measure, p. 226. 
2 “[…] the goal which utilitarians seek to […] promote – happiness, or welfare, or well-
being – is something that we all pursue in our lives, and in the lives of those we love. 
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during the past two centuries we can see an ever-increasing influence of 
technology on modern culture. In short, the big promise of technology is that 
it gives us power over both our natural and social environments.3 Indeed, 
modern man can see that all around him, technology has fulfilled this promise 
to a very large degree. 
 
Technological culture 
“All that is solid melts into air,”4 and this certainly seems a fitting comment 
on the institutional structure in modern liberal democracies. Indeed many 
people experience the institutional structure of the modern state – and of 
modern civil society – as perpetually “under construction.” With regard to the 
legal institutional structure, especially when we look at the growing and 
constantly changing corpus of legal norms and policies that take on a legal 
form, this seems to be a truism. But, more generally, we can say the same of 
all organizations, practices and socio-economic institutions in our modern 
societies, which are constantly re-evaluated and if necessary redesigned. To a 
large degree, the eagerness of the moderns to continually reconstruct their 
common legal and socio-economic world can be explained by the fact that 
modern culture is largely a “scientific” or “technological culture.” Since the 
Scientific Revolution, man has learned to master the forces of nature and has 
used this knowledge for his own purposes. Concomitantly, we have gradually 
come to think of the institutions and practices in our societies as merely 
instrumental to human needs and desires. Moreover, such social institutions 
and practices are thought of as at least as changeable and improvable as our 
natural environment. We not only mastered nature, we also to a large degree 
“mastered” our social world as well. 
In the past two centuries even the most basic institutional, political and 
social structures that seemed to inhibit modern man in his aim to control his 
basic life conditions were challenged. Sometimes this resulted in a 
revolutionary break with the traditions and “truths” (or “prejudices”) that 
                                                                                                                               
Utilitarians just demand that the pursuit of human welfare or utility […] be done 
impartially, for everyone in society. ” Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, pp. 
10, 11; cp. Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law’, pp. 814-817. 
3 Cp. Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 2. 
4 Marx & Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 54; cp. Berman, M., All that is Solid Melts 
into Air. 
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supported the challenged structures and institutions. Indeed, tradition and 
historical background count surprisingly little in a technological culture; what 
counts is how we can make things better for the future.5  Within a modern 
technological culture there is a strong incentive to investigate how scientific 
knowledge can make life better or easier than it is. From this perspective, age 
old traditions or well-established practices and institutions never have any 
“intrinsic” worth; they are evaluated against the needs and desires of the 
present generation and cast aside when they do not live up to expectations. 
Moreover, high respect for the authority of traditions and institutions inhibits 
the quest for truth. Authority and modern science are uneasy bedfellows.6 
Since the birth of modern science in early modernity, it has had 
tremendous success in describing and explaining our natural environment. In 
the first instance, this success was made possible by the “radical” or 
“methodical doubt” that made a relatively anti-authoritarian, anti-dogmatic 
and open attitude towards natural phenomena possible.7 Such systematic 
doubt can spur on empirical and experimental inquiry, and indeed modernity 
saw the birth of an explicitly “empiricist” and “experimentalist” attitude in 
modern scientists. Such scientists, in principle, accept only truths that are 
verified by means of testable empirical and experimental inquiries.8 During 
the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the new scientific method was 
perfected, and the nineteenth century witnessed a thorough 
                                           
5 Cp. Snow, The Two Cultures, p. 44; Gould, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Magister’s 
Pox, p. 92. 
6 “The hierarchical structure of a legal system and the desire for stability […] impede the 
search for truth. […] Systems of thought that emphasize hierarchy, tradition, authority, and 
precedent disvalue the kind of critical inquiry that tests the truths that such systems accept 
are not robust.” Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, pp. 82, 91; cp. Posner, ‘Pragmatic 
Adjudication’ in: Dickstein, The Revival of Pragmatism, p. 238. 
7 It was, of course, especially the modern rationalist philosopher René Descartes who made 
this attitude into a systematic method of scientific and philosophical inquiry. Cp. 
Descartes, R., Meditations on First Philosophy, in: The Philosophical Works of Descartes, 
Cambridge University Press Cambridge UK  1984, pp. 12 etc.; cp. Williams, B., 
Descartes, The Project of Pure Enquiry, Penguin Books Harmondsworth UK 1990, pp. 32 
etc. 
8 Cp. Oldroyd, D., The Arch of Knowledge, An Introductory Study of the History of the 
Philosophy and Methodology of Science, Methuen New York and London 1986, pp. 48-
100. 
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professionalization of scientific inquiry. From then on, (state) universities 
formed the institutional background for scientists. Thus institutionalizing and 
professionalizing scientific research led a spectacular growth in the 
knowledge of the natural world for the benefit of all. 
Since the late nineteenth century, the human and social sciences also have 
become more professional and emancipated from the moral and dogmatic 
traditions that had dominated its agenda.9 The traditional “moral sciences” 
thus became the distinct disciplines of history, economy, psychology and 
sociology. As a result of the efforts of such modern social scientists, modern 
man has gained important scientific knowledge of modern social, economic 
and political systems and human behavior. Nowadays we understand much 
better than older generations did, how our social world is collectively 
“created” and how all sorts of socio-economic and political phenomena can 
be described, understood and, to some extent even explained, in causal terms. 
Of course, the social and political sciences are not as unambiguously 
successful as the “real” or “hard sciences,” because of the relative irregularity 
and unpredictability of human behavior. But this does not mean that there is 
reason to underestimate the knowledge that is acquired in these disciplines. 
From this type of scientific knowledge, it is a small but highly significant 
step to “technology.” Knowledge becomes technology the moment it is used 
to influence and manipulate our natural or social environment. In other words, 
science becomes technology when the new scientific representations of nature 
(or of social systems) are no longer primarily interpreted or understood, but 
instead lived, experienced and, most importantly, used. In short, technology is 
about the use of knowledge.10 We can say that, as in technology, modern 
science becomes a means to control and manipulate nature; it becomes a 
means to power. Therefore, modern science, which aims at understanding 
nature, is almost equivalent to technology, which aims at controlling it. “Yet, 
in all scientific fields, however the work originated, one motive becomes 
implicit in the other,” C.P. Snow argues in his famous “Two Cultures” 
essay.11  When he subsequently argues that the proper administration of 
                                           
9 Cp. Collins, R., Four Sociological Traditions, Oxford University Press New York Oxford 
1994, pp. 20-46. 
10 Lash, Another Modernity, A Different Rationality, p. 92; cp. Unger, Knowledge and 
Politics, p. 45. 
11 Snow, The Two Cultures, p. 67. 
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science would help solve the overriding problems of both the rich and poor 
countries in the world, he gives us a standard exposition of the ideals of the 
Enlightenment.12  
The motive for explaining natural phenomena and the motive for 
controlling them seem to be intimately connected in popular consciousness. 
This explains why in the popular mind the distinction between “pure science” 
and technology generally seems to have a ring of arbitrariness. The average 
citizen cannot really identify with science as “an art for art’s sake.”   In fact, 
generally “theories of great beauty but little power leave him cold.”13 Surely, 
to a large extent, the scientific knowledge that has grown since early 
modernity has in one way or the other become technology. Especially since 
the nineteenth century, modern imagination has become more and more 
fascinated, not so much with the wonders of science, but with the awesome 
power of science as technology. Modern technology even counts as one of the 
great successes of modern man.14  
Technology – whether in the form of modern medicine, modern 
transportation or the means of communication, to name but a few – has 
changed almost every aspect of human life. It has changed not only our 
natural environment but also our social world. Compare Lawrence Friedman:  
 
“In modern times science and technology have totally transformed society; they 
have altered every element of the social equation, and the rate of change from this 
source is steadily increasing. Technology must get major credit or blame for the 
revolution in the way we live today.”15 
 
The modern social world changed just as much as the natural world, maybe 
even more. Not only was the knowledge that was the product of modern 
                                           
12 Snow, The Two Cultures, pp. 41-51. 
13 Posner, Overcoming Law, p. 7; Thus in a modern democracy, where the popular mind 
and will is supposed to rule supreme, there will invariably be a tendency to equate science 
with technology, which means that science perpetually has to prove itself useful to be 
worth funding, for instance. The same goes for scientific legal research. 
14 Randall Collins: “technology may have always had more influence over science than the 
other way around.” Collins, Weberian Sociological Theory, p. 114; cp. Dale, In Pursuit of 
a Scientific Culture, Science. 
15 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 6; cp. Watson, The Modern Mind, p. 4. 
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scientific research put to use in all sorts of technologies, there was bound to 
develop a human or social science that aimed at describing, explaining and 
thereby mastering the causal forces in society in the same manner as we have 
learned to master the forces of nature.16 And indeed, modern psychology, 
sociology and economics have opened our eyes to the hidden laws of human 
(socio-economic) behavior. This had important consequences because in 
many cases social reality proved to be wholly different from what it looked 
like from the traditional or “ideological” perspectives of older generations. 
Many traditional institutional structures and many of the traditional social 
“scientific” categories (that were thought to be “natural” and therefore 
universal and necessary) proved to be highly arbitrary and contingent. 
Moreover, many of the constraints or “laws” in our social world lay elsewhere 
than generally expected.17 
Most importantly, there was not much in the “nature of things” that 
intrinsically legitimated or justified existing social, political and economic 
structures and institutions. Many aspects of the social and political order 
proved to be far from natural or necessary and instead merely man-made 
artifices. Hence they could be thought of as changeable and malleable. 
Increasingly, much of the existing socio-economic reality seemed “up for 
grabs.” Accordingly, Roberto Unger writes, “The manipulative posture 
towards the world takes the form of a denial of the immutability of nature and 
of society. It is the tendency to regard and to treat both the phenomena of 
nature and the arrangements of society as if they were in their entirety proper 
objects of human will.”18 
Furthermore, the modern social sciences have subsequently provided us 
with the knowledge and means to “master” and reconstruct these structures 
                                           
16 Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 225. 
17 “Sociology’s misfortune is that it discovers the arbitrary and the contingent where we 
like to see necessity, or nature […] and that it discovers necessity, social constraints, where 
we would like to see choice and free will.” Bourdieu, In Other Words, p. 14. 
18 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 152; Thus welfare economics takes the well-being of 
individuals as the only norm and generally assumes that “individuals comprehend fully 
how various situations affect their well-being and that there is no basis for anyone to 
question their conception of what is good for them.” Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus 
Welfare, p. 23. 
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and categories, or they seem at least very promisingly able to do so.19 Such 
knowledge is used in our present societies to shape the social world in 
accordance with human needs and desires. We can rightfully use the term 
“technology” when sociologists, political scientists and economists use their 
knowledge of social, political or economic systems to control and steer (or, 
pejoratively, “manipulate”) our social world. Such technologies feed on the 
huge prestige science has in modern culture. Moreover, there seems to be a 
strong link between technology and modern (rational) capitalism and 
industrialism. In the previous chapter I already described these forces in 
modern societies. Modern technology made modern capitalism and 
industrialism possible and, conversely, capitalism and industrialism have been 
driving forces for the advances of science and technology. Many of the social 
and economic changes in modern society can be related to these forces.20 
The growing wealth of the capitalist and industrialist countries over the 
past centuries has released many people from the economic insecurity that 
had previously imprisoned them within the pre-determined social and political 
bounds of the pre-modern world. This is a major factor because with wealth 
came both independence and mobility, which also led to a loosening of 
familial and community bonds. Thus, to many these developments meant 
freedom from such loyalties and dependencies.21 Indeed, we cannot be free 
when we are weak. Therefore the development of socio-economic technology 
is “the development of our power to push back the constraints of scarcity, 
disease, weakness, and ignorance. It is the empowerment of humanity to act 
upon the world.”22 All in all, the rise of modern technology and the wealth-
generating powers of modern capitalist industrialism have liberated many 
from the “chains of nature.”  
Surely, the bourgeois middle classes were the first to profit from this 
liberation. But, since the late nineteenth century in most western nations, the 
general rise in income altered the economic distance between the classes, and 
this was amplified by a system of taxation that compressed the scale. On the 
one hand, the modern welfare state made some redistribution of wealth 
                                           
19 Brint, In an Age of Experts, p. 40. 
20 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, pp. 11, 12. 
21 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, pp. 57, 58; cp. Posner, The Problems of 
Jurisprudence, p. 129. 
22 Unger, R.M., Democracy Realized, Verso New York 1998, pp. 5, 7. 
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possible because governments in such states have, in recent times, taken on a 
responsibility in the distribution of social and economic advantages.23 The 
desire for such redistribution (which seemed just to democratic majorities and 
was also made possible by a work force more organized and powerful than 
any in history) was at the root of the modern welfare state.24 On the other 
hand, though, the mass production for a home market and industry’s 
coinciding growing interest in the needs and tastes of the common people 
gradually enabled the lower classes to enjoy material civilization. This 
strengthened their chances of controlling their own fate. All these gains have 
fueled a growing general belief that, in the words of Friedrich von Hayek, 
“our only chance of building a decent world is that we can continue to 
improve the general level of wealth.”25 
However, there is a serious downside to the technological culture we 
inhabit. The combination of technology and capitalism leads not only to 
power and creativity but also to destruction.26 Previously I mentioned that, 
just like in modern science (as in modernist art), tradition and authority count 
for little in modern technological culture. Not only the dynamics of modern 
(rational) capitalism, per se, but also the general growth of wealth and 
economic security greatly contributes to the breaking down of traditional 
hierarchies and other forms of authority. Moreover, technological change 
continually threatens the communal cultural basis of society that makes 
cooperation, community and authority possible. In the terms used in the 
second chapter, the meaningful normative order of the community and its 
traditions, institutions and practices are always under critical scrutiny and 
therefore seem constantly “under construction.” As Francis Fukuyama says:  
 
“The same innovation that increases productivity or launches a new industry 
undermines an existing community or makes an entire way of life obsolete. 
Societies caught on the escalator of technological progress find themselves 
                                           
23 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, pp. 175, 176; Unger, Law in modern society, p. 193; cp. 
Friedman, Total Justice, p. 68. 
24 Finer, The History of Government, pp. 94, 1481. 
25 Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 230; cp. Marshall, ‘Citizenship and Social Class’, 
in: Citizen and Social Class and Other Essays, p. 28. 
26 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, pp. 83, 162; Fukuyama, Trust, pp. 
312, 313. 
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constantly having to play catch-up as social rules evolve to meet changed economic 
conditions.”27 
 
The major traditions, institutions and authorities in modern society – 
important cultural constructions that make trust, community and collective 
action possible – can easily lose their power to command respect and 
allegiance. One of the major problems of the modern societies seems to be 
that “the institutional fabric, whose basic function has always been to provide 
meaning and stability for the individual, has become incohesive, fragmented 
and thus progressively deprived of plausibility.”28 In other words, when older 
solidarities, institutional structures, hierarchies and authorities stand in the 
way of realizing the will of modern man (economic progress, for instance), 
this modern man is quick to break them down, to replace them with more 
functional and efficient (or “rational”) arrangements.  
A rapidly evolving modern world can hardly maintain a sense of eternal 
stability and certainty. Many will attest to the experience that the rate of 
change is at times so high that it is hard for the imagination to keep up. 
Indeed, the belief in “changelessness” will be fundamentally undermined. The 
net effect of this perpetual changing and rationalizing of the institutional 
arrangement is that institutions and practices will be experienced as highly 
relative and instable. One might even say that modern man must therefore 
learn to “yearn for change, to delight in mobility.” The present circumstances 
seem to require a specific professional attitude. This can be connected with 
the explicitly modern professional ideals of mobility, flexibility, creativity 
and pragmatism. Modern managers are surely expected to live up to these 
ideals, and we might expect that legal professionals will have to follow suit.29 
 
                                           
27 Fukuyama, F., The Great Disruption, Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social 
Order, The Free Press New York 1999, p. 282. 
28 Berger, ‘On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honor’ in: Hauerwas & MacIntyre, 
Revisions, p. 39; cp. Nisbet, Twilight of Authority, pp. 10, 11. 
29 Berman, All That is Solid Melts into Air, p. 96; Friedman, The Republic of Choice, pp. 6, 
53; cp. Sennett, R., The Corrosion of Character, The Personal Consequences of Work in 
the New Capitalism, W.W. Norton & Company New York London 1998. 
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From transcendentalism to immanence 
Since modern capitalist, industrialist and rationalist societies are in constant 
turmoil and our social world constantly changes, this rationalizing by means 
of instrumental reason never seems to come to a halt. In modern societies 
change, and the uncertainty and disorientation that it causes, seems to be here 
to stay. Let us explore the consequences for modern culture in (speculative) 
philosophical terms. We might argue then that modern societies in the 
Western world gradually seem to evolve from a “transcendental culture” to an 
“immanent culture,” largely as a result of the fact that in the transition from 
pure science to technology the transcendental status of knowledge (of both its 
subjects and its objects) is lost. This point is well illustrated by Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s famous metaphor of the “Death of God” in The Gay Science. I 
will argue that this cultural transition from transcendence to immanence will 
have strong repercussions for the legal culture in modern societies.30 
In socio-political terms a transcendental culture knows itself bound by a 
collective focus on an otherworldly – or “transcendental” – Good (or God), 
which is structurally separated from the present actual world. In more 
theological terms, transcendence may be described as the distinction between 
God and the world. By contrast, a technological culture will gradually lead to 
secularization and immanence.31 A transcendental culture is bound to dedicate 
its major intellectual efforts to unveiling and interpreting the Good, which is 
thought to exist in some ideal or transcendental realm and which has some 
independent existence. Unveiling the Good might be necessary in an effort to 
realize it as far as possible in the here and now of the material or profane 
world. The Judeo-Christian culture that preceded the present modern world in 
Europe evidently presented such a transcendental culture.32 Moreover, 
                                           
30 “What Weber called ‘disenchantment,’ the dissipation of our sense of the cosmos as a 
meaningful order, has allegedly destroyed the horizons in which people previously lived 
their spiritual lives. Nietzsche used the term in his celebrated “God is dead” passage: “How 
could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away a whole horizon?”” 
Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 17. 
31 Posner, R.A., Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, Harvard University Press Cambridge 
Mass. 2003, p. 9; Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 157-164.; Unger, Law in modern 
society, pp. 76-86. 
32 We owe, for instance, much of the idea of “transcendental” human rights to this 
transcendental culture that made such an idea plausible: “The natural right doctrine made 
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Nietzsche argued that the Platonic unity of “the Good, the Beautiful and the 
True” is equivalent to “the Way, the Light and the Truth” for Christendom. 
For both philosophies, the realms of being, truth and value are transcendental 
and fundamentally united; for Nietzsche Platonism and Christendom are 
essentially the same.33 
However, it can be argued that the Judeo-Christian culture did already lay 
the groundwork for the modern culture of immanence by de-sanctifying the 
actual present world.34 The transcendental Judeo-Christian theology itself 
superseded previous “immanent theologies” that sanctified the actual natural 
and social world. In an immanent theology, there is no split between the 
profane and the divine, and thus the particular world around us is sacrosanct 
and not up for human manipulation. Judeo-Christianity, however, removed 
the sacred to another world and made the first step towards secularizing the 
actual world. One might say that the profane became (in Platonic terms) a 
“lesser reflection” or “imperfect version” of the divine order and could be 
thought due for improvement by means of human intervention and good 
deeds. By focusing on God’s will and divine inspiration, mortals could, or at 
least should, make the profane world a better place. 
But secularization did not stop short here. Secularization of the profane 
prepared the way for a subsequent secularization of the transcendental, and 
thereby it prepared its demise. From the early Enlightenment on, the 
transcendental (or God) becomes more and more removed from the world as 
we scientifically know it, and eventually the transcendental completely 
disappears from the scientific worldview.35 In a modern “culture of 
immanence,” the world no longer contains, represents or even faintly reflects 
the divine, and therefore the particular forms it takes at any given time need 
not command reverence. From then on, “the features of nature and of society 
are prized as means to the satisfaction of ends, or as ends in themselves if 
                                                                                                                               
room for the transcendent element in European civilization through its emphasis on the 
existence of universal entitlements and rules superior to state power.” Unger, Law in 
modern society, p. 85. 
33 Allison, Reading the New Nietzsche, pp. 91, 99, 186. 
34 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, pp. 159, 160, 179-181; Unger, Law in modern society, 
pp. 76-86. 
35 Cp. Taylor, The Sources of the Self, p. 332. 
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their perpetuation is an object of desire. But they are never worthy by virtue 
of their existence alone, Being implies no sanctity.”36 
The modern scientific methods of methodical doubt and experimental 
reasoning did not unveil a dazzling transcendental reality of Truth, Beauty 
and Goodness – a reality that, according to Plato, could be unveiled by 
philosophical reason. Nor did modern experimental science find in nature 
God as a fountain of Meaning and Love. Nature was discovered to be nothing 
more than a kind of “machine” causally determined by blind laws devoid of 
any meaning or purpose whatsoever. Consequently, the new science 
thoroughly “de-moralized” or “de-humanized” nature. Nature was 
increasingly seen as mere substance ready for technological manipulation by 
human beings. Nature was, in a famous metaphor that originates with Max 
Weber, thoroughly entzaubert. The world was “disenchanted” and 
“demystified;” the magic was gone.37 
This also seems to be what Nietzsche referred to with his famous “Death 
of God” thesis.38 Secularization and technological culture have redirected the 
focus of man from a universal transcendental order towards particular 
objectives and activities in the here and now of the profane world. Modern 
man thereby lost his collective orientation toward Good, Truth and Beauty. 
From this moment on, nothing more prosaic than human “will” is the source 
of good, truth and beauty; the capitals are gone. To summarize, the 
                                           
36 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 159. 
37 “[…] this intellectualist rationalization, created by science and by scientifically oriented 
technology […] means that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that 
come to play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This 
means that the world is disenchanted.” Weber, ‘Science as a Vocation,’ in: Gerth & Wright 
Mills (eds.) From Max Weber, p. 139; Human nature and civilization are also 
disenchanted. Compare Peter Allen Dale: “In Freud’s revolutionary reworking of this 
perennial positivist dilemma, not only is the instinctual duality stripped from its civilized 
disguise – altruism becomes eros; egoism becomes aggression and desire for death – but 
also civilization itself becomes, in his wonderful metaphor, a mere “lullaby” about heaven 
sung to us all […] in our cradles, an elaborate placebo devised by humankind to hide from 
itself the irremediable discontent built into, alloyed with, its very nature.” Dale, In Pursuit 
of a Scientific Culture, pp. 271, 221-225. 
38 Nietzsche, F., Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft, Wilhelm Goldmann Verlag München 1959, 
pp. 150 etc, pp. 166 etc.; Allison, Reading the New Nietzsche, pp. 90-99; cp. Himmelfarb, 
The Demoralization of Society, p. 10. 
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conception of nature and society as possible and proper objects of unlimited 
manipulation becomes available when the world is regarded as completely 
devoid of intrinsic worth or beauty, rather than as the embodiment, 
representation or reflection of the sacred.39 This is exactly what happened 
when both the theology of immanence and of transcendence were superseded 
by a modern secular culture of immanence. 
 
Technological culture and democracy 
The ideal of modern mass democracy also seems to feed on this technological 
culture that fuels the constant changes that we experience in our daily lives. 
And conversely, modern technology gets strong impulses from the fact that to 
serve the desires of democratic majorities, there is a great need of socio-
economic knowledge. Let us define “democracy” provisionally as a state 
where political decisions are taken by and with consent of the people, or with 
the active participation of at least the majority of the people. The word 
literally refers to the idea of “rule by the people,” and this seems to imply at 
least some form of political equality among the people in their political 
influence.40 But democracy can only be a coherent idea when people 
generally feel that they actually (collectively) have the power to “make a 
change” and to influence their social environment. Indeed, modern socio-
economic technology makes this power to at least some degree a fact.41 By 
contrast, democracy can have no meaning to people who feel that our social 
world is completely determined by forces beyond human power. What should 
we democratically decide if the whole order is of Godly origin and therefore 
both intrinsically Necessary and Good? All one can do is try to interpret the 
                                           
39 Lash, Another Modernity, A Different Rationality, p. 92; cp. Taylor, Hegel, p. 401. 
40 Finer, The History of Government, p. 1568; Held, Models of Democracy, p. 1; cp. 
Posner, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, pp. 131-150; Barber, Strong Democracy. 
41 “Technology has made the world over, and in so doing has vastly reduced certain kinds 
of uncertainty; it has also opened the door to a vastly greater level of demands on 
government. Slowly people have come to expect more out of government, out of law, out 
of life. The mechanisms may be obscure, but one key factor is the sense that there are ways 
to control over many of man’s ancient contingencies. Technology is crucial in generating 
this sense of control. Science and machines can conquer disease, life the curse of early 
death, protect against disaster, solve the problems of the world. And from physical control 
the mind moves, in time, to social, collective control.” Friedman, Total Justice, pp. 51, 70. 
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world such that Divine will is unveiled; the will of the people, in itself, has no 
normative force whatsoever.42 
However, if the natural and social order is emptied of all normative 
significance and if modern man subsequently gains power over both nature 
and the collective social environment, what man should do with this power 
becomes a serious point of discussion. If the power is at hand and there is no 
transcendental source of values and goals to be found beyond this world, the 
will of the citizens becomes an important (maybe even the only) source of 
legitimacy for rulings and policies. All this leads to a fundamental argument 
for democracy as rule based on the consent of the people and “democracy has 
become the fundamental standard of political legitimacy in the current era.”43 
With a “community of goals” or a “community of values,” we do not seem 
to be confronted with a particular problem. When all the members of the 
community structurally share certain goals and values, it seems obvious what 
values and goals should be served by modern technological knowledge. The 
idea of the volonté générale, which should inform the rulings and policies of 
the state authorities, can be said to function as both a secular and formal 
substitute for a natural or religious community of values and goals. In an 
immanent modern culture where the actual will of the people is the only 
source of legitimating decisions and policies, we can only act collectively 
when we all actually want the same thing: “the idea of the general will […] is 
the other great discovery of the Enlightenment ethical theory. Man shapes his 
society according to right reason by founding it fully on the general will. For 
the rational is the universal, that which holds all men and is binding on all 
men.”44 
Many today think of this notion of the “general will” as rather romantic 
and obscure.45 In modern, “pluralistic,” mass democracies, this notion of the 
“general will” cannot be less vague and senseless than the notion of 
transcendental or natural rights. Moreover, despite Rousseau’s optimism, the 
notion of a general will of the body politic has often (not only by totalitarian 
regimes) been abused to, to use Rousseau’s own ambiguous phrase, “force 
                                           
42 Cp. Allison, Reading the New Nietzsche, p. 95. 
43 Held, Models of Democracy, pp. xi, 1. 
44 Taylor, Hegel, p. 402. 
45 Cp. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. x; Kelley, The Human Measure, p. 226. 
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individual citizens to be free”46 by making them conform to the particular will 
of the ruling elites; thus making a mockery of freedom. Thus many deem the 
notion of a general will that can be known a priori without consulting the 
people highly dangerous and equally all the variants and offshoots of this 
concept like “public interest” or “public good.”  
In modern, pluralistic societies we can thus safely start from the premise 
that such a general will is both a chimera and undesirable. Modern societies 
consist of several incommensurable moral universes and they have, despite 
many efforts to nation building, even lost the pretence of a common culture.47 
Moreover, any sharing of values that might provide us with common ground 
is thought to be but a precarious and contingent alliance of ends that merely 
reveals the subjective preferences of the allies. The important consequence of 
this is that power holders in the political community will have no self-evident, 
a priori or “natural” legitimacy for their policies as they would in a 
community of goals and values. In other words, a pluralist society will not 
easily become a political community with one ultimate and stable basis in 
“rationality” or a “general will.”  
We should add the (originally Marxist) insight that in many cases, imputed 
shared values or interests reflect not much more than the prejudices and 
interests of the dominant groups within society. We can think of such a 
“common good” as the product of “universalisation projects” of intellectual 
and political elites, making an effort to present particular interests as a general 
will. From a critical perspective such “common ends” and “shared values” 
will typically be looked upon with suspicion as we have learned to suspect 
they hide serious group repression.48  
                                           
46  Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 64. 
47 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, p. 129; cp. Nonet & Selznick, Law & Society in 
Transition, p. 103; Barber, Strong Democracy, p. 62. 
48 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, pp. 41-44, 308, 309; Unger, Knowledge and 
Politics, pp. 102, 103, 69; “The universal is the object of universal recognition and the 
sacrifice of selfish (especially economic) interests is universally recognized as legitimate. 
(In the effort to rise from the singular and selfish point of view of the individual to the 
point of view of the group, collective judgment cannot but perceive, and approve, an 
expression of recognition of the value of the group and of the group itself as the fount of all 
value, and thus a passage from “is” to “ought”.) This means that all social universes tend to 
offer, to varying agrees, material and symbolic profits of universalization.” Bourdieu, 
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Democracy is the only cure for the modern predicament. When rulers need 
legitimacy for their rulings and policies, it will have to be constantly created 
and recreated, somehow, from the “bottom up.” The legitimacy is to be found 
in the consent or the will of the people, or at least the majority. But we can 
argue for this point from a different direction as well. In a technological or 
immanent culture, modern citizens will think of the state and its legal order in 
“functional” terms. As in modern pluralist societies where the individual 
choices of the citizenry seem to be the only arbiter of good, the idea arises 
that the modern state and its laws (just like other authority structures) are 
legitimate only insofar as the state has the power to “facilitate, channel, and 
realize individual choices.”49 
This neatly hooks up with the idea of modern democracy. The lawgiver 
needs legitimacy for his decisions and policies to be effective, and this can 
only be provided by those affected by such decisions and policies: the 
“people.” Here we see an important source of the idea of popular 
sovereignty.50 In a democracy, what the people actually want becomes crucial 
because only this will legitimates the effectuation of legal rules and policies. 
As such, democratic procedures and institutions seem to complement the free 
market in giving voice (and power) to the particular wills and desires of the 
citizens. However, this implies that, like anything else in the modern 
technological immanent culture, democracy is not an end in itself but 
essentially a “means,” a utilitarian device for safeguarding internal peace and 
facilitating the individual freedom to pursue one’s individual ends.51 
To many, this view is too cynical, and it is argued that modern liberal 
democracies cannot survive if the citizens do not orient their behaviour to 
“democratic virtues,” actions that have intrinsic worth in the sense that they 
are good in themselves, or to actions that can be seen as serving some sense of 
the common good – the community’s well-being. Democratic citizenship 
                                                                                                                               
Practical Reason, p. 59, 60; cp. Eagleton, T., Ideology, An introduction, Verso New York 
1991, pp. 56-58. 
49 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 39; “our public institutions can be thought of […] 
as being neutral, value free, procedural institutions for brokering and facilitating the 
choices of pure individuals.” Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 4. 
50 Finer, The History of Government, pp. 1475 –1478. 
51 Posner, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, pp. 165, 166, 178; Von Hayek, The Road to 
Serfdom, p. 78. 
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implies such virtues, it is argued, because otherwise liberal democracies 
reduced to “interest-brokerage” will eventually go under in conflict and 
distrust.52 Nevertheless, in modern pluralist and immanent culture, values 
cannot be self-evident or self-justifying; they will not easily be experienced as 
having intrinsic worth – a worth that cannot be reduced to something else. 
Values are generally thought to serve some, often hidden, extrinsic purpose.53 
We might even say that modern man, with regard to values as in everything 
else, is inclined to a “technological stance.” 
The modern spirit generally seems to have difficulty with any human 
activity of “intrinsic worth,” a worth or value that cannot be immediately 
translated into some extrinsic goal or use. Human activity done for its own 
sake and without ulterior purpose – science for science’s sake, art for art’s 
sake or politics for politics’ sake – becomes suspect: every activity must 
derive its justification from a concrete (or even material) interest, from a 
concrete socio-economic purpose. 
In the second chapter we saw how fraternal ethics, which focused on the 
idea of “virtue” instead of values, makes a common bond or community 
possible, which provides the individual with a secure and meaningful social 
environment. Indeed, the idea of virtue carries a sense of gravity and authority 
that the idea of (subjective) value does not. However, making a distinction 
between virtuous democratic action and self-interested action seems 
invariably to have the effect of making certain citizens, the virtuous, more 
worthy of democratic influence than those who seem to just use the 
democratic institutions and procedures to further their own particular 
interests. But when individual will is the only arbiter of good, no individual 
citizen can claim his or her will to be more worthy than any other, and a 
“hierarchy of worthiness” seems to be fundamentally at odds with this 
democratic premise. The idea of “virtue” seems to lead to perfectionism, 
elitism and moralism. By contrast, the idea of “value”, seen as something 
subjective that needs to be respected as deriving from the individual will, can 
lay claim to moral equality and neutrality.54 
                                           
52 Barber, Strong Democracy, pp. 93-97, 143-148; cp. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent. 
53 Himmelfarb, The Demoralization of Society, pp. 10, 11. 
54 Himmelfarb, The Demoralization of Society, pp. 11, 12. 
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The fact that democracy as a political system became evermore dominant 
during modernity goes hand in hand with modern technological culture: if we 
have the power to make a change, we all deserve a say, and when we cannot 
reach universal agreement or consensus, the majority rules – whatever the 
contents and goals of its rulings.55 But we also need to be able to protect 
minorities and individuals against such majorities. In the previous chapter, we 
explored a solution to this problem: we grant to individual citizens 
constitutional rights that protect them from arbitrary interference from the 
body politic. However, under the present circumstances, people can hardly 
experience these individual rights and the Rechtsstaat that protects them as 
having “intrinsic worth” either. 
Thus such rights become relative to the will of the (qualified) majorities, 
and they are under constant scrutiny for whether they actually serve the goal 
they are expected to serve, or whether they “arbitrarily” or “uselessly” stand 
in the way of the majorities imposing their will on society. The moment we 
start seeing the rule of law as functional or merely instrumental in the 
protection of the interests of individual citizens against arbitrary powers, we 
already start making the idea of individual rights relative to some external 
goal or purpose, preferably stated in concrete material terms. The moment we 
fail to see how, in a particular case, the invocation of rights can serve any 
purpose, we are inclined to make relative, or even ignore, the established right 
and make some other purpose override it.56  
 
                                           
55 “Increase in knowledge (or what is thought of as knowledge) in medicine, engineering, 
and economics means an increase in the capacity of human beings to control “natural” 
forces collectively. Knowledge really is power; but power for whom? For individuals, 
certainly; but only up to a point. For one thing, no individual can command the knowledge 
needed to gain power over the natural (and unnatural) world. Knowledge is a collective 
good, and its power is collective power, that is, power for the state. In an age of science, 
the state could accomplish more, could control more, than ever before; certainly more than 
isolated individuals or even groups of individuals could. Hence a lot more was expected 
from collective action.” Friedman, Total Justice, p. 70. 
56 There is the risk that especially the rights of the weak and the unpopular members in 
society for the goals and benefits of majorities, the problem is that some people will then 
be treated as means to other people’s ends. There is a danger of repression in a purposive 
legal order. Cp. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, pp. 35- 47; cp. Nonet  & 
Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, p. 117. 
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Democracy and social technology 
We discussed the fundamental problem with the legitimacy of the rules and 
policies generated by the state in modern secular societies. The liberal 
democratic institutions are thought to remedy this, to some extent at least. But 
we cannot expect everyone to be convinced of the good of the rulings and 
policies that are generated by these institutions. Many citizens will 
nevertheless conform to these rules and policies because, although they might 
be able to really identify with the values and goals that are served by the 
rulings, the formal democratic legitimacy is enough for them. But even of 
such true democrats, the compliance is bound to be rather unprincipled and at 
times half-hearted. Moreover, in modern pluralistic societies many will not 
experience democratic legitimacy as a sufficient reason to comply. With 
regard to such subjects, there is no alternative but to force minorities and 
individuals into conformity. With regard to the half-hearted ones, the state 
should show them that it seriously enforces the law against those who violate 
it, thus giving them an extra reason to stay within bounds. 
But how can state powers be effectively applied to force minorities or 
individuals into compliance when the product of democratic institutions is no 
more than the formal legitimacy of the rules? Those with a strong interest not 
to comply, or those with values that are at odds with such rules, might not be 
particularly impressed with the argument that it is undemocratic not to 
comply. The strategy of influencing behavior by means of legitimation is in 
many cases the most efficient means, but surely the legitimacy of rulings and 
policies in democracies is often rather thin. In pluralist democracies, 
legitimation strategies will never convince every single citizen in the political 
community, and there seems to be but one important instrument left with 
which to force individual citizens into the desired conformity with the rulings 
of the majority in modern mass democracies. We typically do so, to put it 
prosaically, by means of “sticks and carrots.”57 “Know a person’s mainspring 
of motive and you have as it were the key to his will,” wrote the Spanish 
Jesuit scholar Balthasar Gracián in the seventeenth century:  
 
                                           
57 Unger, Law in modern society,  p. 26; Barber, Strong Democracy, p. 13; “The American 
system is therefore open to the charge that it is chaotic, inefficient, and produces annoying, 
harmful disincentives.” Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 191. 
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“Have resort to primary motives, which are not always the highest but more often 
the lowest part of his nature, because there are more dispositions badly organized 
than well. First guess a person’s ruling passion, appeal to it with words, set it in 
motion by temptation, and you will always checkmate his freedom of will.”58 
 
We can try to convince people to do the right thing and make them conform 
by an appeal to the “rational will.” By convincing them, we give them a 
reason to respect the law and see it is as right, necessary and useful. But this is 
an idealistic stance, in the sense that we try to affect people on the level of 
ideas, justifications and purposes. Gracián, however, is a realist in his advice 
to appeal to the “lowest part of his nature,” directly affecting the will or the 
passions, reasoning from the Humean premise that reason is only a slave to 
the passions, and often we are well-advised to affect the will directly, not 
indirectly, through the faculty of reason. With regard to compliance with the 
law, we should also not be too naïve and idealistic. Thus, Richard Posner 
argues that “ […] compliance with law is more a matter of incentives than of 
deference or respect.”59 And this is well complemented with Friedrich von 
Hayek’s remark that “men are not likely to give their best for long periods 
unless their own interests are directly involved.”60 Like anything in nature, 
human nature also has a degree of manipulability; human behavior is, at least 
to some degree, controllable. Some may call this nihilistic and cynical, but 
others prefer the word “realistic.”61 
We can manipulate and coordinate human behavior effectively and 
efficiently by manipulating the price of behavior. Raising the price of socially 
undesirable behavior will make individuals avoid it and, conversely, lowering 
the price of desirable social actions, and thus reformulating public goods in 
terms of private advantage, will encourage people to do the right thing.62 In 
                                           
58 Gracián, The Art of Worldly Wisdom, pp. 12, 13. 
59 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, p. 234. 
60 Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 138; cp. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, p. 108;  
“Political morality does not fall from heaven, and is not innate to human nature. […] It 
would be a question of establishing social universes where, as in the Machiavellian ideal 
republic, agents had an interest in virtue, disinterestedness, and devotion to public service 
and the common good.” Bourdieu, Practical Reason, p. 144 (emphasis added). 
61 Barber, Strong Democracy, p. 13; cp. Posner, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, p. 9. 
62 Barber, Strong Democracy, pp. 13, 23; cp. Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, p. 59. 
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such a view, “rules are treated by the individual as one more factor to be taken 
into account in his calculus of efficiencies,” according to Roberto Unger: 
 
“This means that he will comply with the rules only to the extent that his own goals 
are better served by compliance than by disobedience. Consequently, the sanction 
becomes the crucial part of the rule. The fear of the sanction operates to internalize 
the requirements of social order in the individual’s reasoning about the most 
effective means to attain personal ends.”63  
 
This is where modern social technologies come into the picture. Knowledge 
of the socio-economic laws of modern society makes it possible to coerce 
parts of the citizenry into conformity. If we want to make certain changes in 
our social world, if we want to reach certain effects by means of policies, we 
need to know how the social world “works,” and how it will react to certain 
rulings and policies. This knowledge can be used to make them as effective as 
possible. But these rulings and policies should not only be effective, they also 
should be efficient. The goals and desires in society are, in principle 
boundless, but the means and resources to reach such goals are always scarce. 
A meta-norm will naturally suggest itself under such circumstances: 
“efficiency.”64 
 
This is seriously at odds with the “art of authority,” which prescribed respect 
for the meaningful normative order that constitutes the community as an 
ultimate good. Therefore politics is not particularly about getting all of what 
you want, or even as much as possible of what you want. As there is always 
the need to curtail such particular individual desires and make room for the 
Good of the community as a motivating factor, traditional authorities are not 
even likely to take the particular desires of individual subjects too seriously.65 
We should remember that authority is a fragile symbolic phenomenon that, 
when stripped of its specific symbols and rhetoric, loses its “symbolic 
efficacy,” its power to command and this implies that authority does not bear 
                                           
63 Unger, Law in Modern Society, p. 26; Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 73. 
64 Efficiency in the use of resources is often called Pareto-optimality or Pareto-efficiency. 
Cp. Lipsey, R.G., Steiner, P.O. & Purvis, D.D., Economics, Harper & Row Publishers 
London 1987, pp. 246-252. 
65 Cp. Taylor, The Sources of the Self, p. 332. 
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too much prosaic or “realistic” instrumental reasoning. From the traditional 
perspective both authority and community are “intrinsic goods” that deserve 
respect regardless of the contingent desires and goals of the individual 
members.66 
The formalist perspective is also hard to reconcile with the present picture 
of things. Like discussed in the previous chapter, modern freedom-loving 
citizens expect the state authorities (and any other authority for that matter) to 
respect their individual human dignity and freedom rights. Like Immanuel 
Kant argued, this is not a demand that is grounded in concrete or particular 
desires, but a demand that is grounded in the formal or abstract “will” which 
has dignity and demands individual autonomy. The democrat, by contrast, 
does not particularly seek legal or formal respect for freedom; he seeks 
respect for the substance, or the particular content, of his will. To the 
democrat the particular desires and goals should count in the democratic 
decision-making process as equal to those of others in society. The fact that 
we can very well imagine a liberal state that is by no means a democracy can 
illustrate this.67 The liberal state is about the reasonableness of the social 
contract and the individual freedom rights that it grants its citizens. In a 
democracy, the will of the people rules supreme, whether it is “reasonable” or 
not. The democrat demands that the power holders recognize and realize the 
actual substance of the preferences and desires of (the majority of) the people. 
Here the fears and desires of the citizens, not reason, dominate the political 
sphere. 
 
The morality of desire and the modern social sciences 
The human sciences were for a long time referred to as the “moral sciences,” 
but the idea that some science can discover the intrinsic good of human being, 
some intrinsic morality that can be derived from being human, gradually got 
lost. The only candidate that we are left with to provide us with values and 
goals is our subjective individual will – or desire. Subsequently, we come to 
                                           
66 Cp. Unger, Law in Modern Society, pp. 26- 37; “Highly censured and euphemized 
discourses and practices which are produced by reference to ‘pure’, purely ‘internal’ ends 
are always predisposed to perform additional, external functions. They do so the more 
effectively the less aware they are of doing so.” Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural 
Production, p. 96. 
67 Cp. Finer, The History of Government, pp. 1568-1572. 
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think of reason as thoroughly instrumental to this will, and instrumental 
reason begins to dominate our way of looking at the world. “Reason is, and 
ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other 
office than to serve and obey them,” David Hume famously argued.68 Science 
and reason are morally inert, they can only help us to effectively and 
efficiently reach the goals and ends of the subjective will. Thus reason 
remains in the neutral realm of means: it is of a purely instrumental nature.69 
The modern technological immanent culture seems to force us into a 
“morality of desire,” a morality that prioritizes the good over the right. 
Compare Roberto Unger: “The morality of desire defines the good as the 
satisfaction of desire, the reaching of goals to which our appetites and 
aversions incline us.” The good can, however, only be thought of as a 
subjective good, a good that every individual has to discover for himself or 
herself: “Reason can’t adjudicate moral disputes.”70 The contingent desires 
individuals have are the only material out of which moral standards can be 
made, and therefore all moral thinking must begin with an understanding of 
the passions to which men are subject as “desiring animals.”71 This seems to 
be exactly what is done when in modern social sciences human behavior on a 
general (and to some degree reductive) level is analyzed in functional or 
instrumental terms.  
In such science, reason is seen as merely instrumental for the actor or 
agent in their effort to reach certain goals.72  These goals are not established a 
                                           
68 Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, book II part III section III. 
69 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 153; Richard Posner also does not invest much trust 
in reason (or jurisprudence) finding ends for the law: “Like most philosophy, all that most 
jurisprudence can do is to arm one against philosophical arguments. It is therapeutic, but 
not curative.” Posner, Overcoming Law, p. 80. 
70 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, pp. 49, 50, 51, 299; Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, 
p. 18; “In this century there has been a strong trend toward accepting science as the only 
rational authority but rejecting both the rational status of ethics and the need for a 
philosophical foundation for scientific rationality.” Gutting, Pragmatic Liberalism and the 
Critique of Modernity, p 3. 
71 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 51. 
72 “Rational Choice theory begins with a single, ideally rational individual. […] He has 
three components: fully ordered preferences, complete information, and a perfect internal 
computer. He acts rationally in as much as he chooses the action, which he correctly 
calculates to be the most instrumental in satisfying his preferences. […] Rational action is 
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priori by such sciences (like in the “moral sciences”).  They are the a 
posteriori product of empirical research, or of democratic decision making, 
and then taken as givens. That is to say, the social scientist typically will not 
claim any expertise in evaluating such goals and preferences. In other words, 
in such social science the individual is constructed as an “actor” or “agent” 
endowed with certain (socially or individually determined) preferences, on the 
one hand, and on the other hand, with instrumental reason to reach his goals 
within the constraining limits of institutional, social or economic conditions. 
In such a kind of anthropology, “reason” is nothing but “reckoning.”73 Indeed, 
Hume argued that there are only two kinds of scientific truths. On the one 
hand, there are those that are the product of mathematical reasoning, and on 
the other, those that are empirically verifiable scientific statements. The rest is 
dubious metaphysics. 74  
Obviously, such a scientific cast of mind does not leave much room for 
philosophical investigation of some transcendental Common Good. Nor can 
it, importantly, with a straight face entertain a notion like “natural” or 
“transcendental” (or otherwise pre-social or pre-political) “rights.” The idea 
of natural rights cannot be much more than, in Jeremy  Bentham’s famous 
phrase, “nonsense on stilts.”75 The idea of Natural Rights or the Common 
                                                                                                                               
thus instrumentally rational action. […] Rational agents can have any (consistent) 
preferences, and are rational if and only if their choices maximise their expected utility 
accordingly. There is no further question of the rationality of their ends.” Hollis, The 
Philosophy of Social Science, pp. 117, 118. 
73 From this perspective, although they were written over three hundred and fifty years ago, 
the following words by Thomas Hobbes sound utterly modern: “Reason is the pace, 
increase of science is the way and the benefit of mankind is the end. And on the contrary, 
metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words, are like ignes fatui, and reasoning upon 
them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and 
sedition, or contempt.” Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 32, 36. 
74 “When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? 
If we take in our hands any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance, let us 
ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it 
contain any experimental reasoning concerning matters of fact and existence? No. Commit 
it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.” Hume, An 
Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, p. 195. 
75 The famous “nonsense on stilts” quotation allegedly comes from ‘Anarchical Fallacies.’ 
Cp. Bentham, J., Rights, Representation, and Reform, Nonsense upon Stilts and Other 
Writings on the French Revolution (The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham), Oxford 
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Good is a product of the dubious metaphysics that was denounced by Hume 
as “scholastic philosophy” and cannot be reached by means of logical 
reasoning or empirical experimental science. There can be no logical or 
empirical truth because the Common Good and inalienable Human Rights are 
part of the normative domain, not of the natural. We should commit such 
nonsense on stilts to the flames, as Hume would say. 
The modern social sciences that are the heirs to this “naturalism” do not 
generally invoke moral or ethical ideals that motivate and explain human 
action but tend to refer to “harder” or more “down-to-earth” explanations, and 
thus the moral sciences developed into modern naturalist sciences during the 
past two centuries. Only non-moral or amoral motivations, like the desire for 
greater wealth or power will be sufficiently “hard” to count as seriously 
scientific, and such wealth or power might subsequently refer to control over 
means to survival or to control over others in the community. It is exactly 
because such explanations can be seen as morally neutral – they were 
explicitly designed to be morally neutral – that they have scientific standing.76 
We can illustrate this point well with Richard Posner’s description of legal 
analysis, which can be deemed scientific according to such modern standards. 
According to Posner such an analysis should “lead discussion away from 
issues semantic and metaphysical toward issues factual and empirical.” This 
means that although “Aristotle’s physics treats objects in nature much as if 
they were animate beings, with goals; today we are more likely to treat 
animate beings on the model of objects.”77 If we could define “the common 
good” in objective and empirical terms (that subsumption of ethics into the 
natural sciences inevitably requires), “then empirical enquiry can determine 
which behaviours may best achieve the stated goals, and whether (and how) 
societies have established their ethical rules to reach those ends.”78 Here, 
                                                                                                                               
University Press 2002; “It is the nature of the Enlightenment as Hegel saw not to accept 
any such authority. Everything must be thought out from the ground up by human reason 
and decided according to reason by human will. […] There are not even entrenched 
individual rights, matters taken outside the sphere of government, as there are with Locke.” 
Taylor, Hegel, pp. 404, 405. 
76 Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, pp. 19, 20 
77 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, pp. 387, 167. 
78 Gould, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Magister’s Pox, p. 244. 
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preferably, we impute such goals like a desire for greater wealth and/or 
power.  
An important advantage of such empirical and “demoralized concepts” is 
that they offer the opportunity, just like in physics, to translate qualitative, 
vague (metaphysical) concepts into empirical and quantitative ones. 
Reference to such relatively physical “things,” such as the wealth- or power-
maximizing behavior, makes it possible to actively observe and even measure 
such behavior.79 With the help of statistics in the analysis of the found 
empirical data, one can discover regularities in the social reality. The beauty 
of such regularities in our social reality is, of course, that they can be 
described or represented in a formal system of abstract rules: a theory. When 
we have established the laws of our social world, we can subsequently try to 
predict and even influence human behavior.80 
Thus, for instance, the modern science of economics (which, interestingly, 
was until the late nineteenth century called “political economy”) makes all 
sorts of actions commensurable by abstracting away from all the qualitative 
differences between human desires and motivations – they are all thought to 
be contingent and equally worthy – and “reckons” in quantitative terms about 
how such actions relate to the desire to maximize wealth or “welfare” or 
“utility.”81 Inescapably science consists in reducing complexity, and this 
reduction of economic science is widely regarded as a very successful one. 
The desire to maximize welfare or utility is a kind of meta-desire that can 
even provide us with a norm – a kind of meta-norm – that any sane person 
should and generally will attest to. At least this is a central assumption in 
                                           
79 “One of the most conspicuous aspects of the rise of technology (assisted by industry and 
the sciences) is […] that the inorganic supersedes the organic and a cultural superstructure 
emerges in which the “big three” of modern society (technology, industry and science) 
rule. In this world of the inorganic, experiment and continuous abstraction seem to 
dominate. Modern man has substituted inorganic for organic material, and inorganic 
energy for organic power. A nature artificielle has spread out over the world. […] Organic 
life will probably always remain a puzzling problem to man, but the inorganic is relatively 
easily accessible and can be manipulated. Hence, man tries to replace the organic by the 
inorganic as much as possible.” Zijderveld, The Abstract Society, p. 84. 
80 Popper, K., The Poverty of Historicism, Routledge & Kegan Paul London 1961, p. 25; 
Hollis, The Philosophy of Social Science, pp. 42, 64. 
81 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, pp. 356-362, 374-387. 
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utilitarian moral theory.82 Because welfare or utility are fairly empirical 
notions this means that we can easily switch from the normative realm to the 
world of facts or matter. Thus, when we make relative the distinction between 
fact and value and subsequently reduce the moral world to the natural one, we 
might find common ground: “We can meet the harsh facts of the flesh, on the 
level where all of us are, or should be, one.”83  
If people do not attest to, or accept the validity of this norm of maximizing 
welfare, and give other (typically less self-interested) motivations to justify 
and explain their actions, economists might argue that, however people 
describe their own actions, it is empirically sound to impute that they 
generally act in accordance with this meta-norm. In addition, we can also 
depart from the premise that human beings always have a particular interest in 
minimizing the costs of satisfying their desires, and thus focus on the 
comparative costliness of the different lines of action. As said before, from 
such a perspective all lines of action are commensurable because they are 
translated into expenditures of a single universal good called wealth (or 
welfare).84 We can now begin to appreciate why Richard Posner calls 
economics “the instrumental science par excellence.”85 
In socio-economic policy analysis, the social scientist will start from a 
“realistic” view of human beings as economic or rational actors and cut to the 
chase. If we translate (or reduce) human desires, values and interests to the 
material conditions that need to be fulfilled to pursue these individual 
                                           
82 Cp. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, p. 10; cp. Dale, The Pursuit of a 
Scientific Culture, p. 175. 
83 Snow, The Two Cultures, p. 77; “The traditional view of a continuity between the natural 
and the moral order was overthrown and replaced […] by the reduction of the moral world 
to the natural one.” Unger, Law in Modern Society, p. 38. 
84 “Very frequently these common ends will not be ultimate ends to the individuals but 
means which different persons can use for different purposes. In fact, people are most 
likely to agree on common action where the common end is not an ultimate end to them 
but a means capable of serving a great variety of purposes.” Von Hayek, The Road to 
Serfdom, p. 67. 
85 “The basic assumption of economics that guides the version of economic analysis of law 
[…] is that people are rational maximizers of their satisfactions – all people (except for 
small children and the profoundly retarded) in all their activities (except under influence of 
psychosis or similarly deranged through drug or alcohol abuse) that involve choice.” 
Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, p. 353; Posner, Overcoming Law, p. 15. 
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projects, we see here that all human beings, although thoroughly divided on 
values, actually do have one common interest. Regardless of what the goals 
and desires are, the means that make it possible to satisfy individual desires 
and interests should be maximized, and we can safely and conveniently talk 
of such means in terms of “money.” Compare Pierre Bourdieu: 
 
“The discovery of labor presupposes the constitution of the common ground of 
production, that is, the disenchanting of a natural world reduced to its economic 
dimension alone. Ceasing to be the tribute paid to a necessary order, activity can be 
directed towards an exclusively economic goal, the one that money, henceforward 
the measure of all things, starkly designates.” 86  
 
Now measured by this yardstick, most activities that were justified as having 
an intrinsic worth that cannot be measured in material effect, are likely to be 
dismissed as “metaphysical” or as merely “symbolic” and as such lacking any 
reference in the real world. In the words of Bourdieu: “Measured by the 
yardstick of monetary profit, the most sacred activities find themselves 
constituted negatively as symbolic, that is, in a sense the word sometimes 
receives, as lacking concrete, material effect, in a word, gratuitous, that is 
disinterested but also useless.”87  
The disenchanting effect of such a perspective is clear, and it has great 
critical potential against all sorts of domination by political authority figures 
or other powerful institutions in society by means of such “vain metaphysics” 
and “empty symbolism.” This also goes for the legal practices and institutions 
in modern societies. The law is full of symbolism and dubious metaphysical 
concepts, which can be “unmasked” from a social scientific perspective as 
mainly hiding from sight the interests of the legal professionals to immunize 
their judgments from scientific or public scrutiny.88  
                                           
86 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, p. 117; cp. Walzer, Spheres of Justice, pp. 21, 22. 
87 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, p. 117, 118. 
88 Posner, Overcoming Law, pp. 33-80; Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal 
Theory, pp. 185-206; “Claims to high ethical standards and collegial regulation were 
reinterpreted by some scholars as “myths” aimed at protecting the privileges of 
professionals.” Brint, In an Age of Experts, p. 40; cp. Collins, R., The Credential Society, 
An Historical Sociology of Education and Stratification, Academic Press New York 1979, 
pp. 147-159. 
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The serious downside, however, also seems clear. There are symbolic 
aspects to politics that cannot be completely dispensed with. The symbolisms 
and rhetoric of political and legal authority, for instance – at least that seems 
to be the conclusion we should draw from the investigation in the second 
chapter. Any functional analysis in realistic or empirical terms will transform 
the experience of authority beyond recognition. Paradoxically, such an 
analysis makes it symbolically ineffective. Furthermore, the individual rights 
that are granted by liberal democracies to protect minorities or individuals 
against democratic majorities may at a first glance seem “factoid,” but closer 
scrutiny reveals that they are also merely of a symbolic nature; in other words, 
they can be thought of as being “social constructions,” as well.89 Again the 
question arises whether we can both take legal rights seriously as well as 
analyze them in instrumental terms. Here also, instrumental analysis might 
threaten symbolic effectiveness. 
 
Pragmatism 
Any social science that tries to describe and explain phenomena in the social 
world (those connected to the free market in modern societies, for instance) 
has to make use of a conceptual apparatus that can only be interpreted as a 
kind of “formalism.” The danger of dogmatism with regard to this formal 
theory is just as apparent here as it is in the juridical formalism that was 
explored in the previous chapter. However, this formalism is thought to be 
thoroughly instrumental and should not be thought of as having any intrinsic 
worth, or having any pre-political or pre-social normative foundation 
whatsoever. We should think of these theories as the product of empirical 
research in the modern social sciences, theories that are readily adjusted and 
revised whenever social reality proves to be different from what the theory 
predicts. Thus, according to Richard Posner we should think of economics, 
for instance, as “a formalism erected on a realist base.”90 The formal theories 
and premises of this science are under constant scrutiny and revision as it 
constantly tries to adapt theory to an ever-changing and whimsical empirical 
reality. 
                                           
89 Cp. Hacking, The Social Construction of What? 
90 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, p. 387; cp. Kennedy, A Critique of 
Adjudication, pp. 116, 309. 
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To make this easier, we are well advised not to take the distinction 
between facts and values too seriously. We should not be too principled to 
refuse to re-conceptualize individual “values” as merely the desire for 
something or other; subsequently we can translate them into matters of 
interests.91 The normative is thus translated into something that has a more 
concrete ring, something that is also sufficiently factual as to be scientifically 
researchable. Now it is possible to employ the experimental or empirical 
scientific method of enquiry to determine the most effective and efficient 
solutions to social conflicts.92  
What probably characterizes pragmatism most is a general distrust of a 
dogmatic attitude with regard to (philosophical) distinctions.93 Thus the 
distinction between fact and reason, or between empirical reality and the 
conceptual scheme by means of which this reality is ordered and explained, is 
thought to be thoroughly relative.94 Remember that the traditional view of 
continuity between the natural and the moral order was in the third chapter 
replaced by a strict division between the natural and the moral order. This 
distinction is now overthrown and replaced “by the reduction of the moral 
world to the natural one.”95 Now the old opposition between the order of facts 
and the order of ideas can be superseded such that scientific research into 
those realms does not require different methods of enquiry. Particularly, there 
is no need for a distinctive method for the realm of ideas – the philosophical 
method of interpretation of symbols or the analysis of concepts. 
                                           
91 “For the moralist of desire there is just a tenuous and elusive line between descriptive 
psychology and ethics. For him, the contingent desires individuals have are the only 
material out of which moral standards can be made. […] Only by repudiating the 
distinction between fact and value, could we go from the mere description of these 
communal values to their use as standards of evaluation.” Unger, Knowledge and Politics, 
pp. 51, 102, 103; cp. Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, pp. 11, 12, 21. 
92 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, p. 387; Posner, Law, Pragmatism and 
Democracy, p. 9. 
93 Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, pp. 17, 18. 
94 Quine, W.V.O., ‘Two Dogma’s of Empiricism’ in: From a Logical Point of View; “Fact 
and theory are not opposed, science, including good social science, unites them. […] 
Modern economics can furnish the indispensable theoretical framework that law so badly 
needs.” Posner, Overcoming Law, p. 19. Cp. Luban, Legal Modernism, pp. 139, 140. 
95 Unger, Law in modern society, p. 38; cp. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, p. 108. 
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Moreover, according to Quine, “meanings, those very models of mental 
entities, end up as grist for the behaviorist mill.”96 The interpretation of 
symbols and the analysis of concepts can be thought of as unscientific 
because symbols and meanings are identified as merely mental having no real 
and determinate existence whatsoever. We must “think things and not 
words,”97 and from the pragmatic premises we can do exactly this. We can 
investigate our social reality all over the board by constructing causal 
explanations of facts arrived by means of experimental inquiry.98 This results 
in a pragmatic scientific attitude, which does not take seriously any claim to 
“pure” or “transcendental” knowledge, knowledge which can be arrived at by 
means of reason, interpretation or conceptual analysis alone.  
What, according to William James, the American philosopher of 
pragmatism, takes the place of rationalist speculation is an orientation towards 
“concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, toward action, and toward 
power.”99 This pragmatic emphasis on concreteness dispels all (philosophical) 
speculation on vague moral values or metaphysics. It also emphasizes 
behavioral and measurable facts which can be investigated by means of 
empiricist and experimentalist methods of inquiry and dispels the reification 
of meanings, particularly of legal concepts; in this sense pragmatism is 
particularly anti-Platonic and anti-rationalistic.  
Importantly, pragmatism is thoroughly technological in spirit because, as 
William James argued, it is oriented both towards action and towards power. 
It is not even particularly interested in founding or finding Truth. When 
knowledge is a successful guide for action and is a powerful instrument to 
reach our goals, then that is all the certainty the pragmatist needs, however 
temporary and relative such certainty is. For the pragmatist, knowledge (or 
reason) is simply a “tool,” an instrument that is wholly at the service of 
                                           
96 Quine, W.V.O., ‘Ontological Relativity’ in: Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 
Columbia University Press New York 1969, p. 26, 27. 
97 The expression is famously attributed to Oliver Wendell Holmes but is also reported to 
originate in the work of Francis Bacon. 
98 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, pp. 113, 114, 116. 
99 James, W., Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth, Harvard University Press Cambridge 
Mass. 1975, p. 31; Posner, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, p. 24; Posner, Overcoming 
Law, p. 5. 
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human goals and purposes. All philosophical speculation on what explains the 
power and adequacy of our knowledge is thought to be vain.100 
 
From “dissensus” to the democratic art of compromise 
We seem to be stuck with empty instrumental reason waiting for the will to 
give it the input it needs to reckon the most effective and efficient course of 
action. We are left with the rather prosaic experience of pursuing one’s ends 
and seeing other persons merely as “aids” or as “obstacles” to the 
achievements of those ends. Moreover, it seems most realistic and 
scientifically sound to define man as a subject of certain desires taken as 
givens for (moral) reasoning. Desires cannot themselves be judged at the bar 
of reason, and this relates to the fact, which was mentioned before, that in the 
modern world the subjective individual will rules supreme.101 In a democracy 
this is not merely a factual or empirical statement but also a normative 
statement. Decisions and policies that express the will of the people, or at 
least that of a democratically victorious majority, have the greatest legitimacy 
in a democratic state; this will of the majority should rule. In addition, modern 
social science as technology offers the means to make policies and decisions 
as effective and efficient as possible in regulating and influencing the society.  
In the ideal case, what the people want can be realized both effectively and 
efficiently by means of modern socio-economic policy science. This, 
however, depends on the goals that these majorities set themselves. But there 
is an important condition that seems to expose both the strength and the 
weakness of modern social scientific technology. The goals that modern man 
and democratic majorities set themselves should be as concrete or material as 
possible because otherwise there is no possibility of knowing and predicting 
how the policy will influence or affect social reality. There is no chance of 
ever empirically monitoring whether the policy has been a success or not. 
Goals described in merely symbolic or worse in metaphysical terms – like 
most moral ideals or aspirations that cannot be translated into some material 
goal – will not pass such a test for concreteness. 
There is, however, also another reason to prefer concrete and material 
goals to vague moral ideals. Within the context of democratic deliberations 
                                           
100 Cp. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. 
101 Unger, Law in modern society, p. 85; cp. Taylor, Hegel, p. 367. 
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and negotiations, it is harder to compromise with regard to moral convictions 
than with regard to concrete goals formulated in material terms. The problem 
is that people generally behave much more principled and uncompromisingly 
when some conflict is experienced as one concerning values – a “dissensus” – 
than when it is seen as merely a conflict of interests. Especially when these 
interests can be translated into a conflict over means in material terms 
(money), a compromise seems to be always within reach. By contrast, values 
are experienced as that which should not be easily compromised because they 
are often of a communal origin. In other words, individuals often do not feel 
that they can freely dispose of values. In addition, it seems hard to see how 
conflicting parties can meet halfway when the values that caused the conflict 
are incommensurable (like they typically are).102 
The looking away from moral convictions and the focus on concrete 
material interests can easily become a cardinal democratic “virtue” in modern 
complex and pluralistic societies. Such a democratic attitude encourages 
compromise, encourages the buying off of all sorts of interest groups, and 
thus social peace is maintained by generally bracketing ideological 
differences. The crucial point being again that, to repeat, “interests, unlike 
ideas can be compromised.”103 This suggests a pragmatic way out of political 
controversy concerning ends. Compare Richard Posner: 
 
“First, efforts are made to instrumentalize political reasoning to the extent possible 
so that intractable issues of ends are transformed into issues of means. Second, the 
responsibility for the extensive instrumental reasoning now required of government 
is handed over to technical experts – instrumental reasoning is what technical 
expertise is good for.”104  
 
Although we live in pluralistic modern societies and might disagree 
substantially on values if we translate those into concrete goals and interests, 
we do not even generally disagree on ends in modern societies. Posner: 
“There happens to be a substantial consensus in our society concerning ends, 
the disagreement is over means and it will lessen as more of us learn more 
                                           
102 Aubert, The Hidden Society, pp. 86-90; Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal 
Theory, pp. 62, 63. 
103 Posner, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, p. 166, 173. 
104 Posner, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, p. 205. 
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about how economic systems work.”105 To be sure, in the first instance this is 
a rather surprising statement considering the fact that he generally agrees to 
the fact that we moderns live in pluralistic societies in which we are 
fundamentally divided on questions of the good or the good life. However, 
Posner might make two steps that explain this contention.  
First we translate vague abstract moral values into concrete goals in 
material terms and then, secondly, we recognize that we do have a kind of 
meta-goal or meta-interest in common: we all have a meta-interest in 
economizing on the means. Considering the fact that means are always scarce, 
we might recognize in the need for “efficiency” both an abstract and a no-
nonsense interest that can provide us with a meta-norm.106 Moreover, this is 
not just a normative statement. It can well be argued that it represents also a 
factual or descriptive statement. Economists might argue that on an aggregate 
level people actually generally act in accordance with this overall end. This 
means that if we want to understand human behavior we need to know how 
economic systems work that are both the “product” and the “producer” of 
such behavior.  
This becomes even more important if we want to influence or change such 
behavior. I argued that in a democracy there is great interest in influencing 
individual behavior because it should be made possible for democratic 
majorities to “create” the society that they prefer. However, I have also 
argued that the moment we start to use our knowledge of social and economic 
systems to manipulate human behavior, such knowledge becomes a “social 
technology.” We have also already established how we can realistically and 
effectively affect human behavior by changing or manipulating the price of 
behavior. Raising the price of socially undesirable behavior will make 
individuals avoid it and, conversely lowering the price of desirable social 
actions will encourage people to reformulate public goods in terms of private 
                                           
105 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, p. 387; “It is true that the conflicting values in 
any political debate can be made commensurable merely by viewing them from a 
sufficiently distant point of view.” Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, p. 57. 
106 “Efficiency is also a concept that captures aggregate effects on individuals well-being, 
and invocations of efficiency should thus be understood to entail a concern for individual’s 
well-being, rather than obeisance to some technical or accounting notion.” Kaplow & 
Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, p. 37. 
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advantage. Indeed, in recent decades we have witnessed the modern corporate 
welfare state yielding to an emphasis on such public policy.107 
But we have also witnessed attempts to force back the reliance on public 
policy by state- or semi-state agents in favor of reliance on the competitive 
forces in the free market; a strategy that is deemed in many cases more 
effective and efficient. Largely instigated by financial pressures, modern 
states have relegated more and more public tasks and policies to the 
rationalization of expertise in a more market-oriented direction.108 The case 
for the liberalism of the free market is, however, often not of a principled 
kind. The arguments are of a much more pragmatic nature, in the sense that 
liberalism generally creates the conditions that makes economic prosperity 
possible. The case for free-market liberalism is therefore thoroughly 
instrumental as is the case for any other institution or practice in a 
technological culture. The case for free-market competition can be 
complemented by principled arguments for the value of freedom, as they are, 
for instance, by Von Hayek in his The Road to Serfdom, but need not be.109 
Posner gives some pragmatic reasons for justifying free-market liberalism. 
For instance, he argues that such liberalism fosters the exchanges of 
information necessary to scientific and technological progress. He also argues 
that such liberalism generally maximizes productive output and that it 
effectively and efficiently encourages and rewards competence. In addition, 
there is a democratic aspect to free-market liberalism as it prevents excessive 
centralisation of decision-making. Last but not least it defuses political and 
sectarian strife because it weakens competitive loyalties within the political 
community (like to family or clan). Indeed, such a justification of free-market 
liberalism by means of such favourable results, to be sure, is thoroughly 
pragmatic.110 
And so is the case for democracy. Democracy is not seen as a value or 
goal in itself – as nothing has intrinsic value or is an ultimate goal in 
pragmatic reasoning – but essentially as a means to satisfy particular desires. 
In this perspective politics in general is not much more than “the 
                                           
107 Unger, Law in modern society, p. 194; Barber, Strong Democracy, pp. 13, 23. 
108 Cp. Brint, In an Age of Experts, p. 124. 
109 Cp. Friedman, M., Capitalism and Freedom, The University of Chicago Press Chicago 
1982. 
110 Posner, Overcoming Law, p. 25. 
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chambermaid of private interests” because no other interests exist. Democracy 
has legitimacy as long as it is a means to satisfy such private interests and 
leads to the desired results. This means that we can even think of democratic 
politics in terms of the free market, like Schumpeter famously does in his 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.111 Schumpeter thinks of democracy as 
a means to the peaceful maximization of the satisfaction of individuals, “a 
utilitarian device for safeguarding internal peace and individual freedom.”112 
Nothing much intrinsic in the concept of democracy or in the idea of free 
market liberalism justifies the institutions that they inspire; only the specific 
interests and desires that they serve do so. 
If private interests and subjective desires rule supreme, the combination of 
such pragmatic liberalism and modern economic thinking leads to a 
preference of free market mechanisms for coordination of human interaction 
in contrast to the explicit use of state power. Respect for individual wills 
implies abstaining from manipulating as much as possible and only a free 
market economy gives the people what they want, instead of what political 
majorities think they ought to want. No taste whatsoever is illegitimate or 
improper so long as it can make a market, and the market makes it possible 
for every individual to maximize the satisfaction of his or her own tastes, 
preferences and desires. Thus the free market takes the actual will of people 
seriously, and we should not allow for any paternalistic or moralistic 
intervention.113 
A free market is also fairer and more egalitarian than any political 
judgment on what we should want or could ever be. Impersonal and not 
political forces determine the free market and demands can, in principle, 
incite a supply without any political intervention. Also, the market does not 
discriminate. Personal characteristics or qualities do not count for much. 
Moreover, by letting market forces determine demand and supply, the 
resolution of conflict is ceded to the private realm where people represent 
only themselves and resolve their differences voluntarily. To conclude, one 
can even go to the extreme of this argument by claiming, with Friedrich von 
                                           
111 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 26; Barber, Strong Democracy, 
p. 118; cp. Brint, In an Age of Experts, p. 144. 
112 Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 78; Posner, Overcoming Law, p. 25; Posner, Law, 
Pragmatism and Democracy, pp. 188-203. 
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Hayek, that “[…] the free market is the only mechanism that has ever been 
discovered for achieving participatory democracy.”114 
 
Law as technology 
This seems to leave us with a private sphere dominated by the mechanisms of  
the free market, on the one hand, and a public sphere where instrumental legal 
rules legitimated by democratic majorities seek to complement or correct 
ruling socio-economic forces, on the other. Such rules can only be successful 
if they sufficiently ally with these forces, and this means that they need to be 
empirically well informed. The law radically changes in character. In the 
classical picture of things, power worked top-down and was concentrated in 
the State, which in an important sense “transcended” society. In the words of 
Scott Lash: “Power was lodged in a transcendent juridico-discursive instance, 
for instance in a transcendental state.” However, “in the Modern,” Lash goes 
on to say, “sovereignty is lodged in the social itself, and power circulates 
immanently ‘in the capillaries of society’; the state is no longer above us but 
among us.”115  But, under such circumstances, not only the state loses its 
transcendental features. In the modern immanent culture, the law is also no 
longer “above” us but “among” us. Surely, this must have important 
consequences for the law and legal professionals.  
We should connect this to another important (and perhaps rather 
demeaning) feature of modern law that we arrived at in the previous 
paragraphs. Modern law is seen as completely derived from the human will. 
There is no pre-social or pre-political order where we might found legal rights 
or obligations. Jean Jacques Rousseau already referred to this when he said 
that the social order “serves as a basis for all other rights. And as it is not a 
natural right, it must be founded on covenants.” When the cosmic order goes 
to pieces, the socio-political and normative order loses its metaphysical 
(transcendental) allure and is now up for grabs.  Argues Rousseau, “The laws 
are but the registers of what we ourselves desire,” and “A people, since it is 
                                           
114 Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. xi; Barber, Strong Democracy, p. 107; Friedman, 
The Republic of Choice, p. 44. 
115 Lash, ‘Modernism and Sociological Thought,’ in: Lash & Whimster (eds.), Max Weber, 
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subject to laws, ought to be the author of them. The right of laying down the 
rules of society belongs only to those who form society.”116  
Obviously it is by now a widely shared idea that the law is a pivotal 
instrument by means of which democratic people rule themselves.117 It is man 
alone who can decide what his social world should look like, and we have 
also established that modern man is apt to look at this world in instrumental 
terms. Thus socio-economic reality is thought to be open to functional 
analysis, negotiation and renegotiation; if necessary it is even open for 
perpetual renegotiation as social needs, interests and technologies constantly 
change. This goes for every aspect of our social contract including the most 
basic human rights and duties.118 
In modern pluralistic societies the law is mainly the systematized and 
coercive embodiment of the desires and preferences of the majority in a 
democracy, and we can expect the law to change when these desires and 
preferences change.119 And, to be sure, this is why in modern democracies the 
law seems to be perpetually “under construction.” But maybe there are 
important reasons or incentives for legal professionals to conceal, or to at 
least “euphemize,” the fact that the law is merely the contingent instrument 
serving the will of democratic majorities. In the formalistic paradigm that I 
described in the previous chapter, the law is thought of as a systematic and 
consistent whole of rights and obligations, which in the end is largely 
legitimated by the respect for individual dignity and equality that the modern 
                                           
116 Rousseau, The Social Contract, pp. 50, 81-83. 
117 “[…] the law is defined instrumentally, at least in part, as a tool, and artifact, which the 
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state owes its citizens. Reason thus gives modern rational law an autonomous 
legitimacy and authority in modern society.  
Posner argues that during the past decades, the alliance of jurisprudence 
and moral philosophy emphasizing “fairness” in many variants can be seen as 
a conservative response to the functionalism and scientism that started to 
penetrate the law.120 But, interestingly, the constant democratic tinkering with 
the law has had an important side effect. Change necessarily undermines 
belief in changelessness – belief in a relatively timeless, sacred order of being. 
One might say that constant legal change reveals the thoroughly political, 
human and instrumental aspects of the law. Maybe some of the magic of 
immutable rightness still clings to modern law, markedly in the charters of 
basic and constitutional rights, but nowadays the main body of law is 
experienced as prosaically instrumental.121  
When the belief in the law as a timeless and sacred set of norms is lost – in 
Weberian terms, when the law is completely disenchanted – it has lost its 
transcendental qualities and the law enters the modern culture of immanence. 
The law is a social technology and as such a means to master and regulate 
social behavior.122 The law is not an ultimate goal in itself, or seen as having 
intrinsic worth or value. The law is instrumental to external goals, any 
objective that the democratic majorities want it to serve. We thus witness “the 
complete secularization of law as a set of rules whose making and application 
were wholly at the mercy of judgments about how to achieve desired political 
objectives.”123 This also means that legal institutions and practices can be 
changed at will, for instance when the existing institutions do not serve 
democratically legitimated goals or purposes.  
                                           
120 “Throughout Western society a traditional professionalism that emphasized guild-like 
restrictions and the cultivation of professional mystique is being challenged by a new, 
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122 Berman, Law and Revolution, p. 39. 
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Now remember Judge Holmes’s claim that it would be wholesome for 
legal professionals to learn to “think things and not words.” Jurists should not 
only acquire a taste for investigating our social reality, but they should also be 
more pragmatic, that is to say less dogmatic with regard to the legal 
institutions and practices in our modern societies.124 A pragmatist does not 
take seriously any claim to “pure” or “transcendental” knowledge, which can 
be arrived at by means of reason or conceptual analysis. Note how William 
James characterizes pragmatism as an orientation towards: 
 
“[…] concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, toward action, and toward power 
and that means the empiricist temper regnant, and the rationalist temper sincerely 
given up. It means the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, 
artificiality and the pretence of finality in truth.”125 
 
Following Holmes, Richard Posner argues that this is exactly what the legal 
world needs. The “internal and dogmatic” perspective focusing on the 
analysis and interpretation of “meaning” has proven inadequate for the 
complex and unstable modern social world; legal professionals should gain 
some distance, and thereby perspective, on their own practice and conceptual 
toolbox. From such distance, we recognize that the formalist lawyer has a 
rather “weak sense of fact,” according to Posner, and “what is needed is 
inquiry, challenge, fallibilism, open-mindedness, respect for fact, and 
acceptance of change.”126 Posner: 
 
“What is missing from law are penetrating and rigorous theories, counterintuitive 
hypotheses that are falsifiable but not falsified (and so are at least tentatively 
supported), precise instrumentation, an exact vocabulary, a clear separation of 
positive and normative inquiry, quantification of data, credible controlled 
experiments, rigorous statistical inference, useful technological by-products, 
dramatic interventions with measurable consequences, and above all and subsuming 
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most of the previous points, objectively testable – and continually retested – 
hypotheses. In law there is a shadow of scientific reasoning, but no edifice.”127 
 
If we think of the scientific attitude in modest and pragmatic terms as nothing 
more than “an attitude of respect for fact,” we may set “before the lawyer, 
judge, and law professor an eminently attainable as well as highly worthwhile 
ideal.” 128 But why does this, at present, seem so necessary for the legal 
world? 
The law and its institutions are the instruments by means of which the 
people rule themselves, and therefore the legitimacy of its rule becomes 
relative to the (contingent) fact of whether the goals that it is set to serve are 
actually realized or not. It will be hard to make citizens conform to rules and 
policies that are flagrantly ineffective in reaching the goals they were 
designed to serve. In other words, the application of the legal rules can be 
legitimate only if it actually, or in fact, serves the democratically legitimated 
goals and purposes. This means that the law and both the legal practices and 
legal science lose their autonomy with regard both to politics and the social 
sciences because, on the one hand, the goals and purposes are to be politically 
defined. The law cannot autonomously define any goal or purpose. On the 
other hand, only social and economic experts can provide the law with the 
means to design truly effective and efficient rules and policies, “The 
responsibility for the extensive instrumental reasoning now required of 
government is handed over to technical experts – instrumental reasoning is 
what technical expertise is good for.”129  
When the law is to be effective in reaching democratically established 
goals, we may rightfully doubt whether legal professionals are able to put 
right the major juridical problems without recourse to the social sciences. 
Such sciences have much prestige in modern societies exactly because they 
are (more or less) effective social technologies based on scientific knowledge. 
But the moment legal professionals take recourse in such knowledge and 
experience, they compromise the autonomy of legal practices.130 Indeed, legal 
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professionals are not very well equipped to make the legal system into an 
effective and efficient instrument of social policy. The education of lawyers is 
often highly formalistic, and law students are taught to think of the legal 
system as a relatively consistent and autonomous whole comprised of 
concepts, rules and principles. 
Effective and efficient law, however, does not require puzzling with 
concepts and the exploration of the “relations of ideas,” but rather, in David 
Hume’s words, “experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and 
existence.”131 To be successful in penetrating and manipulating our complex 
social reality one needs to proceed scientifically. This requires a naturalistic 
ontology and an empiricist and experimentalist method of inquiry. One should 
refocus from the normative and conceptual legal dimension toward the factual 
social reality that the law tries to affect. Formalistic professionals are going to 
lose ground to those professionals who can claim expertise here.132 As the law 
and its institutions will lose their autonomy, they will become more and more 
dependent on the expertise of, for instance, psychologists and psychiatrists 
whom we have actually seen enter the courtrooms in the past decades. Further 
optimization will require the expertise of sociologists and economists.133 
 
The pragmatic dissolution  
The refocus from the normative to the factual will be made easier if the 
distinctions that were introduced in the previous chapter are “dissolved,” or, 
at least, made relative again. In the first place the distinctions between 
“relations between ideas” – the “conceptual scheme” or “theory” – and 
“relations between matters of fact” – empirical truths. For a pragmatist, this 
sharp distinction is not philosophically defensible anymore. Pragmatism 
                                                                                                                               
(with ethics too) as a system of reasoning is that in a pluralistic society it lacks cogent 
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builds on the (Wittgensteinian) realization that the “relations between ideas,” 
in the case of legal science the conceptual structure of the legal system, 
cannot have any independent meaning abstracted from actual or factual 
contexts. In other words, studying legal concepts in abstraction from actual 
conflicts in particular circumstances is a relatively meaningless effort. There 
is no conceptual scheme that can be consistently separated or abstracted from 
such circumstances and contexts. Posner: “Fact and theory are not opposed, 
science, including good social science, unites them.” Only when we have 
done so can “modern economics […] furnish the indispensable theoretical 
framework that law so badly needs.”134 
The pragmatist legal professional and scientist will try to dissolve the 
distinction between facts and norms. There is just an elusive line between our 
factual desires and ethics because the contingent desires individuals have are 
the only material out of which moral standards can be made. Thus, “only by 
repudiating the distinction between fact and value, could we go from the mere 
description of these communal values to their use as standards of evaluation.” 
135 If the distinctions between a conceptual and normative scheme, on the one 
hand, and the factual context and circumstances, on the other, are not taken 
seriously, the factual and the conceptual/normative start to intermingle.136 The 
two worlds, the factual and the conceptual/normative, which was thought of 
as “transcendental” to the first, melt into one. The distinction that promised a 
distinct realm of normative or conceptual investigation or analysis now 
withers away. Legal norms or concepts gain their specific meaning in light of 
the facts, and vice versa. There is only one reality in which both facts and 
norms are immanent.137 
Now that the transcendental is brought back to the here and now of our 
factual world; for Posner the scientific project is to thoroughly and rigorously 
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“naturalize” our normative reality. In other words, the normative should be 
largely reduced to the factual and translated into scientifically (or empirically) 
respectable terms. The traditional view of a sharp distinction between the 
natural and the conceptual and moral order will thereby be overthrown and 
replaced “by the reduction of the moral world to the natural one.”138 The law 
can then be researched as any other phenomenon as “a matter of fact,” which, 
like anything else, is the object of “experimental reasoning.” The whole idea 
of a distinct legal order can be unmasked as an “ideology” in the bad sense of 
the word, ideology that merely serves as a strategy to keep socio-economic 
knowledge claims that compete with formal legal expertise at a distance and 
to avoid the “messy encounter with empirical reality.” 
Autonomous “meanings” are no longer scientifically respectable notions, 
and the hermeneutical and analytical methods by means of which these were 
investigated will generally have to be replaced by real scientific methods: 
empiricist and experimentalist reasoning. The notoriously vague and 
indeterminate “intentionalist” discourse will have to make way for a stringent 
behaviorism and naturalism.139 What people think they mean or intend is of 
no importance; all that matters is what they actually do. Only what they do, as 
opposed to the vague concepts and ideology, by means of which they try to 
justify their actions, can in fact be empirically registered, described or 
measured by means of the statistical and empirical social scientific methods 
of inquiry.  
Behavior can subsequently be explained by means of social and economic 
laws that these sciences have identified. From measuring collected data, we 
can proceed to causal explanations by means of constructing the laws of 
human interaction, and finally from this knowledge we can, at least roughly, 
predict what will happen. The moment we use this knowledge to manipulate 
social reality it becomes technology. Only a thoroughly scientific (a 
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thoroughly “naturalized”) legal system can serve as an effective and efficient 
instrument of social control and social engineering.140 
 
The law is nothing more poetic or elevated than a means to realize certain 
goals by means of force. Descriptions that refer to vague moral concepts such 
as justice, human dignity, rights, or fairness, are eschewed as being 
metaphysical and insufficiently scientific. “The ultimate ratio of law is indeed 
force,” Posner argues, and this can be related to the fact that in modern 
pluralist societies as the scale increases, the extent of agreement on the order 
of ends decreases, and the necessity to rely on force and compulsion grows.141 
Indeed, “power” (closely related to physical force) is also a relatively material 
and non-moral ground for legal obligations, and as such sufficiently hard to 
count as scientific.  
“Law is dissolved into physical force, also an abstract entity but one that 
has a more solid ring and, more important can be interpreted in behavioral 
terms.” Factual human behavior and the exercise of power can be brute facts 
of experience, and such facts can be known without much interpretation.142 
The “naturalization of the law” implies a focus on the actual, on particulars 
and on the facts. To be effective as an instrument of social engineering, the 
legal professional will have to be conscious of the effects of legal practice. 
This means that legal professionals and scientists will have to focus on the 
facts, on the actuality of our social world and make sure that the law makes 
the right impact on it. The law is conceptualized as the exercise of power, or 
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better, as a powerful instrument in the service of human needs. In short, it is 
conceptualized as a technology.143 
There is bound to be a new focus on its efficiency as well. In the modern 
technological culture and in modern democracies there is no end to the goals 
and desires that are articulated by the electorates and their representatives. 
However, every goal or policy has a “price.” Although there seems to be no 
end to human needs and desires, the means are always scarce, and we should 
try to calculate the costs and benefits such that we can make a good estimate 
of whether the means are used economically. In a technological culture, 
efficiency is easily seen as an intrinsic good because we need to get the 
maximum of results with the minimum of resources and costs. Often it is 
presented as an ultimate norm that under the circumstance of scarcity 
everyone should submit because it can unite otherwise highly divided 
individuals in modern pluralistic societies. Such a normative approach tends 
toward consequentialism and utilitarianism, but surely a consistent pragmatist 
will refuse to become too dogmatic in his normative theories.144 
“We can meet the harsh facts of the flesh, on the level where all of us are, 
or should be, one,” C.P. Snow argued.145  We should divert the discussion 
from semantic and metaphysical issues toward those that are adequately 
factual and empirical.146 The focus should therefore be on concrete social 
needs and interests, on the one hand, and on the factual outcomes, on the 
other. Richard Posner argues that from a social scientific perspective lawyers 
are generally rather naïve about how law actually affects the behavior of 
citizens in society. The idea that law affects behaviour not only directly, by 
creating rewards and sanctions, but also to a large extent indirectly, by 
altering attitudes, and through them behaviour, is an article of faith for most 
legal professionals. Especially judges and law professors seem to cling 
strongly to the idea that the law has a strong connection to custom and moral 
                                           
143 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, pp. 18, 19, 26, 28, 29, 223. 
144 Posner, ‘Pragmatist Adjudication’, in: Dickstein (ed.), The Revival of Pragmatism, pp. 
235-253; Posner, Overcoming Law, p. 4; Posner, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, pp. 
59, 337. 
145 Snow, The Two Cultures, p. 77. 
146 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, p. 123, 387; “empirical sciences treat the 
subject matter as a one-dimensional thing that does not need to be set against the 
background of intentions or values.” Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 113. 
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consciousness or that it is experienced as reasonable. This then explains the 
general compliance.  Posner however argues that, from a social scientific 
perspective, one can at least doubt the self-evidence of these theses. Posner 
argues that there is no evidence that these consequences exist, but this fact 
seems to have obviously failed to shake the profession’s faith in the affects of 
the strategy by means of such legitimation.147 
A more realistic and scientifically respectable theory of why people 
comply with the law would analyze the matter in terms of incentives instead 
of in terms of “legitimacy” of the law or “respect” for the law. In a genuinely 
scientific analysis, one should defer such normative and moral terms in 
research into the compliance with law.148 Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that 
moral terms in the law should be “bathed in cynical acid” to strip them of 
their moral connotations. We should abstain from all such “nebulous” and 
“ideological” motivating entities and realize that morality is not a very 
trustworthy or realistic motivating factor for human action. To put it in the 
words of Friedrich von Hayek, “Men are not likely to give their best for long 
periods unless their own interests are directly involved.”149 
For the law to effectively and efficiently regulate behavior the law should, 
as Gracián advised us, try to affect the “primary motives, which are not 
always the highest but more often the lowest part of his nature.” We should 
manipulate human fears and desires such that the fear of sanction enters the 
intelligent calculation. Previously, we have already argued that all such 
deliberation about means is, in essence, a kind of counting of how to attain 
personal ends.150 Appeal to the level of will and desires with a sufficiently 
stiff punishment will make it the self-interests of all to obey the law because 
compliance outweighs the advantages that might be gained from 
disobedience. We simply change the price of conduct; the social sciences, 
especially economics, can help us to do this effectively and efficiently. 151  
 
                                           
147 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, p. 214; Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 
113. 
148 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, p. 234. 
149 Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 138; Luban, ‘What’s Pragmatic about Legal 
Pragmatism?’ in: Dickstein (ed.), The Revival of Pragmatism, p. 289. 
150 Unger, Law in modern society, p. 26; cp. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, p. 55. 
151 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 73; cp. Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, p. 59. 
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In the monitoring of factual outcomes (the factual effects of a certain legal 
regulation in society) rests an important opportunity to render the legal claims 
more objective. Outcomes can be scientifically predicted, described and 
explained in relatively exact and universal terms, and as such social science 
can provide us with a common ground for subsequent political evaluation. If 
we succeed in formulating clear and concrete goals for the law to serve we 
have a clear and concrete standard by means of which we can evaluate and 
criticize the law. This also opens the way to changes if necessary. At the same 
time, “they can control administrative discretion and thus mitigate the risk of 
institutional surrender.”152 But again we should not be too dogmatic about 
such standards and not make too much of this objectivity, because “all such 
purposive judgments are inherently particularistic and unstable: the most 
effective means to any given end varies from situation to situation and the 
purposes themselves are likely to be complex and shifting.”153 This means 
that we need to “introduce openness and flexibility into legal judgment.”154 
Thus the objectivity and the certainty that we wish to derive from such 
objectivity is always relative to time and place. The objectivity is also always 
relative to policy objectives (which are relative to contingent desires) and 
particular circumstances. This means that the certainty aspired to is forever 
out of reach and therefore, according to Nonet and Selznick,  
 
“The quest for purpose is a risky venture for legal institutions. In the large business 
enterprise the heritage of the past is readily perceived as a hindrance to rationality. 
In principle, the organization is free to demystify its rules and alter its procedures. 
But some institutions, notably religious and legal, have depended heavily on ritual 
and precedent to sustain identity or uphold legitimacy. For them the road to 
                                           
152 Nonet & Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, p. 77; “means end judgments seem to 
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Overcoming Law, p. 79; cp. Posner, ‘Pragmatic Adjudication’, in: Dickstein (ed.), The 
Revival of Pragmatism, p. 238. 
154 Nonet & Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, p. 80. 
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responsiveness is necessarily perilous; it cannot be contemplated with easy 
optimism.”155 
 
This accounts for the fact why legal professionals are risk averse and are 
inclined to opt for a rather conservative stance. The constant critical 
evaluation of the legal institutions, practices and decisions threatens to make 
“all that is solid melt into air.” Thus there is a tendency to adopt a “low risk 
perspective” being wary of overly encouraging the constant questioning of 
received authority. In arguing for a more purposive and open legal order, the 
advocates of responsive law opt for a relatively “high risk” alternative,”156 but 
Posner argues that there is simply no choice. Modern citizens demand 
transparency and are due to evaluate the law on its effectiveness and 
efficiency. All lawyers can do to meet this demand is at least try to both be 
clear about the policy objectives and strengthen our respect for fact, because 
there is ample opportunity for improvement. 
We are encouraged to think of the law as a specific product of the state to 
meet specific socio-economic demands. This might be a radical way of 
looking at the law, but in his Problems of Jurisprudence, Posner bluntly 
argues that the modern state is merely the supplier in the market of legal 
services, and the law generally is a means to maximize welfare. To put it 
differently, the legal system is one of the public services that each state offers 
to its residents and to the people and firms who do business with them.157 To 
many lawyers such reasoning is obviously a bridge too far, but it does seem to 
be a consistent argument the moment we start to think of the law in 
instrumental and down-to-earth terms. 
To summarize: now that the old meta-law has broken down, it has been 
replaced by a legal pragmatism that is invoked to justify legal rules and 
decisions. The law is becoming more fragmented, more subjective, geared to 
expedience and less to morality, concerned more with immediate 
consequences and less with consistency and continuity.158 However, it also 
means that legal institutions become, at the same time, more accessible and 
more vulnerable., Because the focus is results-oriented and the forms or 
                                           
155 Nonet & Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, pp. 77, 78. 
156 Nonet & Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, pp. 5-8, 77, 78. 
157 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, pp. 26, 121. 
158 Berman, Law and Revolution, pp. 38, 39. 
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formalities are not regarded as worthy for their own sake, respect for 
procedural forms weakens, and the validity of legal rules becomes 
problematic. The downside is that this seems to mean that officials and 
citizens can more readily do as they please, because the law threatens to lose 
its capacity to restrain officials and command obedience.159 We are left with 
only one means to restrain and control: scientific objectivity. 
 
Legal professionals as social engineers  
Legal professional ideology will be thoroughly “disenchanted” as well. The 
appeal to “disinterestedness” and ethical perfectionism are likely to be 
unmasked as a means to hide their actual interests from the public.160  It seems 
more honest and straightforward to see them as providers on the market of 
legal services and, unmasked like this, the “guild-like” privileges that legal 
professionals are granted will be thought of as unjust: “Even in a non-
democratic polity, public opinion counts for something, and usually a lot. 
Privilege is resented, and may also have ominous political consequences.”161 
Posner argues that legal professional ideology will not survive modernity.  
This argument starts with the idea that the modern pluralistic world seems to 
leave us with the idea of “values,” which replaced the classical (and Judeo-
Christian idea) of “virtues.” 
Traditionally the idea of virtue is connected to a perfectionist idea of what 
it means to be a human being. The virtues are what make one into the most 
perfect human being one can be. Often this is connected to the premise that 
humans are not good and sociable by nature; they need to be perfected by 
reason, culture or religion. “We are born barbarians and only raise ourselves 
above the beast by culture,” Balthasar Gracián wrote, and this implies that 
humanity is a goal and not a fact. The virtues – politeness, fidelity, prudence, 
                                           
159 Nonet, & Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, pp. 74, 117. 
160 “When belief in a profession’s knowledge claims is not justified by the profession’s 
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temperance, courage, justice, generosity etc. – are the road towards true 
humanity; it is the achievement of the virtuous.162 
Virtues were, in many cultures and societies, thought to be relative to the 
status and role in the institutional hierarchies of the community.163 In the mind 
of Aristotle for instance, the virtues of the laborer were thought to be different 
from those of the housewife or the notables in society. Thus, the specific role 
and position of legal professionals also seem to prescribe a specific set of 
professional virtues, “prudence” and “justice” being important among them. 
We can think of the legal professional as rightfully proud when he or she lives 
up to the particular ethical standards that the profession sets for these role 
occupants. We might say that the traditional “status group” of legal 
professionals within society was to a large degree formed by means of these 
standards, and the concomitant professional pride – connected to the idea of 
noblesse oblige – was what made the professionals into a particular 
community. 
But in modern pluralistic societies, there is no collective focus on some 
binding common good, and this leaves the institutionally embedded 
hierarchies and status groups that were bound by the idea of noblesse oblige 
without any social function. The citizens can only see “choice” as the arbiter 
of the good, and thus the idea of subjective “values” replaces the idea of 
objective “virtues.”164 Importantly, this idea of subjective values bears on the 
idea that values are merely conventional, that they have their root in customs 
and conventions that are both contingent and arbitrary. Such customs and 
conventions are not more than human “social constructions” and at bottom 
merely a matter of taste or preferences. Moreover, this view works on the 
assumption that values generally have a purely instrumental, utilitarian 
purpose.165 But since values are incommensurable, we should cut to the chase 
                                           
162 Gracián, The Art of Worldly Wisdom, p. 36; cp. Compte-Sponville, A., Petit Traité des 
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163 Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, pp. 15, 29; MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 123. 
164 Himmelfarb, The Demoralization of Society, p. 10; cp. Kelman, M., A Guide to Critical 
Legal Studies, Harvard University Press Cambridge Mass. 1987, p. 4. 
165 Himmelfarb, The Demoralization of Society, p. 11; “Institutions are no longer believed 
to be god-given or natural. The idea that they have been socially constructed and are 
handled by human beings according to their needs and interests has become widely spread 
in contemporary society.” Zijderveld, The Institutional Imperative, p. 124. 
 222  
and directly focus on these instrumental utilitarian purposes. Moreover, we 
should translate values into concrete interests such that we can reach a 
compromise. 
In a fraternal ethics, “virtue is its own reward.”166 Those who put the good 
of the community ahead of their individual interests will be regarded as both 
trustworthy and virtuous. We can, however, with Max Weber, contrast such a 
fraternal ethics with the ethics of the free market. The ethos of the market is 
deeply antagonistic to such high-minded perfectionist aspirations because on 
the marketplace the “exchange value” of goods is what ultimately matters, 
and there is no place for something like intrinsic value. Such exchange value 
is thoroughly relative and contingent: What something is worth depends on 
the circumstances. Moreover, personal qualities or “character” is of no 
relevance at all in the free exchange of goods in the free market. There is no 
need to perfect oneself with regard to some ideal of humanity or community; 
the interaction can remain much more businesslike and impersonal than 
would be acceptable from a fraternal-ethical standpoint.  
Weber stated that the market is “an abomination to every system of 
fraternal ethics.”167 This seems to be a very significant observation for the 
community of legal professionals that traditionally at least aspire for a 
collegial brotherhood, and also legitimate their status and position with their 
contribution to the larger community that the law makes possible. 
Importantly, because there is no regard for personal qualities or for “honor,” 
markets are also antagonistic to the idea of “status groups.”168 Indeed, Steven 
Brint argues that the status and prestige of professionals in general is now 
thought of in “standard-of-living terms rather than of an occupation’s 
contribution to community well-being.”169 Occupational status and prestige 
are more loosely connected to the ideals of character, judgment and noblesse 
oblige. They are now more prosaically connected to income, and this is 
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obviously much more in congruence with the ethos of the market. The loyalty 
to fellows weakened as professionals and the knowledge they represent were 
more and more seen in terms of “exchange value” rather than in terms of 
moral ideals.170 
 
Pragmatic legal professionalism: law as the balancing of interests 
The focus should be turned away from the past and present forms of the law 
towards the future and the social reality that the law seeks to affect and 
regulate. The professional should become conscious of the particular effects 
legal practices bring about and should try to optimize these. To this effect 
professionals should be more knowledgeable of the social scientific expertise 
that can help them be more effective and efficient in their efforts. But, the 
social world is rather erratic and often proves recalcitrant to our technological 
manipulation. Purposive judgments are “inherently particularistic and 
unstable,” which means that the most effective means to any given end varies 
from situation to situation, and the purposes themselves are likely to be 
complex and shifting.171 
That socio-economic expertise cannot always in advance provide 
professionals with perfect guidance in lawmaking is partly explained by the 
fact that social scientific expertise is generally and necessarily based on 
abstractions from the micro levels and works with generalizations that only 
work relatively well on the macro-scale of social aggregates. Moreover, it 
always concerns knowledge based on historical data that are extrapolated into 
the future often with heavy use of ceteris paribus assumptions. The social 
world, however, is apt to surprise social scientists and prove their 
expectations wrong. This means that, however optimized the legal system is, 
in general, after it has been perfected by socio-legal and legal economic 
analysis and restructuring, it cannot always yield optimal solutions for the 
settlement of conflicts in particular cases. 
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The legal professional works on this micro level and discovers that he 
cannot always derive the most effective and efficient solution to a social 
conflict from the legal system. Because dogmatic formalism makes it 
impossible to learn from the particulars of conflicts, a new attitude is 
demanded of the legal professional.  A formalistic attitude will result in 
staying too close to the legal forms and formalities; it explicitly feeds on the 
desire of legal professionals to abstract away from all those (factual and 
purposive) aspects of legal conflicts on which they cannot claim any 
particular knowledge or expertise. “They want to do well what they do well, 
even if they could make a greater social contribution by performing a more 
important task, such as rendering social justice, less well.”172 
A formalistic focus on legal rights, rules and procedures tends to narrow 
the range of legally relevant facts such that there is a danger of losing contact 
with social reality all together. The danger is that formalism attenuates the 
sense of purpose and leads to a “disposition to rely on authority at the 
detriment of problem solving.”173 Indeed, in the words of Roberto Unger, “the 
language of formal equality is a language of rights as abstract opportunities to 
enjoy certain advantages rather than a language of the concrete and actual 
experience of social life.”174 But if we want particular problems to be 
effectively and efficiently solved we have no choice but to immerse more 
deeply in the “messy” particulars of a case. These particulars, however, are 
only available in a language of the concrete and actual experience of social 
life, and if we want to put ourselves at the service of the particular needs and 
desires of the citizenry, we should refocus from the formal to the actual, from 
the abstract to the particular, and constantly try to learn and improve the 
system by flexibly and creatively developing the law. This introduces 
“openness and flexibility into legal judgment.”175 
This amounts to a pragmatic attitude with regard to the law and its 
institutions and practices. We should not try to find objectivity and security in 
the formal legal system but in the facts of the case. But, according to Richard 
Posner, “systems of thought that emphasize hierarchy, tradition, authority, 
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and precedent disvalue the kind of critical enquiry that tests belief and 
advances knowledge, and as a result the truths that such systems accept are 
not robust.”176 We should not depend rigidly on the authority of the system 
but rigorously test our beliefs against reality in a more experimentalist and 
empiricist spirit.177  
“Freed from formalism and ritual, legal inquiry can be more systematic 
and more empirical. This evolution offers the promise of a more effective 
law.”178 The important conclusion we reach here is that if the law is 
completely instrumental to human needs and desires, it becomes difficult to 
distinguish legal analysis from policy analysis, on the one hand, and to 
distinguish legal decision-making from other forms of systematic decision- 
making from, for instance, managers or public administrators, on the other. 
To determine legal rights and wrongs, we will need to take account of the 
multiple ends both the law and legal decisions might serve. Moreover, it 
requires taking account of the situational constraints that make it hard to reach 
those purposes, and it requires resourcefulness in coming up with practical 
alternatives if necessary.179 The pragmatic professional should therefore 
always keep a stern eye on those multiple ends, situational constraints and 
practical alternatives; in short, it requires a focus on the facts in combination 
with the policy goals that the law is supposed to serve. 
 
Conflict settlement requires a new attitude. Generally, there always seems to 
be a strong tendency for all parties involved to see a legal conflict in moral or 
normative terms. The parties invoke certain values and principles, translated 
into legal norms, and these come to a head-on collision. The judge is called 
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upon to decide who was right and who was wrong. The fundamental problem, 
however, is that all this normative discourse in many cases does not allow for 
an effective and efficient solution or compromise. Values, principles and legal 
rules or norms are not apt for compromise because they are closely tied to the 
social or individual identity of the parties and therefore not “for sale.” 
Although they are thought of as subjective, they are generally not experienced 
as up for compromise because this is experienced as a personal defeat. This is 
why they often evoke strong emotions and are defended with rhetoric that 
does not refer to any objective facts or interests. But not only are values and 
norms experienced as communal property or tied to the authentic identity, 
very often they are also rather vague and abstract. These qualities make them 
even less suitable for a compromise.180 
In modern pluralist societies it is therefore a good strategy not to moralize 
or formalize the conflict but to “naturalize” it. This requires the translation or 
“reduction” of the conflict between values and norms – what can be called a 
“dissensus” – into a conflict of interests. Interests are more individual and 
concrete than values. The conflict of interest  
 
“[…] is a type of social interaction in which it seems that solutions are reached by 
discouraging the actors from getting morally involved in a major aspect of the 
interaction, the condition being that the interests are not diametrically opposed. The 
gain of one party is not wholly a loss to the other.”181  
 
Importantly, interests (in contrast to strong values or principles) can often 
rather easily be translated, and subsequently measured, in financial terms. In 
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legal conflicts, we can translate the whole dissensus in terms of the objective 
and measurable interests of the parties involved. When this is done, we can 
start to devise a compromise that takes the interests of all parties involved and 
of the community at large as all equally worthy and justified. In dealing with 
social strife and conflict in modern mass democracies, this is generally such 
an important and successful strategy that we might declare it to be a distinct 
political “art.” 
The “ethos of the market” is the panacea for the legal conflict that 
threatens to escalate into a frontal collision, leading to much more damage (in 
socio-economic terms) than necessary. According to Posner the relations 
between actors on the market are “deliciously superficial,” and this is what we 
should try to achieve in the settlement of social conflict as well. And indeed, 
“shared superficiality keeps people together by avoiding difficult, divisive, 
personal questions.”182 We should try to keep a cool head and proceed in a 
businesslike manner. Once we have translated the conflict from a dissensus 
into a conflict of interests we can think of the settlement in terms of weighing 
or balancing interests. 
Ideally, the parties involved do all the deliberation that is required with 
regard to their own individual interests, and the legal professionals should 
abstain from entering such deliberations. The professionals should take the 
outcome of such deliberations as given and just balance all the interests 
involved to reach a reasonable compromise.183 All they should do is facilitate 
and try to realise the wishes and desires of those involved as far as possible. 
We saw how modern man has come to think of almost everything as serving 
some extrinsic human purpose or interest.184 Thus, preferably, it is by means 
of the explication of purposes or interests that the judge should motivate his 
decision. 
But there is one important interest that the legal professional, and 
especially the judge should always take into account in his deliberations. 
There should always be consideration for the fact that there is a great public 
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or socio-economic interest in legal certainty, such that only strong counter 
veiling interests can justify compromising this interest. But, in the present 
pragmatic paradigm, this legal certainty is only one interest among many 
others. Thus, what the judge should do is “a matter of balancing rule of law 
virtues against equitable and discretionary case-specific considerations”185 
More specifically, according to Richard Posner the judge  
 
“[…] has to make a policy choice, and the choice is dictated by the results of 
surveying and evaluating the consequences of alternative choices: consequences for 
the rule of law, for the parties, for the economy, for public order, for civilization, for 
the future – in short for society.”186 
 
The judge or any other legal decision maker should be sensitive to the 
complexity of the modern world. In some cases the public interest in legal 
certainty that requires rigidly affirming and applying the pre-established legal 
rules and standards overrides more case specific interests of parties. In other 
cases the judge may find that formalism will seriously risk his legitimacy as a 
problem solver. The judge should then also be well aware of what the 
consequences of his or her decision will be for the parties in particular and for 
society in general. The knowledge and intuition of the judge that make it 
possible for the judge to foresee and evaluate the consequences of his rulings 
can be educated by immersion in the facts. Surely, we are not interested in the 
facts per se (like we are not interested in the Truth) but only in effective 
action. To be effective we will find the findings of the social sciences helpful. 
Posner: “The proper methods of inquiry are therefore those that facilitate 
pragmatic decision making – the methods of social science and common 
sense.”187 
Such an approach that is practical and instrumental is therefore future-
oriented or forward-looking; the pragmatist values continuity with the past 
only in so far as such continuity can help us cope with the problems of the 
present and of the future. If not, the pragmatist will not be so risk averse that 
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he will ignore the undesirable consequence for the sake of legal certainty or 
the vague rule of law values. Thus, this is a progressive or “can do” attitude. It 
advises the lawyer to take the widest possible view on legal conflicts, to 
“naturalize” it when possible and to keep an eye on both systemic and case 
specific consequences. But pragmatism is not bound to an absolute norm of 
consequentialism.188  If there is one thing that characterizes the pragmatist, 
apart from his disdain for arbitrary distinctions, it is that he or she does not 
deal in absolutes. This is also the most democratic way the legal professional 
can proceed, if one thinks of democracy as a means to consensus in a 
pluralistic and divided society. If we think of the essence of democracy 
consensus as the search for “reasonable balances,”189 we can see how legal 
professionals can contribute to a peaceful society where all interests are 
balanced with due care to the interests of others and the community at large. 
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5.   
Critical Commitments 
 
 
 
After exploring two specific aspects of the Enlightenment there is, however, 
still another aspect that might inspire modern legal professionals. Immanuel 
Kant is the first to have pointed to this specific aspect of modern 
consciousness, and it has often been repeated, in many different contexts, ever 
since. In his essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’ Kant argues that for the first time 
in history man becomes aware of the fact that he is a historical being and 
starts to see the social and institutional world around him as the product of a 
particular history. Moreover, now that he gains this distance from his 
particular day and age, modern man can critically investigate the social world 
that he has inherited and ask for the justification of the traditions, institutions 
and practices that he finds himself enmeshed in. Kant sees the age of 
Enlightenment not so much an achieved state, but as a process or project: “If 
it is asked whether we at present live in an enlightened age, the answer is: No, 
but we live in an age of enlightenment.” 1 Modernity can be characterized as 
an epoch in which the critical distance from our own social world is an 
inalienable and irrepressible possibility.  
With Dupré and Luban, I propose to think of this modern critical attitude 
as a defining characteristic of “modernism” in particular.2  Compare David 
Luban: “Modernist culture arises from an intensification of the Enlightenment 
demand that we cast of the claims of dogmatic authority; politically, it arises 
                                           
1 Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in: Political Writings, p. 
58; cp. Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in: Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader, pp. 
32- 50. 
2 Dupré, The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture. 
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from our drastic loss of confidence in the ability of public institutions to cast 
light on human affairs.”3 The critical distance does not only regard the 
traditional or “pre-modern” institutions and practices of our present world, it 
also critically scrutinizes and evaluates the modern naturalist and rationalist 
culture that has emerged.4 
 
Anti-naturalism 
In the last chapter, we investigated a way to “demoralize” or “depoliticize” 
both legal science and legal practice by “naturalizing” the legal order. This is 
a means to achieve more objectivity and effectiveness in both legal science 
and legal practices. The attitude propagated by Richard Posner would 
supposedly lead to a strengthened professionalism because jurists become 
relatively amoral experts in “social engineering” who can then dispense with 
all the vague and pretentious rhetoric referring to vocations and moral or 
political commitments. Moreover, Posner argued that this rhetoric merely 
functions to disguise the actual particular interests jurists have in protecting 
their privileges and monopolies. 
The discipline of economics “is a means for making morality, whatever 
morality one has, into a science,”5 and indeed, especially economics is 
thought to provide us with the chance of cutting short all moral and political 
confusion in legal practices and legal science. Re-conceptualizing the law as 
an instrument of effectively and efficiently realizing predetermined socio-
economic goals would exempt professionals from moral and political 
deliberation and, this is another important and related “selling point,” such 
professionals would have little or no use for the idea of authority.6 If we 
consider the rhetoric and symbolism of authority investigated in the second 
chapter, we understand why this was considered to be an important gain. As 
                                           
3 Luban, Legal Modernism, pp. 11, 51-92. 
4 “Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida […] engage in a rebellion against Kant, 
even as they exploit the intellectual resources that Kant gave them.” Megill, Prophets of 
Extremity, p. 4; cp. Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, pp. 18, 19. 
5 Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, p. 237. 
6“[…] today there are conservative judges and professors of a law and economics 
persuasion who have reconfigured the debate by adopting a highly deductive form of 
policy argument from the premise of wealth maximization and who have little or no use for 
authority.” Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, p. 111. 
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noted before, modern science and the paraphernalia of authority do not go 
well together.7 
Economic reasoning offers a way to successfully deal with pluralism in 
modern societies. This is because the economic system can be imagined as 
directed not to any substantive goal but to consistent and efficient dealing 
with the multitude of individual goals that are its inputs. Especially the free 
market and the associated ideas of a minimum of external interference (by the 
state, for instance) is supposed to be such an institution. The economic system 
takes the individual desires “as they come” and the economist as a social 
engineer has no goal other than the facilitation and protection of these 
individual purposes. “Of course, the market and the state do present restraints 
to the individuals entering, but those restraints are thought to come from 
natural facts (such as scarcities), from purposes of other individuals not from 
some substantive values embedded in the system as such.”8 The system is 
neutral in itself. Importantly, and this distinguishes this paradigm from the 
formalist perspective, the desire or “taste” for formal equality or for fairness 
is considered as on equal footing with all other desires that the system (and 
the social engineers who make use of it) can try to facilitate.9 
Thus efforts are made to instrumentalize political reasoning to the extent 
that intractable issues of ends are transformed into issues of means. Such an 
attitude even advises us to subject ourselves to one meta-norm that can, on an 
abstract level, unite us all in modern pluralist societies. The essence of this 
meta-norm is actually the general utilitarian insight that whatever we disagree 
on, we will always agree that we should maximize the means to the 
satisfaction of our desires. In abstract terms this norm is met if we collectively 
maximize our welfare.10 “We can meet the harsh facts of the flesh;” this is 
exactly the kind of objective that we looked for in our modern pluralist 
societies, because it offers us a possibility for objectivity in our decision 
                                           
7 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, pp. 82, 91. 
8 Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, pp. 15, 16. 
9 Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, pp. 431-436. 
10 “Policy arguers present it as different from pure politics, or ideology, because it appeals 
to universal rather than particular interests. Consequentialist argument appeals to a notion 
of “social welfare” or “efficiency” or “economic growth.” Kennedy, A Critique of 
Adjudication, pp. 109-111. 
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making.11 The objectivity becomes possible because the focus is now 
exclusively on the effects of legal practices and actions on the general well-
being of individuals in society. Such effects can, when we thoroughly 
naturalize the goals and means (by translating everything in terms of money), 
be empirically investigated. So here the claim to objectivity can be supported 
by the fact that positive or empirically-informed data are used. 
The second step will be to assess these effects in order to determine their 
socio-economic desirability. This implies a normative analysis of these effects 
and welfare economics (which can be loosely associated with utilitarianism) 
or efficiency analyses can provide us with a framework for doing so.12 Here 
the claim to objectivity can be supported by the fact that the calculations that 
are performed are formally sound. What economics therefore brings to 
normative evaluation is not only mathematical rigor.13 Efficiency claims are 
both universal and “factoid” and thus we seem to have been rescued from the 
confusions of the normative realm and can stay firmly within the realm of 
facts. An efficiency claim is universal because, whatever we disagree on, we 
will always agree that we should maximize the means to the satisfaction of 
our desires. Such a claim is factoid because of its pertinent claim to 
objectivity as it is both empirically based and technically highly sophisticated. 
Thus it helps us formulate objectively determinable questions, questions of 
fact or of logic, and avoid “subjective questions” about things like fairness 
and justice, which have no objectively determinable answers.14 
From this perspective, the law becomes essentially the use of power to 
reach whatever goals the political community sets itself. What goals these 
should be is merely a matter of contingent tastes and preferences. Many 
                                           
11 Snow, The Two Cultures, p. 77; Rorty, R., Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, 
Philosophical Papers Volume 1, Cambridge University Press Cambridge UK 1991, p. 22. 
12 “I am guided mainly by the kind of vague utilitarianism, or “soft core” classical 
liberalism, that one associates with John Stuart Mill.” Posner, The Problematics of Moral 
and Legal Theory, p. xii; Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, pp. 15-17. 
13 Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, p. 237. 
14 “An efficiency claim has many of the same mediating properties as a rights claim: it is a 
value judgment that is universal (who can be opposed to making everyone better off 
according to their own understanding of better-offness?) and factoid (efficiency arguments 
are nothing if not technical and they are supposedly empirically based).” Kennedy, A 
Critique of Adjudication, pp. 309, 111. 
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lawyers may experience the amoral professional attitude that Richard Posner 
advocates as rather “nihilist” with regard to the law as a discipline, or at least 
uncomfortably “realist.” Indeed, Posner literally states that “force” and 
nothing more poetic is the essence of law.15 Naturalized law becomes merely 
a matter of “incentives” and of calculation. Legal rules are thought of as 
something that the individual citizen considers to be, in Unger’s words, 
 
“[…] just one more factor to be taken into account in his calculus of efficiencies. 
This means that he will comply with the rules only to the extent that his own goals 
are better served by compliance then by disobedience. Consequently, the sanction 
becomes he crucial part of the rule. The fear of the sanction operates to internalize 
the requirements of social order in the individual’s reasoning about the most 
effective means to attain personal ends.”16 
 
Such an individual treats promises and contracts, for instance, not as creating 
special moral ties to one person, but as simply adding new factors into the 
calculation of overall utility. This seems to be at odds with our basic intuitions 
or experience because generally we feel that we should repay loans regardless 
of whether this maximizes our utility.17 This suggests that considerations of 
fairness are not just “one more factor to be taken into account in the calculus 
of efficiencies.” To the contrary, considerations of fairness should be basic 
and should justify a principled attitude and the abstention from individual 
calculative behavior. 
Obviously, making the law into an effective and efficient system requires 
expert knowledge about our complex modern societies, knowledge we can 
only acquire by scientific training and research. That is why Richard Posner 
argues that the responsibility for the extensive instrumental reasoning now 
required of government is handed over to technical experts – “instrumental 
reasoning is what technical expertise is good for.”18 Essentially, he argues for 
                                           
15 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, pp. 83, 120; “[…] modern conservative law and 
economics theorists […] from the liberal point of view […] combines nihilism about 
adjudication with formalism about economics.” Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, p. 
116. 
16 Unger, Law in modern society, p. 26. 
17 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, p. 23. 
18 Posner, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, p. 205. 
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legal professionals who operate as “experts armed with scientific method” 
that constitute a “neutral bar” that make it possible to dispense with the 
uncertainty that characterizes modern social, political and legal conflicts.19 
Notwithstanding the goods that are served by such an attitude, there are 
several reasons for a critical evaluation. For one thing, in this technological 
culture, we become highly dependent on abstract scientific knowledge, 
claimed by experts, and “people recognize, as they must, that in some areas of 
life they face decisions they are simply not competent to make, or nowhere 
near as competent as experts. This is because the complex, interwoven 
structures of society, the sheer amount of scientific and technical knowledge, 
and the secrecy on which some social actors cloak their actions.”20 However, 
discussion will often be short-circuited by means of technical and esoteric 
claims about all sorts of (unassailable) empirical “facts” and calculations. 
Thus people “alienate their powers” to such experts armed with the scientific 
method, and they hardly realize this. Moreover, often both the normative 
premises and the naturalist method of such a science are lost from sight. The 
result is a strengthening of the discourse such that it becomes hard to imagine 
alternative solutions. 
But this claim to neutrality and objectivity can be fundamentally critiqued. 
Duncan Kennedy argues that the re-conceptualization of law as a neutral and 
objective policy science will never succeed completely: “Policy is potentially 
a Trojan horse for ideology.”21 The grist of this argument is that “the dictates 
of efficiency would get you nowhere, for its dictates are utterly 
indeterminable and manipulable.” This is not merely because lawmakers will 
never succeed in retraining the discretion of those who apply the rules 
because of the referential vagueness of the legal terms that are used. It is also 
because the legal system as a whole is committed to contradictory norms and 
goals.22 The choice for welfare maximization is not without alternatives and 
therefore can hardly be seen as a politically neutral choice.23 On a 
                                           
19 Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent, p. 209. 
20 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 78. 
21 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, p. 111. 
22 Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, pp. 12, 13. 
23 “the commitment to value subjectivity is openly perilous […] utilitarians believe that we 
are morally bound to seek to maximize utility, not simply that we might desire to do so.” 
Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, p. 65. 
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fundamental level we might just as well have chosen to maximize “rights” or 
“fairness” and different parts of the legal system can easily be analyzed in 
such terms. In other words, if we choose to talk about legal and social 
problems and its solutions in policy terms, we, in one sense, refer to a social 
good like utility, but in another, to social goods like rights, or even fairness. 
Sometimes we opt for utility and, at other times, for rights or fairness as a 
solution to such social problems. 
Parallel to the discussions in the legal realm, the arguments for rights, 
fairness, justice, or for welfare regularly collide in the political arena. It is a 
political choice to make the maximization of welfare primary and make the 
desire for rights or fairness as just one of the factors to be taken into account 
in the calculation of welfare. We might just as well decide to make the 
fairness of the basic structure fundamental, as the structure within which the 
maximization of welfare can have its way.24 The initial choice for the basic 
norms and goals does make a crucial difference. This also means that the 
policy debates within legal science and practices will also, although they are 
often differently phrased, somehow relate to equivalent political debates.25 If 
the legal professionals are to choose between the suggested policies, there 
seems to be no objective way to decide the matter. Thus we see a blurring “of 
the line between adjudication and legislation.”26 
Balancing the different policies does not seem to be a promising way out 
of this dilemma. Of course, there are rational ways to balance policies and 
thereby we might save the objectivity of the decision-making process and 
refrain from outright political or moral reasoning. According to Kennedy, the 
problem is that balancing “is a weak form of rationality.” No doubt “the 
process seems obviously open to conscious and unconscious ideological 
manipulation, at least by comparison to the paradigm of deduction.” 
Moreover, Kennedy argues: 
 
                                           
24 Rawls, A Theory of Justice; Rawls, Political Liberalism; Kennedy, A Critique of 
Adjudication, p. 148. 
25 “[…] the social values – rights, morality, utility – to which policy argument appeals are 
the very stuff of the universalization projects of ideological intelligentsias.” Kennedy, A 
Critique of Adjudication, p. 148. 
26 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, p. 149; cp. Nonet & Selznick, Law & Society in 
Transition, pp. 7, 73-86. 
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“Indeed, the imagery of balancing, or gravitational force, has an ambiguous 
meaning. Contradicting its scientistic overtone is the suggestion that the question 
involved is one of degree, of line drawing. There is a general cultural understanding 
that the resolution of such questions cannot be “objective” or “necessary” or 
“independent of he observer or decision maker” in the way that resolution of 
conceptual or factual questions can be.”27  
 
But there may be another road to neutrality and objectivity. Instead of probing 
for objectivity in the rationality of the balancing process, one might point to 
the objectivity of the results or consequences. Such results can be experienced 
as objective by referring to the empirical grounding scientifically well-
researched policies can claim. In other words, the resolution of the problem of 
balancing can become an objective process by focusing on the factual 
consequences that the policy will establish. The fundamental problem here, 
though, is that policy arguments cannot reach the objectivity that one might 
wish for because, as Roberto Unger states, “purposive judgments are 
inherently particularistic and unstable: the most effective means to any end 
varies from situation to situation.”28 Exactly because they aim at factual 
results, policy arguments are always vulnerable on factual grounds. Referring 
to facts is thus both an important gain and a risky strategy. 29 The professional 
can never really and completely know in advance what the precise objective 
consequences of his or her policy decision will be. How is the professional to 
objectively balance the consequences of policy decisions in a social world 
that is inherently particularistic and unstable? 
Consequentialist reasoning is always dependent on contingent and 
unpredictable facts “out there” in the social world. This means that the 
reasoning itself is also to a certain degree unstable and indeterminate. 
Considering the fleeting nature of our social world – especially in a capitalist 
                                           
27 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, p. 148. 
28 Unger, Law in modern society, p. 86; Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, pp. 80, 82. 
29 “For some purposes it is useful to distinguish between technical norms and overtly moral 
norms, the stability of which rests on different footings. If an agency bans a food chemical, 
a manufacturer can attack the rule by proving that the chemical is actually harmless. […] It 
is important to recognize this dependence and to be aware that in this sense, then, there are 
no purely technical rules. Technical they may be, but never purely.” Friedman, The 
Republic of Choice, p. 71. 
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society where “all that is solid melts into air” – pragmatic legal reasoning 
might lead to a somewhat more objective regarding of the consequences of 
adjudication. The question is whether the price we pay for the security of 
rights and the overall demand of fairness of adjudication is worth it. 
Moreover, it is a slippery slope from regarding the law in purely instrumental 
terms to completely disregard the importance of individual rights and equal 
and fair treatment. This amounts to the risk of regression to a “repressive” or 
“authoritarian” legal order against which the morality of desire that we 
investigated has, in contrast to the morality of reason, no principled answer.30 
Instead, one might choose to defend the autonomy of the legal system, and 
legal determinacy in the sense of both universality and predictability.31 Such a 
system depends on social norms and (formal) moral ideas that are far less 
vulnerable on factual grounds than technical reasoning in referring to 
consequences.32 
In chapter four, we saw how the pragmatist takes the actual existing 
desires and preferences as fundamental and has no independent criterion by 
means of which these desires can be judged. Certainly, the idea of the rule of 
law and the basic liberal democratic structure of our political community are 
not independent criteria because they are seen just as much as instruments to 
contingent goals as any other arrangement would be. In other words, there are 
no non-instrumental limitations on the choice of means that makes it 
impossible to secure well-defined entitlements for individuals and groups.33 
Roberto Unger reaches the important conclusion that, on a fundamental level, 
instrumental rules are incompatible with a stable social and political order.34 
 
                                           
30 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 70; Nonet & Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, 
p. 117. 
31 Cp. Lucy, Understanding and Explaining Adjudication, pp. 364, 375. 
32 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 71. 
33 “The lack of content of reason in the vision of the Enlightenment can be seen first if we 
probe its basic system of valuation, utilitarianism. The principle of utility assesses the 
value of things extrinsically, by how they serve the ends of man. But where does this 
process stop? […] Utilitarian thought can step over the brink in which man becomes means 
and not end.” Taylor, Hegel, p. 402; cp. Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, pp. 32- 34. 
34 Unger, Law in modern society, p. 28. 
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Richard Posner realizes that there is an irreducible political element in legal 
practices and acknowledges the political and cultural nature of authority, in 
general, and legal authority, in particular.35 This means that it is both utopian 
and undesirable to completely and thoroughly “demoralize” or “naturalize” 
legal practices and legal science. However, the influence of “naturalization” 
in our modern societies is large. We can describe the modern world, which I 
described as an “immanent culture,” as to a large extent the product of the 
success of the modern natural sciences and the technology that it makes 
possible. There are, however, reasons to be worried and critical about the 
modern tendency to naturalize all human conduct and interaction and seeing 
every (social) problem as basically requiring a technological solution. 
First there is the anthropology that this perspective seems to imply. As 
Posner reminds us: “Aristotle’s physics treats objects in nature much as if 
they were animate beings, with goals; today we are more likely to treat 
animate beings on the model of objects.”36 Largely inspired by a longing for 
objectivity, persons and all their actions are seen as part of the order of nature 
– and not as part of some independent Kantian realm of freedom. Thus socio-
economic positivism opts for “the logic of nature.” This means that we also 
tend to see human actions as causally determined and, indeed, the naturalist or 
positivist social sciences tend to conceive of individual choice as essentially 
an illusion.37 The consequence is that human beings are seen as at the mercy 
of, on the one hand, their sense impressions and desires and, on the other, 
their calculations of how to maximize utility. Subsequently, in the free 
exchanges of the market, an “invisible hand” coordinates the “mechanics” of 
the interaction such that the utility of the whole is maximized.  
In today’s modern world, there is consensus on the fact that this is 
wholesome and that such maximizing behavior in free markets should even be 
stimulated. However, many become worried if we start to think of our public 
                                           
35 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, p. 26; Posner, The Problematics of Moral and 
Legal Theory, pp. 205, 211, 215; cp. Aubert, The Hidden Society, pp. 59, 60. 
36 Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, pp. 387, 167; cp. Taylor, C., ‘Self-interpreting 
animals,’ in: Human Agency and Language, Philosophical Papers I Cambridge University 
Press Cambridge 1985. 
37 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 45; cp. Bourdieu, In Other Words, p. 14. 
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realm in such terms.38 An “invasion of economic man”39 into the public 
sphere is alarming for those who feel that we should develop our social 
human nature in a constant effort to create human communities. Moreover, 
there is the fundamental experience that the logic of nature structurally closes 
off non-objectivist ways of looking at human beings and their interaction. 
Many feel attracted to a critical diagnosis of modern culture exactly because 
they feel the need to resist this positivist anthropology: “The preservation of 
our sense of human specialness has in many quarters come to reside on a 
resistance to closure.”40 This also inspires in many a resistance to the 
positivist presuppositions of socio-economic policy science. 
We can refer to, what might be called, a “Hegelian” strand of critique 
here. His critique of modern positivist culture, and especially the 
naturalization of the public realm, is still an important point of departure for 
many today. Ideally, Hegel’s state is a moral community that “encloses” or 
“contains” civil society, which both limits and gives direction to action in the 
private realm. However, modern civil society – the private socio-economic 
realm – threatens to “overflow” onto the state – the public realm – such that 
the public morality that binds the community now threatens to “melt into air.” 
The businesslike and instrumental interactions of actors trying to maximize 
utility seem to be structurally at cross-purposes with the ideal of a (moral or 
political) community. If human tastes, preferences or desires are central, the 
state or the community that it encompasses is reduced to a tool in the 
satisfaction of these preferences. The state cannot, under such circumstances, 
be a greater whole that offers individual members an experience of shared 
identity and belonging. The problem is, in the end, that a state so atomized 
and instrumental might lose the allegiance of its members because it is 
incapable of communal moral action and threatens to become a “plaything” of 
the arbitrary will of factions and contingent majorities that rule in a modern 
democracy.41 
                                           
38 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 59; cp. Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in: 
Rabinow (ed.) The Foucault Reader, p. 36. 
39 Cp. Baert, P., Social Theory in the Twentieth Century, New York University Press New 
York 1998, pp. 153-171. 
40 Dale, In Pursuit of a Scientific Culture, p. 10; cp. Derrida, J. Margins of Philosophy, 
Chicago University Press Chicago Ill. 1982, pp. 11, 20. 
41 Taylor, Hegel, p. 451. 
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We can complement this with Habermas’ famous critique of the modern 
liberal state. The problem with the consequentialist position is that the 
legitimacy of the decisions that it informs depends on the promise of results 
actually being fulfilled. “Customer satisfaction” is a fragile foundation for 
legitimacy especially in modern complex, globalizing economies. In 
Legitimation Crisis, Jürgen Habermas argues that the claim that politics (and 
the law) is a purely instrumental affair has the effect of grounding the stability 
and legitimacy of the state in its capacity to maintain a high level of 
technological success. Under such circumstances the legitimacy of the state 
and its institutions is made relative largely to the delivery of a sustained rate 
of economic growth or welfare. The danger is that, especially in times of 
economic recession, such states will be unable to call on any wider or more 
traditional loyalties on the part of their citizens, with the result that 
(economic) difficulties will readily and dangerously mutate into a crisis of 
legitimacy. 42 This amounts to a plea for an independent (critical) morality 
that dominates in the public sphere, which remains autonomous with regard to 
the socio-economic or “private” realm.43 
To not see the public realm as an independent moral realm, to consider it 
to be just as much at the mercy of instrumental economic action, would thus 
structurally endanger the stability of the state, or, indeed, any tradition or 
institution that gather individuals in some larger whole or community. To 
repeat, under such circumstances no stable social order can exist because 
there are no non-instrumental limitations on the choice of means. “Anything 
might in principle be used as a means to any end,”44 which means that there is 
no possibility for a public morality (whether formal or substantive) that 
structures and limits the desires that dominate in civil society and the political 
community at large.  
Thus, when people interact in the public sphere, the instrumentalist and 
naturalizing attitude can be considered harmful because it leaves the actors 
with no choice but to see their interactions as a head-on collision of particular 
                                           
42 Habermas, J., Legitimation Crisis, Beacon Press Boston 1975; cp. Skinner, Q., (ed.) The 
Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences, Cambridge University Press Cambridge 
UK 1985, p. 8. 
43 Cp. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action; Walzer, Spheres of Justice. 
44 Unger, Law in modern society, p. 28; Taylor, Hegel, p. 402; cp. Kolb, The Critique of 
Pure Modernity, pp. 32- 34 
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and individual interests. Such negotiations will generally concern means and 
not ends, because ends are reckoned to be subjectively “given” and 
incommensurable. The only rational action for actors in such a modern civil 
society is to make sure that they get as much as possible out of the necessary 
compromise and maximize their utility. Moreover, these compromises are 
actually to a large degree predetermined by social forces that are beyond the 
control of the individual. Thomas Nagel argues that we end up with a 
description of human agency and human sociability that seems rather 
“debilitating.” When we view human action from an objective or external 
standpoint, some of its most important features seem to completely vanish:  
 
“Actions seem no longer assignable to individual agents as sources, but become 
instead components of the flux of events in the world of which the agent is a part. 
The easiest way to produce this effect is to think of the possibility that all actions 
are causally determined, but it is not the only way. The essential source of the 
problem is a view of persons and their actions as part of the order of nature, causally 
determined or not. That conception, if pressed, leads to the feeling that we are not 
agents at all, that we are helpless and not responsible for what we do. Against this 
judgment the inner view of the agent rebels. The question is whether it can stand up 
to the debilitating effects of a naturalistic view.”45 
 
Indeed, the emerging picture of both human action and agency does not seem 
very elevating: “The romantic spontaneity and courage are gone, the vision is 
materialistic and depressing,” as William James writes. We end up with a 
“materialistic universe, in which only the tough-minded find themselves 
congenially at home.”46  
 
There is another point of departure for critical investigation of the naturalistic 
culture that we are presently discussing. This critical perspective starts with 
Friedrich Nietzsche. In The Genealogy of Morals, he describes modern man 
                                           
45 Nagel, T., The View from Nowhere, Oxford University Press Oxford 1986, p. 110. 
46 James, Pragmatism, p. 15; Nor is the picture of politics very attractive. Benjamin Barber 
argues that we end up with the idea of politics as “zoo-keeping.” Barber, Strong 
Democracy, p. 3. 
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as a “calculable being,”47 and, to be sure, the moment social scientists or 
economists have identified the causal determinants of human economic 
behavior and thus discovered the laws governing free markets, this knowledge 
can be used to manipulate human behavior. However good the intentions and 
important the ends that it serves, socio-economic technology or policy science 
remains basically the manipulation of human beings.48 It does so by 
influencing the actual desires or the will of human beings and the calculations 
individuals make in trying to maximize their utility. When we conceive of 
human beings as calculating we also make them calculable. Here we are 
introduced to the conception of human beings as being “tricked” and 
“manipulated” into conformity and predictability.49 
In Nietzsche’s vision of the calculable, and thereby, “normalized” 
individual, we can also see the germ of Michel Foucault’s critical diagnosis of 
modern society. By means of the modern human sciences, which Foucault 
analyzes by means of the concept of “knowledge/power,” the whole of human 
society and human behavior threatens to come under human control. In 
Foucault’s view, “modernity” is fundamentally about creating political order, 
which is largely achieved by means of rationality or rationalization and by 
                                           
47 “The task of breeding an animal entitled to make promises involves, as we have already 
seen, the preparatory task of rendering man up to t certain point regular, uniform, equal 
among equals, calculable. The tremendous achievement which I referred to in Daybreak as 
“the custom character of morals,” that labour man accomplished upon himself over a vast 
period of time, receives its meaning and justification here – even despite the brutality, 
tyranny, and stupidity associated with the process. With the help of custom and the social 
straight-jacket, man was, in fact, made calculable.” Nietzsche, F., Genealogy of Morals, in: 
Rundell, J., & Mennell, S., Classical Readings in Culture and Civilization, Routledge 
London New York 1998, p. 96.  
48 “Politics is less a matter of preaching or indoctrination than technical management and 
manipulation, form rather than content; once more, it is as though the machine runs itself, 
without needing to take a detour through the conscious mind.” Eagleton, Ideology, p. 38; 
“People like to feel that they are masters of destiny. And they may be right: possibly 
people in the West are masters of destiny and can exercise choices to an extent past 
generations would have found unthinkable. It may be equally true that they are 
manipulated and preformed to an extent they never imagine.” Friedman, The Republic of 
Choice, pp. 130, 131. 
49 “the commitment to value subjectivity is openly perilous […] utilitarians believe that we 
are morally bound to seek to maximize utility, not simply that we might desire to do so.” 
Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, p. 65. 
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“discipline and punishment.”50 At the endpoint of the logic of naturalism and 
modern technology, we see the nightmare vision of Foucault’s “carceral 
society.” In Discipline and Punish, he depicts modern life as dominated by all 
sorts of experts, described as “the judges of normality.” These experts are 
everywhere, and “each individual may find himself, his subjects […] his 
body, his gestures, his behavior, his aptitudes, his achievements exposed and 
subjected to the pitiless discipline, the minute, detailed prescriptions of these 
invisible powers.” This is because, according to Foucault, the moderns “have 
gradually shifted from the rule of law to an obsession with the creation of a 
normal and healthy population.”51 
Importantly, this vision can only be the product of a critical and external 
perspective on modern society. The naturalistic point of view that dominates 
modern society is in itself incapable of analyzing the kind of culture that it 
produces because the meanings and norms (or “ideology”) that culture 
consists of are beyond the reach of naturalist analysis. From the naturalistic 
perspective we can hardly see, let alone evaluate or criticize, the cultural and 
political implications of this perspective. The naturalist perspective has 
important consequences or effects that remain concealed. Compare Bourdieu: 
 
“The brutally materialist reduction which described values as collectively 
misrecognized, and so recognized interests, and which points out, with Max Weber, 
that the official rule determines practice only when there is more to be gained by 
obeying the rule than by disobeying it, always has a salutary effect of 
demystification. But it must not lead one to forget that the official definition of 
reality is part of the full definition of social reality and that this imaginary 
anthropology has very real effects.”52 
 
We lose sight of the subtle kinds of manipulation and domination particularly 
in the symbolic (or ideological) realm because of the relentless reduction to 
“the material.”53 The real and damaging effect is that, when we see ourselves 
                                           
50 Cp. Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in: Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader, p. 36. 
51 Foucault, M., Discipline and Punish, Vintage Books New York 1979, p. 304; cp. 
Friedman, The Republic of Choice, pp. 44, 45; Skinner (ed.), The Return of Grand Theory 
in the Human Sciences, p. 73. 
52 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, p. 108.  
53 Cp. Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power. 
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(and each other) in such terms, the theory might “realize itself” or make itself 
true. This seems to be a fundamental Nietzschean insight that has great 
critical potential for modern immanent societies. 
This is probably part of the reason why Weber was, compared to Hegel 
and Marx, rather pessimistic about the future of modern society. Hegel 
envisioned an “end of history” in which the substantive values embodied by 
the liberal state would provide a counterpoint and limit the otherwise 
uncontrollable forces that always threaten to dissolve civil society. Famously, 
Marx envisioned the dialectical overcoming of modern civil society in a 
communistic utopia. Weber, by contrast, argued that there is no hope for 
redemption or for overcoming the dialectic. He believed that objectivism and 
reductionism of the naturalist project leads to utilitarianism and materialism, 
tout court.54 
 
Anti-naturalist formalism 
Making the law relative to contingent and volatile desires in modern 
democracy thus structurally endangers the ideal of fairness and even the ideal 
of the rule of law itself. To be fair and stable, legal rules, procedures and 
principles should be primary and independent criteria by means of which we 
evaluate our individual needs and desires. The utilitarian argues from a 
morality of desire and thus reverses the argument. Our actual desires provide 
the criterion by means of which we should evaluate the law. Thus needs and 
desires are primary, and a “taste for fairness” is merely one of the wishes that 
we should maximize among others. Moreover, whether we should do this is 
merely an empirical matter. That is to say, it depends on the contingent fact of 
whether people actually have this wish or taste. If not, fairness will not enter 
the calculations that we make to maximize well-being in society.55 
“We will usually assume that individuals comprehend fully how various 
situations affect their well-being and that there is no basis for anyone to 
question their conception of what is good for them,”56 state Kaplow and 
Shavell in Fairness versus Welfare. This is exactly where formalism and 
naturalism part ways. The formalist would say that what people actually want 
                                           
54 Eliaeson, Max Weber’s Methodologies, p. 11. 
55 Cp. Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, pp. 21, 23. 
56 Ibidem. 
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is not to be the criterion by means of which legal institutions and decisions 
should be judged. To repeat, the formalist states that we need an independent, 
prior idea of legality, justice, or reasonableness or fairness to judge those 
desires and wishes. 
The naturalist consequentialist position can accommodate desires for 
intangibles such as aesthetic fulfilment, altruism, or other valuables aside 
from their individual’s levels of material comfort. Also, a taste for fairness 
can be included. However, such an approach explicitly excludes the use of 
notions of fairness for reasons that are not reducible to concerns about an 
individual’s well-being. According to Kaplow and Shavell we should exclude 
notions of fairness as prior and “independent evaluative principles – 
principles employed to assess the desirability of legal rules without regard to 
the effects of the rules on individual’s well-being.”57 The problem with such a 
prior and independent notion is that we cannot establish such evaluative 
principles empirically. Only a moral philosopher will be able to establish such 
principles with the help of reason, in whatever conception of it. 
When we consider the problem of racism or discrimination on the basis of 
racial or ethnic characteristics, we see the shortcomings of this perspective. In 
an effort to avoid vague metaphysical notions (like “natural rights”), 
naturalists have the tendency to reduce race discrimination to a matter of 
individual tastes. Compare the economist Milton Friedman:  
 
“It is hard to see that discrimination can have any meaning other than a “taste” of 
others that one does not share. We do not regard it as “discrimination – or at least 
not in the same invidious sense – if an individual is willing to pay a higher price to 
listen to one singer than to another, although we do if he is willing to pay a higher 
price to have services rendered to him by a person of one color than by a person of 
another. The difference between the two cases is that in the one case we share the 
taste as in the other we do not. […] But in a society of free discussion the 
appropriate recourse is for me to seek to persuade them that their tastes are bad and 
that they should change their views and their behavior, not to use coercive power to 
enforce my tastes and my attitudes on others.”58 
 
                                           
57 Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, pp. 5, 6. 
58 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, pp. 108-111. 
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Indeed, to use coercive power, the power of the state, to enforce particular 
tastes and attitudes on others is an infraction of their individual freedom. But 
in the naturalist and utilitarian scheme, there is no guarantee that the tastes in 
a society might not change such that the overall utility will be maximized by 
systematically discriminating against some group within society. The 
formalist argues that discriminating preferences and tastes should not count a 
priori. Such tastes are illegitimate even when vast majorities in society 
express them. “A taste for prejudice is not the same as other tastes because it 
restricts and injures individuals – it prevents them from exercising their own 
options.”59 Thus we need an independent criterion to determine which tastes 
do count and which tastes should be excluded as at least unreasonable and 
generally unjust or unfair. 
This point is urgent, indeed, because citizens in modern society generally 
seem to have developed a “taste” for fairness. Lawrence Friedman identifies 
“a general expectation of justice,” which is largely comprised of the “the 
citizen’s expectation of fair treatment, everywhere and in every circumstance. 
[…] It is a pervasive expectation of fairness.”60 The point is that if we take 
this expectation of fairness seriously, the principles of justice that correspond 
to this expectation of fair treatment should be thought of as primary and not 
as merely one desire among others that should be incorporated into the 
calculation of overall utility. But this reasoning has serious consequences for 
the legal system in modern states. Especially state officials and legal 
professionals have to be sensitive to this demand because they are generally 
accountable to the citizens.61 
We cannot see legal rules, rights, principles or procedures as merely 
another alternative policy. To be primary implies that fairness should not be 
thought of as a policy at all, it should not be thought of in instrumental terms: 
It is a goal or a good in itself. Such expectations of fairness as an ultimate 
good do not bear instrumental reasoning. Moreover, fairness is now an 
independent criterion by means of which we evaluate ends, needs and desires. 
What people actually desire does not equal what they should (reasonably) 
                                           
59 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 86; “there may be unfair preferences which should 
not count.” Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, pp. 26. 
60 Friedman, Total Justice, p. 43. 
61 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, p. 173. 
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desire, considering the fact that they should respect certain demands of 
fairness, especially when they are representing the state as government or 
legal officials.  
The postulate of the priority of rationality or reason comes to the fore. We 
saw how it is reasonable to postulate a principled distinction between is and 
ought. The ‘ought’ should be established with the help of reasonable criteria – 
provided by fairness – and not be dependent on any contingent preferences or 
needs.62 This also implies that certain things must be done and others avoided 
whether one likes or desires the consequences or not. People now demand that 
they  
 
“[…] live under rules or procedures that command their allegiance because of a 
rightness or goodness irreducible to individual desires or to a calculus of means and 
ends. […] Without such constraints on the scope of instrumental judgments, it 
would be impossible for individuals to treat one another as moral persons – as 
beings capable of distinguishing what they want from what they ought to do. Only 
by asking the latter question can they overthrow the tyranny of blind desire and 
establish a social order that will not be at the mercy of private interest.”63 
 
If the law becomes thoroughly relative to contingent preferences and needs, it 
will lose both its autonomy and thereby legitimacy in modern society.64 
According to Roberto Unger, “The security of rights, so important to the ideal 
of legality, would fall hostage to context-specific calculations of effect” and 
would thereby become fundamentally unstable. 65 This also informs the 
contrast between non-consequentialism and consequentialism, and we may 
                                           
62 Cp. Weinberg, The Idea of Private Law. 
63 Unger, Law in modern society, pp. 28, 29; “Any political society based on some strong 
notion of the common good will of itself by this very fact endorse the lives of some people 
(those who support its notion of the common good) over other (those who seek other forms 
of good) and thereby deny equal recognition. Something like this […] is the fundamental 
premise of a liberalism of neutrality, which has many supporters today.” Taylor, The Ethics 
of Authenticity, p. 51; Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 70. 
64 Nonet & Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, p. 77. 
65 Unger, Law in modern society, pp. 27-29, 86; Unger, The Critical Legal Studies 
Movement, p. 3. 
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conclude that we have reached a fundamentally anti-naturalist and anti-
consequentialist position.66 
 
The lure of the universal 
Both objectivity and fairness of legal institutions and practices can be realized 
in a modern legal system when we rationalize the law into a coherent system 
of written or codified legal rules, prefixed fair procedures, individual rights 
and legal principles. In addition, a list of basic (constitutional) rights and 
principles can be established which is acceptable (because fair and 
reasonable) to all.67 Importantly, when the law is viewed in non-instrumental 
or non-consequentialist terms a rationalized legal system can assume a 
“factoid” appearance and it is specifically the air of universality of the system 
that facilitates the subjection of the citizens to the law. This is important, 
because needs and desires are not just subjective and individual but 
“individuating, that is, we are distinguished from one another by our wants 
while reason and perceptions are universal.”68 Universal reason provides us 
with the road to transcend subjectivity and particular needs and desires. 
Rationalization of the law is first a project of “universalization.” This 
universalization is, in turn, a “strategy of legitimation” because it assumes an 
air of objectivity and thereby the air of necessity.  
Universalization is a very successful strategy of legitimation indeed, and 
no modern legal order can afford to neglect it. But we should also remain 
critical of this strategy because the experience of necessity that it induces 
easily lures us into the belief that both reason and rational law are somehow 
grounded in a transcendental realm. Thus we subject ourselves to something 
that we have ourselves created and subsequently placed in some metaphysical 
realm; again we effectively and completely “alienate our powers.”69 In the 
                                           
66 “If we must express this intelligibility in terms of purpose, the only thing to be said is 
that the purpose of private law is to be private law.” Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, p. 
5; Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, pp. 45- 47. 
67 Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law’ p. 845; Parsons, ‘The Professions and Social Structure’, 
in: Essays in Sociological Theory, pp. 41, 42; Friedman, Total Justice, pp. 80-93. 
68 Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, p. 64; “Means and form, as objects of reason, 
are public; ends and substance, as concerns of desire, are private.” Unger, Knowledge and 
Politics, p. 45. 
69 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, pp. 18-20. 
 251 
present section, I critically investigate how the law attains such an air of 
objectivity and necessity, which implies a critical exploration of the “alliance” 
between reason and modern law. 
Consider the following example. When, in his famous essay The Two 
Cultures, C.P. Snow speaks of the Second Law of Thermodynamics he 
becomes rather lyrical and describes this law “as one of the greatest depth and 
generality: it has its own sombre beauty: like all the major scientific laws, it 
evokes reverence.”70 Interestingly, the factual generality of this natural law 
seems to inspire in Snow both an aesthetic and a normative experience, as 
Snow thinks of universal law as both beautiful and reverence evoking. To put 
it in slightly stronger terms, the generality of the law seems to force him into 
submission. Snow experiences reverence, and he feels compelled to follow its 
prescriptions. 
The point of this example is that the experience of the law’s generality 
seems to subtly blend with the experience of the law’s validity. Factual 
generality or universality almost indiscriminately and imperceptibly 
transforms into legitimacy, and thus we seem to gently slide from facts to 
norms through the experience of universality. We easily slide from norms to 
facts as well: universal norms or rules attain a “factoid” quality.71 We might 
say that generality “mediates” between the factual and the normative. 
Universally valid legal rules can acquire a factoid appearance, although legal 
rules are man-made and obviously reside on the normative side of the 
fact/norm divide. 72 This explains why “universalization” is “the universal 
strategy of legitimation.” Marx and Engels mention this, for instance, in The 
German Ideology when they state that in giving some ideas and interests an 
                                           
70 Snow, The Two Cultures, p. 72; cp. Gould, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Magister’s 
Pox, p. 89. 
71 “Rules do not depend on ongoing dialogue to gain a dimension or content; they can be 
understood since they refer to “objects” in the exterior domain of reason, even by someone 
who shares no sense of community with his fellows.” Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal 
Studies, p. 62. 
72 Interestingly the natural law idea, the set of principles that combine description with 
prescription and apply universally to all societies, was a major source of the concept of 
explanatory scientific laws. Cp. Unger, Law in modern society, p. 75; cp. Bourdieu, The 
Logic of Practice, pp. 37-40; Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law’ pp. 820, 841-850. 
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ideal form, “it will give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them 
as the only rational, universally valid ones.”73  
In the terminology of Pierre Bourdieu: “The reference to the rule’s 
universality represents increased symbolic power associated with its being put 
into form, into an official formula, into a general rule.”74 The mere generality 
and universality (and thereby the experience of objectivity and necessity) 
contributes to the “symbolic effectiveness” of the law. We can influence 
individual behavior, not by the use of direct force or by means of instilling 
fear or by manipulating their calculations of utility, but by means of 
“legitimation.” People will comply or conform voluntarily: no physical force 
or manipulation of the will is necessary. 75 They might even often prize and 
obey such a system of rules, although their self-interest or personal advantage 
would be served with disobedience.76 Bourdieu argues that modern law has 
become a “nomological science,” which employs the means of formalization 
and systematization by means of which legal norms are removed from the 
contingency and particularity of concrete cases. This formalization gives such 
norms the “seal of universality,” which is “the quintessential carrier of 
symbolic effectiveness” and thus “introduces into social relations a clarity and 
predictability.”77 The “rationalization” of the law is a route to objectivity and 
thereby a means to both “depoliticize” and “demoralize” both legal science 
and practices.78 
For the Rule of Law to be “symbolically effective,” it is more important 
that there is a universal rule applied without exceptions than what this rule is 
exactly. This is so because the (symbolic) effectiveness of the Rule of Law 
depends on its being experienced as universally valid.79 However, the 
                                           
73 Marx & Engels, The German Ideology, in: Collins, Four Sociological Traditions, p. 16. 
74 Bourdieu, Practical Reason, p. 143. 
75 Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, pp. 119, 125, 126; Bourdieu, Practical 
Reason, pp. 142, 143; Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, pp. 59, 236-240; Friedman, 
Total Justice, p. 30. 
76 Unger, Law in modern society, p. 28. 
77 Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law’, pp. 845, 846; Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 
p. 131. 
78 Lenski, Power and Privilege, p. 53. 
79 Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 88; Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law’, p. 825, 841-
850. 
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symbolic effectiveness of the law paradoxically depends on denying symbolic 
effectiveness.80 What should remain concealed is that this effect is aimed at 
compelling obedience. To repeat, written or codified legal rules, prefixed 
procedures, rights and even principles have a “factoid” appearance only when 
they are viewed in non-instrumental terms. The Rule of Law is effective only 
when it denies that it tries to effectuate anything. We can illustrate this by 
quoting Friedrich von Hayek in his Road to Serfdom on legal rules:  
 
“In fact, that we do not know their concrete effect, that we do not know what 
particular ends these rules will further, or which particular people they will assist, 
that they are merely given the form most likely to on the whole to benefit all the 
people affected by them, is the most important criterion of formal rules. […] This 
consideration is in fact the rationale of the great liberal principle of the Rule of 
Law.”81 
 
The respect that is paid by the subjects to universal rule, of course, makes 
regularity and “regularization” possible and, to be sure, it is always easy and 
comfortable to act in accordance with clear and distinct rules. But when we 
connect the strategy of universalization with the regularization of human 
agency, we could also re-describe the universalization effect as the 
“normalization effect.” And indeed, according to Bourdieu the law, an 
intrinsically powerful discourse (although it is of course coupled with the 
physical means to impose compliance on others) can be seen as a 
“quintessential instrument of normalization.”82  
But there is more to this phenomenon. There is deep “intuition” that 
acting in accordance with general and universal rules is the essence of ethical 
action. This might be explained by the experience that acting in accordance 
with such rules seems to imply a subordination of the individual to the group, 
                                           
80 “Highly censured and euphemized discourses and practices which are produced by 
reference to ‘pure’, purely ‘internal’ ends are always predisposed to perform additional, 
external functions. They do so the more effectively the less aware they are of doing so.” 
Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production, p. 96. 
81 Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 83 (emphasis added). 
82 Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law’, pp. 845, 846; cp. Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in: 
Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader, p. 36; Brint, In an Age of Experts, p. 114. 
 254  
which defines the passage to an ethical order.83 That explains why the 
submission to a fair and coherent system of universal rules is generally 
legitimated by ethical or moral philosophical (and not pragmatic or 
consequentialist) arguments. (Indeed, in Chapter Three we saw that these are 
particularly Kantian arguments.) The experience is that in the end the legal 
system must be founded in some morality because “ultimately all norms are 
moral norms,” however formal and procedural they may be in a modern 
liberal-democratic order.84 
 
Anti-formalism 
Talcott Parsons argued that professionals should generally commit to the 
“universal perspective” because only then can they show respect for our 
individual freedom.85 Indeed, it is exactly this promise to technical neutrality 
that makes it attractive for the professional to “identify with reason,” and we 
can now see that they are the kind of agents that have, in the words of Pierre 
Bourdieu, a vested (and concealed) interest in the universal.86 However, the 
strong push towards the universal in the law has its drawbacks. One drawback 
is that the legal order and practices become highly abstract and technical: 
abstract formulas and procedures become the essence of modern law. 
Moreover, if we combine the demand for objectivity (or universality) with the 
“pervasive expectation of justice” in modern societies, we see both a growing 
abstractness and a proliferation of legal rights and entitlements. This 
effectively means more law and a massive “legalization” of society. Friedman 
even speaks of a “due process revolution.”87  
It will also mean that this law will be of a more abstract and technical 
nature, administrated by experts, armed with primarily analytical skills and 
formal legal knowledge, trying to be non-judgmental and aiming for 
objectivity and neutrality. Such formalist legal experts will merely follow the 
                                           
83 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, pp. 108, 109; Bourdieu, Practical Reason, pp. 142, 
143; cp. Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, pp. 63-69. 
84 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 71. 
85 Parsons, ‘The Professions and Social Structure’, in: Essays in Sociological Theory, pp. 
41, 42; According to Unger in liberal society the legal order is “a bureaucracy in the 
wings” devoted to the “universal.” Unger, Law in modern society, pp. 167, 184. 
86 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, p. 33. 
87 Friedman, Total Justice, pp. 80-93. 
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procedures and apply the legal rules in concrete cases. There is something 
“bureaucratic” about this attitude. In his book Critical Legal Studies, Mark 
Kelman gives us a succinct (and rather dismissive) description of such a 
professional: 
 
“Rules are associated with distancing and role-playing; the bureaucrat need not 
listen as long as he gives you your due. No one can demand anything but 
compliance with preset rules; conversation and explanation of one’s conduct are 
avoided, for it is easily ascertained whether one has done all he must. One can shut 
up those who ask for explanation of one’s conduct – a rule’s a rule, don’t complain 
to me. Ongoing attempts to reassert the coherence and comprehensiveness of 
doctrine, of whatever web of legal rules purports to describe social relations, are 
part of a collective effort to pacify and reassure us that we have been delivered from 
existential tragedy.”88 
 
The claim to objectivity and neutrality can be criticized on a very fundamental 
level. There is no overall way to escape ideology or politics: a legal system, 
however formally consistent and complete, cannot always and completely 
determine the outcome of a concrete legal conflict. There are many reasons 
why the law is often indeterminate in ways that cannot be overcome and 
therefore why the promise of objectivity and neutrality cannot be completely 
fulfilled.89 
In Explaining and Understanding Adjudication, William Lucy confronts 
“orthodox” legal theorists who feel that legal practices can, to a large extent, 
be predictable and impersonal with “heretics” who do not. Orthodox writers 
like H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin defend impersonality and 
predictability.90 By contrast, heretics argue that the formalist pretensions are 
nothing more than a strategy to mask the substantial elbowroom or 
“discretion” that legal professionals have in legal judgment. The experience 
of objectivity and neutrality is not in general the product of intrinsic qualities 
(e.g. the meaning) of the legal rules. Often, it is determined by something 
external to the system of the law, something that stays implicit but might 
easily be manipulated. If so, discretion can be used to force a (generally 
                                           
88 Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, p. 63. 
89 Cp. Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, pp. 120-122. 
90 Lucy, Understanding and Explaining Adjudication, pp. 2. 
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conservative and liberal) political morality on society, in general, and on the 
parties involved, in particular.91  
To show how the legal system is indeterminate, critics might start by 
identifying internal contradictions within the system.92 Surely, if the system is 
not consistent or coherent, it cannot completely determine the outcome of 
concrete legal conflicts, even in easy cases where the right legal answer seems 
to be readily and unambiguously deducible from the legal system. If internal 
contradictions can be found, the conclusion would even be that “there are, in 
short, no easy cases.”93  
Another criticism might be based on the fact that formalism is pertinently 
non-consequentialist. Non-consequentialism seems to make the rules, rights 
and principles of the legal system structurally indeterminate because “they are 
under-inclusive as to purpose or they are over-inclusive as to purpose, or 
both.”94 For instance, drawing the line for majority at eighteen, which gives 
someone the right to vote, is under-inclusive because it will always exclude 
young people who are perfectly able to make up their mind and use their right 
to vote responsibly. At the same time, there are also always people who are 
above the age who are immature and incapable of such responsible choice. 
There will always be cases in which one feels compelled to identify the 
particular purpose of a particular rule. When the purpose is found, it will be 
useful in evaluating the particular consequences of the application of the rule 
in a particular concrete case, and this will destabilize the system. As stated 
several times before, purposive judgments are inherently particularistic and 
unstable.95 We can always ask why in one case one decides to follow the rules 
and ignore purposes and consequences, while in another we ignore the rule 
and reason according to purposes and consequences instead.  
                                           
91 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, pp. 47, 133-156; Kelman, A Guide to Critical 
Legal Studies, p. 4. 
92 “According to the Critics, every legal doctrine is coupled with a counter doctrine that 
underwrites its exceptions.” Luban, Legal Modernism,  p. 41; cp. Kennedy, D., ‘Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication’, Harvard Law Review vol. 89 1976, pp. 1685-
1778; Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, pp. 127, 128. 
93 Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, p. 4. 
94 Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, p. 40. 
95 Unger, Law in modern society, p. 86; cp. Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, pp. 80, 82. 
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A third focal point is the problem that universal and abstract rules, rights 
and principles often (or always) require extensive interpretation when they 
are to be applied in particular and concrete circumstances. If reasoning in a 
policy style, we might solve this problem by trying to match the identified 
purposes with the measurable or foreseeable consequences of the application 
of a rule and thus reach a certain measure of predictability and impersonality. 
The formalist, however, has only analytical or hermeneutical means at his or 
her disposal and has to determine what a rule means in the particular 
circumstances of the particular case.96 A first problem is that legal systems 
generally have gaps. Sometimes there just is no general legal rule available in 
the particular case before us. We might try to fill the gap by extrapolating 
from other rules that govern comparable cases, by reasoning analogically, that 
is. 
We might also, more generally, try to reason from systematic or “formal” 
qualities of the law to fill the gap. However, it is clear that it will not be easy 
to ascertain determinacy and objectivity in such “hard cases.” The opposite 
also happens: Rules overlap in the sense that they govern the same cases but 
prescribe different or even contradictory solutions.97 What rule should we 
apply in such a case? In addition, interpretation will be made difficult by the 
fact that legal wordings will often be ambiguous and vague. Even the explicit 
legal rules, which might be thought of as being far more determinate in their 
meaning than particular rights, can take on an indeterminate meaning in 
particular circumstances. This seriously weakens a claim to predictability and 
impersonality.  
                                           
96 “A formal view of justice requires, to be coherent, a belief in the possibility of 
formalistic legal reasoning. And it is likely to be most persuasive in the realm of exchanges 
among individuals rather than in that of government distribution, which involves choices 
among conflicting interests. Thus, it tends to distinguish sharply between an impersonal 
justice of reciprocity that dispenses with distributive premises and an arbitrary justice of 
distribution whose pronouncements are never impartial and general enough to have 
anything more than the appearance of law. […] Language is no longer credited with the 
fixity of categories and the transparent representation of the world that would make 
formalism plausible in legal reasoning or in ideas about justice.” Unger, Law in modern 
society, pp. 195, 196. 
97 Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, pp. 45- 51. 
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Ludwig Wittgenstein famously raised a last problem I will briefly discuss: 
No rule can determine the scope of its own application. For instance, when we 
want to apply the rule “close the door at five,” we have to make several 
judgments about whether certain particulars in our empirical reality 
correspond to concepts such as “close,” “door” and “five.” The basis for these 
judgments cannot be found by means of logical or hermeneutical analysis of 
the meaning of these concepts. The moment we agree that language is not a 
“mirror of nature,” there are also no “objective” tests of correspondence 
outside the text or the rule. There are solutions to this problem because in 
practice we generally succeed in applying the rule without any problem. Such 
solutions typically refer to “practical reason” or to the consensus of an 
“interpretative community” – Wittgenstein himself spoke of “life forms.”98 
Duncan Kennedy replies that  
 
“[…] whatever method one chooses as a solution to the “application problem,” that 
is, however one grounds rule application, that method will not have the 
demonstrable or objective quality that would be necessary to guarantee that the 
decision maker’s ideology played no role in the choice of an outcome.”99 
 
A last promising road to objectivity and impersonality would be finding a 
“background normative theory” that helps us to interpret rules, rights and 
principles in concrete circumstances. Preferably the theory is found to be 
already informing the major part of the system in the sense of being 
“immanent” or “inherent” or “intrinsic” to the legal system.100 This theory 
would help fill the gaps and decide on the right way to repair overlaps and 
contradictions. Modern legal theory often works from the idea of an intrinsic 
order expressible by a background normative theory and it also seems to be 
presupposed by professionals in the legal practices. The legal order is treated 
as a repository of some particular set of intelligible purposes, policies, 
                                           
98 “this was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every 
course of action can be made out to accord with the rule.” Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical 
Investigations, Blackwell Oxford 1967 § 201; cp. Kripke, S.A., Wittgenstein on Rules and 
Private Language, An Elementary Exposition, Harvard University Press Cambridge Mass. 
1982. 
99 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, pp. 31, 32, 161; Lucy, Understanding and 
Explaining Adjudication, p. 143; Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, pp. 4, 46-7. 
100 Cp. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, pp. 16, 18-21. 
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principles or some particular morality that can be distinguished from ordinary 
daily legislative politics.101  
Both the consequentialist theorist and the formalist theorists work from 
background normative theories that give coherence to the legal corpus and 
practice and which strengthens its universal appeal and applicability. 
Preferably, such a background theory fits the existing corpus of legal 
materials like a glove. It might therefore even be conceived of as “grounding” 
the legal system and practice.102 The coincidence of the coherent theory and – 
an at least extended part of – the body of law gives a clue to the fact that this 
is, in fact, the “essence” or moral “foundation” of the system. Thus Richard 
Posner claimed, in his earlier work, that American private law is basically 
informed by economic efficiency. By contrast, Ronald Dworkin argued that 
the idea of law as integrity helps us to work the law pure.103 
According to Roberto Unger what is looked for is a “canonical form of 
social life and personality” that supports (or at least should support) the legal 
system and practices. An entire field of law, or the law as a whole, will be 
presented as the expression of this underlying form such that, in cases of 
confusion and incoherence, we can find a solution in the theoretical 
construction of this canonical form. Surely, the forms and theories that are 
referred to in modern legal science have become more and more abstract, but, 
according to Unger, the basic idea has remained the same since pre-modern 
times. There is a “meta-scheme” or “basic structure” that informs, or at least 
should inform, legal theory and practice. Modern legal science has only 
changed the demands for the rationality (or at least reasonableness) of this 
                                           
101 Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, p. 9; Unger, What Should Legal Analysis 
Become?, p. 72. 
102 “Fit or coherence rule making is distinct from the method of developing the definitions 
of the words in legal rules as an aid to applying them, because it is focused on the choice 
among different rules proposed to resolve a gap, conflict, or ambiguity in the legal system 
seen as an ensemble of rules. It is clear that the judge is making law. He does so by treating 
the whole corpus of rules (rather than the words of a particular rule) as the product of an 
implicit rational plan, and asks which of the rules proposed best furthers that plan. If he 
employs the method of coherence, he will make law that is no influenced by his personal 
convictions, simply because he will follow the rational plan even when he doesn’t agree 
with it.” Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, p. 33. 
103 Cp. Posner, R.A., Economic Analysis of the Law, Little Brown Boston 1972; Dworkin, 
Law’s Empire, p. 400. 
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basic structure. What has motivated this search “has been the fear that, carried 
to the extreme, the critique of objectivism and formalism would leave nothing 
standing.”104 
However, as Unger extensively argues, “no extended body of law in fact 
coincides with such a meta-scheme, just as no broad range of historical 
experience coincides with the implications of one of the evolutionary views 
that claim to provide a science of history.” This implies that “it is always 
possible to find in actual legal materials radically inconsistent clues about the 
range of application of each of the models and indeed about the identity of the 
models themselves.”105 We can generalize this argument by referring to 
discussions in modern philosophy. Philosophy in both its modern and pre-
modern guises has also been largely pre-occupied with finding a universal and 
eternal “canonical form” or “grid” that underlies the empirical, or at least 
visible, reality that we scientifically investigate. Critical philosophers as 
diverse as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Foucault and Derrida seriously 
undermined this search. In the end there is no such canonical grid of concepts 
in terms of which the world is best divided and classified. 
 
Anti-philosophy 
We should, in the words of Pierre Bourdieu, be very wary of “the dangerous 
old conceptual fiction” of the “pure” disinterested and neutral subject that by 
means of “pure reason” can reach intrinsic qualities or “forms” or 
“knowledge in itself.” There is no pure subject that has access to things in 
themselves or to their intrinsic aesthetic, moral or metaphysical qualities. A 
“view from nowhere” or a “God’s eye point of view” that might see the world 
as it is in itself is unavailable to us mortals.106 This Nietzschean insight 
implies that “there is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective “knowing,” 
and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, 
different eyes, we use to observe one thing, the more complete will our 
                                           
104 Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, pp. 12-14; “The thesis of radical 
indeterminacy turns out to be in large part a metaphor for something else: a planned 
campaign of social and cultural criticism.”Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, p. 
121. 
105 Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, pp. 9-11; Unger, What Should Legal 
Analysis Become?, pp. 109-111. 
106 Cp. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, p. 50; Nagel, The View from Nowhere. 
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“concept” of this thing, of our “objectivity,” be.”107 Importantly, this idea 
structurally undermines and completely discredits the orthodox idea that the 
task of moral, political or legal philosophy is to analyze the formal language 
of morals, or the formal vocabulary of politics. The same goes for the analysis 
of the concept or the intrinsic formal structure of law or legal reason. Michel 
Foucault also extensively argued that there is simply no such changeless grid 
of concepts and meanings awaiting neutral analysis.108 
In addition to the fact that we will never reach absolutely true knowledge, 
thinkers like Nietzsche and Heidegger argue that the schematic, abstract and 
“reductionist” concepts of modern technological rationality radically rob 
reality of its multiplicity and human experience of its richness and vitality. 
They argue that reality far transcends the abstract formal structure that we 
impose on it.109 We should be aware of this reductionism and never be 
tempted to mistake the conceptual apparatus for the real world that it pretends 
to describe. Moreover, the use of “objective knowledge” is never innocent. 
Concepts are not timeless entities with fixed meanings, but should instead be 
thought of as, according to Heidegger, “weapons,” or, according to 
Wittgenstein, as “tools.” The understanding of such concepts is always, in 
part, a matter of seeing who is wielding them and for what purposes: “The 
whole structure of human knowledge, then, is in doubt, except as the indicator 
of a purely human reality, as the reflection of purely human 
preoccupations.”110 
The moment we accept that there is no perspective-free knowing, we 
easily make the next step that consists in denying “disinterested knowing.” 
Michel Foucault here uses the concept of “knowledge/power” to emphasize 
the strong entanglement of claims to objective knowledge with a claim to 
power or legitimate domination.111 Bourdieu makes similar claims when he 
says that “all objectivist knowledge contains a claim to legitimate 
domination.”112 The implication of the attack upon formalism by the critical 
                                           
107 Bourdieu, Distinction, p. 28. 
108 Skinner (ed.) The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences, p. 13. 
109 Megill, Prophets of Extremity, pp. 49, 94. 
110 Ibidem; Unger, Law in modern society, pp. 195, 196. 
111 Cp. Foucault, ‘Truth and Power’ in: Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader, pp. 51-75; 
cp. Nonet & Selznick, Law & Society in Transition, pp. 4, 5. 
112 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, p. 28. 
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legal scholars is that there is no hope that the law can be grounded in some 
explicitly “legal reason” – the canonical “vocabulary” or “language of law” – 
that can be successfully and credibly contrasted to ideology, moral or political 
philosophy or to legislative politics. According to Unger the point of the 
critical project “is to demonstrate that a doctrinal practice that puts its hope in 
the contrast of legal reasoning to ideology, philosophy, and political prophecy 
ends up as a collection of makeshift apologies.”113  
 
The critique of legal formalism 
Rationalization projects in the law will amount to rationalization of the 
established political order, which is thereby effectively “consecrated.” Indeed, 
Roberto Unger calls this project a “daring but implausible sanctification of the 
actual.”114 Especially those who cannot identify with the established legal 
order – and with the political order that it sanctifies – and who feel that severe 
injustices are perpetuated and legitimated by the formalist and objectivist 
legal discourse try to expose the internal contradictions and indeterminacy of 
the system to “desecrate” “demystify” or “disenchant” mainstream legal 
practice and science. Kennedy justifies such a “de-legitimation” by referring 
to a deep longing for “justice and liveliness,” while the mainstream legal 
practice and science seems rather “dead and wrong.” Legal formalism makes 
it seem as if the present social world and the legal institutions and practices 
that support and sustain it are necessary and permanent. The belief system 
that gives the impression of being necessary and objective falsely makes it 
appear as if the longing for justice and liveliness is out of reach, “falsely 
making it appear that they can’t be realized or that they have already been 
realized.” We should try to “break open” these belief structures by showing 
them to be inconsistent with our longing for liveliness and justice. Kennedy: 
 
                                           
113 Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, pp. 9-11. 
114 Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, pp. 7, 9; Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law’, p. 
838; Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, p. 132; “the doctrines of protected constitutional 
interests and of legitimate ends of state action were the chief devices for defining the 
intrinsic legal-institutional structure of the scheme of ordered liberty. They could not be 
made coherent in form and precise in implication without freezing into place, in a way that 
the real politics of the republic would never tolerate, a particular set of deals between the 
national government and organized groups.” 
 263 
“There is a false appearance of determinacy in the social world, and the false 
determinacy hides a true determination by human agency. In other words, people 
“alienate their powers. […] Also that belief systems constitute all of us in ways 
inconsistent with our own longings and impede our efforts to realize justice and 
liveliness by. […] I suggest that it would be in some sense “better” to determine our 
fates without alienating our powers.”115 
 
According to Unger we should therefore lend 
 
“[…] extraordinary interest to the exceptions, the countervailing solutions, the 
residues and “mistakes,” of every legal order. For these are signs of past or rejected 
solutions, of subordinated interests, and roads not taken, form material which the 
hidden, contrary side of the divided consciousness can work. Each of them becomes 
a possible starting point for more general alternatives in law. Thus, from having 
been intellectual and political embarrassments, they become intellectual and 
political opportunities.”116  
 
But Kennedy argues that we should not just investigate the “contradictions,” 
the “mistakes” and the “embarrassments” of the existing legal order, rather we 
should continually create or provoke them. We are explicitly urged not to 
submit to the existing “necessities” in our social world and produce 
“representations” or “artefacts” that will be inconsistent with the ruling 
ideologies such that they are robbed of their self-evidence and “naturalness.” 
This is not an easy task because these ideologies deeply determine the 
perspective on things.117 The strategy is to continually demonstrate how also 
the law, like human knowledge generally, is a purely human reality, “the 
reflection of purely human preoccupations.”118 This implies that all claims to 
objectivity and necessity can be exposed as false.119 Hopefully, this makes 
room for alternative visions of social and political order. 
However, if one makes everything relative to human preoccupations and 
denounces claims to objectivity the charge of all destructive “relativism” or 
                                           
115 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, pp. 15-19. 
116 Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, pp. 127, 128. 
117 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, pp. 15-19. 
118 Megill, Prophets of Extremity, p. 49. 
119 Cp. Unger, R.M., False Necessity, Anti-necessitarian social theory in the service of 
radical democracy, Verso New York 2004 (1987). 
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even devastating “nihilism” is close at hand. And what about Kennedy’s 
representation of the law and legal practices? Is there no claim to inherent 
objectivity in his representation? Kennedy acknowledges that it is not a 
representation in the sense of a “mirror image” of legal practice and science 
“out there in reality.” The object of his investigation “transcends” or 
“surpasses” the representation “and indeed my understanding, no matter what 
method(s) I adopt, and that’s fine with me,” he says.120 But we nevertheless 
should not take the critique of epistemology to mean that (now that objectivity 
in any absolute sense can never be guaranteed by some “right method”) we 
should fall into the other extreme of absolute relativity. Kennedy thinks that 
the critique of epistemology has not totally invalidated the methods he uses to 
come to an understanding of his subject and to falsify the arguments and 
theories that he reached with them. After the devastating critique of modern 
epistemology, however, objectivity might just receive a new, less pretentious, 
meaning. 
Objectivity now merely refers to “a representation that hasn’t been 
falsified (yet)” without denying that personal moral and political 
commitments influence the representation. On the other hand, the subject 
under investigation does not allow for just any representation. However much 
we would like something to be otherwise – because it would better match or 
serve his political and moral purposes – “reality” cannot bend in just any 
direction.121 Kennedy opts for “eclecticism,” which can be characterized as 
using whatever methods available – whether they be “hard” methods aspiring 
for causal explanation or “soft” methods trying for interpretative 
understanding  – to communicate a representation of the subject that the 
audience can recognize as “true” and that the audience experiences as a 
“revelation.” In Kennedy’s words: 
 
“To my mind, none of this “undermines objectivity,” The object quality of that 
which is represented is accessible to the audience, and the representation works only 
to the extent that the audience can hold it and the object and the author in mind 
together without experiencing the representation as falsified or inert. The artifact is 
effective not because it is constructed following procedures that guarantee that it 
represents objectively) though much of it may be empirical or deductive), but 
                                           
120 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, p. 15. 
121 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, pp. 14-18. 
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because by juxtaposing the representation, the author, and the object the audience 
experiences a “revelation.”122 
 
Formal law and the abstract society 
The critical, rather irreverent attitude with regard to the formalist and 
objectivist “push towards the universal” is partly motivated by the kind of 
society that it produces, sustains and legitimates. One can argue that the 
formalist abstract nature of the legal system “mirrors” the formalist abstract 
nature of modern society. Anton Zijderveld relates modern abstract rationality 
and knowledge to the gradual evolution and growth of the modern “abstract 
society,” which is a true “society of strangers.” Zijderveld: “Abstract 
formalism has generally superseded all substance – a process that is 
remarkably in tune with the main tenets of abstract society. […] a world in 
which substance is superseded by forms, material by methods, essence by 
functions, reality by abstractions.”123 
A critical perspective on such an “abstract society” can be brought in line 
with the cultural criticism that I broadly classified as “Hegelian.” We 
identified an inner tension between the formal rationality of formalism and 
the instrumental rationality of consequentialist reasoning, but this Hegelian 
critique is generally directed at modern society as the product of both formal 
and instrumental rationality – the rationality of the autonomous individual 
who has to make choices as to what goals he should pursue, how he should 
(efficiently) pursue them and what boundaries free citizens of a liberal 
democracy should set themselves in order not to impede or even damage other 
free citizens in their pursuits. Indeed, law in modern liberal democratic states 
centers on individuals rather than on groups. More specifically, it focuses on 
what individuals have in common: the capacity for rationality, which makes it 
possible to appreciate the necessity to limit individual freedom by means of a 
universal legal system.  
Subsequently, law “tends toward generality, toward universalism – that is, 
toward a single general code of conduct applicable to everyone within the 
jurisdiction.”124 Such a formal universal law leaves room for a variety of 
                                           
122 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, p. 18. 
123 Zijderveld, The Abstract Society, pp. 83, 85. 
124 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 152; cp. Luban, Lawyers and Justice, p. 30. 
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individual goals and values, and it is blind with regard to communal, cultural 
or ethnic differences, because it treats individuals as both equal and abstract 
subjects. This can be regarded as an important achievement of modern law 
because everybody can expect equal treatment; the law does not differentiate 
between classes, cultures or ethnic groups, which is a characteristic of pre-
modern law. Thus universal formal law is one factor in “the trend to suppress 
ethnicity and multiplicity in the nineteenth century.”125 But the net effect, 
however paradoxically, is that legal uniformity plays a role in processes of 
“homogenization”:  
 
“The development of modern society, partly under the impulse of general will 
theory and Enlightenment modes of thought generally, has been towards a greater 
and greater homogenization, and in this respect a modern Western society would be 
unrecognizable to a man of early nineteenth century Europe.”126 
 
Analytical or formal rationality “distinguishes” and “separates” but does not 
seem able to see “things in their inner dialectical connections,” according to 
Hegel. The analytical dissection of everything into separate individual objects 
leads to a “splintered” vision of reality that is beyond repair. Politically, the 
problem is that the ensuing vision of men as radically separated, rational 
individuals pursuing their chosen individual goals and goods loses sight of the 
community in which the necessary contexts for these pursuits are set. Hegel 
criticizes the Enlightenment project because the rationality it employs (also 
for rationalizing the legal and political order) is fatally partial and inadequate. 
We saw how this rationality desacralizes all sorts of (traditional) authorities 
and communal meanings and values. The important gain is that the individual 
can emancipate from the firm grip of arbitrary authority, but there is also a 
serious loss. We end up with a view of the world as merely “a heap of objects, 
open to human scrutiny and use.”127 Moreover, the shared meaningful and 
                                           
125 Ibidem. 
126 Taylor, Hegel, p. 407, 408; Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 36; cp. Foucault, 
‘Discipline and Punish’, in: Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader, pp. 206-213. 
127 Taylor, Hegel, p. 401; “More and more aspects of human life can come to be treated as 
commodities to be exchanged. Nothing is sacred. […] The freedom of civil society because 
of its separation from all content, threatened to trivialize life and convert all human 
relations into commodity relations.” Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 33. 
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normative order is “desecrated” or “disenchanted” because meanings and 
values are not “objective” in any formal rationalist or empirical sense. They 
are merely “subjective” and therefore arbitrary projections upon a reality that 
is “in itself” devoid of meaning and purpose. Nothing is sacred and 
everything is up for “commodification.” “More and more aspects of human 
life can come to be treated as commodities to be exchanged.”128 
Moreover, there are no substantial values, thick institutions or traditions 
that will limit both the pursuit for individual welfare and the proliferation of 
needs and desires. “The emptiness of his freedom and his domination by 
impulse are among the roots of the endless drive for more which infects every 
aspect of civil society.” 129 The notion of individual freedom is thought of in a 
negative way as freedom from external impediments and constraints in the 
satisfaction of an individual’s particular needs and desires.130 Enlightenment 
(analytical or instrumental) rationality cannot autonomously limit such needs 
and desires, and therefore all the limits (such as those set by the legal order) 
will be experienced as external constraints. The demands of the political or 
legal order on the individual will also be experienced as impediments and 
constraints from the outside, arbitrarily limiting freedom.131 
Although individuals, if they are reasonable, will see such restrictions and 
limitations on their will as necessary, they will be experienced as a necessary 
evil because freedom is the fundamental good. Instead, Hegel argues that 
some set of limits the community imposes on the freedom of individual 
citizens should be experienced as meaningful and valuable; they should be 
internalized as such. But the limits the liberal state and modern society set are 
formal and abstract; the modern individual does not really identify with such 
                                           
128 “There are no substantial values or traditions limiting what kinds or quantities can be 
taken up into civil society’s circulation of needs and goods.” Kolb, The Critique of Pure 
Modernity, pp. 32, 33. 
129 Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, pp. 35, 36. 
130 Cp. Berlin, I., Liberty, Oxford University Press Oxford UK 2002, pp. 30-54. 
131 “Kant’s political theory […] takes its start from men as individuals seeking particular 
goals, and the demands of morality and rationality, i.e., universality, only enter as 
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outside. Rationality is not immanent, but an external, formal universality which demands 
only that the negative freedom of all individuals be made compatible.” Taylor, Hegel, p. 
372. 
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an “empty” social order. The price of the formalization and universalization 
of the law is that modern law does not provide particular meanings and 
concrete norms that the members of the community can recognize themselves 
in. It is next to impossible to identify with abstract legal rules, procedures and 
principles, just like it is hard to experience the abstract “society of strangers” 
as a community in which one feels congenially at home.  
This can be related to the fact that, according to Max Weber, in modern 
society authority takes on a “rational-legal” character. Authority in modern 
society is rather formal, bureaucratic, legalistic, rational and instrumental. 
Charismatic and traditional authority are, by contrast, of a more personal 
nature because they rest, respectively, on the particular charisma of a leader 
and on the prestige of traditions and institutions in the community that is 
reflected in those who represent them. Legal-rational authority rejects such 
personalism characteristic of the “pre-modern” types of authority and is, 
instead, committed to rules and to legal processes. Fundamentally, it rests on 
universal norms.132   
However, compared to charismatic or traditional authority, such a 
rational-legal order is, on the whole, rather “cold and bloodless.” We should 
even doubt whether we can speak of authority at all. If we think of authority 
as a kind of bonding, as a link of legitimacy between someone who 
commands and someone who obeys, it is difficult to see here what the 
bonding actually consists of. The law has become “a form, a framework: a 
mode of organizing and translating authority, which has become diffuse and 
multiplex.” 133 The authority of modern law is thus highly abstract and 
cerebral and does not have a firm grip on the emotions and the imagination of 
the community members. 
Moreover, the Enlightened “radical notion of freedom being purely formal 
and therefore vacuous cannot generate a new substantive vision of the 
polity.”134 A civil society that is regulated with the help of such formal 
universal rules, will lead to a form of social and political interaction that is 
“unusually bare.” Modern societies tend to what Anton Zijderveld calls “thin 
                                           
132 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 212; Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition, p. 143. 
133Friedman, The Republic of Choice, pp. 112, 113. 
134 Taylor, Hegel, p. 372; “The separation of universal form from particular has become 
institutionalized.” Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 15. 
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institutions.” Institutions are rationalized according to their functions and 
“ruled and measured by efficiency and effectiveness. Therefore, it is easy to 
view them as “alienating strictures that impose abstract forms of authority and 
control.”135 The structures of mutual recognition and interaction in modern 
society are relatively empty and formal, and there is no pressure to care for, or 
identify with, the community as a meaningful and normative whole because 
the modern state that comprises it is also a formal or functional entity devoid 
of any substantive content. Modern citizens acknowledge the formal 
requirements of procedural and formal justice in their dealings with one 
another but the larger community becomes an empty abstraction. 136 
Karl Popper refers to such modern societies as “abstract societies,” 
societies in which men practically never meet face-to-face. “Such a fictitious 
society might be called a completely abstract or depersonalized society,”137 
and as such, the group can hardly be thought of as a community or even a 
concrete and real group of men in any meaning of the word. Surely we can 
relate this to Tocqueville’s characterization of modern society as a “society of 
strangers.”138 An abstract society like this is increasingly unable to provide 
the citizens with a communal identity. A society in which face-to-face 
relations are to a large extent replaced by relations between official 
functionaries and anonymous role occupants, who practice these roles without 
really identifying with them, cannot provide man with a concrete experience 
of meaning in his life. Modern man, according to Zijderveld “is largely 
estranged from nature and endures his society as something that confronts 
him. He does not “live society,” he faces it.” Moreover, he does not identify 
with the roles that he plays in this society largely because “the modern 
individual is compelled to change roles like the jackets of his wardrobe. A 
distance grows between himself and his roles, and he experiences a loss of 
meaning and reality, which usually is called “alienation.”139  
The characteristic mode of organization in which such a functionary 
works is bureaucracy, an organizational form that requires a “bureaucratic 
                                           
135 Zijderveld, The Institutional Imperative, pp. 15, 17. 
136 Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, pp. 25, 26, 28. 
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attitude.” This attitude consists, in a strictly functional and detached way, of 
dealing with things, and these rational agents can only be effective and 
efficient if they are “sufficiently dehumanized to be factors in the realization 
of calculable goals.” This attitude starts to structurally influence modern 
consciousness, and human beings generally become agents of formal 
knowledge who Weber characterizes as “experts with spirit and sensualists 
without heart.”140 Indeed, Zijderveld sees them as specialized experts and 
dehumanized functionaries: “A man without qualities consists of qualities 
without man.”141 
 
Authenticity, homogenization and alienation 
In modern society there is room for the exploration and realization of 
“authenticity,” of finding one’s own particular lifestyle and values. The quest 
for freedom and authenticity was a major motivating force in “desecrating” 
and dismantling the traditional social institutions and stratifications to the 
point that uniform castes, estates or classes, which gave pre-modern society a 
strict structure, are almost absent. The increase in differentiation and the 
leveling of class differences seems, however, not to lead to more diversity and 
pluralism but to a powerful “homogenization.” The abstract order in which all 
are free and equal seems to result in a society of a rather uniform and 
predominantly consumptive style of life.142 On might argue that exactly 
because such an abstract and leveled society does not have the power to form 
the identity of the individual coherently, modern media and commerce 
becomes more powerful because it is now the sole producer and supplier of 
standards, norms and values that the individual as a free consumer can pick 
and choose from. These meanings and norms were formerly part of a social 
structure but they now, in the words of Zijderveld, “float around like pieces of 
common property.” We might add that the mass media tries for the greatest 
satisfaction of the desires of the greatest number, and therefore they generally 
focus on the average consumer and supply the images and products that have 
the greatest appeal. The result: “cultural uniformity has spread out over 
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industrial society which is coached and stimulated by the mass media that 
offer fads, fashions, norms and values by the thousands merely for the sake of 
consumption.”143 
The matching attitude or mentality also invades the public sphere – the 
political sphere where shared meanings, norms and institutions constitute our 
collective identity, and which deserves a special loyalty and respect. While 
Hegel’s state was a moral community enfolding and limiting modern civil 
society, now the larger community is thought to be invaded by calculating 
individuals maximizing their utility. Moreover, the borders of the modern 
nation states are not natural borders for the modern mass media and capitalist 
commerce either, and this means that “a worldwide civil society may be the 
direction in which we are headed today.”144 Given the trends towards 
formalization, homogenization and commodification that this seems to 
promise, we might be less than enthusiastic about these trends in 
“globalization.”145 
The formal and neutral state (and formal and neutral legal procedures and 
laws) matches the modern society of strangers. The political and legal theory 
backing it officially banishes myth and fable and aspires to be a radically 
rational or rationalized community. But this theory has not provided a basis 
for men’s identification with a larger community or nation-state. If there is no 
basis for identification, there is a good chance that citizens even feel rather 
alienated from the state and its laws. Certainly, the modern state as the 
product of reason and self-interest does not generate very warm feelings of 
belonging or special loyalty in the citizenry. Individuals sharing nothing but 
formal reason and an interest in law and order, do not share very much. We 
can analyze this alienation with the help of another classic theme in modern 
sociology: the danger of “anomie.” Anomie is “essentially the absence of a 
meaningful order, a nomos in which one can feel at home and in which one 
can develop one’s identity and character, one’s capabilities and talents.” 
According to Zijderveld, this state of meaninglessness and the experience of 
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anomie definitely occur in abstract, over-bureaucratized and strongly 
controlled modern societies.146 
Alienation can be a characteristic experience in modern societies when 
individuals cannot identify with the meaningful order and institutions of the 
larger community. Such alienated citizens feel they cannot develop their 
identity, character, capabilities and talents in any satisfying way. If practices 
and institutions are rather impersonal and formal – “cold and bloodless” – the 
experience of alienation comes close to the experience of anomie because 
who can really identify with abstract, over-bureaucratized and formalized 
institutions like the modern state and its legal institutions?147 Modern societies 
tend to what Zijderveld calls “thin institutions.” Such thin institutions are 
easily experienced as “alienating strictures that impose abstract forms of 
authority and control” that even inspire people to protest and rebel. There is 
always the possibility, according to Zijderveld, that the abstract society 
“triggers the spirit of protest.”148 It is this spirit of protest that seems to inspire 
the critical attitude with regard to the modern formalist law as well. 
But we should not overstate this point. Society can never in fact become 
purely abstract. “A pure civil society is an idealization like a frictionless 
plane; it does not exist as described. It exists with a larger community, as 
“economic man” always has.”149 This means that there is always a set of 
substantive meanings and values that people do identify with and that do 
motivate action, which are not constantly scrutinized as to their rationality and 
efficiency. Indeed, it can be argued that modern societies have actually 
functioned with a large part of their traditional outlook intact. The fact that 
modern nations like Great Britain and the Netherlands consider themselves 
bound by a Queen shows that “myth and fable” our still very much alive in 
modern political reality. Even a republic with a highly individualized 
population like the United States makes ample use of myths to create a feeling 
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of a common culture and destiny. The Presidency and its rich symbolism is an 
important source for pride and identification, and so are the myths of the 
frontier, the myth of the perpetual new beginning, and the myth of the 
boundless future that is open to self-creation. Surely these are hardly 
compatible with the findings of modern (social) science and reason.150 
For Hegel the state and its laws should be the embodiment of a 
community with which individual citizens can identify and that has to be lived 
as an “organic whole.” This whole is more than the aggregation of its 
individual elements because it is the locus of a larger life transcending petty 
citizen interests and individually defined goods.  
 
“According to Hegel, the state must constitute a common life in which all find their 
identity, otherwise the citizenry can only experience government and the legal order 
as external impediments to their freedom which means that “government can only 
survive as a despotism over individuals crushing private wills under the yoke of a 
law with which no-one identifies.”151 
 
Surely, the tendency to abstraction and formalism does not seem very 
promising to most. It can be argued that both modern formalist law and the 
litigation explosion are the product of a general “estrangement” exactly 
because what people share in a modern social world has become highly 
abstract. According to Lawrence Friedman the (real or apparent) decline of 
authority is a crucial factor: “Authority itself has changed. There is a loss of 
loyalty, commitment and trust. This then is another reflex of the dependence 
on strangers.”152 He argues that a pervasive expectation of formal and 
procedural justice in most modern Western societies has been accompanied 
by a formalization of both the law and the social relationships that it regulates. 
As the lawgiver and legal institutions have, to a high degree, met the demand 
for both fairness and objectivity in the legal practices, we witness a process of 
“legalization” of practically all social relationships. Nowadays no area of life 
is completely beyond the influence of law and even traditional zones of 
immunity such as the family have been extensively legalized. Friedman 
argues that “the scope of law has expanded; it has become a gigantic, total 
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presence.” Thus the decline of authority goes hand-in-hand with a boundless 
“legalization” of society. Moreover, not only will there be ever more law in 
such societies, we can also expect a rise in the use of legal proceedings to 
solve social and political problems. We can expect an explosive growth of 
litigation. Friedman: “The emotional distance strips away inhibitions against 
using formal law, just face-to-face relationships tend, on the whole to create 
this kind of inhibition.”153 
The public world should be spared from such “legalization,” and an 
ensuing litigation explosion should be avoided.  In the public or political 
realm, we need the vocabulary of justice to be more flexible, shared, 
substantial and argumentative than a system of formal law can ever 
provide.154 However, in such a society the (artificial) boundaries between 
private law and the public sector or public realm tend to melt away. In the 
modern world, legal formalist thinking invades the whole public order 
because, according to Lawrence Friedman, “modern legal culture insists on a 
single, unified domain of fairness and legality and demands a single standard 
of justice. To satisfy this demand, every institution has to fall into line.”155 
Lawrence Friedman points to some structural social and political 
problems. The demand for law ever increases, and this means that the legal 
institutions will easily be overburdened. Those seeking legal remedies will be 
confronted with delay, but, as the saying goes, justice delayed is justice 
denied and thus the growing demand for law and legal adjudication of 
conflicts is bound to challenge the legitimacy of the legal order. Surely there 
are boundaries to what a community can afford to spend on its legal 
institutions to meet the seemingly boundless demand for justice within the 
citizenry. In addition, there is the continual and structural impairment of 
governmental administrative tasks and duties. As the government is more and 
more restricted in its powers and competences to rule, and if citizens are 
granted all sorts of rights and procedures, it becomes hard to reach goals in an 
effective and efficient way. If citizens can get a judge to check, obstruct or 
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even reverse public actions that they do not approve of, government action 
will be at least delayed, at worst, made impossible. 
But, maybe most importantly, one may point to the damage to the (moral) 
fabric of society. The pervasive demand and supply for fairness might 
generally undermine the trust between citizens; it might also undermine the 
morality and creativity in dealing with conflict. Trust and social creativity are 
important lubricants in social interaction and this means that these trends 
cannot fail to have an effect on the quality of life in such a modern society. 156 
Modern formal law is the product of a decrease in trust and moral consensus 
in the community to the extent that we can hardly talk of a community at all. 
On the other hand, modern formal law and its “bureaucratic functionaries” 
tend to strengthen and hasten the trend towards the abstract society that does 
not seem appealing. 
 
Grades of commitment 
If we acknowledge that the tendency towards de-moralization and de-
politicization of the state and the legal order has a serious downside, we seem 
to be back to Durkheim’s conclusion that a state of order or peace ultimately 
remains a moral task.157 Richard Posner, the champion of scientism, admits 
this much when he says that “the entanglement of law with morality, politics, 
tradition, and rhetoric may well be permanent and the path to complete 
professionalization therefore permanently blocked.”158 But does this means 
that we have come full circle and that we are back in the community of shared 
understandings of the second chapter? The legal professional should realize 
that there is an irreducible political and moral dimension to legal 
professionalism, and this makes it important to a self-conscious and self-
critical professional attitude. Legal professionals should scrutinize their 
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loyalties, their commitments or their “engagement.” This engagement can 
range from a self-conscious and consistent conservative stance to a radical 
revolutionary one. 
The (ideal-typical) conservative attitude derives from the feeling that we 
should be careful with the disenchantment of the present institutional, social 
and political order. Such an order is thought to be a precarious historical 
achievement, which deserves our loyalty and commitment. Conservatives 
often emphasize the importance of the present institutional order in civilizing 
the individual - in making human beings, who are in their natural or 
uncivilized state selfish and aggressive, into social beings. In such a model 
peace and consensus is important, as it is the fragile product of such civilizing 
traditions and institutions.159 The emphasis is on guarding the established 
order and the – particular, local and historically evolved – shared 
understandings of the community. Conservatives generally point to the fact 
that our strongest sentiments, memories, and loyalties are always focused 
upon “particular persons, particular inherited languages, particular places, 
particular social groups, particular rituals and religions.”160 This particular 
meaningful normative order is a “nomos” derived from reason, morals and 
history that deserves our respect and that should be protected against arbitrary 
powers.161 This serves as the starting point for an investigation into “grades of 
commitment” of the legal professional.  
Some will not feel at home with a conservative political commitment. 
Such views often come to the fore when an established political order is 
threatened and accompanied by the pessimistic idea that the present can be 
seen as largely “degenerated” from a golden past. But in many cases this is 
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informed by an unfair comparison of the best of the past with the average or 
worst of the present. Maybe it is sometimes more fair to see the present as an 
evolution from a simpler past, resist “nostalgia” and face the complexity of 
modern life. Whatever one’s feeling about the past with regard to the present, 
we might conclude with Richard Posner that the “clock cannot be turned 
back, especially to a time that only exists in the imagination.”162 Also David 
Luban urges us to resist a nostalgic longing for the (imaginary) past and 
instead, take a critical look at the values and traditions that we inherited from 
previous generations. Why should we today privilege any of the values of our 
grandparents when we are committed to undoing the wrongs of the social 
world that we inherited from them?163 
Roberto Unger also warns us of the pitfalls of nostalgia. We should, for 
instance, be highly critical of the image that is often presented to us by 
nostalgic thinkers of an ancient republican community, where the whole 
citizenry had an active experience of self-rule, devotion to the public good, 
and life on the historical stage. Remember that Kronman presented us with 
the ideal that at least legal officials exhibit these qualities. This image is often 
presented as the incompatible antithesis to the existing modern liberal 
democracies where private enjoyment or development of subjectivity and 
authenticity flourishes at the price of a shrinking public space. Unger argues 
that this contrast is not only a false opposition, which inhibits our imagination 
and creativity in social and political theory, but he even qualifies it as a 
“sham”: 
 
“The opposition between the two forms of government is false, not because it can 
be easily resolved, but because it is a sham. The picture presented in contrast with 
the existing democracies, whether or not made to describe any real society of the 
past, is simply their inverted self-image, the receptacle of everything that seems 
missing in contemporary social life, and a confession of practical and imaginative 
failure.164  
 
But he offers a different reason for resisting romanticizing some Golden Age 
of community; such an image stifles reformative imagination and creativity. 
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The community seems to be continually under siege, and this generates the 
feeling that we should hold on to any kind of communality or order that we 
have left. Unger: “Precisely because the idealized communal republic cannot 
emerge from present political arrangements as the outcome of any plausible 
sequence of practical reforms and conceptual adjustments, it confirms the 
power of the established order in the very act of pretending to deny it.”165 The 
image of the community as a “paradise lost” consecrates the present order by 
making it seem inevitable and necessary because the better (traditional) world 
is gone for good or forever beyond our reach. There is thus a tendency to 
sanctify the remaining political order and see it as both precious and without 
alternative. 
We should start with stripping the present of its deceptive appearance of 
necessity: the social and institutional world is merely the outcome of 
historical processes that could have easily led to other results as well. The first 
grade of commitment that I introduce here is seeing the social institutional 
order is as relative to contingent historical processes.166 In other words, we 
should resist any kind of “historicism” that argues that the present is the 
necessary outcome of necessary and objective historical processes or 
evolution.167 Although we realize this, we might take the stance that we are 
nevertheless stuck with it. We cannot and should not do much about it right 
now. This means that we take an “ironic” or “pragmatic” (both terms were 
suggested by Richard Rorty) attitude with regard to the social-political 
institutional order. Irony is the experience that the present social and 
institutional order is “highly contingent, the product of social history and 
forces, and yet something that we cannot, in our present lives, avoid treating 
as part of the universe in which we interact with other people, the material 
world, and ourselves.”168 This attitude is still rather cautious and conservative, 
and some will not feel comfortable with this kind of commitment.  
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If we substitute the “harmony model” of society for a “conflict model,” it 
becomes harder to sustain the ironic stance. Generally it is thought that the 
harmony model favors a conservative view with regard to the existing re- or 
constraining social and institutional order.169 However, sociological models 
that emphasize conflict rather than hard-won harmony and functionality do 
not conceptualize society as a harmonious whole. Society is rather seen as an 
“arena” where individuals and groups compete for scarce resources such as 
goods and honor. The behavior of individuals is, in the words of Randall 
Collins, “explained in terms of their self-interests in a material world of threat 
and violence. Social order is seen as being founded on organized coercion. 
There is an ideological realm of belief (religion, law), and an underlying 
world of struggles over power; ideas and morals are not prior to interaction 
but are socially created to serve the interests of parties to the conflict.”170 
We might contrast here the “low-risk” view of law and order of the 
skeptical conservative with a “high-risk” view of the progressive radical.171 
The conservative emphasizes the indispensable contribution of (legal) 
institutional stability in modern societies and worries about the fragility and 
precariousness of the existing systems of authority. He tends to feel that only 
where there is respect for the established order and constituted authority do 
people experience the security that is a prerequisite for genuine freedom. The 
authority and stability of the legal order is based on a fundamental consensus. 
The low-risk view warns us of taking this hard-won stability and consensus 
for granted. By contrast, the conflict model sees the established harmony as 
merely the product of coercion. Moreover, if you take a more optimistic view 
of human nature, one might be less reluctant to make relative the importance 
of traditions and institutions. If one judges the current outcome of the past 
struggles and conflicts as unjust, one might be prepared to risk the anarchic or 
anomic consequences of criticizing, reforming or even destroying the present 
social world.172 This matches with a high-risk view of law and order that, in 
the words of Nonet & Selznick:  
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“[…] emphasizes the potential resilience and openness of institutions. It is more 
careless of authority, more accepting of challenge and disarray. This approach 
resists the equation of “law” and “order”; it is sensitive to the fact that law 
characteristically upholds a specific kind of order in the form of received moral 
codes, systems of status, and patterns of power. The very concept of “order” is 
perceived as problematic, subject to historically changing expectations, compatible 
with controversy and expressive behavior. In this perspective law is valued as a 
resource for criticism and an instrument for change, and there is a tacit faith that the 
system of authority can better preserve itself, and be better, if it is open to 
reconstruction in the light of how those who are governed perceive their rights and 
reassess their moral commitments.”173 
 
When we see society as an arena where groups and individuals try to advance 
their interests over others leading to overt conflict or domination, we might 
also find it hard to see legal traditions as “springs of value.” The institutional 
world is simply the product of previous victories of previous victorious rulers 
who contingently won the struggle for power. In the words of Walter 
Benjamin, the institutions, traditions and values that are thought to be the 
product and foundation of some social consensus and that are handed to us 
from previous generations are simply “spoils of victory” whose origin we 
“cannot contemplate without horror.”174 Unger: 
 
“Institutions become a second order fate, but only after having been shaped and 
stabilized by a surprising history of fighting and compromise, of halting insight and 
armed illusion. People forget the sufferings and sorrows of this war, and re-imagine 
them as culture.”175 
 
The moment we feel we cannot identify with this order and even feel 
estranged, alienated or excluded from the present political order, we are 
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forced to an “external” view. Under such circumstances, an “estranged 
outsider” finds it hard to experience the authority of the law and of 
government, and we might not be talking of some small minorities or 
scattered individuals. Unger again: “There is an important sense in which the 
average citizen of a rich industrial democracy – not just the member of 
‘discrete and insular minorities’ – feels himself to be an angry outsider, angry 
at his rulers or his bosses or both and powerless to change the constraints 
upon his situation. Students of popular consciousness and political culture 
have observed that the belief that the state and big business are run as a racket 
to the benefit of predatory elites is widespread.” 176 
Such an estranged outsider who sees the law as the arbitrary and unjust 
result of previous power struggles will find it hard to uncritically submit and 
identify with this political and legal community. Importantly, taking such an 
external and critical perspective will be a de-legitimizing first step. When we 
see the law as a contingent social construction and explain it in terms of 
specific interests instead of understanding it in terms of intrinsic qualities and 
founded in a genuine consensus, we are well under way to weakening the 
force of the ideologies that support it.177 A third grade of commitment might 
then arise from the feeling that the current legal institutional order is bad as it 
is, and does not deserve our uncritical support and commitment. The existing 
institutional order is judged to be unsatisfactory, and we might decide that a 
reformation is in order. This is the next grade of commitment that we might 
take with regard to the institutional order: we might then take on a “reformist” 
attitude.178 
But surely, we need an idea of the direction that such reforms should take. 
If we want to repair the injustices that the present system (re-) produces, there 
probably is a conception of substantive justice with regard to which the 
present legal system and practice is found wanting. If we want the reform to 
lead to a consistent system, such a general idea should inform the 
reformation; we need a “critical morality” or “a critical definition of the social 
world” to give us a sense of direction.179 An important conception of justice 
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might be provided by a profound experience of inequality in modern liberal 
capitalistic societies (or even in the world at large). Socio-economic 
inequalities are often justified as inevitable or even necessary by-products of 
freedom, economic growth and welfare. The present legal institutional 
structure can be seen as both sustaining and legitimizing the resulting 
inequality and domination. Surely, this view has roots in a Marxist diagnosis 
of the modern world. 
Another critical perspective can be provided by the Hegelian critique. 
Modern abstract societies are supported by abstract legal systems informed by 
a liberal procedural or “formalist” conception of justice. This is the kind of 
social or legal order that real people of flesh and blood longing for a real full-
blooded community sharing substantial values or goals cannot readily identify 
with. What we might try to strive for is both a substantially moral and rational 
order that makes both a real freedom and real community possible.180 Those 
who feel estranged from the present social world might aspire to a 
combination of both more equality and community, and this aspiration does 
seem to feed on a deep human need in modern societies. For many in modern 
societies, justice does not only mean fair treatment by other people (and 
especially by the government and its legal officials) but “it also means getting 
a fair shake out of life.” Such substantial conception of justice leads to the 
idea that people should have equal starting positions in their individual lives 
and that they should at least be compensated if they are left with less than 
others for reasons that are beyond their power to influence.181 
This is mainly a socio-economic aspiration, but it might already require a 
greater redistribution of scarce resources than most liberal democracies 
presently realize.182 More of a socio-cultural (symbolic or ideological) nature 
is, however, the critical dismantling of the perceptions of the individuals in 
society, because many of the inequalities, and the domination that it makes 
possible, cannot be repaired merely by means of economic policies. For 
instance, activists in the struggles of the so-called “politics of identity” are 
motivated by the experience that the “projecting of an inferior or demeaning 
image on another can actually distort and oppress.” Thus to be denied equal 
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recognition can be a severe form of oppression, and this oppression can only 
be fought at an ideological level.183 Of course, a social definition (like being 
Dutch) is just as much beyond the individual’s power to change as a 
biological definition (like being a woman). In addition, there is always a 
dangerous tendency to naturalize or “biologize” traits that are actually merely 
of a social nature, which makes them even more irreproachable. We should, 
moreover, not forget that the biological definitions also always have an 
irreducible social aspect (like that of being a woman). Both biological and 
social definitions in fact strongly influence the chances and choices of such 
individuals or members of certain groups. In recent decades many who feel 
oppressed in such a way have demanded, not just equality before the law in 
the sense of equal formal rights, but legitimacy or recognition.  
The battle for recognition is often described as “symbolic,” but, if one 
does not take a naturalist or formalist stance, to qualify something as such is 
not a disqualification.184 To the contrary, the moment one realizes how 
oppressive our collective symbolic or ideological world can be, and how real 
and concrete the consequences for certain individuals and groups are – 
Bourdieu uses the term “symbolic violence”185 – we realize that we might 
need to develop a critical stance with regard to these perceptions. This form of 
oppression and domination is not easily detected nor combated by means of 
the naturalist or formalist methods and instruments. As we are dealing with 
the ideological sphere, this seems to require both critical and “soft” methods 
that focus on language and meaning such as “semiotics” or 
“deconstruction.”186 
Duncan Kennedy describes the goals of his leftist project as “to change 
the existing system of social hierarchy, including its class, racial, and gender 
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dimensions, in the direction of greater equality and greater participation in 
public and private government.”187 Given these goals, we can understand why 
Kennedy does not want to feel limited to using scientific methods that are 
considered to yield hard or objective results. Such methods explicitly abstract 
away from what he thinks is both interesting and urgent about our social 
world: “The more “hard” (capable of being counted, highly verifiable and 
replicable, intersubjectively “valid”), the more “narrow” (partial, fragmentary, 
meaningless)” Kennedy states. To combat the existing hierarchies and 
domination, we should not abstract away from this symbolic oppression but 
engage it on the level of ideology. The things that interest Kennedy are 
“broad,” like justice and liveliness, “so they can be grasped in their totality 
only be means that are “soft” (contestable, subjective, vague.)” Kennedy: 
 
“I think the way to respond to this dilemma is by using the hard/narrow methods of 
representation strategically, in the interest of making the soft/broad methods 
plausible, and in order to poke threatening holes in what seem to me false as well as 
legitimating and deadening representations of others. We don’t believe only 
statistics, and we don’t believe only prose that sings totality. Why not use both?” 188 
 
We saw that the opposition might take the form of a conservative argument 
for the necessity or the inevitability of the present institutional and social 
arrangements. This means that before actual reforms can take place, it will be 
necessary to confront such claims to necessity. What will be argued for is the 
contingency (historicity) of the present arrangements, and then the legitimacy 
of these arrangements will be critically questioned. Thus, the past two 
paragraphs can be thought of as efforts to de-legitimize the efforts to make 
fairness or efficiency the leading “necessary” or “inherent” conceptions of 
justice. But these conceptions also have critical power against each other and 
against other competing conceptions. This makes it possible to criticize and 
make relative claims to objectivity and necessity. 
In such an effort to de-legitimation, one might try to “unmask” the 
existing institutions by showing that they serve some other hidden function 
                                           
187 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, p. 6. 
188 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, pp. 17, 18; “we need narrative as well as causal 
explanations to make sense of political and legal experience.” Luban, Legal Modernism, p. 
14. 
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than they officially seem to do.189 “Conservatives insist that might is 
employed only as the handmaiden of right, to restrain and rebuke those who 
put self-interest above the common good, while radicals maintain that the 
state employs might to suppress right, in defense of selfish interests.”190 There 
is always the possibility that a dominant group or class has used the law to 
further their particular interests by making the coordinated efforts of the 
society and its legal institutions as a whole serve their particular goals. It is 
very well possible that elites or other powerful groups in society succeed in 
masquerading their particular interests as universal interests: Gerhard Lenski 
even argues that it is relatively easy to transform force in authority, or might 
into right. When an elite gains power, it is in a position to influence the legal 
institutions and rewrite the law, and this gives the elite the opportunity to 
reformulate their special interests in terms of general and impersonal 
(universal) terms, thus giving them the allure of necessity and objectivity. But 
laws can always be written in such a way that they favor some particular part 
of society more than other segments. “In short, laws may be written in such a 
way that they protect the interests of the elite while being couched in very 
general, universalistic terms.”191 
Also the freedom that the modern liberal state promises might be judged 
to be illusionary to a large extent, and people generally are not conscious of 
this fact: “People never see the axioms and postulates of their own society; 
these are too close up to be visible. Free choice and its values are among these 
axioms. The limits of free choice are even more invisible.”192 The reformist 
might decide to “unmask” the rhetoric of freedom that informs the current 
emphasis on formalism by making the arbitrary limits of freedom in the 
present institutional arrangement visible. There is thus a false appearance of 
determinacy about the axioms and postulates of the social world, which hides 
                                           
189 Hacking, The Social Construction of What?, pp. 20, 6; cp. Mannheim, K., Essays on the 
Sociology of Knowledge, Routledge and Kegan Paul London 1952. 
190 Lenski, Power and Privilege, pp. 50, 51; “The problem is to show that the so-called 
deeper element really is common and not just another particular interest masquerading as 
universal.” Kolb, D., The Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 114. 
191 Lenski, Power and Privilege, pp. 41, 50-53. 
192 For instance: “What is not presented by the media – or by society in general – cannot be 
chosen; the consumer never even knows these possibilities exist.” Friedman, The Republic 
of Choice, Law, p. 132. 
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a true determination by arbitrary powerful elites. This means that people 
“alienate their powers.” Kennedy suggests “that it would be in some sense 
better to determine our fates without alienating our powers”193  
Surely, in such a project “positivism,” in whatever form, is a kind of 
generic enemy. Positivist approaches generally proceed from “givens,” from 
something that is regarded as objective and inevitable – as “present.” The 
modernist view that combats this positivist project seems to defend the 
freedom that we threaten to alienate (maybe without our realizing it). This last 
freedom is, it seems, “the freedom not to believe in or be determined by our 
own mental constructions.”194 Justice and morality are not given with some 
social structure or political order; they are the product of a constant effort. 
According to Pierre Bourdieu, because a political morality “does not fall from 
heaven, and is not innate to human nature,” we need a critical definition of the 
social world, or a sociology, that will free us by “freeing us from the illusion 
of freedom, or even more exactly, from the misplaced belief in illusory 
freedoms. Freedom is not something given: it is conquered – collectively.” 195 
The conquering of freedom starts with unmasking the illusions of the present 
order by a critique of the presented necessities.196 The critical visions of 
sociologists like Marx and Weber are instrumental in this defense. But many 
also feel that philosophers like Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida 
provide weapons to fight “the Enlightenment pretension to construct a science 
of society modeled on natural science.”197 
An important source for “the unmasking turn of mind” is the sociology of 
knowledge of Karl Mannheim. This strategy of unmasking does not entail 
                                           
193 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, pp. 18, 19; cp. Unger, False Necessity. 
194 Dale, In Pursuit of a Scientific Culture, p. 10; cp. Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ 
in: Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader, p. 36. 
195 Bourdieu, Practical Reason, p. 144; Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, p. 15. 
196 Cp. Unger, False Necessity; Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 129; “in social evolution 
nothing is inevitable but thinking makes it so.” Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 54. 
197 Megill, Prophets of Extremity, p. 4; “the empiricist and positivist citadels of English 
speaking social philosophy have been threatened and undermined by successive waves of 
hermeneuticists, structuralists, post-empiricists, deconstructionists and other invading 
hordes. […] Among these general transformations, perhaps the most significant has been 
the widespread reaction against the assumption that the natural sciences offer an adequate 
or even a relevant model for the practice of the social disciplines.” Cp. Skinner (ed.), The 
Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences, p. 6. 
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facing the opposition by trying to refute ideas and arguing for other better 
ones, but by trying to undermine or de-legitimate them. One does so if one 
succeeds in exposing a hidden function that the ideas or arguments serve. If 
some conception, idea, policy or regulation is shown to serve the interests of 
some (dominant) group in society while the pretension is to serve universal 
justice, this unmasking will strip this conception of “a false appeal to 
authority.” The moment one sees the “extra-theoretical function” of an idea, it 
will lose its “practical effectiveness.” Unmasking an idea does not so much 
involve the “disintegration” of an idea but stripping it of a false appeal to 
authority. We might call this “unmasking constructionism,” and it can be 
readily combined with the reformist attitude with regard to the institutional 
order.198 
The premise is that when we become aware of the axioms and postulates 
of our own institutional world and society, we can subsequently “transcend” 
these axioms, postulates and institutions. This requires that we actually can 
break through the formative contexts of our practical or conceptual world.199 
Compare Roberto Unger: 
 
“Our practices of discourse can be changed, sometimes deliberately but always 
slowly. The reason why it is hard for us to change our practices is that, to a large 
extent, we are the sum of practices of discourse and action. The reason why we can 
change our practices nevertheless is that they never exhaustively define us: we 
enjoy a residue of productive and creative capacity that they fail to use up or tame. 
The goals we pursue through them are never our only possible aims. […] 
Underlying this fact is a persistent feature of our relation to the institutional and 
discursive contexts in which we act: there is always more in us than there is in them, 
more powers of insight, desire, and association than they are capable to countenance 
or to prevent. Consequently, people have a two-sided consciousness in even the 
most entrenched and all-inclusive society and culture. They never surrender 
completely to the routines and pieties that seem to have mastered them. They 
secretly entertain a mental reservation. If the established order suffers a trauma, 
                                           
198 Hacking, The Social Construction of What?, pp. 20, 6; cp. Mannheim, Essays on the 
Sociology of Knowledge. 
199 Unger, Passion, pp. 8, 23-36; Unger, Knowledge & Politics, pp. 223-231; Luban, Legal 
Modernism, p. 55. 
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they may suddenly cast aside what they seemed, so completely, to have 
embraced.”200 
 
To change our practices and fight the injustices and conquer our freedom, we 
not only need a critical definition of the present world but to unmask the 
legitimating ideology that sustains it. We need compelling alternative visions 
to inspire and move people to action. Influential thinkers like Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida might provide transcendent and compelling 
cultural visions that radically break from previous thought. 201 Such 
“transcendence” might be referred to as a typical modernist goal both in art 
and in politics202 and, indeed, Kennedy describes his project as “modernist” 
because it tries to achieve “transcendent aesthetic/emotional/intellectual 
experiences at the margins of or the interstices of a disrupted rational grid.” 
But how does one generate such disrupting transcendent experiences? 
Kennedy: 
 
“The practical activity […] centers on the artifact, something made or performed 
(could be high art, could be the most mundane object, could be the deconstruction 
of a text, could be the orchestration of dinner). […] Making and appreciating 
artifacts are two paths toward transcendent experience, but they regularly upset the 
theory of experience. The analytics, which in modernism are always ex post, […] 
emphasize the omnipresence of repressed or denied “primal forces” or “dangerous 
supplements” and the plasticity of formal media that presuppose that they are not 
plastic.”203 
 
We might associate this with a typically Romantic aspiration. Among the 
Romantics, the route to metaphysical transcendence is “characteristically by 
                                           
200 Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, pp. 63, 127. 
201 Megill, Prophets of Extremity, p. 1. 
202 “Art in our century has displayed a modernist tendency toward constant revolution and 
the invention of new forms. It has been important to break the former rules and create new 
modes of art. […] Yet it refuses what in many other areas of life is a typically modern 
desire for unity and system, for the pure form.” Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, pp. 
18, 19; Luban, Legal Modernism, pp. 51-54; Unger, Passion, p. 33; Kolb, The Critique of 
Pure Modernity, pp. 18, 19. 
203 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, pp. 7, 8, 346. 
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way of aesthetic creation.”204 If we feel estranged from modern society as an 
order that is able to manipulate people as “a totality of the anonymous” and 
from the “abstract society of strangers” that partly results from the abstract 
and empty liberal conceptions of rationality, justice as fairness, this might 
provoke criticism and protest. This abstract anonymity evokes a Romanticist 
counterforce, which is also very much part of the experience of being modern, 
that seeks to realize values and conceptions of justice that seem generally 
neglected or even consciously oppressed in liberal-democratic modern 
societies.205  
The Romantic modernist tries to “open up” or “break open” the axioms, 
postulates or formative contexts that seem “closed” in the general dominant 
discourse and that determine us. The modernist tries to disrupt this experience 
of “closure” to reveal as yet unthinkable and unsuspected new possibilities. 
One might even say, as Kennedy does, that the modernist critique becomes a 
goal in itself. Kennedy describes it as a “project of originality, of innovation 
for its own sake, the “cult” of innovation.”206 But surely by now the reformist 
attitude seems far too cautious and ineffective. The more one feels estranged 
with regard to the legal order and the society that it legitimizes and sustains, 
the less one can expect a patient, piecemeal reforming attitude. This 
estrangement will motivate a “rebellious attitude” with regard to the legal 
system. When we feel we should radically and thoroughly transform it, we 
reach a new grade of commitment. The rebel is at a greater distance from the 
established order and feels pragmatic, piecemeal tinkering and reformism to 
be inadequate.207  
                                           
204 Dale, In Pursuit of a Scientific Culture, p. 5; According to Megill, “the dominant 
philosophy of the later twentieth century has become “aestheticism,” by which he means 
the “tendency to see ‘art’ or ‘language’ or ‘discourse’ or ‘text’ as constituting the primary 
realm of human experience.” Dale, In Pursuit of a Scientific Culture, p. 282; cp. Megill, 
Prophets of Extremity; However, Posner classifies Kennedy as a (although rather defeatist) 
“pragmatist.” Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, p. 270. 
205 “this abstract anonymity has caused the re-emergence of romanticism, with Heidegger’s 
existentialism as a late fruit of this romantic turn.” Zijderveld, The Institutional Imperative, 
p. 50. 
206 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, p. 349. 
207 Hacking, The Social Construction of What?, pp. 20, 6; What is required according to 
Roberto Unger is “total criticism” and “revolutionary reform” not partial and piecemeal 
reformism. Cp. Unger, Knowledge and Politics, pp. 1-7; Unger, False Necessity, pp. 64, 
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The “loss of faith” in the existing system and its normative claims is now 
complete. There is no especial faith in the rationalizing and universalizing 
claims and aspirations of modern law; a totally objective and rational legal 
science and practice is not possible. But Kennedy argues that the absolute 
opposite – that rationality and objectivity are totally impossible – is just as 
hard to prove. Kennedy has lost faith in this project as well: “I’m not sure that 
it’s impossible to show – maybe someone can show – that objectivity, 
rationality, the subject, and representation are all impossible. I just don’t think 
anyone has shown it so far, but I could be wrong. I’ve lost faith in the 
enterprise of trying to show it.”208 The proof that rationality and objectivity 
are impossible would require metaphysical arguments and an epistemology  
that are just as unavailable as the arguments to the opposite.209 We should 
wield a less pretentious conception of objectivity. “There is no other available 
meaning for objectivity than “a representation that hasn’t been falsified (yet),” 
which is not to deny that personal, moral and political commitments influence 
this representation. In Kennedy’s view, this justifies methodological 
eclecticism.210 
However, Kennedy also tells us that there is no guarantee whatsoever that 
the loss of faith automatically means that the alienated powers are recovered 
from “those owners of the technical discourses used to pursue their conscious 
or unconscious political projects through the manipulation of the supposedly 
objective and rational “sciences” of understanding society” – in one word, 
from the legal experts. Of course, there is also no guarantee that the ordinary 
or mobilized and re-possessed citizens would decide for a freer, more 
egalitarian or communitarian society. Moreover, the loss of faith also means 
that there is no more belief in the project of the “reconstruction” of society 
because this will only lead to more new reifications, necessities, to new 
claims to rightness based on more theoretical claims and visions. Although 
                                                                                                                               
65; But compare Kennedy: “No critique is truly global […] structuring and critiquing are 
interminable activities.” Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, pp. 33, 275-277. 
208 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, pp. 8, 286, 350. 
209 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, pp. 1, 86, 89, 92, 276, 277; “Clearly, developing 
an indeterminacy argument that functions at the metaphysical level is a daunting and 
complicated task, but that has not cowed many heretics.”; Lucy, Understanding and 
Explaining Adjudication, pp. 194, 199, 200. 
210 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, pp. 15, 16. 
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losing faith in theory does not mean giving up doing theory, it “means giving 
up the expectation of rightness in the doing.”211 Many will immediately see 
that there is a deep tension between Kennedy’s political program and the 
intellectual underpinnings that structurally undermine all claims to rightness. 
Surely they undermine political aims as well: “If the struggle for a more 
communitarian and egalitarian society is not, either implicitly or explicitly, 
ultimately a claim to rightness, then what can it be?”212 
But we might derive from Unger an “intrinsic” good in the modernist 
project; we might see a certain ethics in the critical rebellious attitude. If we 
embrace the idea that no institutional order or social vision can ever fully 
exhaust the types of human association and connection, we need to 
continually scrutinize and criticize the established meanings and institutions. 
The modernists have “the belief that the individual can expect no progress 
from the revision of his contexts. He can assert his independence only by a 
perpetual war against the fact of contextuality, a war that he cannot hope to 
win but that he must continue to wage.”213 Kennedy also describes this un-
winnable “war” as a goal in itself, and refers to it as a “cult of innovation.”214 
Thus we have entered the world of the rebel and left that of the reformist. 
But an activist who moves beyond the world of ideas and argument and who 
tries to change the world by means of all sorts of action might be called a 
“revolutionary.”215 The revolutionary (whether he has a clear view of a more 
just post-revolutionary world or not) tries to subvert the established order by 
trying to cause a “crisis.” According to Walter Benjamin the history of the 
oppressed teaches us that the “state of emergency” is the rule, and not the 
exception. We should be aware of this and realize that there are circumstances 
                                           
211 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, p. 361. 
212 Lucy, Understanding and Explaining Adjudication, p. 9. 
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– Benjamin specifically had the fascism of his time in mind – in which it is 
our task to actively bring about such a state of emergency.216 The 
revolutionary is trying to cause a crisis such that all the taken-for-granted (or 
“reified”) truths, perceptions and values in the community will be thoroughly 
disrupted. They will come to life and start moving again. Bourdieu argues that 
the most durable effect of the crisis is “the symbolic revolution as profound 
transformation of styles of thought and life, and, more particularly, of the 
whole symbolic dimension of everyday existence.”217 If one is dissatisfied 
with the present “symbolic dimension of everyday existence” such a 
transformation might seem promising. 
Bourdieu points especially to the “cultural producers” – writers, artists, 
public intellectuals – to critically scrutinize and even subvert the established 
order: “The cultural producers are able to use the power conferred on them, 
especially in periods of crisis, by their capacity to put forward a critical 
definition of the social world, to mobilize the potential strength of the 
dominated classes and subvert the order prevailing in the field of power.”218 
What is needed is a critical definition of the social world in a crisis that sets 
all established perceptions and definitions afloat. But this is not enough. The 
revolutionary will try to provoke a crisis. For the revolutionary, therefore, the 
ultimate political problem is not of Truth or even Justice in the abstract. The 
ultimate political problem is one of “action.” 
But, as Bourdieu tells us, “In the case of the social world, speaking with 
authority is as good as doing” and surely, legal professionals are authoritative 
speakers with regard to the law. As “legal discourse is a creative speech 
which brings into existence that which it utters,” legal speech has real effects 
                                           
216 Benjamin, W., ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ in: Illuminations, p. 257. 
217 Bourdieu, Homo Academicus, p. 193; “Revolution […] must have a profoundly 
dislocating effect upon the traditions or rules by which men normally live. […] The 
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pure rationality.” Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition, pp. 143, 145; “people […] never 
surrender completely to the routines and pieties that seem to have mastered them. They 
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Should Legal Analysis Become?, p. 127; cp. Sennett, The Fall of Public Man, pp. 183-194. 
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in the social world and is “as good as doing.” Much legal speech is even “the 
limit aimed at by all performative utterances” because such action brings into 
being what it declares there to be and thereby affects and often changes our 
socio-political environment.219 A lawyer must therefore realize the impact of 
his choices, for the way in which he uses his language is also normative. We 
should therefore continually critically reflect on our commitments, intentions 
and actions. 
                                           
219 Bourdieu, In Other Words, Essays, p. 53; Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 
42. 
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6. 
Conclusion: The Legal Junction 
 
 
 
If we critically scrutinize our commitments, the present presentation of the 
modern “legal junction” might serve as a signpost. We might even come to 
the conclusion that in our daily practice we are not consistent, that we vary 
our priorities with the specific problems and situations that we are confronted 
with. Such inconsistency is problematic if one dogmatically strives for 
integrity. Especially if integrity is thought of as an aspiration to moral 
perfection, as the ideal of being in perfect harmony with the larger 
community, inconsistency will be experienced as an indication that something 
must be wrong. There is something fundamentally suspicious about 
identifying with one project one moment and changing one’s commitments in 
the next. Only one genuine commitment can be “authentic,” and actions that 
are not in accordance with that commitment are merely “pragmatic” or 
“strategic” and sometimes even outright “opportunistic.” Surely, such 
qualifications are considered to be disqualifying.  
However, we can think of this need for integrity as variant of the kind of 
“foundationalism” that has been rejected by philosophers who have left 
behind the preoccupations of both modern philosophy and modernism. This 
aspiration seems to imply that there is some sort of “essence” of right action 
that is valid at all times and places which might be found in the nature of 
things, or which might be found “inside” oneself if one thinks of this essence 
as a unified authentic “subject” to which one should remain true. Only if such 
an essence informs our actions are we a person of integrity or an “integral 
whole.”1  But antifoundationalism implies that there is no deeper 
                                           
1 Cp. Kronman, A.T., The Lost Lawyer, pp. 80-87. 
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metaphysical foundation for human practices. Nor can we find deep inside 
ourselves some grounding “subject” as an integral whole or as authentic; this 
subject is a product of our imagination and not some metaphysical entity. 
“Anti-foundationalism” and the “Death of the Subject” are thus marks of a 
move beyond modern philosophy and modernism: “post-modernism.”2 
Religious authority and community is generally justified by reference to 
some immanent or transcendent truth that the believer should conform to. In 
chapter two, we came across the temptation to metaphysically ground both 
legal authority and the (legal) community. In the first place, it seems attractive 
to ground the legitimacy of the law and its practices in some conception of 
“natural law,” which supposes that some basic set of legal norms and 
principles are intrinsic to the fabric of the universe. If we “historicize” this 
natural law idea, we might arrive at the conception of a Legal Tradition as a 
historically evolving Grand Narrative – the product of the collective 
experience and wisdom of jurists, with its own distinct logic and necessity. 
We added the idea that Tradition is the product of the subtle art of legal 
reasoning and prudence. But reference to “nature” or “historical logic” is 
certainly a metaphysical claim, and the postmodernist urges us to stay clear of 
such pretentious and even oppressive discourse. Moreover, “all too often this 
language of artistic and practical prudence has been made to immunize legal 
thought against social criticism.”3 
But if we cannot ground authority in some substantial and stable 
metaphysics, we seem to be left with guarding the authority of the law by 
making sure that the people in society who are subject to the law can identify 
with it. Indeed, “the more that law conforms to prevailing moral opinions, 
including the moral opinions of relevant subcultures such as the commercial 
community, the easier it is for lay people to understand and comply with 
law.”4 Especially in modern democracies where authority of learning, 
individual distinction and taste are weakened, men come to “distrust all 
authority that does not seem to arise from public opinion.”5 The repudiation 
of traditional forms and dogmas in order to make room for policies that 
                                           
2 Best S., & Kellner D., Postmodern Theory, Critical Interrogations, Macmillan Press 
London 1991, pp. 4, 5.  
3 Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, p. 62. 
4 Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, pp. 208, 209. 
5 Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition, p. 124. 
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further freedom and welfare reinforces public opinion. De Tocqueville looked 
upon this development with anxiety because it seems to make each man’s 
common sense the guide to all difficulties and mysteries, which has a 
“sterilizing effect on intellectual distinctions.”6 
Indeed, public opinion and common sense seem rather flimsy and volatile 
as grounds for legal decisions. Moreover, it is hard to know how the vast 
majority really thinks about all sorts of complicated moral and technical 
issues that legal professionals are confronted with. Still, somehow modern 
legal professionals, at the risk of losing authority in society, have to keep in 
touch with and be responsive to public opinion. Modern legal professionals 
therefore walk the thin line between intellectual conservatism and cautious 
conformism with shifting moral opinions. 
Moral consensus and public opinion in society might not only be unstable, 
but public opinion might also be rather repugnant to the sensitive mind. For 
instance, Arnold Gehlen pointed to a growing “primitivization” of modern 
consciousness. Modern man often demands a simplicity and plasticity that the 
law, with its technical sophistication and subtle distinctions, often cannot 
offer. Moreover, this demand for simplicity often lines up with a demand for 
emotional satisfaction that is illustrated by modern man’s tendency to express 
himself in slogans. “It is represented by the mass media which continuously 
bombard us with their slogans and nervous shocks promising us the newest, 
the latest, the best and the deepest.”7 
Modern mass media also play a role in another trend in modern society. 
Partly because of the influence of the mass media, “authority has been 
reshaped in the image of the celebrity.”8 The media have broken the 
monopoly of face-to-face influences and role models, and today people 
identify with and model themselves on media celebrities. Even the authorities 
of the traditional institutions – like Royalty and the Papacy – have to fall in 
line with this celebrity culture, and this has important consequences. Celebrity 
status implies constant exposure to the public and keeping a close connection 
with public opinion. “Celebrity culture embraces primarily heroes of popular 
culture; secondarily, political leaders. It has expanded, however, to take in all 
                                           
6 Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition, p. 129. 
7 Zijderveld, The Abstract Society, p. 87. 
8 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 117. 
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the elites, including the modern businessman.”9 Indeed, it has expanded to 
advocates, public attorneys and even to judges. 
Public opinion can be a Pandora’s box. Unger observes that many citizens 
of modern democracies feel themselves to be “angry outsiders” with regard to 
the establishment: “The belief that the state and big business are run as a 
racket to the benefit of predatory elites is widespread.”10 Charismatic 
politicians or activists can mobilize this discontent, and the mass media will 
provide them with the necessary exposure. Advocates or public attorneys, if 
not judges, will learn how to manipulate this new reality when legal practices 
are confronted with this discontent. The more traditionally minded legal 
professionals might find modern mass culture, with its “hypes” and its 
constant emotional appeals, rather demeaning, and they will find it hard to 
conform to its “logic.” However, public opinion, images, slogans, sound bites 
and all sorts of hyped products and trends, constitute much of our common 
world today, and modern legal professionals will have to learn how to manage 
modern media exposure and prudently audit their public image, however 
unpleasant this may be. 
Although rational-legal authority is neither very emotionally satisfying nor 
always even very convincing in modern culture, it does function as an 
indispensable counterweight to the flimsy and volatile nature of public 
opinion and to democratic power play. Legal procedures, codified legal rules 
and legal principles help to transform conflicts such that certain important 
goods are included in the deliberation. One primary good is that all parties 
involved are heard with respect and consideration.11 Secondly, the outcome of 
legal conflict resolution is at least to some degree predictable, and to this 
effect, it is more important that there are fixed general rules and procedures 
than what these rules actually prescribe. Moreover, the procedures also make 
it possible to establish the facts in a conflict, facts that easily escape those 
carried away by emotions and indignation. Science can help to keep a cool 
head and falsify or expose all sorts of myths and fables that are presented as 
factual truths. 
                                           
9 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 124. 
10 Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, pp. 81, 82. 
11 Hampshire, Justice is Conflict, pp. xi, 11. 
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The good of individual emancipation is served with the development of a 
system of rational, fair and formal rules and procedures. Modern legal science 
and formalistic legal practices fall in line with a general trend in modern 
societies to abstraction and generalization – in short, an increasing 
“intellectualization.” This is “the tendency to think and speak in terms of 
highly abstract models and formalistic categories.”12 In chapter three, I 
investigated the idea of a legal science that rationalizes the law by purging it 
of all particular and contingent content and arrives at the universal forms. 
Essentially, this is a process of “de-situating” legal questions, “that is, 
divorcing them from the compromising association of their cultural 
contexts.”13 Thus we abstract away from legal subjects and their contexts all 
particular qualities – particulars that should not be included, as the law should 
treat all parties as free and equal. 
“Means and form, as objects of reason, are public; ends and substance, as 
concerns of desire, are private,” Unger writes. When desiring “men are 
private beings because they can never offer other more than a partial 
justification for their goals in the public language of thought.”14 This inspires 
the formalist project of rationalizing and formalizing the law so that legal 
reason provides a shared and objective public discourse in a deeply divided 
modern society. Formal legal knowledge facilitates reasoning from a shared 
vocabulary that narrows the differences between individuals on the level of 
their particular goals and desires. 
However, the push toward universality that informs this project should not 
be taken too seriously. The forms, fairness and rationality of the law should 
not be presented as a metaphysical foundation for legal institutions and 
practices either. Postmodern anti-foundationalism urges us to regard 
formal/technical law talk as a discourse like any other. Universalization or 
rationalization is not a method that provides us with privileged access to some 
transcendental legal reality. Moreover, there is always the danger that this 
formal knowledge is elevated above the cultural contexts from which they 
were abstracted away. In addition this elevation also threatens to elevate the 
                                           
12 Zijderveld, The Abstract Society, p. 87. 
13 Toulmin, Return to Reason, p. 78. 
14 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 45. 
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“haves” of this knowledge above the “have-nots,” who are often radically 
excluded from the intricate technicalities of modern law.15 
In addition, the idea of the “legal subject” as the result of abstracting away 
from all particular subjects should be critically scrutinized. This subject is 
merely a construction. However, it is a construction with unfortunate or even 
immoral consequences because it has normative power. Human beings are 
always “situated” in linguistic and social contexts that are not unequivocal. 
Thus, like these contexts, humans are “socially and linguistically decentred 
and fragmented.”16 The least we should do is resist the temptation to see the 
abstract subject as “transcendental.” Any scientific formal conception of 
human beings is an abstraction that both denies and represses human 
existence as underdetermined, indeterminate and inexhaustible. Scientific 
formalist conceptions are alienating and de-humanizing. For Roberto Unger 
this culminates in a plea for casuistic analogical reasoning, without the 
mystifications that traditionally accompanied this art:  
 
“Analogical reasoning and knowledge of people are constant companions: the 
interpretation of self-experience and the interpretation of other people’s experience 
provide each other with the analogies that rescue us, if only a little bit, from both 
solipsism and self-obscurity. The suppression of analogical judgment in legal 
thought would, if it could be accomplished, result in a radical dehumanization of the 
law: one method for people, and another for rules. We should rid ourselves of both 
the superstition of conceptual imperialism and the counter-superstition of legal art. 
Practices are practices. They serve multiple, half-articulate purposes, as they also 
shape the aims we can pursue and the possibilities we can entertain. They lack 
permanent essences.”17 
 
But this lack of permanent essences (of practices, of subjects, of the law) can 
be acknowledged without radically changing the daily legal practices. 
Professionals might take an “ironic” stance with regard to the ideals of 
rationality, objectivity and fairness and justify them with reference to political 
                                           
15 Cp. Toulmin, Return to Reason, p. 100. 
16 Best & Kellner, Postmodern Theory, pp. 4, 5; cp. Carty, A. (ed.), Post-Modern Law, 
Enlightenment, Revolution and the Death of Man, Edinburgh University Press Edinburgh 
1990. 
17 Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, p. 62. 
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goods rather than to metaphysics.18 The ironist realizes that nothing has an 
intrinsic nature or a real essence: “So she thinks that the occurrence of a term 
like “just” or “scientific” or “rational” in the final vocabulary of the day is no 
reason to think that Socratic inquiry into the essence of justice or science or 
rationality will take one much beyond the language games of one’s time.”19 
So long as the ironist feels that the language games can be justified with 
reference to important political goods, she self-consciously plays along. 
Surely, such an ironic commitment is not a very solid base and, as there is 
no “intrinsic” good to be served with the formalist attitude, the ironist might 
too easily succumb to instrumental or pragmatic reasoning. We saw how 
instrumentalist purposive reasoning necessarily refers to particular and 
contingent circumstances and thus endangers the ideals of equality, legal 
certainty and “objectivity” (in a non-metaphysical sense). Moreover, with 
regard to the effectiveness and efficiency of legal decisions and actions, 
professionals are at the mercy of (social) scientists, whose claims will be hard 
to assess from the legal angle. 
However, the most important problem is that we may expect an 
unwillingness to submit to any rule of which the subjects do not understand 
the ulterior purpose or the use.20 Legal rules and procedures cannot be goods 
in themselves, and thus do not provide us with an independent criterion. They 
are constantly evaluated by means of a criterion that comes from the outside: 
Does this rule or procedure serve any purpose here? Whether it serves its 
purpose depends on the particular and contingent circumstances. The danger 
is that professionals are constantly forced to discuss the conflict on terms that 
are, ideally, external to the legal formalities. The practices and the institutions 
will be made thoroughly and irremediably relative. This problem cannot be 
resolved, but legal professionals will have to realize that the risk of this quest 
for purpose may be a “naturalization” of the law. 
The modern world is strongly influenced by the positivist’s idea that the 
“scientific method” exhausts rationality itself. Importantly, the forms of 
“verification” allowed by modern science have been institutionalized by 
modern society: “What can be ‘verified’ in the positivist sense can be verified 
                                           
18 Cp. Rawls, Political Liberalism. 
19 Rorty, Contingency, irony and solidarity, pp. 74, 75. 
20 Cp. Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, pp. 177, 178. 
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to be correct […] or to be probably correct, or to be highly successful science, 
as the case may be; and the public recognition of the correctness, of the 
‘highly successful scientific theory’ status, exemplifies, celebrates, and 
reinforces images of knowledge and norms of reasonableness maintained by 
our culture.”21 
This goes a fortiori for those scientific claims regarding the good of 
material or economic progress, “liberating us from drudgery and incapacity 
and giving arms and wings to our desires.”22 But here again abstract and 
formalist reasoning are both a blessing and a curse. “Professionals who are 
committed to particular disciplines, technical or economic, too easily assume 
that economic and technical issues can be abstracted from the situation in 
which they are put to use, and so can be defined in purely disciplinary 
terms.”23 Again this implies a narrowing of the perspective that can have 
unfortunate consequences. To begin with, such reasoning (or calculations) 
promise neutrality and objectivity, and this promise cannot be completely 
fulfilled. Maximizing welfare is political choice and depends not only on 
“doing one’s sums right” but “doing the right sums,” which does imply taking 
notice of the relevant social, historical, and cultural contexts of human needs 
and desires – “in other words, doing calculations that are directly relevant to 
the practical situation in question.”24 
The reference to epistemological foundations with regard to the scientific 
theories is tempting here as well. There is a tendency in the socio-economic 
sciences to think of the data as “facts” found by means of empirical research. 
The scientific theories in which these facts are recorded are representations, 
which, if they are true, correspond to empirical reality. Such a theory grounds 
truth in a metaphysical reality that we do not have any scientific access to. As 
I argue in this book, such foundationalism can be avoided by taking a 
pragmatist stance. “For the pragmatist true sentences are not true because they 
correspond to reality, and so there is no need to worry what sort of reality, if 
any, a given sentence corresponds to – no need to worry about what “makes” 
it true.” But, importantly, this pragmatism stays close to the positivist notion 
                                           
21 Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, p. 106. 
22 Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, p. 6. 
23 Toulmin, Return to Reason, p. 61. 
24 Toulmin, Return to Reason, p. 66. 
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that knowledge is power, a tool for coping with reality. “He drops the notion 
of truth as correspondence with reality altogether, and says that modern 
science does not enable us to cope because it corresponds, it just plain enables 
us to cope.”25 
We thus arrive at a pragmatic positivism that is well aware of the 
shortcomings of de-situated abstract reasoning. But there is yet another point. 
The instrumentalist attitude, just like the legal formalist, reaches “objectivity” 
(again in a non-metaphysical sense) by focusing on means instead of goals. 
Only “means and form, as objects of reason, are public.”26 Modern policy 
science, which exclusively focuses on means, will not provide us with a very 
firm basis for men’s identification with the community. Because this is so, in 
modern society people tend to find substitutes in all sorts of ideology, “myths 
and fables” that, from the perspective of the scientific experts, is mostly 
counterproductive and “irrational.”27 However, both legal formalism and 
scientism are at the root of this; “irrationalism” is their dialectical shadow. 
The constant resurgence of such myths and fables might also be connected 
to the fact that in modern society and in its institutions and associations, 
individuals participate only in partial, distanced and formal roles. “Individuals 
expose only a limited portion of their humanity to their fellows in each of the 
narrow strips of life on which they meet.” 28 Modern society makes it possible 
for people to share certain purposes or interests, but makes it very hard to 
shape the various groups into a full-blooded community, since this requires 
seeing the individual members as complete persons instead as merely 
jobholders or formal role-occupants. The interaction may be rational and 
efficient when it concerns the allocation of scarce means and resources; it is 
in shared narratives and moral universes that human beings feel fully human. 
Compare Charles Taylor: 
 
“One of the great objections against Enlightenment disengagement was that it 
created barriers and divisions: between humans and nature; and perhaps even more 
grievously, within humans themselves; and then also, as a further consequence, 
between human and human. This last seems to follow both because of the atomist 
                                           
25 Dale, In Pursuit of a Scientific Culture, pp. 158, 159.  
26 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 45. 
27 Taylor, Hegel, p. 411. 
28 Unger, Law in modern society, p. 168. 
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affinities of naturalism and because the purely instrumental stance to things allows 
for no deeper unity in society than that of sharing certain common interests.”29 
 
Disciplinary emphasis on the technicalities of the human sciences imposes a 
set of “professional blinders that direct their attention to certain narrowly 
defined considerations, and often prevent them from looking at their work in a 
broad human perspective.”30 But if both the formalist and the pragmatist legal 
experts succeed in resisting the inclination to define their own field with its 
specialized theories and methods, as the final reality, they might become both 
more modest and more sensitive to the complexity of what transcends his 
world and knowledge.31 This is particularly difficult for the pragmatist 
because she is very much oriented towards concrete and deliberate action as 
she constantly sees room for improvement and progress. Indeed, many of 
these ideals could be realized if to achieve them were the sole aim of 
humanity. Regrettably, there are an infinite number of good things of which 
we cannot hope to achieve more than a few within our lifetime. Von Hayek:  
 
“That these things cannot be all done at the same time, that any one of them can be 
achieved only at the sacrifice of others, can be seen only by taking account of 
factors which fall outside any specialism, which can be appreciated only by a 
painful intellectual effort – the more painful as it forces us to see against a wider 
background the objects to which most of our labors are directed and to balance them 
against others which lie outside our immediate interest and for which, for that 
reason, we care less.”32 
 
Modern science and philosophy have introduced several distinctions and 
dichotomies that have been institutionalized in modern society. To establish 
man’s moral independence and technological power, the Enlightenment 
project works from man’s separation from nature, society, and the “other” 
generally. The result is the alienation of the individual – the subject – from 
objectified nature, from an oppressive community, and from other human 
beings. It created barriers and divisions among human beings, but also 
                                           
29 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 383. 
30 Toulmin, Return to Reason, p. 140. 
31 Zijderveld, The Abstract Society, pp. 83, 84; Toulmin, Return to Reason, p. 140 
32 Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 60. 
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“within humans themselves” – like the division between reason, which is 
objective, and desire, which is subjective. Modern man therefore moves “in 
two worlds only precariously bound together.”33 Moreover, the modern world 
leaves much to be desired. Consider these words of David Kolb: 
 
“Our world of universal imposition carries out fully the understanding of the being 
of things in terms of presence that has been with the West since the Greeks. Our 
world fulfills the Platonic desire for the essential being of things to be open and 
steadily present, but we have no transcendent dimension or any goal for eros. We 
have Hegelian mutual connection and transparency, but without dialectical tension 
and depth. It is achieved will to power but without Nietzsche’s contention and 
shifting perspective. This world would be familiar to Comte: open facts ready for 
recording and manipulation but without Comte’s religion of humanity.”34 
 
In response to these barriers and divisions, and the lack of goals, tension, 
depth, contention, shifting perspectives and humanism in the modern world, 
nineteenth-century intellectual history was, according to Peter Allen Dale, in 
essence a search for “an adequate replacement for the lost Christian totality” 
with “Romanticism” as its most significant offshoot. The Romantic 
Movement proceeded from a critique of Enlightenment values and the 
“wasteland” that the French revolution left behind. This movement “was bent 
on remaking Christianity for the modern world, secularizing it as a 
metaphysical idea of social and individual wholeness, in which all the great 
enlightenment antinomies, mind and nature, infinite and finite, self and other, 
might be reconciled anew.”35  
This quest remains alive in a “critical counter-culture” that rejects the 
conventional morality of the Enlightenment and in “aesthetic modernism” 
emerging in “avant-garde modernist movements and bohemian subcultures, 
which rebelled against the alienating aspects of industrialization and 
rationalization, while seeking to transform culture and to find creative self-
realization in art.”36 Especially modern art was thought to have a 
“dislocating” or even “transformative” quality that disrupted the one-
                                           
33 Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 45. 
34 Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 148. 
35 Dale, In Pursuit of a Scientific Culture, p. 5. 
36 Best & Kellner, Postmodern Theory, pp. 2, 3. 
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dimensional and objectifying perspective of modern man such that new ways 
of seeing and experiencing become possible. This, in turn, fed the hope that 
cultural change might advance social change. In chapter five, I explored the 
form this critical counter-culture takes in the legal world. 
Romanticism and aesthetic modernism often took on a metaphysical guise. 
For instance, Nietzsche’s metaphysics of the “will to power” and his call for 
“aesthetic self-realization” fit this ideal well. Also Heidegger explicitly 
engaged in a metaphysical quest, trying to deconstruct the modern 
technological perspective, which is the result of a “forgetting of being,” and 
restoring a perspective that overcomes the separation of subject to object thus 
once again opening up to the richness, multiplicity and diversity of being. 
Heidegger’s existentialism can be seen as a reaction to modern abstract 
bourgeois society.37 
But here, too, we are urged to radically resist the metaphysical seduction 
because it cannot be other than a longing for foundations that we just do not 
have any access to. Moreover, modernist aestheticism “is open to the 
postmodern critique [because] it glorifies the author.”38 The idea of some 
author’s intention or genius as a unified and autonomous source of meaning is 
philosophically incoherent. There is no such clear-cut and heroic “subject” 
determining the meaning of the artifact, heroically undermining and 
transforming the social conventions and “revaluating all values.” 
Postmodernists argue against the dogmatic moralism, the stifling seriousness 
and elitism of modernism and plead for pluralism, irony and the bridging of 
the gap between artists and audience, critics and the laity.39 
However, we need to save some of the modernist seriousness and 
commitment. According to Roberto Unger the modernist quest can proceed 
without a longing for some metaphysical “terminal station” and even without 
the belief that we can expect any real progress with the revision of his social 
and cultural contexts. The full potentiality of human beings is always limited 
by these contexts, and Unger therefore calls for a constant fight for a critical 
independence to keep our minds open for something else. Therefore the 
modernist fights his “perpetual war against the fact of contextuality, a war 
                                           
37 Cp. Zijderveld, The Institutional Imperative, p. 50. 
38 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, p. 347. 
39 Best  & Kellner, Postmodern Theory, pp. 10-14. 
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that he cannot hope to win but that he must continue to wage.”40 To this effect 
we need a critical distance, and we should constantly put “our ideals and self-
understandings through the skeptic’s flame, risking nihilism for the sake of 
insight.”41 
 
According to Lawrence Friedman, legal practices are always the expression of 
“moral hegemony” in a society, and without a doubt, these practices carry the 
“imprimatur of state and society.” Law, he argues, “has the sole franchise on 
official norms. It holds the monopoly of legitimate violence, and it expresses 
what was intended to be a monopoly of legitimacy itself.” The legal 
professional self-consciously acknowledges that the legal system cannot help 
to “enforce prevailing moral standards.”42 Moreover, to protect its fragile 
authority and not risk alienating the public, the law should not distance itself 
too much from the prevailing moral standards. The promise of modern legal 
professionalism still includes guarding the authority of the law by keeping it 
in close interaction with mainstream morality. But, surely, the good that is 
served is an ambivalent good; it needs to be carefully balanced with other 
goods – goods that are, however, just as ambivalent. 
The law’s entwinement with politics and the prevailing morality is a 
reason why, measured against Richard Posner’s standards of professionalism, 
the law’s professionalization “has not proceeded far at all.”43 The 
effectiveness and efficiency of legal practices and institutions still leave much 
to be desired. The demand to be responsive to the desires within the political 
community and to be effective in the realization of the goals that it sets itself, 
can only be ignored at the risk of losing legitimacy. But here again this good 
cannot claim priority at all costs because it is, again, an ambivalent good. To 
mitigate its dangerous side effects, we need to commit to other goods the law 
serves. One set of such goods can be ordered under the citizen’s demand for 
equal respect, objectivity, transparency and fairness from both the 
government and legal officials in the modern liberal state. But here again the 
good of liberal respect and the formalist ideal of the rule of law is an 
                                           
40 Unger, Passion, p. 36. 
41 Unger, Passion, p. ix. 
42 Friedman, The Republic of Choice, p. 71. 
43 Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, p. 203. 
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ambivalent good, and under certain circumstances, we need to be prepared to 
take a critical stance, or even distance from this demand also.  
Legal practices are therefore the permanent stage of fundamental political 
and moral conflict and strife: “What was withdrawn from the main staging 
ground of politics and culture, reappears, however, under the disguise of 
technical expertise, in the practice and discourse of the professions.”44 As 
Weber writes: “Our civilization destines us to realize more clearly these 
struggles again, after our eyes have been blinded for a thousand years – 
blinded by the allegedly or presumably exclusive orientation towards the 
grandiose moral fervor of Christian ethics.”45 The existentialist conclusion 
that we reach is that these choices and decisions cannot be unequivocally 
dictated by some kind of logic; legal practices are the stage for inevitably 
ungrounded choices. “This is the source of Weber’s doctrine of the difference 
between “facts” and “values,” of the inevitable choice that one always makes 
when one decides what to do.” 46 
Indeed, legal practices are the stage for the most fundamental ideological 
conflicts of the conflicting themes of traditionalism and modernism or those 
between – “on the one hand, the values of community, moral authority, 
hierarchy, and the sacred and, on the other hand, individualism, equality, 
moral release, and rationalist techniques of organization and power.”47 What 
emerges is a jurist who tries to be a loyal and trustworthy “insider” and a 
critical and innovative “outsider” at the same time. “There emerges the 
characteristic figure of the modern jurist who wants – and needs – to combine 
the cachet of theoretical refinement, the modernist posture of seeing through 
everything, with the reliability of the technician whose results remain close to 
the mainstream of professional and social consensus.”48 
One might call this a cynical posture, as Unger does, but one might also 
appreciate this legal professional for not being too dogmatic and too self-
important, for not trying to single-mindedly impose on the community one 
particular good as the result of his need for integrity or authenticity. 
                                           
44 Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become?, pp. 113. 
45 Weber, ‘Science as a Vocation,’ in: Gerth & Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, p. 
149. 
46 Collins, Max Weber, p. 36 (emphasis added). 
47 Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition, p. ix. 
48 Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, p. 10. 
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Postmodern authority, ironic formalism, pragmatic positivism and anti-
foundationalist modernism, each cannot claim exclusivity. Indeed, they 
should not do so for the goods that are served in the modern world are 
structurally ambivalent, and this amplifies the modern or postmodern 
appreciation of “pluralism” as something that we should not try to overcome 
but as a good in itself. In other words, in an open society, diversity has 
become part of our ideal world, and even the tragic tension that we 
necessarily experience between our ideals – as the fulfillment of some ideals 
always excludes the fulfillment of others – has become valuable as it 
constantly reminds us of our human limitations and imperfection. 
We end up with a “legal junction” and conclude that we cannot reduce the 
junction to a one-way road to salvation by resolving the fundamental tensions 
in modern law. But this is not a plea for “anything goes” relativism. Such 
relativism seems to be merely the mirror-image of the dogmatic demand for 
absolute (metaphysical) guarantees. There is no need to conclude that any 
wild opinion is as good as any other. There is still room for objectivity with 
regard to both morality and facts resulting from rational argument or 
empirical research.49 This is not to suggest that abandoning the quest for 
metaphysical guarantees is but a minor feat; indeed, by doing so, the world 
does take on a new appearance. At the same time this is not a radically new 
world, especially not for modern legal professionals who as “connoisseurs of 
chaos” specialize in making decisions under conditions of uncertainty. 
 
                                           
49 Cp. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, pp. 126, 148. 
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Nederlandse samenvatting 
 
De moderne jurist wordt in de dagelijkse praktijk geconfronteerd met een 
verwarrend geheel van verwachtingen en verplichtingen. Sterker nog, vaak 
lijken de eisen die aan juridische professionaliteit worden gesteld innerlijk 
tegenstrijdig. In dit proefschrift wil ik deze ervaring van tegenstrijdigheid 
onderzoeken. Als we er van uitgaan dat professionalisme (ten opzichte van 
amateurisme) een bepaalde belofte inhoudt dan is de vraag: wat is de 
specifieke belofte van de moderne juridische professional? Het antwoord dat 
in deze studie wordt gepresenteerd is een complex antwoord. Deze 
complexiteit ontstaat omdat in de huidige praktijk de volgende vier beloftes te 
onderscheiden zijn: 
 
De jurist bewaakt het gezag van het recht en zijn representanten. 
De jurist realiseert transparantie en rechtszekerheid. 
De jurist is effectief en efficiënt. 
De jurist heeft een open, kritische, en innovatieve houding, en durft initiatief 
te nemen om tot grotere (maatschappelijke) rechtvaardigheid te komen. 
 
Deze eisen laten zich goed begrijpen vanuit vier verschillende 
waardeoriëntaties die in onze samenleving toonaangevend zijn. In hoofdstuk 1 
onderzoek in op een inleidende wijze deze oriëntaties: gemeenschap, vrijheid, 
technologie en cultuur- of maatschappijkritiek. Deze waardeoriëntaties staan 
binnen een moderne pluriforme cultuur op gespannen voet met elkaar en dit 
spiegelt zich in de theorie én de praktijk van het recht. Als we elk van de vier 
eisen absoluut nemen dan levert dat een specifieke consistente opvatting van 
juridische professionaliteit op. Als we die vier ideaaltypische juristen 
vervolgens met elkaar confronteren, kunnen we de spanningen op het spoor 
komen die het moderne recht kenmerken. 
In de inleiding en het eerste hoofdstuk leg ik mijn methode nader uit. De 
constructie van een ideaaltypische jurist vanuit één van de bovengenoemde 
waarden vereist het begrijpen (in de zin van Verstehen) van een bepaalde 
professionele houding, van bepaalde kennisclaims en van de instituties die 
door deze waarde geïnformeerd zijn. Zolang deze houding, kennis en 
instituties als waardevol worden beschouwd in de gemeenschap, houdt de 
daarbij horende opvatting van professionaliteit zijn specifieke 
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aantrekkingskracht. Met andere woorden, de achterliggende waarden 
rechtvaardigen de professionele houding, de kennisclaims en de instituties 
waarmee deze waarde gerealiseerd kan worden.  
De conclusie zal zijn dat de moderne juridische professional vier 
verschillende waardeoriëntaties dient die niet altijd even goed met elkaar te 
verenigen zijn. Sterker nog, de vier waarden zijn structureel ambivalent en we 
blijven dus achter met een “juridisch knooppunt.” De dilemma’s laten zich 
echter niet a priori op theoretisch niveau oplossen, ik probeer de knoop alleen 
te ontwarren om zo de professionele dilemma’s van de moderne jurist beter 
begrijpen.  
 
De kunst van gezag 
Het gezag van het recht laat zich verbinden met de waarde van gemeenschap. 
Vooral het verlangen naar een gemeenschap van gedeelde waarden, gebruiken 
en betekenissen biedt een sterke legitimatie voor juridisch handelen. Een 
professioneel engagement met autoriteit en gemeenschap leidt tot een meer 
traditionele opvatting van juridische professionaliteit. De juridische traditie 
laat zich dan begrijpen als een  door generaties juristen tot recht gevormde 
geheel van waarden, gebruiken en gedeelde betekenissen in de gemeenschap. 
In hoofdstuk 2 construeer ik vanuit dit idee een traditioneel type van 
juridische professionaliteit. 
De juridische traditie laat zich niet geheel in abstracte of formele termen 
beschrijven, noch laat het zich begrijpen middels een afstandelijke kritisch-
analytische houding. Integendeel, de jurist wordt geacht zich te laten vormen 
door de traditie en zich te committeren aan de instituties en gebruiken van het 
recht. Een goede jurist wordt binnen de beroepsgroep ingewijd in de 
juridische praktijken en gebruiken die hij wordt geacht op een onafhankelijke 
en onpartijdige wijze te dienen. De jurist moet zich aan de juridische traditie 
‘geven’ en hier past een hermeneutische houding, waarbij hij zich persoonlijk 
identificeert met het recht als geheel van juridische normen en waarden die 
gemeenschap mogelijk maken.  
De waarden van het recht maken “substantiële rationaliteit” mogelijk: in 
concrete geschillen wordt een rechtvaardige oplossing gevonden. De 
vertaalslag van de waarden van de gemeenschap naar het concrete geval 
vereist het begrijpen en kunnen uitleggen van het recht (hermeneutiek) en 
praktische wijsheid. Deze moet worden gevormd door een intensieve 
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juridische training en door ervaring. Juridische praktische wijsheid laat zich 
het best begrijpen als een “kunst”: de kunst van het verenigen van individuele 
leden van de gemeenschap in gedeelde waarden of een gedeeld belang in een 
specifieke situatie. Een dergelijk juist juridisch oordeel kan de leden van de 
gemeenschap werkelijk verzoenen: de individuele belangen die hen verdeeld 
hield worden overwonnen en de partijen weten weer wat hen werkelijk bindt 
als leden van de gemeenschap. 
Dit type jurist bewaakt zo de gemeenschap in situaties waar conflict dreigt 
te escaleren en de eenheid wordt bedreigd. Dit idee van de jurist als een loyale 
en onafhankelijke bewaker van de gemeenschap draagt bij aan het gezag van 
de jurist en aan het wekken van een betrouwbare indruk in de gemeenschap. 
Dit gezag is echter kwetsbaar en lijkt zelfs een kwestie te zijn van alles of 
niets. Óf de gezagsdrager is daadwerkelijk de vertegenwoordiger van de 
gemeenschap en de verdediger van haar waarden en belangen, óf de 
gezagsdrager is een ‘bedrieger’ die de collectieve macht die hij 
vertegenwoordigt gebruikt om deelbelangen, of zijn eigenbelang te dienen. 
Ongefundeerde roddel en achterklap kunnen al een dermate reputatieschade 
opleveren dat de autoriteit niet meer kan functioneren en dit verklaart waarom 
er speciale instituties bestaan die de juridische autoriteiten moeten 
beschermen tegen dergelijke aantasting van het gezag. Deze instituties – de 
levenslange aanstelling van de rechter, het procesmonopolie en de vaste 
declaratie van de advocaat bijvoorbeeld – maken het mogelijk dat de jurist 
onafhankelijk en belangeloos kan opereren. 
Deze traditionele jurist zal zijn handelen rechtvaardigen door te verwijzen 
naar het algemene belang, of naar de waarden die gemeenschap mogelijk 
maken en beschouwd het nastreven van het individuele eigenbelang in de 
maatschappij of op de vrije markt als bedreigend voor de gemeenschap 
(omdat het kan leiden tot conflict en onverzoenlijkheid). De jurist zal zich dus 
ook, middels een betrekkelijk aristocratische houding, distingeren van de 
moderne maatschappij waar deelbelangen of zelfs individueel eigenbelang het 
handelen bepalen. Hij moet bovendien institutioneel worden afgeschermd van 
het oordeel van de leden in de maatschappij omdat juridische kennis en 
juridisch handelen niet goed te beoordelen zijn voor de leek. Omdat zijn 
gezag kwetsbaar is, is het wenselijk dat de jurist alleen door gelijken wordt 
beoordeeld. Als er klachten zijn over het functioneren van juridische 
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professionals zal hij door een tribunaal van peers worden beoordeeld en 
eventueel gewaarschuwd of gestraft. 
De juridische professional verbindt in het ideale geval zijn persoonlijke eer 
aan het feit dat hij de gemeenschap als geheel dient en ervaart dus ook geen 
scherp onderscheid tussen zijn private persoon en zijn publieke persoon als 
ambtsdrager. Deze jurist zal zijn persoonlijke private belang structureel 
ondergeschikt maken aan het publieke belang. Dat is een kwestie van 
noblesse oblige voor hem, want hij is zich zijn publieke verantwoordelijkheid 
voortdurend bewust. Deze professional is dus ook trots op zijn beroep, op de 
beroepsgroep waar hij toe behoort, en op de belangrijke rol die deze speelt in 
de gemeenschap. Hij spiegelt zich aan de meest voorbeeldige, succesvolle 
leden van de beroepsgroep en probeert zo te voldoen aan de standaarden van 
professionele perfectie die in de groep leven. Dit levert ook een hiërarchische 
professionele (sub-) cultuur op die versterkt wordt door de institutionele 
hiërarchie. Deze hiërarchie mondt uit in één hoogste rechtsprekende instantie 
die het mogelijk maakt dat het recht met één mond spreekt. 
Deze traditionele opvatting laat zich vervolgens contrasteren met twee 
moderne opvattingen van professionaliteit die respectievelijk kunnen worden 
begrepen vanuit de moderne waarden van individuele autonomie en van de 
effectiviteit van de overheid in het realiseren van de doelen die de 
democratische gemeenschap zichzelf stelt.  
 
Vrijheid en formalisme 
In de moderne politieke cultuur wordt algemeen aanvaard dat de waarde van 
individuele vrijheid en ontplooiing bescherming verdient. Als we deze waarde 
centraal stellen zien we dat de opvattingen over recht en de daarmee 
samenhangende opvattingen over juridische professionaliteit veranderen want 
vanuit de eis van bescherming van het individu rijst een veel formalistischer 
en proceduralistischer beeld op van recht en juridische professionaliteit dan 
het traditionele beeld te zien gaf. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt dit perspectief nader 
onderzocht. 
De veranderingen in het recht gaan gepaard aan ontwikkelingen die de 
moderne maatschappijen typisch doormaken. Twee belangrijke kenmerken 
van moderne samenlevingen zijn, ten eerste, voortdurende sociaal-culturele 
verandering en, ten tweede, geografische en sociale mobiliteit. Deze 
dynamiek in moderne maatschappijen kan worden gezien als het gevolg van 
 331 
industrialisatie en van (rationeel-) kapitalisme. Het gevolg van alle beweging 
is een ‘maatschappij van vreemdelingen,’ individuen die minder intensief met 
elkaar in contact komen, waardoor ze ook abstracter voor elkaar blijven.  
Deze individuen ontrekken zich ook gemakkelijker aan de autoriteiten en 
aan de gemeenschappelijke waarden, gebruiken en betekenissen van de 
gemeenschap. Hierdoor wordt een groter pluralisme mogelijk en er kan zelfs 
een cultuur ontstaan waarin juist het vinden en ontwikkelen van je unieke of 
‘authentieke’ zelf een belangrijke waarde wordt. Ieder kritiekloos 
conformisme aan voorbepaalde waarden en rollen wordt verdacht en gezien 
als valse schijn. De vraag is echter hoe in deze pluralistische “maatschappij 
van vreemdelingen” nog een (juridische) orde kan worden gerealiseerd?  
Dat kan door de mensen aan te spreken op hun redelijkheid. Individuele 
vrijheid en orde gaan samen als individuen zich realiseren dat voor een 
vreedzame en succesvolle samenleving duidelijke regels en procedures nodig 
zijn waar iedereen zich aan houdt. De ervaring van de “maatschappij van 
vreemden” suggereert het beginpunt van deze nieuwe redelijke orde: ieder 
subject is gelijk in een abstracte zin. Dit abstracte (rechts-) subject wordt 
gezien als autonoom en verantwoordelijk voor zijn handelen juist omdat hij 
vrij en gelijk is. Omdat een systeem van juridische regels en procedures een 
gemeenschap mogelijk maakt, is het redelijk zich aan deze regels en 
procedures te houden want deze maken uiteindelijk ook vrijheid mogelijk. De 
juridische regels reguleren een publiek domein en de individu die zich hieraan 
conformeert en binnen de regels blijft, is verder vrij in het bepalen van zijn 
eigen normen, waarden en doelen. 
Om paternalisme en moralisme door autoriteiten (door de overheid, maar 
ook door juridische professionals) te voorkomen moet de lijn tussen publieke 
juridische gebondenheid en private individuele vrijheid zo scherp mogelijk 
zijn. Het recht moet daartoe tot een systeem van heldere en duidelijke 
procedures, regels en sancties worden gemaakt en hier ligt een taak voor de 
moderne rechtswetenschap. Het rechtssubject mag niet meer afhankelijk zijn 
van het onnavolgbare en oncontroleerbare oordeel van de jurist, maar moet de 
juridische waarheid direct uit de wet of andere rechtsbronnen kunnen leren 
kennen. In het ideale geval is rechtsspraak nu een mechanische toepassing van 
vooraf kenbare juridische regels en procedures. Dit is om verschillende 
redenen een onbereikbaar ideaal, maar het gelijke respect dat de iedere vrije 
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individu verdient vereist dat de jurist naar voorspelbaarheid, transparantie en 
naar een gelijke behandeling streeft. 
Omdat juristen nu een meer afstandelijke kritisch-analytische houding 
innemen zien we een heel andere juridische cultuur ontstaan. De traditie 
wordt niet hermeneutisch maar kritisch op haar formele redelijkheid 
onderzocht. Juridische instituties and procedures worden zodanig 
‘gerationaliseerd’ dat er een abstract formeel systeem van regels kan worden 
geformuleerd dat zich ondubbelzinnig laat codificeren en toepassen. Gezocht 
wordt naar universaliteit, transparantie en communiceerbaarheid. Er is niet 
langer een streven naar “substantiële rationaliteit” maar naar “formele 
rationaliteit”. De moderne jurist wordt gezien als niet meer dan een expert op 
het gebied van het formele, positieve recht. Het vergt geen Bildung of  
historisch bewustzijn, of andere bijzondere talenten of eigenschappen om een 
dergelijke expert te worden. Bepaalde analytische vaardigheden en formele 
kennis van het formele, gepositiveerde recht is nu voldoende. 
Een sterke onderlinge solidariteit tussen de juristen is ook niet meer nodig. 
De gemeenschap van juristen wordt ook een “maatschappij van 
vreemdelingen” en de interactie in de opleiding en in de dagelijkse praktijk 
wordt minder intensief. De onderlinge verhoudingen worden hier ook 
geformaliseerd en de uiterste consequentie is dat hier formele regels 
(gedragscodes) worden opgesteld om de juristen voor te schrijven hoe ze zich 
in bepaalde situaties moeten gedragen. Deze regels beschermen ook de jurist 
tegen aantasting van hun formele gezag. Ze zullen elkaar alleen corrigeren als 
het handelen duidelijk in strijd is met deze codes en het liefst deze correctie 
over laten aan een centrale autoriteit. 
Niet langer wordt geprobeerd om partijen met een beroep op de 
gemeenschapszin te verzoenen. Juristen zullen niet moraliseren met 
betrekking tot gemeenschappelijke waarden en normen, maar proberen de 
partijen louter aan te spreken op hun redelijkheid. Het beschrijven van 
conflictbeslechting als een esoterische “kunst” is elitair en verhult een 
onderliggend paternalisme en moralisme. De jurist als ‘expert professional’ 
pretendeert echter geen bijzondere kennis te hebben van de waarden en 
betekenissen die de gemeenschap binden. Deze juridische expert claimt alleen 
kennis van de formele regels en procedures en hoe die moeten worden 
toegepast en de gemeenschap die deze jurist bewaakt is niet meer dan een 
formele gemeenschap: een rechtsstaat als “een glazen huis.” 
 333 
Deze expert brengt een scherpe scheiding aan tussen zijn publieke persoon 
(een persoon met een formele rol in de gemeenschap) en zijn ‘echte’ 
authentieke zelf die hij bewaart voor zijn privé-leven. Er hoeft geen 
persoonlijk engagement te zijn in de publieke rol; sterker nog, dat engagement 
zal door partijen als moralistisch of vooringenomen worden gezien. De 
partijen in het geding willen dat hun persoonlijke waarden en belangen 
voorop staan en op een transparante wijze worden getoetst aan het bestaande 
stelsel van juridische normen. 
De juridische expert kan, als hij formeel juist handelt, een indruk van 
onafhankelijkheid en onpartijdigheid wekken. Het gezag van het recht zit niet 
in het welgevormde oordeelsvermogen en het karakter van de door de traditie 
en het beroep gevormde jurist, maar in het recht als een formeel consistent 
systeem van regels en procedures want een hieruit afgeleid juridisch oordeel 
wordt aanvaard als neutraal en onpersoonlijk. De jurist is onafhankelijk en 
onpartijdig omdat hij niet meer is dan een ‘spreekbuis’ van de algemeen 
geldende en in algemene termen geformuleerde wet. Bovendien is het 
juridische regelsysteem voor iedereen gelijk en maakt maatschappelijke status 
of rol ook niet meer uit. De universaliteit van een dergelijk oordeel benadert 
dat van de universaliteit van de rede. De standaarden van professionele juist 
handelen worden daarmee zuiver formele standaarden en de institutionele 
hiërarchie wordt een zuiver formele hiërarchie die alleen door de rede wordt 
voorgeschreven. De hiërarchie is wel nog steeds nodig om fouten te 
corrigeren en het recht met één mond te laten spreken. 
In het ideale geval hoeft deze jurist niet in het bijzonder van de 
maatschappij te worden afgeschermd omdat zijn handelen transparant en 
redelijk is. Ieder persoon die beschikt over voldoende analytische 
vaardigheden en kennis van het recht kan het juridische handelen narekenen 
en/of voorspellen. Juridisch juist redeneren laat zich gemakkelijk 
onderscheiden van juridisch onjuist redeneren en de fouten zullen in de 
procedures worden gevonden en gecorrigeerd. De indruk dat juridische 
professionals onderling het hand boven het hoofd houden zal verder 
maatschappelijk onaanvaardbaar zijn en alleen teveel fouten zal het “legaal-
rationele gezag” van de jurist aantasten.  
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Alle macht aan het volk 
De moderne wereld is niet alleen een wereld van een grote geografische en 
sociale mobiliteit, ze is ook een wereld waarin technologie een bijzonder 
grote rol speelt. Moderne technologie en mobiliteit zijn natuurlijk zelfs sterk 
met elkaar verbonden. De moderne wetenschap heeft de moderne mens niet 
alleen een enorme kennis opgeleverd over onze natuurlijke én sociale 
omgeving, maar ons ook de middelen gegeven om deze omgeving te 
beïnvloeden: technologie. In het vierde hoofdstuk wordt onderzoekt wat dit 
voor de politieke cultuur en het recht betekent. 
Nu de moderne mens grote technologische macht heeft, rijst de vraag wat 
hij met deze macht moeten doen. Iedere moderne gemeenschap moet 
maatschappelijke doelen formuleren en in een pluralistische moderne 
samenleving zijn deze niet vanzelfsprekend en vooraf gegeven. Democratie is 
een oplossing voor dit probleem: de meerderheid beslist. Omdat democratie 
sterk lijkt te zijn verbonden met de technologische cultuur (als je geen macht 
hebt over je sociale en natuurlijke omgeving hoef je geen doelen te 
formuleren en dient de democratie nergens toe) legitimeren democratisch 
gekozen bestuurders zich ook door middel van het formuleren van 
gemeenschappelijke doelen en gaat de politieke discussie voor een 
belangrijke deel over de verdeling van de schaarse middelen waarmee deze 
kunnen worden gerealiseerd. 
Het recht is een heel belangrijk instrument voor het realiseren van veel van 
dergelijke politieke doelen. Het recht is dan geen doel op zich meer, maar een 
middel waarmee door de politiek geformuleerde “extrinsieke” doelen moeten 
worden gerealiseerd. De rechtvaardiging van het recht ligt ook in de 
democratisch gelegitimeerde doelen en daarmee buiten het recht. Dit biedt 
echter een nieuwe kans voor de verwetenschappelijking van het recht. In 
tegenstelling tot allerlei normatieve en “intrinsieke” rechtvaardigingen van het 
recht, kunnen deze externe doelen worden geformuleerd in concrete, 
empirisch meetbare termen. We kunnen dan onderzoeken of in de juridische 
praktijk deze doelen ook daadwerkelijk worden gerealiseerd, of dat het 
systeem bijsturing behoeft. 
Als de doelen worden gerealiseerd kunnen we ook nagaan of dit op een 
efficiënte wijze gebeurt. Het aantal doelen dat de democratische gemeenschap 
zich stelt kan in principe oneindig zijn, maar de middelen zijn altijd schaars. 
Dus is de inzet van schaarse middelen een voortdurend onderwerp van debat 
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in de democratie en efficiëntie biedt een norm waarmee velen in redelijkheid 
zullen instemmen. Immers, hoe efficiënter we de middelen inzetten hoe meer 
doelen we kunnen realiseren. Er is bovendien een vrij brede consensus 
ontstaan over de vraag hoe we de middelen in de gemeenschap kunnen 
maximaliseren. Het vrije markt kapitalisme maakt een steeds groeiende 
welvaart mogelijk die vervolgens het realiseren van allerlei maatschappelijke 
doelen mogelijk maakt. 
Het recht wordt nu gezien als een systeem van regels en procedures dat 
buiten zichzelf gelegen doelen dient, doelen die zo concreet mogelijk zijn 
geformuleerd en die juristen op zo efficiënt mogelijke wijze moeten 
realiseren. Dit vraagt een heel nieuw professioneel ethos. De jurist die het 
recht als autonoom ziet en die zich zuiver analytisch en formalistisch opstelt, 
wordt nu beschouwd als bijziend en rigide. De jurist moet oog krijgen voor de 
maatschappelijke effecten (en effectiviteit) van zijn handelen en veel 
kostenbewuster worden. De jurist moet op een verantwoorde manier een 
kosten–baten analyse maken en zich niet verschuilen achter de formele regels 
en procedures en de vage normatieve doelen die deze zouden dienen. 
We kunnen er overigens niet op rekenen dat juristen uit zichzelf 
doelmatiger en efficiënter zullen worden. Juristen hebben er belang bij om 
zeer algemene waarden en vage doelen als legitimatie voor hun handelen te 
noemen. Of deze daadwerkelijk worden gerealiseerd laat zich immers niet 
controleren en dus kunnen ze daar niet concreet op worden afgerekend. Een 
realistisch beleid om juristen effectiever en efficiënter te maken richt zich ook 
niet op de rede of op het overtuigen van de juristen, maar direct op hun 
concrete belangen. In de rechtsspraak zou zich dit kunnen vertalen in het 
formuleren van concrete en meetbare productiedoelen. Er zal een informeel of 
zelfs formeel sanctiestelsel in het leven worden geroepen die de rechters een 
incentive bieden om bepaalde productie quota te halen en efficiënt om te gaan 
de beperkte (financiële) middelen van de rechtbanken. 
Voor advocaten of notarissen kan de vrije markt kan hier een rol spelen. 
Het herformuleren van juridisch werk als een doodgewone ‘dienst’ als iedere 
andere, een dienst waar ook gewoon een markt voor kan bestaan, maakt het 
mogelijk om de vragers op deze markt meer invloed te geven op de 
professionals. De professionals worden gedwongen zich meer gelegen te laten 
liggen aan de eis van effectiviteit en efficiëntie door de klanten omdat ze 
anders van het marktplein zullen worden weggeconcurreerd. De markt maakt 
 336  
het belang van de aanbieders congruent met die van de vragers en zo worden 
professionals uit hun ivoren toren gehaald en op het niveau van hun eigen 
belang om een inkomen te verwerven beïnvloed. 
Dit werkt ook andersom. De moderne, pragmatische jurist moet zijn blik 
gefixeerd houden op de concreet te realiseren maatschappelijke doelen en de 
kosten in de hand houden. Om de doelen te realiseren moet het recht zich 
richten op de burgers als rationele behartigers van hun eigenbelang en moeten 
juristen niet al te naïef en idealistisch zijn over hoe mensen tot het 
maatschappelijk gewenste handelen kunnen worden gebracht. De jurist zal het 
effectiefst en efficiëntst zijn als hij door alle ideologische rechtvaardigingen 
heen prikt en zoveel mogelijk probeert de concrete belangenafwegingen van 
de burger te beïnvloeden. Dit kan door de preferenties, belangen en de 
rationele afwegingen van de burgers te manipuleren. 
Net als het recht is ook de rede is geen doel op zich maar een instrument 
voor het realiseren van buiten haar gelegen doelen. Een effectief en efficiënt 
recht vraagt dus niet een zuiver kritisch-analytische houding van de juridische 
professionals. Daar waar de formalist zich focust op het conceptuele niveau 
van het recht, wordt de pragmatist een “social engineer,” of een “case 
manager” met een scherp oog voor de feiten. Deze jurist heeft een empirische 
en technologische blik, gaat pragmatisch te werk en laat zich niet (mis-) 
leiden door allerlei vage waarden en ideologische retoriek. Juridisch 
oordeelsvermogen en conflictbeslechting wordt nu vooral een kwestie van het 
afwegen en beïnvloeden van concrete, maatschappelijke doelen en belangen.   
De juridische instituties en procedures worden nu ook op hun effectiviteit 
en efficiency getoetst en middels de instrumentele rede gerationaliseerd. Met 
name de instituties die de jurist moeten beschermen tegen invloed vanuit de 
maatschappij worden nu met het nodige wantrouwen bekeken. Deze 
instituties worden gerechtvaardigd door de behoefte aan onafhankelijke en 
belangeloze professionals. Maar in het huidige perspectief is belangeloosheid 
en onafhankelijkheid een fictie (een typisch professionele ideologie) die 
vooral dient om de belangen van de juridische professional te verhullen. 
Niets is meer heilig of onaantastbaar in een technologische democratie en 
dat betekent dat de instituties die de juridische professionals zo onaantastbaar 
lijken te maken, kunnen worden hervormd. Als de politieke gemeenschap 
effectiviteit en efficiency wil, dan is er geen enkele rechtvaardiging te 
bedenken voor het uitzonderen van de juridische professional. De claim van 
 337 
praktische wijsheid en inzicht in de basale waarden die de gemeenschap 
constitueren van de traditionele jurist zal, net als de claim van formeel-
juridische expertise als een waarde op zich van de formalist, structureel door 
het publiek worden gewantrouwd. 
 
Kritisch engagement 
Het beschermen van de individuele menselijke waardigheid in een liberale 
rechtsstaat en het idee van de democratische en maakbare samenleving door 
middel van wetenschap en technologie zijn twee aspecten van de Verlichting. 
De formele- of instrumentele rede maakten een structureel kritische houding 
mogelijk met betrekking tot de maatschappelijke instituties en de cultuur van 
het ancien régime. De kritische houding heeft zich echter uitgebreid naar de 
moderne cultuur die door de genoemde Verlichtingsidealen zelf is 
veroorzaakt. De pretenties van de liberale rechtsstaat, vrije markt kapitalisme 
en de representatieve democratie, die een stempel op het recht en haar 
instituties drukken, worden aan kritisch onderzoek onderworpen. De 
Verlichting kan zich dus kritisch tot zichzelf verhouden en dit leidt tot een 
cultuur waarin een open, kritische en innovatieve houding, en de durf om tot 
grotere rechtvaardigheid te komen een belangrijke waarde 
vertegenwoordigen. Hoofdstuk 5 is gewijd aan dit aspect van de moderne 
cultuur. 
De moderne technologische cultuur laat zich fundamenteel bekritiseren 
omdat het geen recht doet aan moraliteit, aan menselijke waardigheid en 
omdat het weinig ruimte laat voor gemeenschapszin. De social engineer 
neemt de bestaande preferenties en belangen van de individu als gegeven en 
probeert deze of te manipuleren of te faciliteren, afhankelijk van zijn 
professionele rol op dat moment. Of deze preferenties en belangen immoreel 
of asociaal zijn doet niet ter zake; het is niet democratisch om bepaalde 
preferenties en belangen als waardiger te beschouwen dan andere. Bovendien 
moeten de te realiseren doelen in zo concreet mogelijke termen moeten 
worden geformuleerd en dit leidt tot een massale “reductie” van kwalitatieve 
aspecten tot materiële, kwantitatieve begrippen. Er is een goede kans dat de 
doelen in termen van geld en/of macht worden geformuleerd en dit doet 
uiteindelijk weinig recht aan de rijke normatieve en betekenisvolle sociale 
werkelijkheid. 
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De kennis die we hebben van menselijk handelen en menselijke 
samenlevingen geeft ons macht over die mensen en die samenlevingen. Als 
we deze kennis gaan gebruiken om menselijk handelen en de samenleving 
naar onze hand te zetten, en dus een technologische houding innemen ten 
opzichte van mens en maatschappij, dan betekent dit heel concreet de 
manipulatie van mensen. We spreken deze individuen niet aan op het niveau 
van de rede of als verantwoordelijk gemeenschaps-wezen, maar manipuleren 
zijn behoeften, belangen en preferenties. Zo zijn ook productiequota een 
manier om het handelen van rechters te beïnvloeden en is marktwerking een 
manier om advocaten en notarissen te laten doen wat de vragers op de markt 
willen. We noemen dit niet voor niets de disciplinerende werking van de 
markt. Al is deze manipulatie democratisch gelegitimeerd, het blijft 
manipulatie waar we ons kritisch toe kunnen verhouden. 
De (analytische of formele) rede biedt hier een antwoord op door te stellen 
dat juist de bescherming van het individu tegen deze machtsuitoefening de 
formele rechtsstaat nodig maakt. Het recht biedt een mogelijkheid om het 
machtsuitoefening over individuen te toetsen aan heldere en duidelijke, vooraf 
gestelde regels. Een voorwaarde is echter dat deze regels universele gelding 
hebben en niet in instrumentele termen worden geïnterpreteerd. Een 
instrumentele duiding van deze regels zou de bescherming die ze bieden te 
veel relatief maken aan de toevallige omstandigheden van het geval. Dit zou 
leiden tot grote onzekerheid met betrekking tot de rechten en plichten die in 
de regels zijn vastgelegd. 
Maar ook naar het project van de formele rechtsstaat kan kritisch worden 
gekeken. De formele rechtsstaat wordt mogelijk door de maatschappij van 
vreemdelingen en laat zich rechtvaardigen als een geheel van praktijken om 
de waardigheid van de vrije individu te beschermen. Dit roept het beeld op 
van een “abstracte maatschappij” waarin het enige dat de individuen bindt de 
formele rede is. De mens is echter een op waarden georiënteerd wezen en 
zoekt een gemeenschap waarin hij werkelijk substantiële waarden deelt. Maar 
formalisme en technologische reductionisme vernietigen de gedeelde waarden 
en de betekeniswereld waaruit een werkelijke gemeenschap bestaat. De 
burger zal zich als gemeenschapswezen niet alleen vervreemd voelen van het 
“lege” of formele recht. Hij zal zich ook vervreemd voelen van haar 
representanten, de formalistische juridische experts, die geen enkele 
inhoudelijke waarde lijken voor te staan waar de burgers zich mee kunnen 
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identificeren. Een dergelijke formele gemeenschap is geen werkelijke 
gemeenschap en het “legaal-rationele gezag” van haar autoriteiten is geen 
werkelijk gezag. 
De onvrede met de huidige sociale en politieke werkelijkheid – de onvrede 
met de liberale rechtsstaat, het vrije markt kapitalisme en het reductionistische 
materialisme dat haar kenmerkt – kan, aan de ene kant, leiden tot een 
verlangen naar een terugkeer naar de traditionele waarden. Dit leidt tot 
vormen van (neo-) conservatisme waarin een terugkeer naar de cultuur van 
gemeenschapszin, opoffering, eer en deugd wordt bepleit. De conservatief 
streeft naar een traditionele waardegemeenschap die mede door het recht 
wordt mogelijk gemaakt. De onvrede en vervreemding kan echter ook leiden 
tot een poging door middel van een radicalisering van de kritiek de huidige 
cultuur te doorbreken. Dit leidt tot een radicalisering van het geloof in een 
betere samenleving als iets dat nog in de toekomst ligt en waarvoor we 
(voortdurend) de bestaande politieke en sociale verhoudingen moeten 
overwinnen: modernisme. In hoofdstuk vijf onderzoek ik de professionele 
houding die hierbij aansluit. 
Je kunt verschillende graden van engagement onderscheiden voor een 
dergelijk project. Een eerste stap is dat de huidige sociaal-politieke orde wordt 
gezien als het toevallige product van een toevallige geschiedenis. Er is, met 
andere woorden, niets noodzakelijk aan de huidige institutionele orde en er 
zijn veel meer mogelijkheden niet gerealiseerd dan we misschien geneigd zijn 
te denken. Dit vereist een historisch bewustzijn (en dat is een zwakke kant 
van de analytische en de instrumentele rede) maar we kunnen desondanks tot 
de conclusie komen dat het niet wenselijk is om de huidige institutionele orde 
grondig te hervormen en te proberen onze cultuur te veranderen. We kunnen 
dan spreken van een “ironische” of “pragmatische houding”: de huidige orde 
is niet noodzakelijk en laat wellicht veel te wensen over, maar we moeten het 
er mee doen. Vooral vanuit een harmoniemodel van sociale interactie kun je 
heel goed tot deze conclusie komen. 
Als we echter de huidige verhoudingen zien als een toevallige uitkomst 
van een voortdurende machtsstrijd tussen allerlei groepen en belangen in de 
gemeenschap, en dus een conflictmodel hanteren, wordt het moeilijker een 
dergelijke houding vol te houden. Als we de toevallige uitkomst van deze 
strijd als onrechtvaardig en als het product van dwang ervaren, dan kan dit 
een sterke motivatie opleveren om je te engageren voor een rechtvaardiger 
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orde. Een dergelijk engagement laat zich dan als “reformistisch” kenmerken. 
De hervorming van de sociaal-politieke orde, en het recht dat deze orde 
bestendigt en legitimeert, begint met het bekritiseren van de verschillende 
legitimaties van die orde en haar instituties. Alle betrokkenen moeten worden 
overtuigd van het feit dat deze orde zich niet laat rechtvaardigen en dat ze 
onze loyaliteit niet verdient. Als iedereen daarvan overtuigd is, staat men 
misschien open voor alternatieve ordeningen.  
Het kan in dit kader nodig zijn om de huidige institutionele orde en de 
ideologie die haar legitimeert te “ontmaskeren.” Dit betekent dat de ideologie 
niet als waarde op zich wordt beschouwd maar wordt gezien als een manier 
om achterliggende belangen van specifieke groepen en/of individuen te 
verhullen en te beschermen. Een dergelijke ontmaskering is een beproefde 
methode tot “de-legitimering” van instituties en ideologieën. In een moderne, 
“modernistische” cultuur is een dergelijke ontmaskering een veelgebruikt 
wapen waarmee ruimte kan worden gecreëerd voor innovatie, creativiteit en 
voor hervormingen. De modernistische houding kan zelfs worden omschreven 
als een “cult van de innovatie.” In een dergelijke cultuur wordt innovatie bijna 
een doel op zich. 
De revolutionair is het meest radicaal geëngageerd. De revolutionair is zijn 
geloof in de bestaande politieke, sociale en juridische orde volledig verloren 
en wil door actief handelen een plotselinge en massale bewustwording 
forceren om een bewustzijnsverandering mogelijk te maken. De revolutionair 
probeert in de moderne gemeenschap een “crisis” te veroorzaken die lijdt tot 
een algehele “symbolische revolutie”: een diepe transformatie van het 
bewustzijn van de leden van de gemeenschap. De fascinatie voor het 
fenomeen van de revolutie in de moderne tijd laat zich verklaren door een 
diepgeworteld verlangen naar het plotseling doorbreken van alle bestaande 
verhoudingen, betekenissen en waarden met als doel ruimte te creëren voor 
iets nieuws. De cult van de innovatie wordt gevoed door een modernistisch 
verlangen naar iets nieuws, iets spannends dat achter de horizon op ons wacht. 
Ongetwijfeld zijn er activistische juristen die dit verlangen ten diepste 
delen. De meeste zullen echter niet zover gaan omdat ze de risico’s die ermee 
gepaard gaan veel te groot vinden. Sterker nog, veel juristen zullen het 
revolutionaire (zowel symbolische als zelfs lichamelijke) geweld niet kunnen 
rechtvaardigen. De rechtvaardiging ligt meestal in een onvoorspelbare 
toekomst en we nog maar moeten afwachten of het werkelijk blijvend onze 
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politieke en sociale orde ten goede komt. De ervaring met revoluties in de 
geschiedenis stemt ook niet optimistisch. 
 
We blijven achter op een juridisch knooppunt waarin vier waardeoriëntaties, 
die elk op zich ambivalent zijn, met elkaar op gespannen voet staan. De 
moderne juridische professional kan geen van deze oriëntaties absoluut 
nemen in de voortdurend keuzes die hij moet maken in specifieke juridisch 
conflicten. De hoop is dat de manier waarop in deze studie de knoop is 
ontward zicht geeft op de spanningen die de moderne jurist in zijn dagelijkse 
praktijk ervaart en dat de jurist op het juiste moment tot de juiste keuzes 
komt. Dat blijft de belofte van de moderne professional. 
 
Arie-Jan Kwak, augustus 2005 
